Judgment :- 1. This is a petition praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing Ext. P2 notification produced along with the petition. 2. The petitioner is the owner of 81 cents of garden land in Sy. No. 166/9 in Varapuzha Village. The first respondent is the Personal Assistant to the District Collector on whom the powers of a District Collector in relation to the compulsory acquisition of land under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) have been admittedly conferred. The second respondent is the Eloor Panchayat and the third respondent is its President. Ext. P2 notification under S.3 of the Act is dated 27th December, 1973. It was published in the Kerala Gazette dated 29th January, 1974. In the notification it is inter alia stated thus: "The District Collector, Ernakulam in proceedings No. Clause.24001/73 dated 6-12-1973 having directed under sub-section (4) of S.19 of the Act, that in view of the urgency of the case the provisions of S.5 of the Act, shall not apply, notice to that effect is hereby given to all whom it may concern." The declaration under S.6 of the Act was also dated 27-12-73. The notice under S.9 however was issued only on 22- 8-74. 3. The contentions raised by the petitioner in this petition were two. (1) There has been no application of the mind to the question of urgency and therefore the dispensation with the enquiry under S.5 of the Act was unwarranted. (2) The provisions of the Act particularly the emergency provisions thereof had been applied by the first respondent solely at the instance of the second and third respondents who were out to spite the petitioner because they were peeved by the petitioner's refusal to accede, to the request of the Panchayat to sell the land to the Panchayat. These grounds and the averments in support of those, grounds have been denied in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 2 and 3. The first respondent has not filed any affidavit. It is alleged in the petition that the first respondent merely acted at the behest of respondents 2 and 3 without applying his mind to the question whether the particular land was required for a public purpose and did not at all apply his mind to the question whether the emergency provisions should be applied. 4. It is alleged in the petition that the first respondent merely acted at the behest of respondents 2 and 3 without applying his mind to the question whether the particular land was required for a public purpose and did not at all apply his mind to the question whether the emergency provisions should be applied. 4. The case has been referred to a Division Bench by George Vadakkel J. by an order which reads as follows: "From Ext. P2 it is seen that by proceedings dated 6121973, the District Collector under S.19 (4) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1971, directed that S.5 of the said Act shall not apply to the acquisition proceedings. Ext. P2 is the notification in accordance with S.3 (1) of the Act and is dated 27121973. The notification under S.3 (1) was published in the Kerala Gazette dated 29 11974. It is so stated in Ext. P3 which is a notice under S.3 read with R.3 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rules, 1963. The main point raised in this O.P. is that on these facts this is a case covered by the decision of Govindan Nair J. (as he then was) in Seshagiri Mailer v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition (1964 KLT 54), Learned Government Counsel points out that the abovesaid decision has been referred to and dissented from by Gopalan Nambiyar J. in Raman v. District Collector, Ernakulam (1967 KLT 552). In view of this conflict, I think that an authoritative decision' on the point by a larger Bench is called for. Place papers before the learned Chief Justice for appropriate directions." 5. Before we refer to the decisions it will be useful to refer briefly to the procedure contemplated by the Act. After the notification is published under S.3 which is commonly referred to as a preliminary notification an enquiry under S.5 of the Act will have to be held and the report of the District Collector will have to be sent either to the Government or to the Board of Revenue. When the Government or the Board of Revenue are or is satisfied after considering the report made by the Collector under sub-section (2) of S.5 that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, a declaration shall be made to that effect either by the Government or the Board of Revenue. When the Government or the Board of Revenue are or is satisfied after considering the report made by the Collector under sub-section (2) of S.5 that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, a declaration shall be made to that effect either by the Government or the Board of Revenue. Thereafter the Collector will take order for acquisition of the land and the land will be marked out and measured. Thereafter a public notice shall be given by the Collector stating that the Government will take possession of the land and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him. This has to be followed by an enquiry by the Collector and the passing of an award by him. When the Collector has made an award either under S.11 or on agreement under S.16 he is empowered to take possession of the land. It is thus clear that possession can normally be taken only after an award had been passed. However, special provision has been made under S.19 of the Act for taking possession even before an award had been passed. It is necessary to extract S.19(1) and 19(4). "19. Special powers in cases where land is needed urgently. (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the Government or the District Collector, for reasons to be recorded in writing, so direct or directs, the Collector may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) of S.9, take possession of any land needed for a public purpose though no award has been made. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances: Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least three days' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience. (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the Government or the District Collector the provisions of sub-section (1) are applicable, the Government or the District Collector, as the case may be, may direct that the provisions of S.5 shall not apply, and, if they or he so direct or directs a declaration may be made under S.6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of S.Y. 6. It is settled law that in view of the wording of sub-s. (4) of S.19 what is required is the subjective satisfaction of the Government or the District Collector for the words used are "in the opinion of the Government or the District Collector". The satisfaction being a subjective one the scope of enquiry regarding that satisfaction in proceedings before the court under Art.226 of the Constitution is very very limited. Nevertheless it is equally well established that if there has been no application of the mind to the question of urgency which alone will justify the direction that the provisions of S.5 of the Act will not apply a court will be entitled to set aside the procedure adopted of doing away with the enquiry under S.5. We may add here that the right conferred by S.5 is a very valuable right. In given cases a person may be able to establish that the particular land is unsuited for the public purpose or that other land is more suitable for the purpose, or even that acquiring the particular land would cause undue hardship and prejudice to the owner and that without detriment to public interest other land may be acquired. If the owner of the land sought to be acquired can establish that there has been no application of the mind to the question whether there is an urgency which would justify giving up the enquiry under S.5 of the Act he can approach this court for redress of his grievances. Dealing with S.17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (corresponding to S.19 (4) of the Act) the Supreme Court in Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. The Stale of Uttar Pradesh and others AIR. Dealing with S.17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (corresponding to S.19 (4) of the Act) the Supreme Court in Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. The Stale of Uttar Pradesh and others AIR. 1967 S. C. 1081 observed that the opinion of the State Government under S.17 (4) can be challenged as ultra vires in accordance with law, if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to that matter and that action is malafide. There is a much more elaborate discussion of the matter in the decision of the Mysore High Court in Thirumalaiah v. State of Mysore and another AIR. 1963 Mysore 255. We shall read from the head-note of the decision which correctly summarises the judgment. "Sub-section (1) of S.17 becomes applicable only if by the application of its own mind the Government comes to the conclusion that the case is an urgent case and that the land proposed to be acquired is a waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Power which may be exercised under sub-section (4) of S.17 should be exercised in exceptional cases where it would be reasonable for the Government to dispense with the hearing enjoined by S.5-A. Such would be cases where some great prejudice or inconvenience would be caused by adherence to the requirements of S.5-A compliance with which might defeat the very purpose of the acquisition which has become emergent. It would not be right to invoke the provisions of S.17 (4) in all cases in which an acquisition is proposed to be made without the Government considering the question whether the case is a fit one for the exercise of the power conferred by that sub-section. If power under S.17 (4) has been exercised without there being any real urgency, the notification issued under that subsection dispensing with the requirements of S.5-A would be open to the criticism that it was made without the authority of law. It cannot be said in all cases in which the Public Works Department suggests the acquisition of property for the construction of a tank, the case must necessarily be regarded as a case of urgency. It cannot be said in all cases in which the Public Works Department suggests the acquisition of property for the construction of a tank, the case must necessarily be regarded as a case of urgency. Unless the construction of the tank has to be made immediately without loss of time so that some emergent situation which has arisen demands its construction without compliance with the requirements of S.5-A the case cannot be considered to be one of urgency. It would be in each case for the Government to consider whether notwithstanding the fact that the land is needed for the construction of a tank adherence to the requirements of S.SA would occupy such a long time as to be productive of such great harm or prejudice as would defeat the very purpose of the acquisition." 7. The same view has been taken by the Punjab High Court in Murari Lal Gupta v. State of Punjab and another AIR. 1964 Punjab 477. It has been observed in Para.7 of the judgment that "a direction dispensing with adherence to the provisions of S.SA can be issued only in exceptional cases in which the matter is so urgent that the time that is likely to be spent over the hearing directed by S.SA would produce such great harm or public mischief that a direction dispensing with that hearing is imperative So far as the existence of public purpose is concerned, the declaration made under S.6 is conclusive. The same, however, cannot be said about the urgent importance which alone can justify the acquisition of land under S.W." 8. A Division Bench of this Court in Mammu alias Kunhammad Keyi v. Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Tellicherry 1965 KLT 1021 applied the above principles. We shall extract the head-note to the decision which summarises correctly its contents. "In the present case the notification under S.3 is dated 20 51963. The direction under sub-section (4) of S.19 was made on 23- 61963. The notice under S.9, however, was published in the Kerala Gazette as required by sub-section (5) of that section only on 211 1964. The dates are significant and belie the story of any extreme urgency as the foundation for the action under sub-section (4) of S.19. The direction under sub-section (4) of S.19 was made on 23- 61963. The notice under S.9, however, was published in the Kerala Gazette as required by sub-section (5) of that section only on 211 1964. The dates are significant and belie the story of any extreme urgency as the foundation for the action under sub-section (4) of S.19. An order is vitiated by mala fides if it is passed by an authority without applying its mind at all, even though there is no evidence of any personal ill-will, corrupt motive, or other improper purpose. Such is the direction impugned in this case; and the same and all the other proceedings subsequent thereto cannot but be quashed". 9. Gopalan Nambiyar J. referred to the above decision in Raman v. District Collector, Ernakulam and others 1967 KLT 552 and distinguished the decision by stating the following reasons in 1967 KLT 552. "In the present case, the dates stand thus: The S.3 notification was dated 26101965 and published on 14-121965; the urgency provisions were invoked by the Collector on 811966; the petitioner filed his objections on 12 1-1966; he was intimated of the Collector's action on 20-1 1966. The Governmental delay between the issue and the publication of the notification under S.3 has been explained in Para.5 of the counter-affidavit of the 3rd respondent. After the publication of the notification, action has been prompt. The notice under S.9 could not be issued in view of the order of interim stay issued by this Court The declaration under S.6 was published in the gazette dated 17 5 1966 (see Para.8 of the counter-affidavit of the 3rd respondent)". 10. The decision in Seshagiri Mailer v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition 1964 KLT 54 which was relied on by the petitioner in Raman v. District Collector, Ernakulam and others 1967 KLT 552 was found unacceptable to the learned judge on the ground that he could not agree with the proposition that a delay of more than thirty days in proceeding with the land acquisition must necessarily spell a negation of urgency for the acquisition. 11. The Gujarat High Court in the decision in Shri Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi v. The State of Gujarat and another 1967 ILR. Gujarat 620 also dissented from the view that was taken in Seshagiri Mailer v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition 1964 KLT 54. 11. The Gujarat High Court in the decision in Shri Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi v. The State of Gujarat and another 1967 ILR. Gujarat 620 also dissented from the view that was taken in Seshagiri Mailer v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition 1964 KLT 54. It has to be observed that there has been an overstatement of the case in Seshagiri Mailer v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition 1964 KLT 54. What was meant of course was that there must be an urgency which cannot brook the delay of an enquiry under S.S. This enquiry, of course, as was pointed out by the Gujarat High Court in Shri Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi v. The State of Gujarat and another 1967 ILR. Gujarat 620 will take in not only the period within which the objection should be tiled after the notification under S.3 is published but also the period that could reasonably be taken for conducting an enquiry. It is clear from the provisions in S.19(4) of the Act that the special direction contemplated by that section is that the provisions of S.5 shall not apply. This of course can be taken only in cases of urgency as visualised by sub-s. (1) of S.19. But the object of sub-s (4) of S.19 is to dispense with the enquiry under S.5 enabling a declaration being made under S.6 and possession being taken of the land after the expiry of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-s. (1)of S.9, even in cases where no a ward had been passed by the Collector. Dispensing with the enquiry and expediting the declaration under S.6 of the Act are intrinsically linked with the urgent need to take possession. We would like to add in this connection that in cases of urgency steps must be taken to have the notification under S.3 published as early as possible in the Gazette as required by S.3 of the Act. It is notorious that there is often considerable delay in getting a notification under S.3 of the Act published in the Gazette. If it is found necessary to direct dispensation with S.5 depriving a citizen of his right to object to his land being compulsorily acquired it is only fair and just that there should be a speeding up of the procedure under the Act. If it is found necessary to direct dispensation with S.5 depriving a citizen of his right to object to his land being compulsorily acquired it is only fair and just that there should be a speeding up of the procedure under the Act. Possession can be taken only after a notification under S.3 and after public notice under S.9 and 19 (1) of the Act and unlike under the Central Act 1894 the Collector is obliged under the Act to state his reasons in writing before taking possession under the special provisions in S.19 of the Act. If no urgent steps will be taken under the Act and if the authorities can act leisurely there can be no justification for dispensing with the enquiry under S.S. In any view this is an aspect to which the mind has to be applied before enquiry is dispensed with. As was said earlier the urgency must be such that it is not possible to allow the time that may be reasonably required for an enquiry under S.S. If such time that may be required for the enquiry is available before the date on which possession has to be taken or can be taken it cannot be said that there is an urgency which calls for dispensation with the enquiry under S.S. This aspect has to be seriously borne in mind. These two aspects of urgency and dispensation cannot be treated separately as if there is no link between the two. This has been clarified by the judgment in Mammu alias Kunhammad Keyi v. Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Tellicherry 1965 KLT 1021. 12. We are of the view that in this case also the procedure adopted clearly belies the story of an extreme urgency as the foundation for the action under S.19 (4). It may be stated again that the notification was dated 27-12-73. The direction under sub-section (4) of S.19 was on 6-12-73 as is seen from Ext. P2. Ext. P2 was published in the Gazette on 29-1-74. The declaration was also on the same day. Nevertheless the notice under S.9 was only on 22-8-74. The notice of the petitioner as required by S.3 of the Act and R.3 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rules was only at the end of February 1974. This court was approached on the 20th March, 1974. The declaration was also on the same day. Nevertheless the notice under S.9 was only on 22-8-74. The notice of the petitioner as required by S.3 of the Act and R.3 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rules was only at the end of February 1974. This court was approached on the 20th March, 1974. It can thus be seen that the authorities showed no urgency for taking possession and no material has been placed before us from which a possible view could have been taken that there was such an urgency that could possibly justify action being taken under S.19 of the Act. 13. In the light of the above, we set aside Ext. P2 notification and all proceedings that followed that notification and allow this writ application. Allowed.