Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, who describes himself as a petty shop owner, seeks to quash a notice issued by the Assistant Labour Officer, Alwaye, the first respondent herein, under S.29 (1) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Act, on the ground that he is not bound to exhibit the notice as stipulated by S.11 of the Act. The petitioner contends that he is running the shop himself and that he has no employees under him. The first respondent issued a notice to him on 4-3-1974 asking him why action should not be taken against him for not exhibiting a notice specifying the day of weekly closure as enjoined by S.11 of the Act. According to the petitioner, S.11 applied only to shop owners who employed persons in the shop and did not apply to persons like the petitioner and therefore he was not bound to exhibit the notice as per S.11 of the Act. The first respondent thereupon instituted criminal proceedings against the petitioner before the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court to answer a charge under S.29 (1) of the Act. The present petitions are filed to quash the prosecution and to stay further proceedings in the Court below. Further contention raised by the petitioner is that S.11 is violative of Art.19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India in that it infringed the right of the petitioner to carry on his trade and as such S.11 is bad and a prosecution for violation of such a law cannot stand. 2. The petitioner sought reliance for his first contention on the judgment of this Court rendered by Moidu J. in Crl. R. P.Nos. 519 and 526 of 1973. This petition originally came before one of us and as it was felt that the decision rendered by Moidu J. in Crl. R. P. Nos. 519 and 526 of 1973 needed re-consideration in view of two Supreme Court rulings, directly in point, which were not brought before Moidu J., the case was referred to be heard by a Division Bench. 3. The Act in question is ameliorative in nature and has been promulgated with the avowed object of conferring benefit on employees. The attempt on the part of the petitioner is to avoid the provisions of the Act. Persons like him try to defeat the provisions of the Act by such methods. 3. The Act in question is ameliorative in nature and has been promulgated with the avowed object of conferring benefit on employees. The attempt on the part of the petitioner is to avoid the provisions of the Act. Persons like him try to defeat the provisions of the Act by such methods. The Supreme Court has warned against such attempt while considering similar provisions. Analogous provisions in similar enactments came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in three cases. In Manohar Lal v. The State (AIR. 1951 S. C. 315), the Supreme Court had to consider the provisions of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, Act X of 1940. In that case, the party concerned was running a shop and he was assisted by his son. There were two sections in the shop: one dealing with articles of haberdashery and the other dealing in articles of stationery. The relevant provision in the said Act, viz., S.7(1) read as follows: "Save as otherwise provided by this Act, every shop shall remain closed on a closed day Sub-s. (2) (i) of S.7 read as follows: "The choice of a closed day shall rest with the owner or occupier of a shop & shall be intimated to the prescribed authority within" The appellant in that case elected to close one section on Mondays and the other section on Saturdays and gave the necessary intimation. The appellant's son sold an article on Monday, which was a 'closed day' for that section. The owner of the shop was prosecuted. The appellant contended that he cannot be proceeded against since there was no employee in his shop and that the sale was effected by his son. He relied also oft the following exemption. "Nothing in this Act shall apply to x x x x x (i) persons employed in managerial capacity & 0) the members of the family of the employer". The Supreme Court repelled all these contentions and observed as follows: "The impugned section is a general one & applies to all kinds of shops; that is to say, to those in which labour is employed as well as to those which are run by the owners and their families. The Act in which the section occurs is directed at regulating the hours of employment of persons who are employed in the business of shops or commercial establishments. The Act in which the section occurs is directed at regulating the hours of employment of persons who are employed in the business of shops or commercial establishments. Therefore, in so far as S.7 covers establishments where labour is employed, it is undoubtedly intra vires. Where a shop is run only by the owner and his son without employment of any labour, the mere fact that cls. (i) and 0) of S.2A exempts persons employed in managerial capacity and the members of the family of the employer from the purview of the Act cannot give the owner or the son the right to keep the shop open on a closed day. Even where the owner of the shop and the manager are the same, the two capacities will have to be separated for purposes of S.7 (1) under which the owner is obliged to close his shop one day in a week. S.2A (i) does not control S.7 (1). Consequently, where the son sells an article to customer on a closed day the owner would be guilty under S.16 read with S.7 (1)." The Supreme Court took a liberal construction of the provisions of the section and held: "The Legislature may have felt it necessary, in order to reduce the possibilities of evasion to a minimum, to encroach upon the liberties of those who would not otherwise have been affected. That we think it had power to do. Further, to require a shopkeeper, who employs one or two men, to close and permit his rival, who employ's perhaps a dozen members of his family, to remain open, clearly places the former at a grave commercial disadvantage To permit such a distinction might well engender discontent and in the end react upon the relations between employer and employee. All these are matters of policy into which we cannot enter but which serve to justify a wide and liberal interpretation of words and phrases in those entries." 4. To the same effect is the decision reported in Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1961 S.C. 418). There also, it was the Punjab Trade Employees Act (Act X of 1940), which was the subject-matter for consideration. The contention was that the appellant did not employ any stranger as his employee and that the entire work was being done by him and the members of his family. 1961 S.C. 418). There also, it was the Punjab Trade Employees Act (Act X of 1940), which was the subject-matter for consideration. The contention was that the appellant did not employ any stranger as his employee and that the entire work was being done by him and the members of his family. On the ratio of the decision referred to above, this contention was rejected. The additional contention that the provisions of S.7 (1) of the said Act violated the appellant's right to carry on trade or business guaranteed by Art.19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India and that the restriction imposed was not reasonable within the meaning of Art.19 (6) of the Constitution, did not find favour with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court repelled this contention also and observed: "The ratio of the legislation is social interest in the health of the worker who forms an essential part of the community and in whose welfare, therefore, the community is vitally interested. It is in the light of this purpose that the provisions of the Act have to be scrutinized." The Supreme Court sustained the provisions of the Act on another ground also in the following words: "Apart from this, the constitutionality of the impugned provision might be sustained on another ground also, viz., with a view to avoid evasion of provisions specifically deployed. It may be pointed out that acts innocent in themselves may be prohibited and the restrictions in that regard would be reasonable, if the same were necessary to secure the efficient enforcement of valid provisions. The inclusion of a reasonable margin to ensure effective enforcement will not stamp a law otherwise valid as within legislative competence with the character of unconstitutionality as being unreasonable. The provisions could, therefore, be justified as for securing administrative convenience and for the proper enforcement' of it without evasion" In view of this authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the provision in S.11 of the Act is either violative of Art.19 (1) (g) or that the petitioner was protected since he did not employ any stranger as employee in his shop. 5. A kindred question arose for decision by the Supreme Court in Ramdhandas v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1961 S.C.1559). 5. A kindred question arose for decision by the Supreme Court in Ramdhandas v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1961 S.C.1559). There the provisions contained in the Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, Act 15 of 1958, regarding limitation as to hours of work of employees and specification of opening and closing hours was attacked as violative of Art.19 (1) (g) and outside the limitation prescribed by Art.19 (6). The Supreme Court went in detail on the question and held that the limitation regarding the closing and opening hours was neither violative of Art.19 (1) (g) nor beyond the power under Art.19 (6) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that "the said provisions were designed for the interests of the owner of the shop or establishment himself and that his health and welfare is a matter of interest not only to himself but to the general public. A restriction imposed with a view to secure this purpose would, in our opinion be clearly saved by Art.19 (6) ". The Supreme Court also said that "the welfare of labour, or indeed of the elements which determine its content are neither of them fixed or static, but are dynamic, being merely the manifestation or index of the social conscience as it grows and develops from time to time. "It is therefore necessary to guard against evasion of such legislation enacted deliberately to protect labour. 6. The general law regarding welfare legislation including labour legislations is that a party should not be allowed to defeat its purpose. No one should be allowed to escape from the rigours of social, welfare and labour legislation deliberately enacted in the interests of the community. Time was when Courts allowed subjects to avoid certain legislations by lawful means. Even such canons are looked rather askance at the present time. The canon of construing a social legislation of the kind we are dealing with in this case is very different from the canon of construing ordinary law. The Court cannot countenance any tactics to circumvent or defeat the provisions of the legislation of this kind. And we think, Courts will be justified in even straining the language of the Act, if found necessary, to achieve the purpose which the Legislature had in placing the particular legislation on the Statute Book. The Court cannot countenance any tactics to circumvent or defeat the provisions of the legislation of this kind. And we think, Courts will be justified in even straining the language of the Act, if found necessary, to achieve the purpose which the Legislature had in placing the particular legislation on the Statute Book. Therefore, not only should the Courts disapprove all subterfuges to defeat a social legislation but must actively try to prevent such subterfuges succeeding in their object. To countenance an argument as the one put forward by the petitioner in this case would be to encourage employers to defeat the provisions contained in such legislations and thus defeat the object of the legislation. It will be the duty of the Court