BAI AMBUBIBI HAKIMKHAN v. SAYED HAIDERMIYA BAVDINMIYA
1975-11-11
S.H.SHETH
body1975
DigiLaw.ai
S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant is the decree-holder. He obtained against the judgment-debtor-respondent a decree for a sum of Rs. 760. 00 with interest and cost. Thereafter he filed several darkhast to recover the decre- tal amount but did not succeed in obtaining the satisfaction of his decree The present darkhast was filed on April 12 1972 He sought the recovery in the present darkhast of the total amount of Rs. 1988. 05 paise. Notice was issued to the judgment-debtor who raised two objections to the execution of the decree. His first objection was that the execution of the decree was barred by time. His second objection was that the agricultural land which the decree-holder sought to attach was not liable to be attached. The Executing Court over-ruled both the objections and ordered darkhast to proceed further. The judgment-debtor appealed against that order to the District Court. The learned Appellate Judge reversed both the findings and dismissed the darkhast. It is that order which is challenged in this second appeal. ( 2 ) THE first question which arises is whether the present second appeal is maintainable. A second appeal in execution proceedings lies by virtue of sec. 100 read with sec. 47 and sec. 2 (2) of Civil Procedure Code. Sec. 47 provides for determining the questions which may arise before the Exe- cuting Court in execution proceedings. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 2 of Civil Procedure Code inter alia provides that a decree shall be deemed to include the determination of any question within sec. 47 of Civil Procedure Code. Therefore any order which is made under sec 47 in execution proceedings becomes a decree by virtue of the deeming fiction incorporated in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. Now sub-sec. (1) of sec 100 in its opening part provides as follows : (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to a High Court on any of the following grounds namely:xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx. IT is clear therefore that a second appeal under sec. 100 lies to the High Court against the appellate decree passed by the Court below.
IT is clear therefore that a second appeal under sec. 100 lies to the High Court against the appellate decree passed by the Court below. Since every order recorded between the parties to the suit in execution proceedings under sec. 47 is deemed to be a decree under sub-sec (2) of sec. 2 the provisions of sec. 100 are attracted to it and ordinarily a second appeal lies. However sec. 100 is not absolute in terms. It opens with the words Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code. These words clearly mean that if there is any other provision in the Civil Proce- dure Code which bars a second appeal in a particular case no second appeal shall be competent even though see 100 sec. 47 and sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code are attracted to it. Sec. 102 of the Civil Pro- cedure Code provides as follows :102 No second appeal shall lie in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of small Causes when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed one thousand rupees. THEREFORE in a suit which is of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes no second appeal shall lie if the subject-matter of the original suit did not exceed one thousand rupees. The suit out of which the present execution proceedings arises was the money suit in which the plaintiff claimed from the defendant a sum of Rs- 760/- as the principal amount. Such a money claim is cognizable by the Court of Small Causes constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The first condition laid down by the sec. 102 is therefore satisfied. The amount which the plaintiff claimed from the defendant was Rs. 760. 00. That is to say it did not exceed one thousand rupees. Therefore second condition laid down by sec. 102 is also satisfied. Therefore by virtue of the provisions of sec. 102 of the Civil Procedure Code the present second appeal in my opinion is not competent and cannot be maintained. .