J. M. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE most important and interesting question that arises in the present appeal is whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and hear the present suit in view of the provisions of the Act. ( 2 ) MR. Oza submitted that the authority contemplated under the Act has no jurisdiction to decide such a question regarding the title claimed by a third party over the suit property. Such a suit filed by a third party for declaration of his title to the suit property is not barred by the previsions of the Act. Mr. Oza contended that the legislature did not leave such a question to the authority under the Act for its decision. In support of his submission Mr. Oza has laid considerable emphasis on two decisions of the Bombay High Court - (1) Shri Adinath Tirthankar Jain Mandir v. Shri Shantappa Dada Madnaik 67 Bombay Law Reporter 49 and (2) Keki Pestonji Jamadar v. Rodabai Khodadad Merwan Irani 74 Bombay Law Reporter 198. ( 3 ) AS against these decisions Mr. A. H. Thaker Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the Charity Commissioner (Respondent No. 3) has relied upon several reported and unreported decisions of this Court and on the basis of those decisions and the relevant provisions of the Act submitted that the trial Court has reached its conclusion correctly on this issue. ( 4 ) THE first reported decision of this Court is the case of Kuberbhai Shivdas v. Mahant Purshottamdas Kalyandas 2 Gujarat Law Reporter 564 J. M. Shelat J. (as he then was) has considered the entire scheme of the Act and observed at page 567:"the inquiry held by the Deputy or the Charity Commissioner under Section 19 is by no means an administrative or an executive inquiry". It is further observed:. ". . It is also clear that the inquiry is not only for the purpose of registration for such an inquiry would involve adjudication of questions such as whether a trust exists if so whether such a trust is a public trust whether the applicant is a trustee the mode of succession to that post and what is still more far reaching in importance whether a particular property belongs to such a public trust. The entries to be made by the Assistant Charity Commissioner are as I have said to be made on the basis of the findings arrived at by him in an inquiry held under Section 19 Though these findings and entries are made conclusive under Section 21 (2) the legislature has provided remedies where it is subsequently found that a change in such entries is necessary. Section 22 provides for such a change in the entries. Mr. Vakil however contended that the plaintiffs would have no right under Section 22 to apply for a change in the entries on the ground of fraud or dishonesty of the 1st defendant. That no doubt is true because Section 22 confines itself to a change which has occurred after an entry is made under Section 21. It appears however that realising that there was a lacuna in the Act the legislature amended the Act by Bombay Act No. LIX of 1954 and by Section 2 of that Amendment Act inserted Section 22-A in the Act. The new Section provides that if at any time after the entries are made in the register under Section 21 or 22 it appears to the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner that any particular relating to any public trust which was not the subject-matter of the inquiry under Section 19 or sub-section (3) of Section 22 as the case may be has remained to be inquired into he may make further inquiry in the prescribed manner record his findings and make entries in the register in accordance with the decision arrived at and the provisions of Sections 19 20 21 and 22 would apply to such inquiry with regard to the recording of the findings and the making of the entries in the Register. But it was argued by Mr. Vakil that the expression any particular relating to any public trust which was not the subject-matter of the inquiry under Section 19 or Section 22 (3) would not mean the subject-matter of the previous inquiry which has already been inquired into and there-fore the plaintiffs would have no right even under Section 22-A to approach the Assistant Charity Commissioner and point out to him that the entries made by him were the result of fraud played upon him by the 1st defendant. That contention in my view cannot be accepted. That contention in my view cannot be accepted. Though retaining the final and conclusive character of the findings and entries made under Sections 20 and 21 Sections 22 and 22-A make provision for changes to be made where such changes appeal to be necessary either as a result of a change having occurred subsequent to the date of the entries or as a result of some particular having been left out from consideration in the previous inquiry. It was pointed out by Mr. Vakil that Section 22-A would not apply to a case like the present one because the word particular in Section 22-A would have the same meaning as the word particulars in Section 18 (5) and those particulars having been already ascertained in the previous inquiry under Sections 19 and 20 they would not be allowed to be reagitated under Section 22-A. Though the construction suggested by Mr. Vakil is somewhat ingenious it is a construction too narrow and too artificial to be adopted and it is furthermore not consistent with the object of the Act. As stated in the preamble that object is to regulate and make better provision for the administration of the public trusts which would include having decisions relating to public trusts in an expeditions manner through the machinery provided by the Act without having recourse to protracted litigations. It is also clear that in view of the wider definition of a public and charitable trust in the Act the object of the legislature was to have once for all registration of trusts wherein all the necessary particulars regarding such trusts including the properties belonging to them would be included so as to restrict if not to prevent altogether scope for further litigation. It is there-fore that the legislature thought fit to give finality and conclusiveness to the findings arrived at in an inquiry under Section 19 and entries made under Section 21. The word particular mentioned in Section 22-A would mean any information or detail as to a trust which has not been considered in a previous inquiry under Section 19. It is there-fore that the legislature thought fit to give finality and conclusiveness to the findings arrived at in an inquiry under Section 19 and entries made under Section 21. The word particular mentioned in Section 22-A would mean any information or detail as to a trust which has not been considered in a previous inquiry under Section 19. Indeed it could not be the intention of the legislature to lay down that even though information is furnished to the Assistant or the Deputy Charity Commissioner which was not before him at an earlier inquiry or which was suppressed by a trustee for example for the purpose of avoiding a property to be declared to be property belonging to a public trust it should not and cannot be inquired into. It is further observed: it may be observed that there is nothing in Section 22-A to show that a party other than a trustee cannot approach the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner and lay before him some particular suppressed from him in an inquiry under Section 19 by a trustee. Section 19 itself contemplates an application under Section 18 by any person having interest in a public trust not necessarily a trustee only. If such an application is entertained under Section 19 for the purpose of an inquiry thereunder there can be no reason why an application under Section 22-A by a third party cannot be made and an inquiry made therefrom as contemplated by that Section. The plaintiffs thus could have taken out a proceeding by making an application under Section 22-A which provides a specific remedy for a change in the entries and could have satisfied the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner. . . . . . These undoubtedly would be the particulars relating to a public trust which were not the subject-matter of the previous inquiry under Section 19 and which could under Section 22-A have been gone into by the Assistant Charity Commissioner at the instance of the plaintiffs". It is further observed:"as I have said the Act divides the particulars to be ascertained under Section 19 into two categories and these two categories are dealt with by the Act in two ways. It is further observed:"as I have said the Act divides the particulars to be ascertained under Section 19 into two categories and these two categories are dealt with by the Act in two ways. Section 79 lays down that any question whether or not a trust exists and whether such trust is a pubic trust or a particular property is the property of such trust shall be decided by the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal as provided by the Act. Under sub-section (2) the decision of any one of these officers is made final and conclusive unless it is set aside by the decision of the Court on an application made to it or of the High Court in appeal provisions of Section 79 show thus that a finding in an entry made under Sections 19 20 and 21 constitute not merely an administrative order for the purpose of registration only or an order as between the Charity Commissioner and the trustee only as suggested by Mr. Vakil but that such a finding and an entry made on the basis thereof are as regards the trust the properties belonging to it and the mode of succession to the office of the trustees". At page 570 it is further observed :". . . THE Act having provided a new and wider definition of a public and a charitable trust it must have been thought necessary to avoid such a contingency and therefore Section 79 (1) had to be enacted. It is pertinent to observe that Section 79 occurs in the Chapter which provides miscellaneous provisions. It is to a decision on the question whether or not a trust exist and whether such a trust is a public trust or a particular property is the property of such trust specifically mentioned in Section 79 (1) that finality has been conferred by subject to the decision of the District Court on an application made to it or the High Court in appeal. It would also appear that Section 79 had to be inserted to make clear what Section 80 provides. It would also appear that Section 79 had to be inserted to make clear what Section 80 provides. Section 79 therefore expressly provides that the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner shall have power to decide matters set out therein and having conferred that power on those officers the legislature by Section 80 debars the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to decide or dial with any question in respect of which the decision or the order of such officer has been made final and conclusive under Section 79 (2 ). That was necessary because under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in spite of Sections 19 20 and 79 a civil court would still have jurisdiction to entertain matters involving such questions. That jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been now taken away by the provisions of Section 80 of the Act. At page 571 it is further observed: "section 79 shows that an application can be made to the District Court by any person and not merely by a trustee who is aggrieved by the decision of the Charity Commissioner under Section 70 or 70-A of the Act. Section 70 provides an appeal to the Charity Commissioner against an order passed under Sections 22 and 22-A amongst other Sections. Therefore any person not merely a trustee can apply under Section 22-A for a change in the entry on a matter or a particular left out from consideration in a previous inquiry under Section 19 Therefore there is a complete code provided in the Act for dealing with matters set out in Sections 18 and 19 and recourse must be had to the procedure laid down in the Act. This is made clear by the provisions of Sections 80 which bar the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in the two categories of matters viz. (1) those questions left under the Act to be decided by the Assistant or the Deputy Charity Commissioner under Sections 18 and 19 and (2) those which the Act has made final and conclusive under Section 79 (1) and Section 21 (2 ). The plaintiffs having had recourse to Section 70 and not having followed up their remedy under Section 72 are bound by the decision of the Charity Commissioner in their appeal before him". The plaintiffs having had recourse to Section 70 and not having followed up their remedy under Section 72 are bound by the decision of the Charity Commissioner in their appeal before him". It is true that in that case the plaintiffs who were parties to the application filed before the Deputy Charity Commissioner had filed a suit for declaration that particular properties belonged to the public trust. ( 5 ) IN Ishwarlal Nanalal v. Ghanchi Chimanlal R. Indian Law Reports 1963 (Volume 4) Gujarat 767 late Mr. justice Mody had to consider a case of a third party. The issue that arose for determination in that case was whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the issue where the suit immoveable property which included as one of the immoveable properties belonging to the public trust is a property of the ownership of the plaintiff ? After referring to Sections 79 and 80 of the Act at page 772 the relevant observations made are:"what Mr. Parikh however contended was that the case of third party such as his clients whose property was wrongly included in a public trust was not a question whether the particular property is the property of such trust. In his submission the rights of third parties could not have been affected in this manner by these Sections nor could the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts have been barred in an Act which primarily pertains to public trusts I have got to look at the language of the Sections to see whether the rights even regarding the properties of third parties have been affected by these Sections. As I have pointed out on a plain reading all questions regarding any property being the property of a public trust are included in Section 79 (1 ). That it was intended to make this sub-section embrace all questions regarding properties which may be connected with the public trusts is indictaed by the fact that the legislature has also included all questions whether or not a trust exists or such trust was a public trust to be decided solely by these authorities. That it was intended to make this sub-section embrace all questions regarding properties which may be connected with the public trusts is indictaed by the fact that the legislature has also included all questions whether or not a trust exists or such trust was a public trust to be decided solely by these authorities. In my view whether the contention is raised by a third party or any party connected with a trust regarding any property being or not being the property of trust such question is intended by Section 79 (1) to be determined by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or Charity Commissioner in appeal. After referring to the observations made by Shelat J. in Kuberbhai Shivdas Case (supra) at pages 774 and 775 the observations made are: ". . . . Sections 18 19 and 20 concern themselves with the registration of public trusts. Section 18 (1) casts a duty on any trustee of a public trust to which the Act applies to make an application for the registration of the public trust and the other sub-sections go on to provide as to whom this application should be made and what it should contain. One of the necessary contents of the applications are in regard to the list of moveable and immoveable trust properties with such description and particulars as may be sufficient for the identification thereof as also the appropriate value of these properties. Section 19 provides for the inquiry to be held by the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner on receipt of an application or suo motu for the registration of a trust under Section 18. The inquiry which the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has to make is in regard to whether a trust exists or whether such trust is a public trust as also certain other matters mentioned in this Section. Section 20 provides that on the completion of the inquiry provided under section 19 the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner should record his findings with the reasons therefore as to the matters mentioned in the said Section and for making of an order for the payment of a registration fee. These Sections clearly indicate an inquiry of a judicial nature to be held by officers of the position of Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner in regard to whether any property is a property of such trust. These Sections clearly indicate an inquiry of a judicial nature to be held by officers of the position of Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner in regard to whether any property is a property of such trust. The expression whether any property is a property of such trust is repeated in Section 79 (1) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act under which as is pointed out above the decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal is made final and conclusive. The scheme of the Act therefore clearly indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to provide a complete machinery in regard to public trusts and as pointed out by my learned brother Shelat J. it provides for the registration of public trusts wherein all necessary particulars regarding such trusts including the properties belonging to the trust will be included. Mody J. has also considered the argument advanced by Mr. Parikh that the legislature intended to affect such third parties whose properties would be involved very often without knowledge of the proceedings for registration and leave such parties high and dry on the rocks. According to him (Mr. Parikh) it could not be that such parties could be left without a remedy for no fault on their part particularly in those cases where there was a genuine lack of knowledge of any proceedings for registration. After referring to the provisions of Section 70-A of the Act he agreed with Mr. Parikh that it was not an effective remedy provided to such a party like the plaintiff. But according to him Section 22-A of the Act provided an effective remedy to such a plaintiff. In this behalf after referring to the observations made by Shelat J. in Kuberbhais case at page 781 he has observed:". . Shelat J. held that the word particular mentioned in Section 22-A would mean any information or detail as to a trust which had not been considered in a previous inquiry. The question will be: Whether a particular property claimed by a third party can be said to be an information or date relating to a trust inasmuch as it relates to an immoveable property alleged to belong to a trust. The question will be: Whether a particular property claimed by a third party can be said to be an information or date relating to a trust inasmuch as it relates to an immoveable property alleged to belong to a trust. The claim made by a third party in connection therewith would indeed be a particular relating to a public trust inas-much as it is the claim in regard to an immoveable property which is held under an inquiry under Section 19 to be belonging to the public trust. In a case like the present one there can be no doubt that the claim remains to be inquired into in the inquiry under Section 19 nor can it be gainsaid that this claim is not the subject-matter of the inquiry under Section 19. If that be so then the provisions of Section 22-A would be applicable and the third party would have a remedy under this Section. ( 6 ) OUR learned Brother D. A. Desai J. in Ratilal Keshavlal Pathak v. Bai Mani First Appeal No. 67 of 1963 with Second Appeal No. 377 of 1963 decided on 4-7-1969 had an occasion to consider a similar question. The argument advanced before him was that when a question whether a particular property is the property of the public trust arose between a person other than the trustee or beneficiary of a trust and the trustee of the trust the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to decide the question whether the property is the property of the public trust. The contention was that when any property is entered in the public trust register as a property of the trust and no public notice is issued then such a decision may be final or conclusive between the persons interested in the trust but it cannot affect the rights of the outsider or person not a party to that proceeding nor would a decision in such an inquiry be res judicata as against the person not a party to the proceeding. That contention observed Desai J. would raise a wider question about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the question whether any particular property is the property of the public trust or not. For deciding that wider question about the jurisdiction about the Civil Court he considered the scheme of the Act and observed:. . . . That contention observed Desai J. would raise a wider question about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the question whether any particular property is the property of the public trust or not. For deciding that wider question about the jurisdiction about the Civil Court he considered the scheme of the Act and observed:. . . . Thus the Bombay Public Trusts Act confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Deputy Charity Commissioner or Charity Commissioner to decide the question whether any particular property is the property of the public trust. That decision is final and conclusive. The jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of the question which is by or under the Bombay Public Trusts Act required to be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under the Act namely the Assistant Charity Commissioner or Deputy Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner is ousted. The jurisdiction also appears to have been ousted in respect of this question because the decision of the afore-mentioned authorities has been made final and conclusive. It cannot be disputed that the decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner or Deputy Charity Commissioner or Charity Commissioner on the question whether a particular property is the property of the public trust is not only made final but in order to decide that question exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the afore-mentioned three authorities and the decision of the said authorities on the particular question is made final and conclusive subject to an application to the District Court-and appeal to the High Court. It is an inescapable conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the said question is ousted. In view of the aforementioned provisions and in view of the Act providing for appeal and revisional jurisdiction to District Court and the High Court it is difficult to believe that in any given set of circumstances if the question arises whether the property is a property of the public trust the civil court will have jurisdiction to decide that question. But Mr. Patel urged that any question may be concluded for the purpose of the Act between the parties who had notice of the proceedings or who were parties to the proceedings. Mr. But Mr. Patel urged that any question may be concluded for the purpose of the Act between the parties who had notice of the proceedings or who were parties to the proceedings. Mr. Patel urged that it is inconceivable that any decision of any authority will be final and conclusive even as against the person who is not a party to the proceeding. The scheme of the Act shows that a special machinery is set up to decide certain questions including the question whether any particular property is the property of the public trust. The decision of the competent authority on this question is final and conclusive. The finality attaches to the decision as to the decision is made something akin to a judgment in rem. If however no provision was made for a third party to obtain redress in respect of the question which is concluded at his back it would have become necessary to find out whether the decision which is otherwise final or conclusive will have its conclusive character or will have finality even as against a third person. Initially before the amendment in 1960 sub-clause (ii) of Section 50 provided for a decision of the District Court as to whether any property is the property of the public trust. By amendment the words whether the property is the property of the public trust are deleted. But Section 22-A has been introduced by Amending Act 59 of 1954 which provides a machinery for considering or reconsidering any question falling under Section 19 which was not inquired into at the time of initial inquiry under Section 19 and a further inquiry can be made in respect of it. It therefore the third person wants an inquiry to be held to End out whether particular property is the property of the public trust it would be open him to approach the Assistant Charity Commissioner under Section 22-A. Provision contained in Section 22 would strengthen the view that unless resort is taken to de machinery set up by the Act for deciding certain questions the decision of the authorities set up under the Act on the question exclusively set apart for its determination would be final and conclusive against every one irrespective of the Act whether that person was a part to the proceeding when the question was raised and decided. Therefore as stated earlier the Act provides a complete Code for adjudication of the question whether the property is the property of the public trust. In view of the fact that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred upon the authorities set up under the Act to decide whether the property is the property of the trust and that decision is made final and conclusive and further in view of the fact that in respect of such question jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted by the specific provision contained in Section 80 it is difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Patel that where a third party raises a question that the property is not the property of the public trust and the decision made at his back affects him the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to decide that question. In my opinion even in such circumstances the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to decide this question. In supported his conclusion he has relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Taraben Baldevdas v. Charity Commissioner 57 Bombay Law Reporter 1069 and the decision of this Court in Kuberbhais Case (supra ). ( 7 ) OUR learned Brother P. D. Desai J. in Surat Machchi Panch Trust v. Bai Ganga Harilal Civil Revision Application No. 550 of 1969 decided on 16 March 1973 had also an occasion to consider similar question. After referring to the scheme of the Act he observes:". The relevant provisions of the Act set out above clearly indicate that the question whether a particular property is the property of a public trust is a question which under the Act is expressly required to be decided by the authority constituted under the Act and that such decision is final and conclusive and that Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to decide or deal with such question. The finally which attaches to the decision of the authority constituted under the Act is not merely for the purposes of the Act and is not confined in its operation to the parties to the proceedings under the Act. The decision is given under the Act in the course of a judicial proceeding and has the effect of a judgment in interim and the decision would bind all persons whether parties or not". The decision is given under the Act in the course of a judicial proceeding and has the effect of a judgment in interim and the decision would bind all persons whether parties or not". He has further observed:"the learned trial Judge overlooked the provisions of Section 22-A of the Act in coming to the conclusion that a third part who may not have been a party to the proceeding under the Act would have no remedy and that unless be was entitled to take an action in a civil court his rights would be extinguished without there being any remedy left from him. Section 22-A provided for further inquiry by Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner at any time after the entries are made in the register under Section 21 or Section 22 If in the course of such inquiry it appears to the said authorities that any particular relating to any public trust which was not the subjectmatter of the inquiry under Section 19 had remained to be inquired into the said Section further authorises the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner to record his findings and make entries in the register in accordance with the decision arrived at as a result of such inquiry. The word particular mentioned in Section 22-A would mean any information or detail as to a trust which had not been considered in a previous inquiry. The claim made by a third party in connection with a property which is either alleged to belong to a public trust or registered as a property belonging to a public trust would be a particular relating to a public trust which was not the subjectmatter of previous inquiry and it would be certainly open in an inquiry under Section 22-A to the appropriate authority to investigate into such a claim and record necessary finding thereon. A third party would not therefore be left without any remedy and civil court is not necessarily the only forum which could give him the necessary relief. A third party would not therefore be left without any remedy and civil court is not necessarily the only forum which could give him the necessary relief. He has in support of his conclusion relied upon the decision of this Court in Kuberbhais Case (supra) and the decision in Ishwarlal Nanalals Case (supra) ( 8 ) WE may also point out that in Shukla Ramanujacharya Govindacharya v. N. N. Shah 13 Gujarat Law Reporter 493 our learned Brother S. H. Sheth J. has expressed a contrary opinion in regard to the scope and ambit of Section 22-A of the Act. At pages 496 and 497 the relevant observations made are:"the question therefore which I am called upon to consider is whether there is patent lack of jurisdiction in the Deputy Charity Commissioner to entertain the application made by the City Deputy Collector so as to enable me to interfere with the proceedings at an interim stage. The application which has been made in terms states that Inquiry No. 6470 of 1952 was made in the matter of this public trust and its properties and by an order dated 29th May 1953 Survey No. 568 of Vadaj in the City of Ahmedabad was registered as a public trust property. The very fact that Survey No. 568 of Vadaj in the City of Ahmedabad has been registered as a public trust property and the very fact that an entry has been made in that behalf in the public trust register pre-suppose beyond doubt that inquiry as contemplated by Section 19 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act was made by the Deputy Charity Commissioner that he had recorded a finding in that behalf as contemplated by Section 20 of the said Act and that the entry was made in pursuance of the powers conferred upon him by Section 21 of the said Act. If that is the situation the question before me is whether the Deputy Charity Commissioner has jurisdiction to entertain the present application. and to delete or cancel that entry from the public trust register. Section 22-A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 to which Mr. If that is the situation the question before me is whether the Deputy Charity Commissioner has jurisdiction to entertain the present application. and to delete or cancel that entry from the public trust register. Section 22-A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 to which Mr. Shah has invited my attention provides that if at any time after the entries are made in the register under Section 21 or 22 it appears to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner that any particular relating to any public trust which was not the subject-matter of the inquiry under Section 19 or sub-section (3) Section 22 as the case may be has remained to be inquired into the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner as the case may be may make further inquiry in the prescribed manner record his finding and make entry in the register in accordance with the decision arrived at or if appeal or application has been made as provided by the Act in accordance with the decision of the competent authority provided by the Act. Section 22-A applies to cases as its language clearly shows where any particular relating to any public trust was not the subject-matter of the inquiry under Section 19 or sub-section (3) of Section 22 as the case may be and in respect of which an inquiry is required to be made. It is only in such cases that Section 22 empowers the Deputy Charity Commissioner to make further inquiry into the matter. In this case as I have stated in the foregoing paragraphs an inquiry was made under Section 19 in relation to Survey No. 568 and it was registered as a public trust property. It was the subject-matter of inquiry and no fresh inquiry in relation thereto can be made by the Deputy Charity Commissioner now. In my opinion therefore under Section 22-A the Deputy Charity Commissioner has no jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the City Deputy Collector on 17th October 1968it appears that the consistent view taken by this Court in the aforesaid decisions was not brought to his notice. ( 9 ) MR. In my opinion therefore under Section 22-A the Deputy Charity Commissioner has no jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the City Deputy Collector on 17th October 1968it appears that the consistent view taken by this Court in the aforesaid decisions was not brought to his notice. ( 9 ) MR. Oza has laid considerable emphasis in support of his submission on the Full Bench decision of the Bom High Court in Keki Pestonji Jamadar v. Rodabai Khodabad Merwan Irani 74 Bombay Law Reporter 198 and urged that the view expressed by the Full Bench of Bombay High Court should be preferred by this Court to the view expressed by the single Judges of this Court in the aforesaid decisions. It was vehemently contended that this Court had relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Taraben Baldevdas Parikh v. The Charity Commissioner 57 Bombay Law Reporter 1069 which has been overruled by the aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court. The decision of the Bombay High Court given prior to the date of bifurcation of the Bigger Bilingual Bombay State is binding on this Court. ( 10 ) SHAH J. speaking for the Division Bench in Tarabens Case (supra) has considered the scheme of the Act critically and observed at page 1073:"the scheme of these provisions appears to be in the first instance to confer jurisdiction upon the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to hold an inquiry inter alia relating to the existence of a trust whether such trust is a public trust and whether any property is the property of such trust. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to decide questions which have been either dealt with by an officer or authority under the Act or which are to be decided or dealt with by him is excluded save as expressly provided by the Act and the decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner subject to decision in appeal is made final and conclusive. In short the legislature has provided a tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction to try the questions specified in Section 19; and has made provision for appeals against those decisions and has expressly excluded the jurisdiction of the civil courts in matters which are entrusted to the jurisdiction of that tribunal". In short the legislature has provided a tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction to try the questions specified in Section 19; and has made provision for appeals against those decisions and has expressly excluded the jurisdiction of the civil courts in matters which are entrusted to the jurisdiction of that tribunal". ( 11 ) NOW the jurisdiction of such amplitude having been conferred under the Act upon the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner to decide questions set out in Section 19 and jurisdiction of the civil courts having been simultaneously excluded it would be difficult to hold that the civil court has jurisdiction to decide the same questions over again in a civil suit. Reliance however was sought to be placed upon the terms of Section 50 which enables suits relating to public trusts to be filed for certain reliefs by the Charity Commissioner or by two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Charity Commissioner. One of such suits is a suit where a declaration is necessary that particular property belonging to the public trust (it is significant to note that that part of Section 50 is amended by Amending Act of 1960) or where a direction is required to recover possession of such property or proceeds there-of or. . . ( 12 ) IT was submitted that if jurisdiction of the civil court to decide whether a particular property is the property of a public trust is excluded the civil court would have no jurisdiction even at the instance of the Charity Commissioner or two or more persons who have obtained his consent in writing to entertain a suit for a declaration that a particularly property belongs to a public trust and for con-sequential reliefs. But it has to be noted that the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is made subject to any provision expressly made and Section 50 being such a provision jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits which fall within the description of suits mentioned therein may not be regarded as excluded. But it has to be noted that the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is made subject to any provision expressly made and Section 50 being such a provision jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits which fall within the description of suits mentioned therein may not be regarded as excluded. It is true that in that case at page 1073 it is observed : it is unnecessary in the present case to express any opinion on the question whether it was intended by the legislature to render the decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner final and binding upon a person who has had no opportunity of appearing before that officers. ( 13 ) IN Keki Pestonji Jamadars Case (supra) the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has undoubtedly taken a contrary view. At page 206 it is observed after referring to the relevant provisions of the Act:"in the light of these provisions the first question which we have to decide is whether the civil court has jurisdiction to decide or deal with the questions raised in Rodabais suit in regard to her title to the suit property and in regard to the corresponding lack of power or title in Jamshedji to convey that property to the trust. In the language of Section 80 the answer to this question must depend upon whether by or under the Act these questions are to be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under the Act and such decision is made final and conclusive by the Act. The relevant provision stated as conferring the requisite power being Section 79 the precise point for determination is whether the aforesaid questions arising in Rodabais suit are to be decided or dealt with by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner in the inquiry under Section 19 and whether the decision of these questions is made final and conclusive by the Act. If yes it would be incompetent to the civil court to decide or deal with those questions because by Section 80 its jurisdiction in that regard is expressly excluded. If yes it would be incompetent to the civil court to decide or deal with those questions because by Section 80 its jurisdiction in that regard is expressly excluded. It must be stated that in order that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide or deal with a question may be barred under Section 80 it is necessary both that by or under the Act that particular question has to be decided or dealt with by an officer or authority under the Act and the decision of such officer or authority has been made final and conclusive by the Act. At page 207 it is observed :". . . . Under Sections 19 (1) and (2) the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has to make an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether a trust exists and whether such trust is a public trust and whether any property is the property of such trust. Under Section 21 (2) the entries which the authorities have to make after the decision is recorded under Section 20 in the inquiry held under Section 19 are final and conclusive. Section 79 (1) provides expressly that the question whether or not a trust exists and such trust is a public trust or particular property is the property of such trust shall be decided by the Deputy or instant Charity Commissioner md such decision shall be final and conclusive. The provisions of Section 79 are too clear to admit of doubt or difficult as regards the description of questions which the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has to decide or deal with under the Act and in respect of which the decision is final and conclusive. The next step however is fraught with difficulty and that step is to determine the scope and ambit of these questions. The first of the three questions which the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has to decide is whether or not a trust exists. . . . The second question which the authorities have decide under Section 79 is whether such trust is a public trust. . . . The third question relegated to the decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is whether the particular property is the property of such trust. . . . The second question which the authorities have decide under Section 79 is whether such trust is a public trust. . . . The third question relegated to the decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is whether the particular property is the property of such trust. This clause is couched in words of doubtful import leading to the expression of divergent views as regards its scope Learned Counsel for the appellant contends for the view that as the question whether the particular property is the property of the trust cannot be answered without deciding whether the author of the trust had the right or title to the property conveyed to the trust the authorities must decide this latter question and indeed it is their function and duty to decide it. It is urged that questions of title to the particular property are thus required to the decided in inquiries under Section 19 and the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide those questions is barred under Section 80 The contesting respondents contend for the rival view that the question whether the author of the trust had title to the property conveyed to the trust is outside the scope of the inquiry under Section 19 and therefore the jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide or deal with the question is not barred. The learned Government Pleader has pointed out the merits and demerits of both the views but he has given good reasons why the contention of the respondents should be accepted in preference to that the appellant. Having considered the matter in all the aspects prescribed before us we are of the opinion that the respondents are right in the contention. The purpose of the Act the procedure prescribed for inquiries under Section 19 the absence of any remedy under the Act to those who were not parties to the inquiry under Section 19 but whose anterior or superior title would be concluded by the decision in that inquiry and the general scheme of the Act all tend to show that questions of title to the trust property are out-side the scope of the inquiry under Section 19. With respect to the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court we may say that we are not able to persuade ourselves to accept that view and to differ from the view taken by this Court almost consistently in this behalf in the reported and unreported decisions referred to above. ( 14 ) SECTION 19 (ii) of the Act casts duty upon the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner on an application under Section 18 of the Act or upon an application made by any person having interest in a public trust or on his own motion to make an inquiry in the prescribed manner for the purpose of ascertaining whether any property is the property of such trust. ( 15 ) SECTION 21 (1) of the Act enjoins a duty upon the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to make entries in register kept under Section 17 in accordance with the finding recorded by him under Section 20 or if appeals or applications are made as provided by the Act in accordance with the final decision of the competent authority provided by the Act. Sub-section (2) of it in categorical terms provides that the entries so made shall subject to the provisions of the Act and subject to any change recorded under the following provisions be final and conclusive. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that in an inquiry contemplated under Section 19 of the Act the authority specified therein has to make inquiry whether any property is the property of public trust. It will necessarily mean that inquiry has to be made whether the property belongs to the public trust or to any private individual if any such claim is made and the decision given by the specified authority subject to the provisions of the Ace and subject to any change recorded in the provisions is given finality and conclusiveness It may be noted that in such a proceeding ordinarily the main contest is in that behalf ( 16 ) SECTION 22 of the Act refers to the change. Sub-section (1-A) of it contemplates forwarding of the report to the sub-registrar referred to in sub-section (7) of Section 18 of the Act if the change to be reported under sub section (1) relates to any immoveable property. Obviously it is with a view at all persons affected may know about it. Sub-section (1-A) of it contemplates forwarding of the report to the sub-registrar referred to in sub-section (7) of Section 18 of the Act if the change to be reported under sub section (1) relates to any immoveable property. Obviously it is with a view at all persons affected may know about it. Sub-section (2) of it indicates that for the purpose of verying the correctness of the entries in the register kept under Section 17 or ascertaining whether any change has occurred in any of the particulars recorded in the register the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner may hold an inquiry. As this Section refers to the change recorded in the register kept under Section 17 of the Act meaning thereby subsequent to the recording of entry in the register the legislature introduced Section 22-A by Bombay Act No. 59 of 1954 which reads as under:"if a any time after the entries are made in the register under Section 21 or 22 A appears to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner that any particular relating to any public trust which was not doe subject-matter of the inquiry under Section 19 or sub-section (3) of Section 22 as the case may be has remained to be enquired into the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner as the case may be may make further inquiry is the prescribed manner record his findings and make entries in the register in accordance with the decision arrived at or if appeals or applications are made as provided by this Act in accordance with the decision of the competent authority provided by this Act. The provisions of Sections 19 20 21 and 22 shall so far as may be apply to the inquiry the recording of finding and the making of entries in the register under this Section". A mere glance at the wording of this Section indicates that such an inquiry can be made by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner at any time. It is not necessary for involving that power that it should be by a person having interest in the public trust. ( 17 ) THE expression person having interest has been defined in Section 2 (10) of the Act. It is not necessary for involving that power that it should be by a person having interest in the public trust. ( 17 ) THE expression person having interest has been defined in Section 2 (10) of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 22 of the Act also contemplates sending of report regarding the amendment made in the entry under sub-section (3) of it to the sub-registrar referred to in sub-section (7) of Section 18 of the Act for the purpose of registering it. Section 28-A of the Act contemplates sending of copy of entries relating to immoveable property of such public trust made by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner in the register kept under Section 17 to the sub-registrar of the sub-district appointed under the Indian Registration Act 1908 in which such immoveable property is situated. That is obviously for the purpose referred to by us earlier. ( 18 ) IT is not necessary to refer to Sections 70 70 and 72 of the Act referred to in the aforesaid decisions. Section 79 of the Act which is the most material Section for the purpose of deciding this question reads:" (1) Any question whether or not a trust exists and such trust is a public trust or particular property is the property of such trust shall be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal as provided by this Act. It in terms enjoins a duty upon the said authority to decide whether a particular property is a property of such trust. It will necessarily mean that a question regarding the title to the property viz. that property belongs to a public trust or it belongs to a private individual is required to be decided by the said authority. Sub-section (2) of it reads: (2) The decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal as the case may be shall unless set aside by the decision of the Court on application or of the High Court in appeal be final and conclusive. The wording of this sub-section in our opinion leaves no doubt that such decision given by the said authority has been given by the legislature finality and conclusiveness which is no doubt subject to the setting aside of it by the decision of the Court on application or of the High Court in appeal. The wording of this sub-section in our opinion leaves no doubt that such decision given by the said authority has been given by the legislature finality and conclusiveness which is no doubt subject to the setting aside of it by the decision of the Court on application or of the High Court in appeal. It is thus very clear in our opinion that such a decision given by the competent authority whether particular property is a property of public trust or not will be final and conclusive unless it is set aside by the decision of the Court on application or of the High Court in appeal. ( 19 ) 1. The word Court has been defined in Section 2 (4) of the Act as under: (2) In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context - (3) Court means in the Greater Bombay the City Civil Court and else-where the District Court. It is significant to note that the decision of the Court is to be on application and such application is provided under Section 72 of the Act which in terms states: (1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Charity Commissioner under Sections 40 41 50 70 or 70-A or on the questions whether a trust exists and whether such trust is a public trust or whether any property is the property of such trust may within sixty days from the date of the decision apply to the Court to set aside the said decision. It is thus evident that such decision can be set aside only by the decision of the said Court on the application or by the decision of the High Court in appeal. That appeal to be made in the High Court is provided by Subsection (4) of Section 72 of the Act. If really the legislature had intended that such decision shall be set aside by the decision of the ordinary Civil Court in a suit filed by a third party in this behalf under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the legislature could have very well provided by making a specific reference to it. Specific reference is made as to when such a decision will not be given finality and conclusiveness. Specific reference is made as to when such a decision will not be given finality and conclusiveness. ( 20 ) SECTION 80 of the Act is another material Section which is an exclusion Section taking away the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Court in this behalf. It reads:"save as expressly provided in this Act no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act to be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under this Act or in respect of which the decision or order of such officer or authority has been made final and conclusive". Under Section 19 of the Act the authority under the Act has to make an inquiry whether a particular property belongs to a public trust or not. Section 21 (2) of the Act gives finality and conclusiveness to the entries made on the basis of the findings recorded by the said authority in an inquiry under Section 19 of the Act. It is only subject to the provisions of the Act and subject to the provisions following it. Section 79 of the Act in terms states that such a question whether a particular property belongs to a public trust or not has got to be decided by the said authority and the decision of the said authority is given finality and conclusiveness subject to such decision being set aside on the application to the Court or in the High Court in appeal. . ( 21 ) AS said earlier we may repeat and say that while deciding a question whether a particular property belongs to a public trust or not if the dispute is raised the authority contemplated under the Act has got to decide a question that the property belongs to a public trust and while deciding it it is necessary to decide that it does not belong to any private individual. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that such a question has to be decided or dealt with by or under the Act by the officer or authority under the Act. Such decision has been given finality and conclusiveness and it is only subject to be varied or set aside as contemplated by or under the Act and in no other manner. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that such a question has to be decided or dealt with by or under the Act by the officer or authority under the Act. Such decision has been given finality and conclusiveness and it is only subject to be varied or set aside as contemplated by or under the Act and in no other manner. ( 22 ) IN our opinion therefore it is difficult to accept the view that when a third party raises such a question of title that question does not fall within the jurisdiction of the said officer or authority under the Act and the Civil Court can decide such a question. In our opinion in view of these relevant provisions of the Act there is no escape from the conclusion that the Civil Court cannot have any jurisdiction to decide or to deal with such a question. ( 23 ) THE Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has derived support in respect of its conclusion from the provisions of Section 26 of the Act and Mr. Oza has also tried to rely upon the provisions of that Section. That Section 26 of the Act reads:"any Court of competent jurisdiction deciding any question relating to any public trust which by or under the provisions of this Act is not expressly or impliedly barred from deciding shall cause copy of such decision to be sent to the Charity Commissioner and the Charity Commissioner shall cause the entries in the register kept under Section 17 to be made or amended in regard to such public trust in accordance with such decision. The amendments so made shall not be altered except in cases where such decision has been varied in appeal or revision by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Subject to such alterations the amendments made shall be final and conclusive". It is significant to note that such entries are to be made on the bash of a decision of a competent Court deciding any question relating to any public trust. But it has been made abundantly clear that that question relating to any public trust must be such that it is not expressly or impliedly barred from deciding by or under the provision of the Act. But it has been made abundantly clear that that question relating to any public trust must be such that it is not expressly or impliedly barred from deciding by or under the provision of the Act. The provision of that Section cannot be pressed into service for deriving support to the conclusion reached by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid decision. On the contrary in our opinion that Section clearly indicates that such a question was never intended by the legislature to be decided by any Court of competent juridiction and that is why such provision is made under Section 26 of the Act that such decision of a competent Court should not be in respect of any question relating to any public trust which by or under the provisions of the Act is expressly or impliedly barred. ( 24 ) THE Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has also taken into account for reaching it conclusion that the procedure prescribed by the Act for the conduct of inquires under Section 19 is wholly unsuited to a proper and effective adjudication of disputed titles to the trust property. It is observed in that behalf:. ". . . . . IT is unthinkable that question of title could be permitted to be decided by a Tribunal finally and conclusively without any obligation to record the evidence fully. It is a matter of common experience that subtle shades of evidence are often missed in a memorandum containing merely the substance of the evidence. In our opinion that question is wholly irrelevant Appeal in that be half could be only to the legislature. That factor in our opinion need not be taken into account for considering whether the jurisdiction of the competent Civil Court is barred under the provisions of the Act for deciding such a question. ( 25 ) SUPPORT is also derived by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court from the definition of person having interest given in Section 2 (10) of the Act which shows that the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is expected and required to decide questions raised at the instance of persons who are interested in the trust. ( 25 ) SUPPORT is also derived by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court from the definition of person having interest given in Section 2 (10) of the Act which shows that the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is expected and required to decide questions raised at the instance of persons who are interested in the trust. It is no part of their function under Section 19 to decide claims which are ad verse to the trust and which are made in assertion of titles which are hostile to the trust. Such title cannot be held concluded in violation of the principles of natural justice. Neither the Act nor the Rules contemplate that persons who claim adversely to the trust or who dispute the right or title of the trust to the trust property must be heard in the inquiry under Section 19. In Act Section 19 and Rule 7-A (1) only reckon applications under Section 18 which are to be made by trustees and applications by any person having interest in a public trust. Surely persons in the position of Rodabai and Baimai are not persons having interest in a public trust. They are interested in the assertion of their own private title to the trust. ( 26 ) IT will be significant to note that in Section 19 of the Act reference is to the receipt of an application under Section 18 or upon an application made by any person having interest in a public trust. It empowers also the authority referred to therein on its own motion to make inquiry as regards whether a particular property is the public trust property. As said earlier Section 22-A of the Act does not restrict the making of an inquiry contemplated under it on an application made by a person having interest in the public trust. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has observed that the provisions made under Sections 70 70 and 72 of the Act providing remedies against the decisions referred to under Section 19 are undoubtedly relevant because summary decisions are seldom accorded the privilege of being taken that high. But in the opinion of the Full Bench this circumstance is not sufficient by itself to extend the scope of the inquiry under Section 19 so as to bring within its sweep contested questions as regards title to the trust property. But in the opinion of the Full Bench this circumstance is not sufficient by itself to extend the scope of the inquiry under Section 19 so as to bring within its sweep contested questions as regards title to the trust property. With respect we may say that really there is no question of extending the scope of inquiry under Section 19 of the Act in this behalf. The relevant provisions clearly show that such contested questions as regards title to the trust properly are within its sweep. We are also not in agreement with the view taken by it that there is no effective remedy provided in the Act against such decision of the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in the appeal. In our opinion as held by several decisions of the single Judges of this Court referred to above the effective remedy is provided under Section 22-A of the Act. We are not inclined to accept the reasoning adopted by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court for reaching the conclusion that the conclusion reached by Mody J. in this behalf in Ishawalals Case (supra) was not the correct one. The Full Bench answered the first question in the negative referred to by us above. As regards the second and the third questions it is observed:"as regards questions 2 and 3 we are of the opinion that for determining whether the bar under Section 80 of the Act arises it is irrelevant whether the person who wants to raise the particular question was or was not a party to the proceedings under Section 19. The fact that such a person was a party to those proceedings may perhaps raise a bar of analogous to that of res judicata but we are not concerned with that question and would prefer not to express any opinion there-on. The Civil Court would however have the jurisdiction to decide the points mentioned in question No. 1 in the sense that Section 80 cannot operate as a bar to that jurisdiction". Really speaking the question involved in that case was whether Jamshedji the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he created the trust or otherwise had authority to create a trust under Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Act. Really speaking the question involved in that case was whether Jamshedji the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he created the trust or otherwise had authority to create a trust under Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Act. No doubt while deciding that question the Full Bench has reached the conclusion that such a question raised by a third party regarding his title to the property cannot be decided by the authority or the officer under the Act. With respect we may say that we are not able to persuade ourselves to accept that position as a correct position and to differ from the view taken by the single Judges of this Court referred to above. As said earlier our learned Brother S. H. Sheth J. had taken a different view regarding the interpretation of Section 22-A of the Act which is against the view taken by the other single Judges of this Court in the decisions referred to above. Those decisions were not pointed out to him. We are of the opinion that the view taken by the other single Judges of this Court in the decisions referred to above is the correct view. ( 27 ) IN Bhatt Ch imanlal Ratanji v. Patel Manu Ladhu Second Appeal No. 233 of 1971 with Second Appeals Nos. 234 of 1971 to 237 of 1971 decided on 17th and 18th September 1975 my learned Brother C. V. Rane J. had an occasion to consider this question and he has also considered the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Keki Pestonji (supra ). The relevant observations made by him are:"apart from the above legal position as to the binding nature of the Case of Taraben (supra) I may point out that the main point that arose for consideration in the Case of Keki Pestonji (supra) was entirely different from the one to be decided in the appeals. The Full Bench considered the following questions: (1) Is the question whether the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he has created the trust or had otherwise authority to create the particular trust covered by Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 ? The Full Bench considered the following questions: (1) Is the question whether the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he has created the trust or had otherwise authority to create the particular trust covered by Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 ? (2) Can a person who has once appeared in the proceedings under the Bombay Public Trusts Act and has made his contentions therein on the above question bring a suit in a Civil Court in respect of such a question or (2) Has the Civil Court no jurisdiction to deal with or decide such a question by reason of Section 80 of the Act ?among other things it has been observed ill the above case:"the purpose of the Act the procedure prescribed for inquiries under Section 19 the absence of any remedy under the Act to those who were not parties to the inquiry under Section 19 but whose anterior or superior title would be concluded by the decision in that inquiry and the general scheme of the Act all tend to show that questions of title to the trust property are outside the scope of the inquiry under Section 19". The Full Bench answered the first question which relates to the main point in the negative and as regards questions 2 and 3 it observed:"we are of the opinion that for determining whether the bar under Section 80 of the Act arises it is irrelevant whether the person who wants to raise the particular question was or was not a party to the proceedings under Section 19. The fact that such a person was a party to those proceedings may perhaps raise a bar analogous to that of res judicata but we are not concerned with that question and would prefer not to express any opinion thereon. The Civil Court would however have the jurisdiction to decide the points mentioned in question No. 1 in the sense that Section 80 cannot operate as a bar to that jurisdiction". The Civil Court would however have the jurisdiction to decide the points mentioned in question No. 1 in the sense that Section 80 cannot operate as a bar to that jurisdiction". Now according to Section 19 the question whether any property is a property of a public trust is to be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner and according to Section 79 of the Trusts Act the question whether or not a trust exists and such trust is a public trust or particular property is the property of such trust can be decided only by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal as provided by the Trusts Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the Trusts Act lays down categorically that the decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal as the case may be unless it is set aside by the decision of the Court on application or of the High Court in appeal is final and conclusive. It is needless to add that while deciding the question whether any particular property is the property of a public trust the authorities concerned will have to decide the question of title and in that case in view of the clear provisions of Section 19 of the Trusts Act it is difficult to say that the question of title cannot be decided by the aforesaid authorities and that it; is only the civil court that can decide such a question. In view of the above clear position in law the observations of the Full Bench in the above case that the questions of title to the trust property are outside the scope of inquiry under Section 19 seem to have reference only to the first question referred to it for its decision viz. whether the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he has created the trust or had otherwise authority to create the particular trust covered by Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 and they must be read in that context. whether the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he has created the trust or had otherwise authority to create the particular trust covered by Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 and they must be read in that context. In the present case however it is not the contention of the defendants that the author of the trust was not the lawful owner of the property of which the trust was created or that the trust in question was created without any authority. In the present case it is the contention of Defendant No. 2 that the suit fields had gone to his share as a result of a partition amongst brothers and the present case does not involve any such question as was required to be considered by the Full Bench in the Case of Keki Pestonji (supra ). Under these circumstances the decision in the Case of Keki Pestonji (supra) would not be quite relevant for the purpose of deciding the main points at issue in these appeals. In my opinion the view expressed by Rane J. in the aforesaid decision is the correct view. ( 28 ) IN The Charity Commissioner Ahmedabad v. Maharajgiri Shadulgiri 13 Gujarat Law Reporter 955 a Division Bench of this Court consisting of my-self and my learned Brother C. V. Rane J. had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of Sections 19 to 22-A of the Act. At pages 960 to 962 it is observed:". . . . Moreover there are certain other provisions of the Act to which we shall refer at a later stage by which person having interest can move the authorities concerned to make further inquiries in the matter. Considering all these circumstances it is not open to the respondents to challenge the orders in question on the ground that no public notice had been issued while holding the inquiry under Section 19 of the Act. Considering all these circumstances it is not open to the respondents to challenge the orders in question on the ground that no public notice had been issued while holding the inquiry under Section 19 of the Act. At page 962 after referring to Section 22-A of the Act it is observed:"the above provisions clearly show that even after an inquiry under Section 19 has concluded and entries are made in the register under Section 21 or Section 22 it is open to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to hold a further inquiry if it appears to him that any particular relating to any public trust which was not the subject-matter of the inquiry under Section 19 or sub-section (3) of Section 22 has remained to be inquired into. Even according to Section 70-A of the Act it is open to the Charity Commissioner in any of the cases mentioned in Section 70 to call for and examine the records and proceedings of such case before any Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of any finding or order recorded or passed by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner and to pass appropriate orders as contemplated by that Section. It cannot be disputed that the Charity Commissioner can exercise the powers of revision under Section 70-A either on his own motion or at the instance of the person having interest. It is thus found that the Charity Commissioner can revise the orders enumerated in Section 70 which include the findings or orders as the case may be under Sections 20 22 and 20-A. The above provisions of the Act show that the rights of the persons having interest are in no way prejudiced by holding inquiries under Section 19 and other relevant Sections of the Act without issuing any public notice because a suitable remedy is provided to them by the aforesaid provisions of the Act to move the authority concerned for obtaining adequate relief even after the inquiries as stated above are concluded. ( 29 ) WE are therefore of the opinion that if the plaintiff is assumed for the sake of argument to fall in the category of a third party and it is such a third party who has come to the ordinary Civil Court for a declaration about the title to the immoveable property which was held to be a property of the public trust in an inquiry held under Section 19 of the Act the Civil Courts jurisdiction is ousted in view of he provisions of the Act to decide that question. The remedy to challenge the decision of the officer or the authority under the Act was as contemplated in our opinion by Section 22-A of the Act. It may be that Section 70-A may not be an effective and adequate remedy as observed by late Mr. Justice Mody J. in Ishwarlal Nanalals Case (Supra ). We are also not in agreement with the learned Assistant Government Pleader that Section 72 of the Act provides such a remedy especially in view of the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) added to Section 72 of the Act. Appeal dismissed. .