JUDGMENT - P. M. MUKHI, J.:---This is an appeal from on order passed by the learned judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay, dismissing the plaintiffs Notice of Motion for an injunction in relation to an order made by the Court of Small Causes at Bombay in an Ejectment Application No. 600/E of 1962. 2. It is necessary to set out a few facts in order to appreciate the rival contentions, and to consider whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for issue of the injunction. 3. The plaintiff Pestonji Dhanjishaw Zilla claims to be in exclusive possession and occupation of a room in Khareghat Colony, Hughes Road, Bombay-7. Defendants Nos. 1 to 7 to the suit are the trustees of the Parsi Panchayat, Bombay, which claims to own the several properties in the Khareghat Colony---including the building to which the said room is attached. Defendant No. 8 is one A. H. Wadia, described as Khot of Kurla, having his office on Station Road, Kurla, Bombay-70. Defendant No. 9 is one Ratanbai Beaverwalla and it is significant that her address is not given either in the plaint or in the Notice of Motion. 4. It requires to be noticed that at the stage of the Notice of Motion neither defendant No. 8 nor defendant No. 9 were served. According to the plaintiff, defendant No. 8 was the owner of the room occupied by him along with a certain portion of open land said to be a part of the property to which the plaintiff lays a claim. 5. It is the plaintiffs case that he has a right to remain in possession of the room and open land to which he has laid the claim on the basis of a document which is dated the 4th of July, 1949 and is said to have been executed by defendant No. 8 A. H. Wadia. It is claimed by the plaintiff that under this document the said Wadia was the absolute owner of the suit property, that is to say, 800 square yards of land with a room standing thereon admeasuring 27 x 25 with a common passage situate and lying and being on Survey No. 7305, Cadestral Survey No. 434 (Part) at Babulnath Road, Khareghat Colony. 6. 6. According to the plaintiff, this document, which is described as an agreement of assignment, is said to have been executed in 1949 by Shri A. H. Wadia in his (plaintiffs) favour, the consideration being a sum of Rs. 20,000/-, out of which a sum of Rs. 2,000/- is claimed to have been paid as advance in cash on the same date, the balance Rs. 18,000/- to be paid within a period of 30 years. According to the plaintiff, he paid a further sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the said Wadia, for which, however, no receipt or document has been produced. 7. As regards possession, it is now his case that the 8th defendant put him (the plaintiff) in possession of the said room by a letter dated the 4th of July 1953, a photostat copy of which has been produced and annexed as Exh. B to the plaint. 8. It would appear that defendant No. 9 Ratanbai Beaverwalla is a licensee of the Parsi Panchayat, Bombay, in respect of a room in Khareghat Colony and according to the plaintiff, this room was Room No. 1, Fever Hospital Building, Khareghat Colony. The trustees of the Parsi Panchayat filed an ejectment application, No. 600/E of 1962 against defendant No. 9 as she was in arrears of compensation and obtained an order for possession. 9. In the events that happened and after a considerable amount of contest a decree for ejectment was passed against the said Ratanbai Beaverwalla some time in 1965. 10. It may be noticed that according to the plaintiff defendant No. 9 Ratanbai Beaverwalla , had in 1953 made an application to the trustees of the Parsi Panchayat requesting them to allot some accommodation as she was a pauper and her husband had left her and in her application she had stated that her two sons, Kaki and Shiraj aged 16 and 5 respectively and her daughter Soona aged about 21 years were to reside with her in the said trustees may allot to her. It has already been mentioned that ultimately the 9th defendant failed to pay compensation to the trustees, with the result that an ejectment application had been filed and the ejectment order was passed by the Small Causes Court, Bombay. 11. It is the case of defendants Nos. It has already been mentioned that ultimately the 9th defendant failed to pay compensation to the trustees, with the result that an ejectment application had been filed and the ejectment order was passed by the Small Causes Court, Bombay. 11. It is the case of defendants Nos. 1 to 7, that is to say, the trustees of the Parsi Panchayat, who claim to own the property at Khareghat Colony what defendant No. 9 Ratanbai Beaverwalla is the mother of the plaintiff and that she had been a licensee of one of the rooms which was described as Room No. 1, (and which is now sought to be referred to and described by the plaintiff as 32-K, Khareghat Colony) and that the plaintiff and his brother and sisters were living with their mother, the said Ratanbai Beaverwalla, and, therefore, the eviction decree which was passed against defendant No. 9 could be executed in respect of the premises against the plaintiff also. 12. It would appear that the execution of the decree of the Small Causes Court obtained by defendants Nos. 1 to 7, the trustees of the Parsi Panchayat, in respect of the premises, was obstructed, with the result that an obstructionist Notice was taken out, being Notice No. 277 of 1972, inter alia against the plaintiffs. 13. At the hearing of the said obstructionist notice the plaintiffs case was that the 9th defendant, Ratanbai Beaverwalla, was not his mother and he claimed the said premises in his own right. There was also a further contention as to the identity of the property in question, the plaintiffs case being that the room, 32-K, which he was occupying was not the same as Room No. 1, which had been given on licence to the said Ratanbai Beaverwalla and which was the subject matter of the eviction order. 14. The obstructionist notice was made absolute by a judgment and order of the Small Causes Court dated the 16th of November, 1972. 15. It requires to be noticed that the plaintiff and his Advocate did not remain present at the hearing of the said obstructionist notice on the 16th of November ,1972. 14. The obstructionist notice was made absolute by a judgment and order of the Small Causes Court dated the 16th of November, 1972. 15. It requires to be noticed that the plaintiff and his Advocate did not remain present at the hearing of the said obstructionist notice on the 16th of November ,1972. According to the plaintiff, because he and his Advocate could not remain present in the Small Causes Court on the 16th of November 1972, he could not produce before that Court the document dated the 4th of July, 1949 on the basis of which the plaintiff now claims the right to present possession of the property in terms of Order 21, Rule 103 of the Civil Procedure Code. Nothing is said as to why the plaintiff and his Advocate could not be present on 16th November, 1972 in the Small Causes Court. 16. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the present suit, being Short Cause Suit No. 621 of 1973, in the City Civil Court a Bombay, some time in August, 1973. 17. It is in this suit that a notice of motion was taken but on the 27th August, 1973 on which the order appealed against was passed by the Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay, on the 4th of December, 1974. 18. It requires to be noticed that according to the plaintiff relations between him and the trustees of the Parsi Panchayat were strained and there were disputes between him and the trustees as regards some other property at Gondavli, and that, therefore, the plaintiff apprehending that the trustees would wrongly attempt to execute the warrant of possession obtained by them in the Ejectment Application No. 600/E of 1972, filed against defendant No. 9, filed \ suit in the City Civil Court, being suit No. 2551 of 1972, to restrain the trustees of the Parsi Panchayat from executing the said warrant of possession against the plaintiff. 19. In that suit also a notice of motion was taken out, which appears to have been dismissed for default and ultimately the suit itself, being Suit No. 2551 of 1972, was also dismissed for non-prosecution. 20. It is plaintiffs case, as the appellant before me that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court was in error in refusing to grant him an injunction as prayed for in the notice of motion dated 27th of August, 1973. 21. Mr. 20. It is plaintiffs case, as the appellant before me that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court was in error in refusing to grant him an injunction as prayed for in the notice of motion dated 27th of August, 1973. 21. Mr. Walawalkar, the learned Advocate for the appellant, has stated that the appellant has filed this suit as a suit under Order 21 Rule 103 of the Civil Procedure Code and the right which he claims to the present possession of the property and which he seeks to establish by this suit is based on the two documents, that is to say, an Agreement of Assignment dated the 4th of July, 1949, Ex. A, and the photostat copy of a letter dated the 4th of July, 1953, which is Exh. B. 22. The second contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant is that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court has gone wrong in coming to the conclusion that defendant No. 9 Ratanbai Beaverwalla is the plaintiffs mother in the face of the plaintiffs contention that she is not his mother and that his mother is a lady by the name of Ratanbai Dhanjishaw Zilla. The contention is that there is no evidence on record on the basis of which the learned Judge of the City Civil Court could come to the conclusion that defendant No. 9 in the plaintiffs mother. According to the learned Advocate for the appellant, the two documents shows prima facie that the plaintiff has a right to the present possession of the suit property so that pending the filing, hearing and determination of the suit, the appellant would be entitled to an injunction restraining the trustees of the Parsi Panchayat from taking possession from him of the said room and land under the eviction order against defendant No. 9. 23. Mr. Walawalkar says that until it is proved that defendant No. 9 is his mother and that he was in possession of the property through her, the eviction order obtained by the trustees cannot be executed against the plaintiff. 24. Mr. Zariwalla who appears for respondents Nos. 1 to 7, original defendants Nos. 23. Mr. Walawalkar says that until it is proved that defendant No. 9 is his mother and that he was in possession of the property through her, the eviction order obtained by the trustees cannot be executed against the plaintiff. 24. Mr. Zariwalla who appears for respondents Nos. 1 to 7, original defendants Nos. 1 to 7, that is to say, the trustees of the Parsi Panchayat, has contended that first of all the suit from which the present appeal arises, as filed, is not maintainable and that in any event the suit as filed is not a suit under Order 21, Rule 103 of the Civil Procedure Code. 25. Now, at this stage it requires to be noticed that when the suit was lodged in the City Civil Court on the 27th of August, 1973 it contained a prayer, being prayer (a), in the following words:--- "That it may be declared that the plaintiff uses and occupies the said piece of land in his own right and/ or under the said agreement dated 4th July, 1949, admeasuring approximately 300 sq. yds. with structure admeasuring 27 x 25 or thereabouts standing thereon with common passage bearing survey No. 434 (part) on the Babulnath Road and known as Khareghat Colony, Bombay, as per the plan attached;" The plaint also contained the necessary averments seeking to show that the plaintiff had a right de hors the judgment-debtor to remain in the present possession. It would appear, however, that when the plaint was scrutinised by the Registrar of the City Civil Court, a question arose as to the Court-fee payable and in the events that happened prayer (a) was deleted, by the plaintiff, the rest of the prayers re-numbered and the suit was thereafter admitted. 26. In other words, there is no prayer in the suit, as filed, for a declaration that the plaintiff had a right which he claimed to the present possession of the property and that, right was his own wish and or under the two documents on which the plaintiff was seeking to base his claim. 27. 26. In other words, there is no prayer in the suit, as filed, for a declaration that the plaintiff had a right which he claimed to the present possession of the property and that, right was his own wish and or under the two documents on which the plaintiff was seeking to base his claim. 27. The only substantial prayer which is left is the former prayer (b) that it be declared that the warrant of possession in Ejectment Application No. 600/E of 1962 filed in the Small Causes Court, Bombay, was not executable against the plaintiffs suit property at 32-M, Khareghat Colony, Bombay, and that the same was illegal, void and bad in law. Then follows other prayers for a permanent order and injunction against the trustees restraining them from taking possession under the order of the Small Cause Court in the eviction proceedings. 28. The next contention of Zaiwalla is that the two Documents on which reliance has been placed by the plaintiff in respect of the alleged right to remain in possession independently of defendant No. 9 are such a suspicious nature that no reliance can be placed thereon and that in any event a prima-facie case has not been made out by the plaintiff. Mr. Zaiwalla contended that the scrutiny of the two documents even showed that a false case was being put up by the plaintiff. 29. Now, first of all there can be no doubt that before the Court can grant an injunction the plaintiff must make out a prima-facie case. Assuming that the suit, which the plaintiff has filed, is a suit, under Order 21, Rule 103 of the Civil Procedure Code and the object of the suit is to establish the plaintiffs own right to remain in possession, then it is clear that the plaintiffs claim to remain in possession is based on the document dated the 4th of July, 1949, a copy of which is at Exh. A to the plaint, and the original of which is also before the Court. 30. As the learned Judge of the City Civil Court has observed, it is interesting to look at the original document. 31. The document, which is said to be an Agreement of Assignment is executed on a stamp paper of ???? A to the plaint, and the original of which is also before the Court. 30. As the learned Judge of the City Civil Court has observed, it is interesting to look at the original document. 31. The document, which is said to be an Agreement of Assignment is executed on a stamp paper of ???? and the endorsement of the General Stamp Office shows that it was issued on the 30th of April, 1949 to one "D.D. Tanna, Advocate", but it is clear that the document has not been either drawn up or attested by this Advocate. After the title of the document the words "858 sq. yards, LAND STRUCTURE as SHOWING in PLAN" are added in red ink so as to form part of the heading. But this endorsement has not been initialled. There are several alterations and additions, some in red ink and some in black ink, but none of them are initialled. 32. In the third line of the first paragraph there is a correction in ink and a typed portion is changed into "A.H." in front of the name Wadia. In the second paragraph as to the measurement of the piece of land a typed figure has been changed to "8" so that it now reads "800". The Survey Number which was left blank has been filled in as "7305". The document is typed on both sides of the stamp paper and even on the reverse of the stamp-mark, which is normally not done, and as the learned Judge of the City Civil Court observed, "There are some red ink erasures". The period of the number of years during which the balance amount of Rs. 18,000/- may be paid, is altered from some figure to "30" and the words (THIRTY ONLY), are added in black ink plus figure "80" is again entered. There are no initials at the corrections, assuming that the number has been changed from some number to "30". Again in paragraph 5 whatever period was typed in was changed to "30" in black over red ink and a date "4-7-1979" is written an hand in reddish-blackish ink. Again two further dates are introduced on the side to the right as "4-7-1949 to 4-7-1979". 33. In the typed schedule the piece of plot admeasuring "800 sq. yard." as originally filled in is changed to "300 sq. Again two further dates are introduced on the side to the right as "4-7-1949 to 4-7-1979". 33. In the typed schedule the piece of plot admeasuring "800 sq. yard." as originally filled in is changed to "300 sq. yard" and the words "THREE HUNDRED SQUARE YARDS ONLY" are added in red ink. 34. The document does not appear to have been typed by a profession typist or drawn up by a legal practitioner. That of course, would not affect its validity, but at this stage when a prima facie case is sought to be establish, the nature and the get up of the document has its relevance. 35. Now, there are two significant factors, which may be noticed: one is that the document does not bear any signature of the alleged assignor. Under the typed words "Signed and Delivered by the Assignor in the presence of" there is a writing in a form of scrawl which could be read as "For A.B. Wadia". Even assuming that it could be read so, there is no doubt that the word "For" is there. Below that there is no signature as such, but slightly to the left there is a handwritten word which could be read as "witnesses" and in line with that word there is an illegible scrawl, the first letters of that scrawl could be "Did" or "Dw". It can, therefore, be property contended, as has been done by the defendants that there is no signature to the document in so far as the alleged assignor is concerned. On the right hand side of the second page of this document under the words "Signed and Delivered by the purchaser in the presence of" is what appears to be the signature of the plaintiff "Pestonjee Dhunjishaw", but there is no signature of any witness. 36. Then there is a typed matter on the right side margin of the second page, that is to say, in the right hand side margin are the typed words "I say received the within mentioned amount of Rs. 2000/- as an advance from the within named purchaser, Shri Pestonji Dhanji Sha Zilla". 36. Then there is a typed matter on the right side margin of the second page, that is to say, in the right hand side margin are the typed words "I say received the within mentioned amount of Rs. 2000/- as an advance from the within named purchaser, Shri Pestonji Dhanji Sha Zilla". Below these words there is some handwriting and the word on the left could be read as "Witness" and to the right of this word there is again a signature in the form of a scrawl, which is illegible, but under this scrawl there is a word which could be read as "Advocate". To the right side of this typed endorsement as to the receipt of Rs. 2000/- there is a revenue stamp of one Anna, on which there is some handwriting which could be read as "A. H. Wadia" with the word "for" before and the word "Khot" after it. 37. Mr. Zaiwalla has, in my view, properly contended that the document in not even signed by anyone and all that has been done is that some one has written the words "for A. H, Wadia". 38. The other significant factor which requires to be noticed is that somebody who is clearly not an Architect has prepared a plan of the property which refers to Cadestral Survey No. 434 (part) and shows "H.A. Wadia C.P. Wadia" as "Lessor" To "P.D. Zilla" who is shown as "Lessee". This plan also mentions the house 23 x 25 with 300 sq. yards. A line is drawn under these words and then appear the words and then appear the words "Open land 697 sq. yards". 39. On the plan there is a similar scrawl as noticed on the original document and it could be read as "for Wadia". At the foot of the Plan, there is another sketch of a room with a front view and a side view and on left drawn in red ink is a sketch which is preferred to as a "Seal of C. Wadia and N. Wadia" and could represent the sun rising out of the waters with a hammer resting on the sun. Curiously this so-called seal is freely drawn by hand and, therefore, does not appear to be a seal at all. 40. Curiously this so-called seal is freely drawn by hand and, therefore, does not appear to be a seal at all. 40. Lastly, on the left hand corner of this so-called Plan of the property is the misspelt word "surveyor" and below that is another scrawl which could suggest "Modak Co." with the words "Engr" below it, which could suggest Engineer and then there is date 16-6-1969. 41. I must confess that this is perhaps the crudest document that I have yet seen and it is obvious that it could never have been prepared by a professional man. 42. It requires to be noticed that the person who has prepared this document does not seem to have any ideas as to the area of the property which is sought to be agreed so be assigned. The document begins with "858 sq. yards", the next figure is "800 sq. yards" and lastly the figure is "300 sq. yards." 43. In the plan annexed to the document, the house is described as 27 x 25 in front of which words "300 sq. yards" is written, yet below it the area is shown as "open land 697 sq. yards". 44. The learned Judge of the City Civil Court has very carefully scrutinized the document and had come to the conclusion that on the face of it is a got-up document. 45. I have seen the document myself and I am not persuaded to take a different view. 46. It is also significant that the alleged assignor, who, according to the document, claims to be the absolute owner of the property comprised therein has not even been served with the Notice of Motion. His address is somewhat vaguely shown as at Station Road, Kurla, and in his inept effort to make out a prima facie case the plaintiff has not chosen to consider it necessary to produce an affidavit from this Mr. Wadia or anyone on his behalf to say that the property mentioned in the document was owned by him and that in 1949 he executed the alleged agreement. Exh. A, in favour of the plaintiff. 47. I have already mentioned that whoever has prepared the document is not even sure as to what is the area of the property and it varies from 300 sq. yards, 697 sq. yards to 800 sq. yards and 858 sq. yards. Exh. A, in favour of the plaintiff. 47. I have already mentioned that whoever has prepared the document is not even sure as to what is the area of the property and it varies from 300 sq. yards, 697 sq. yards to 800 sq. yards and 858 sq. yards. There is also the fact that the consideration said to have been agreed upon was a constant figure of Rs. 20,000/-. 48. Even prima facie there is nothing to show that the plaintiff paid Rs. 2000/- to the said A. H. Wadia because the receipt on the document also does not bear any signature excepting the words in handwriting which could be read as "for A.H. Wadia Khot". In the plaint the plaintiff has alleged that he paid a further sum of Rs. 10,000/-, but no evidence of any witness has been produced to enable the Court even to crime to a prima facie conclusion that the plaintiff had the money, that the plaintiff paid the money and as to whom it was paid 49. Then there is the aspect of possession. Immediately one notices a glaring contradiction. The document, Exh. A, recites in paragraph 3 thereof that the assignor has handed over the physical possession of the said property with structure standing thereon with all the rights and privileges, etc. But it is the plaintiffs case that he received possession only in 1953 on the basis of a letter written by A.H. Wadia Khot, Kurla, and the date is shown as 4-7-1953. It is addressed to "the Secretary," whatever that may mean. There is no indicating as to which Secretary it is addressed to or whose Secretary the addressee is supposed to be. The body of the letter reads as follows :--- "Please do needful and handover the possession of one block in Rustomjees property at Khareghat Colony, Chopate Bunde, This P. D. Zilla is our old client and is the owner of sailing ships, Mubarak and Shajabhan. "Do the needful and helpful to Zilla." Then after the body of the letter there are the typed words "Yours truly" and below that the typed word "Wadia" without any initials. In between there is the usual scrawl which is illegible. 50. How, curiously on this very letter the following words appears below the word "Wadia" and are typed "Received possession the said block at Khareghat Colony"......"Thanking You", "P. D. Zilla". In between there is the usual scrawl which is illegible. 50. How, curiously on this very letter the following words appears below the word "Wadia" and are typed "Received possession the said block at Khareghat Colony"......"Thanking You", "P. D. Zilla". Just above the words "thanking you" is the signature probably of the plaintiff and below the typed words "P. D. Zilla" is the date "4-9-1953". 51. It requires to be mentioned that when the learned Judge of the City Civil Court was considering this letter he was referring to the copy as annexed to the plaint which copy erroneously refers to the word "Pestonji" instead of "Rustamji". That is why the learned Judge of the City Civil Court has not enquired as to who is this Rustamji. Advocate for both the sides have not been able to enlighten me as to who this Rustamji is and how this letter has any bearing on the suit property. 52. In my view it is also significant that although the letter is addressed to no specific person but to some Secretary it has also not referred to any particular block. The plaintiff has made an endorsement in typed-letters that he has received possession of the "said block." The question at once arise as to what is the meaning of the words "the said block". Curiously, in his pleadings he plaintiff has averted that he received possession and it is his claim that he received possession of the suit property on the 4th of July, 1953, whereas Exh. E shows the date under his signature as 4-9-1953, that is to say, two months thereafter. 53. It requires to be noticed that the plaintiffs case is based on these documents and these documents alone. It is true that at this stage we are concerned only with prima facie case, but I am unable to persuade myself that these documents can be said to make out a prima facie case of the right which the plaintiff claims, viz. that he acquired this property from one A.H. Wadia, who claimed to be the absolute owner thereof. 54. It requires to be repeated that the description of the property is itself vague. that he acquired this property from one A.H. Wadia, who claimed to be the absolute owner thereof. 54. It requires to be repeated that the description of the property is itself vague. Apart from the fact that the 8th defendant has not been examined or an affidavit obtained from him, the plaintiff has not even cared to serve him for the purpose of the notice of motion, and to show the plaintiffs prima-facie entitlement, and yet in his affidavit in support of the notice of motion the plaintiff has stated that he occupied the said premises in his occupation "in my own right under the said agreement of assignment dated 4th July, 1949." 55. As a matter of fact, I find myself in substantial agreement with the learned Judge of the City Civil Court that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case and that the two documents Exhs. A and B, are even on bare examination so suspicious that at this stage at least no reliance can be placed by the Court on them. The learned Judge was right, in my opinion, when he observed :--- "From all this it appears to me that the document Ex. A which is produced in original is a completely unreliable document; even the language of the document, the tenor of it, the way in which it is drawn, the corrections that are made, the discrepancy in the area, the nature of the signature, the manner in which the stamp paper is obtained, makes me draw a reasonable inference that the document is a bogus document got up by the plaintiff." 57. The next point which requires discussions the nature of the suit which the plaintiff has filed. According to the plaintiff it is a suit under Order 21, Rule 103 of the Civil Procedure Code and that what the plaintiff is trying to do is to exercise his right under Order 21, Rule 103, viz, the right which he claims to the present possession of the property, this right, according to the plaintiff, being the right given to him under the agreement of assignment Exh. A read with the letter of possession, Exh. B. 58. A read with the letter of possession, Exh. B. 58. Now, it requires to be notice that under Order 21, Rule 103 it is in terms provided that when an order is made under Rule 98 or Rule 99 or Rule 101, such an order shall be conclusive but subject to the result of any suit which any party not being a judgment-debtor may institute to establish his independent right to remain in possession of the property. 59. I have mentioned that the suit as prepared may have been considered to be a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, but it has been noted that before the suit was instituted and admitted prayer (a) was deleted so that when that was done, it could be contended and it may still be contended that the suit being Suit No. 6621 of 1973, is not a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, and that if that is so then the order which was made by the Small Causes Court in the obstructionist proceedings shall remain conclusive. 60. In order that the suit may be considered to be a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, it must be a suit to establish a right of the plaintiff to remain in possession de hors defendant No. 9 against whom the eviction order was obtained by defendants Nos. 1 to 7 as trustees of Parsi Panchayat. By deleting prayer (a) and confining his prayer to a declaration that the warrant of possession is not executable against the plaintiffs alleged property, viz. 22-K, Khareghat Colony, and that the said warrant of possession was illegal, void and bad in law, the plaintiff has altered the very nature of the suit and what he is seeking to do now is to really ask the Court to sit in appeal against the order made in obstructionist proceedings. 61. At one stage Mr. Zaiwalla seems to suggest that if there was any dispute as to identity of property, then such a dispute can only be a matter for the executing Court. But he then appreciated that such a question did not arise in the present proceedings because the only question was whether the suit as filed by the plaintiff can be said to be a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, or not. But he then appreciated that such a question did not arise in the present proceedings because the only question was whether the suit as filed by the plaintiff can be said to be a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, or not. If it is a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, then the decision in the suit, if favourable to the plaintiff, would override the order passed by the Small Causes Court in obstructionist proceedings. If it is not a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, then the order of the Small Causes Court shall remain conclusive. 62. Mr. Mahuvakar has argued that even after deleting the prayer (a), the suit still remains as one under Order 21, Rule 103. It would not be proper to decide this point conclusively in these proceedings, but prima facie if regard is to be had to the words of Rule 103, then the plaintiffs suit must be one where he seeks to establish a right independent of the judgment debtor and on the basis of which he seeks to assert his claim to the present possession of the property. 63. If on the suit as framed the plaintiff will not be entitled to relief in terms of prayer (a), which has been deleted then it is somewhat difficult to appreciate how he can succeed in establishing the right contemplated by Rule 103. 64. I may mention the Mr. Walavalkar seemed to suggest that the mere possession of the property was sufficient to protect the plaintiff. According to Mr. Walavalkar, a person in possession has a prima facie right to remain unless there is an order of the Court against him or that there is an order against the third person through whom he claims. 65. Now, broadly speaking this may be so, but it is to be remembered that unless the plaintiff establishes his right as contemplated under Order 21, Rule 103, the order under Order 21, Rule 28 is conclusive. This would mean that the Small Causes Court has already held that the plaintiff was in possession of the property as a son of defendant No. 9 against whom the eviction order was passed. That order and findings conclusive until and unless the plaintiff succeeds in establishing his right as contemplated by Order 21, Rule 103. This would mean that the Small Causes Court has already held that the plaintiff was in possession of the property as a son of defendant No. 9 against whom the eviction order was passed. That order and findings conclusive until and unless the plaintiff succeeds in establishing his right as contemplated by Order 21, Rule 103. Therefore, at this stage and so far as the City Civil Court and this Court is concerned the question whether defendant No. 9 Ratanbai Beaverwalla was person through whom the plaintiff claims and that, therefore. He could be removed under the eviction order as has already been determined will remain conclusive subject only to the result of the suit, if it be a suit under Order 21, Rule 103. In my view, therefore, it was not necessary for the learned Judge of the City Civil Court nor is it necessary for this Court to decide whether defendant No. 9 Ratanbai Beaverwalla is the Plaintiffs mother or not. At the moment, the plaintiff must establish prima facie a right to remain in possession independently of judgment-debtor and that right obviously depends on the two documents which have already been discussed in detail. I have held that they do not disclose a prima-facie case sufficient for the purpose of granting an injunction. 66. It requires to be noticed that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court at the request of both the parties had inspected the site and noticed that the room of which the plaintiff claims possession was a part of larger building and that the learned Judge had also noticed a marble tablet outside the wall of the property from which it could be seen that the property was claimed by the trustees. Mr. Mahauvakar has complained that he had no opportunity to explain the presence of this marble tablet. It was also brought to my attention by the learned Counsel for the defendants Nos. 1 to 7 that an assertion in the affidavit in reply that the entire property belonged to the trustees and that they are shown as owners in all relevant Government and Municipal records has not been controverted by the plaintiff in his affidavit in rejoinder to the defendants affidavit in reply. 1 to 7 that an assertion in the affidavit in reply that the entire property belonged to the trustees and that they are shown as owners in all relevant Government and Municipal records has not been controverted by the plaintiff in his affidavit in rejoinder to the defendants affidavit in reply. It is not necessary to consider this aspect of the matter because I have already held that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case that he has a right, which he claims to the present possession of the property. 67. In my view the learned Judge of the City Civil Court was right in dismissing the Plaintiffs notice of motion with costs. 68. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 69. Respondents Nos. 1 to 7 not to execute the eviction order for four weeks from today. 70. Mr. Mhauvakar on behalf of the appellants undertakes that notice will be given to respondents Nos. 1 to 7 if the appellant should decide to adopt any further proceedings, which he may be entitled to. 71. The original documents Exhs. A and B, to be kept in a sealed cover and delivered to the Registrar of the City Civil Court when the papers are sent down. -----