Judgment :- 1. A. S. No. 614/71 is filed by parties 6 to 9 and A. S. No. 637/71 is filed by party No. 2 in LAR. No. 28 of 1965 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Irinjalakuda.1 acre 811/4 cents of land in Sy. No. 215/9 of Velookara Village, Mukundapuram Taluk was acquired by the Government for the use of Nadavaramba English High School and Secondary School. Notification under S.2(1) of the Cochin Land Acquisition Act (corresponding to) S.3(1) of the Kerala Act) was published in the Gazette on 10th October 1961. Parties 1 and 6 to 9, who are the landlords, claimed Rs. 150 per cent as land value and also claimed value for the improvements. Party No. 2, the verumpattom tenant, claimed land value at Rs. 500 per cent and also the entire value of improvements. The Land Acquisition Officer valued the land at Rs. 35 per cent and separately valued the building, well and trees. He did not apportion the compensation. Dissatisfied with this the respective appellants asked for reference and the lower court enhanced the land value to Rs. 60 per cent, coconut trees were valued on a capitalised basis of their income, the other trees were valued on timber value basis and the total compensation was fixed at Rs. 24,070.10 This was apportioned between the respective appellants as follows: The land value as enhanced cams to Rs. 10,875. 7/ 8th of it,i. e., Rs 9,515.60 was directed to be paid to parties Nos.1 and 6 to 9 who are the jenmies of the land. The balance 1/8th was directed to be paid to party No. 2 who is the verumpattomdar of the land. This apportionment was based on S 20 of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act. The value of improvements, namely coconut trees, jack trees and bamboo clusters was apportioned in the ratio of 3:1 between the second party and parties Nos.1 and 6 to 9. The entire value of the well, the cost of fencing and shed and the other items of improvements were directed to be paid to the second party alone. Both sides are dissatisfied with the enhancement and party No. 2 is also dissatisfied with the apportionment and the above appeals are filed in these circumstances. 2. The first point arising for consideration relates to the further enhancement of compensation claimed by each set of appellants. Both sides are dissatisfied with the enhancement and party No. 2 is also dissatisfied with the apportionment and the above appeals are filed in these circumstances. 2. The first point arising for consideration relates to the further enhancement of compensation claimed by each set of appellants. Under the Land Acquisition Act the market value of the land has to be determined adopting a method which will fetch the maximum compensation to the persons interested in the land. But, that does not mean that the land value can be fixed as a vacant site and the trees standing thereon valued on the principle of capitalisation of the income from them. If the land value is fixed on the basis of the extent and as a vacant site only timber value of the trees can be reckoned in fixing the compensation. If the value is fixed on the basis of a capitalisation of the income, separate land value cannot be awarded. There may be an exception to this in a case where the trees are not spread over the entire area acquired but only in a portion of it. In the latter case it is permissible to fix the compensation on the principle of capitalisation of the income and deduct from the land value separately fixed, the value of the extent for the standing space of the trees. In this case little attention is paid by the Land Acquisition Officer or by the lower court to any of these principles. As stated earlier, the full area acquired is valued as a vacant site. The trees are valued on the principle of capitalisation of income and the aggregate of all these is taken as the market value of the land acquired. So doing 1 acre 811/4 cents has been valued at Rs. 24,070.10 which will be a compensation on the high side if any one of the methods referred to above had been adhered to. But, there is no objection to the compensation fixed and therefore the question of reducing the compensation does not arise. The only question is whether any further enhancement has to be allowed. The appellants have relied on Ext. P-4, a registered assignment deed for JO cents of land sold for a consideration of Rs. 3,500. Ext. P-4 is one year after the notification. The property comprised in it consists of land and a building. The only question is whether any further enhancement has to be allowed. The appellants have relied on Ext. P-4, a registered assignment deed for JO cents of land sold for a consideration of Rs. 3,500. Ext. P-4 is one year after the notification. The property comprised in it consists of land and a building. There is no acceptable evidence in respect or the value of the building and the lower court was therefore right in not placing any reliance on it in fixing the land value. The only other evidence is the Commissioner's report, Ext. C-1, filed by pw. 4, the Commissioner. According to that report, the property can be valued at Rs. 300 per cent. The Commissioner has not referred to or considered any transaction in the neighbourhood. His estimate is based only on the information gathered by him from some persons in the locality. It is only a guess work and the court below was therefore right in not accepting it. No other evidence is referred to by the appellants to prove the market value. As stated earlier, the compensation already allowed by the lower court is more than reasonable and no further increase of it is called for. Hence, the appellants are not entitled to any enhancement in the compensation. 3. The next point relates to the correctness of the apportionment made by the lower court. According to the appellant, in A.S. No. 637 of 1971, the apportionment should have been made as provided for in S.112 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964. In this connection the following dates have to be noted: It is only when possession is taken the land acquired vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. From this the appellant's counsel argues that the acquisition was only on 4th April 1964 and as the Act came into force on 1st April 1964 provisions of S.112 must apply. He relied on Balakrishnan v. Vasu 1972 KLT. 409 in this connection. From this the appellant's counsel argues that the acquisition was only on 4th April 1964 and as the Act came into force on 1st April 1964 provisions of S.112 must apply. He relied on Balakrishnan v. Vasu 1972 KLT. 409 in this connection. The counsel for party No. 2 also placed reliance on Act 4 of 1961 and contended that the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act which fixed the compensation in the ratio of 7:1 between the landlord and tenant stood repealed when Act 4 of 1961 came into force and that the principle laid down in S.112 of Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 has been applied in Thomas v. Annamma Abraham 1969 KLT. 903, Raghavan Unni v. Athar Rowther 1958 KLT. 559 and Krishna Ayyar v. Kuthiravattath Nair 1958 KLJ. 613 even to a case to which S.112 does not apply. To appreciate these points it is necessary to read here S.112, Clause.1, 2 and 5. "112. Apportionment of land value in cases of acquisition.-(1) where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this section. (2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements. (5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in subsection (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or but shall be apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition. According to the respondent's counsel, the value of the rights of the parties as on the date of S.3(1) notification or alternatively as on the date of the award must be taken and apportionment made on that basis. Under S.25 of the Land Acquisition Act (Kerala Act) the market value of the land acquired has to be ascertained with reference to the date of S.3 notification. S.9 requires the parties interested in the land to file a statement specifying their interest in the land and the compensation claimed by them for such interest. Under S.25 of the Land Acquisition Act (Kerala Act) the market value of the land acquired has to be ascertained with reference to the date of S.3 notification. S.9 requires the parties interested in the land to file a statement specifying their interest in the land and the compensation claimed by them for such interest. S.11 requires the Land Acquisition Officer to hold an enquiry into the value of the land and the value of the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and to make an award fixing the compensation and also apportioning the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land. It is open to the persons interested in the land acquired to agree in the apportionment of the compensation and S.31 provides that the particulars of such an apportionment should be specified in the award and as between persons who have so agreed the award shall be conclusive evidence of the correctness of the apportionment. Such an award is under S.12 conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested of the value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. On the basis of the award the Land Acquisition Officer is to tender payment of the compensation to the person interested and if he or they do not receive it to deposit the same in the reference court. S.33 makes provision for this payment. There is no statutory provision specifying the date to take possession after the passing of the award. There are cases where possession is taken after a long lapse of time after the award. By then the award would have become final either because the award of the Land Acquisition Officer has been accepted or because the time for reference has expired or because there is an agreement between the persons interested in the land as regards the apportionment of the compensation and that is specified in the award. In all such cases the apportionment made is final and does not depend on the taking of the possession of the land. Though the acquisition will be complete only with the taking possession of the land, the rights of the parties in the compensation can very well be conclusively settled as stated above even before possession is taken. Taking possession is only the final step in the acquisition proceedings. Though the acquisition will be complete only with the taking possession of the land, the rights of the parties in the compensation can very well be conclusively settled as stated above even before possession is taken. Taking possession is only the final step in the acquisition proceedings. Acquisition starts with the notification under S.3 & the land acquisition law provides for a finality both in respect of the compensation & in respect of the apportionment at a stage long before the stage of taking possession and if in the interregnum a different mandate is given by the Legislature that should not and will not affect the earlier land acquisition proceedings. This way, the respondent's counsel contends that the apportionment should not be made dependent on taking possession of the land but must depend on the rights of the parties on the date of S.3 notification and alternatively on the date of the award. There is much force in this contention. S.112 is not retrospective in its operation. If on the basis of the land acquisition proceedings the apportionment has become final in the manner described above before S.112 came into force, that finality is not affected merely because the possession of the property is taken only after the Act came into force. But, the decision in Balakrishnan v. Vasu 1972 KLT. 409 does not deal with such a case and that decision clearly shows that even before passing of the award the Act came into force and so no exception can be taken to its correctness. In this case also the award did not apportion the compensation between the landlord and the tenant and the various dates given above clearly show that the award had not become final when Kerala Land Reforms Act came into force. The acquisition was not also complete as possession had not been taken before the Act came into force. A reference application was filed within time and when the court was called upon to apportion the compensation it is not open to the court to ignore the provisions of S.112 of the Act. S.112 is as much a mandate to the court to apply that law as it is a declaration of the rights of the parties in the compensation amount. S.112 is as much a mandate to the court to apply that law as it is a declaration of the rights of the parties in the compensation amount. Even though on the date of S.3 notification the tenant's interests had only a lesser value, the interests or the rights of the parties were re-defined by Act 1 of 1964 before the award became final and the acquisition was complete by taking possession. It is open to the person interested to take advantage of the alteration of the rights even after the award and ask for a reference. The only prohibition in asking for a reference is that it should not be beyond the time mentioned in S.20 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is open to the court to consider the rights of the parties as altered by the statute and apportion the compensation accordingly. The decision of the Supreme Court in Grant v. State of Bihar AIR. 1966 S.C. 237 lays down this principle. Here though the value of the respective rights as on the date of S.3 notification was different, before the award became conclusive the statute has intervened and the court cannot ignore on any valid principle the said statutory change in the apportionment. Therefore, on the facts of this case there is no escape from the provisions of S.112 of Act 1 of 1964 in apportioning the compensation. In the light of this conclusion it is not necessary to consider the correctness of the other point and the other decisions referred to by the appellants' counsel. 4. Hence, the apportionment in this case can only be in proportion to the 'profits derivable from the land' by parties 1 and 6 to 9 on the one hand and party No. 2 on the other. The former are the jenmies and the latter is a tenant. The lease deed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the 2nd party is dated 10th February 1971. The landlord was entitled to get on the date of S.3 notification only the pattom mentioned in that document, i. e., Rs. 1.62. The income from the property as seen from the Commissioner's report is Rs. 843.21 (taking the yield from the cocoa-nut trees and arecanut trees which are alone shown as yielding). The compensation fixed in the case, namely, Rs. 24.070 will have to be apportioned in the ratio of Rs. 1.62: Rs. 841.59. 1.62. The income from the property as seen from the Commissioner's report is Rs. 843.21 (taking the yield from the cocoa-nut trees and arecanut trees which are alone shown as yielding). The compensation fixed in the case, namely, Rs. 24.070 will have to be apportioned in the ratio of Rs. 1.62: Rs. 841.59. That means parties 6 to 9 will get Rs. 46 and 2nd party will get the remaining Rs. 24,024. These amounts with 15 per cent solatium will be drawn by the parties from the compensation amount in deposit. 5. In the result, A.S. No. 614/71 is dismissed; A.S. No. 637/71 is allowed to this limited extent, namely that the compensation amount fixed by the lower _court will be drawn by parties 6 to 9 and party No. 2 as follows:-Parties 6 to 9 are entitled to draw Rs. 46 and 15 per cent solatium thereon and party No. 2 is entitled to draw the remaining sum of Rs. 24,024 and solatium. Interest at the usual rate on the compensation enhanced by the court below is also due to the respective parties from the date of dispossession to the date of deposit. In the nature of this case all the parties shall suffer their costs.