Judgment :- VEERASWAMI 1. These appeals, arising out of a suit under S. 92, C.P.C., and by defendants 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9 who are trustees among others, one directed against a decree directing a scheme to be settled and asking for a draft scheme and other against a decree settling a scheme for Sir Thiagaraja College, Madras, and allied institutions. In a partition document, dated 19th May 1917, executed by Pitti Pedda Thyagaraja Chetti and Pitti Chinna Thyagaraja Chetti, the properties described in the C schedule thereto were set apart for charitable and other purposes. This trust has since grown considerably, the properties belonging to which are now estimated to be worth somewhere near half a crore of rupees. Originally what was a small school in the first decade of this century, developed by 1950 into Sir Theagaraja College, High School and an Elementary School. About 2000 students are studying in the day college, 1220 students in the evening college, 1900 students in the High School and 100 in the elementary school. These institutions provide for different courses of study and are recognised by the University of Madras. On 12th November 1931, Stone, J. on an application under Ss. 35 and 36 of the Indian Trustees Act, 1866, appointed additional trustees and by another order dated 26th November 1931, the same learned Judge settled a scheme and provided for filling up vacancies which may arise in the Trust Board, He directed that there should be a Board of Trustees consisting of 7 members, out of whom one to be elected by the teaching staff of the school, two to be elected by the Councillors of the Corporation, two to be co-opted by the Board of Trustees and two to be appointed by the adult male members of the family of the donors. The scheme fixed the tenure of office, made provision for eligibility, of re-election, and cessation of trusteeship. By another application under the said section the scheme was amended by an order of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. dated 16th July 1953. The scheme fixed the tenure of office, made provision for eligibility, of re-election, and cessation of trusteeship. By another application under the said section the scheme was amended by an order of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. dated 16th July 1953. As amended, the scheme provided for a Board of 12 members, who should be appointed in the manner prescribed, that is to say, two to be appointed by the adult male members of the family of the donors, two, of whom one to be elected by the teaching staff of the school and another by the College staff, two to be elected by the Councillors of the Corporation of Madras, one to be elected from among the old students by the old students of the Thyagaraja Educational Institutions, one to be nominated by the Syndicate of the University of Madras, two to be co-opted by the Board of Trustees and two ex-officio members, namely, Principal of the College and the Headmaster of the High School. The scheme further provided for the order of election, tenure of office, eligibility for re-election, cessation of trusteeship and also provided for the power of the Board of trustees to make such laws or by-laws not inconsistent with the scheme as were necessary for the administration and management of the college and school. Substantially, the scheme, as framed by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. in modification of the earlier one, has been in force ever since, except for some minor alterations effected by orders of court later. Now, the plaintiffs claiming to be old students, instituted the suit with the consent of the learned Advocate General for a declaration that the scheme settled by Stone, J. and later modified by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. as aforesaid, was null and void and not in accordance with law, for settling a scheme, to remove defendants 2, 8 and 9 from the office of trustees, to appoint new trustees and vest the properties in them and for certain interlocutory directions. The plaint, therefore, was based on the allegations that the scheme, which was in force before, was invalid and it was therefore, necessary to have a fresh one settled, that there was mismanagement, misfeasance, malfeasance including misappropriation and breach of trust and further that there was also favouritism and constant confusion as between the members of the trust Board and that it was also necessary, because of their misconduct, to remove defendants 2, 8 and 9 from the office of trusteeship. The suit was resisted strenuously. At the trial, as many as 11 issues were framed. Sethuraman, J., who tried the suit, found that the plaintiffs bad interest in the trust and were entitled to maintain the suit, that the scheme settled by Stone, J. and modified by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. under Ss. 35 and 36 of the Indian Trustees Act, was invalid, as the Act did not authorise settling such a scheme, that the allegations of mismanagement, breach of trust, malfeasance, misfeasance, misappropriation, confusion, favouritism and the rest were not established, that the allegations of misconduct against defendants 2, 8 and 9 were also not established and that in view of the fact that he had found the earlier scheme to be void and without authority, it was necessary to frame a fresh scheme of management. He, therefore, called for a draft scheme and later settled the scheme of management, which, as we said at the out-set, are the subject-matter of the two appeals. 2. The appellants strenuously contest the finding of the learned trial Judge, that the plaintiffs had the locus standi to institute the suit under S. 92 C.P.C. The argument is put in two ways. One is that the plaintiffs, even as old students, which is not admitted, have no interest in the trust as envisaged by S. 92 C.P.C. and that secondly in any case, the motive of the plaintiffs was to espouse the cause of the Principal of the College and to support him. Our attention has been invited to two pending suits in the City Civil Court, in one of which the second defendant, as plaintiff, is contesting the no confidence motion against him brought at the Board of management, and in the other an order made by the Board of Trustees suspending the Principal was under challenge. Mr. Our attention has been invited to two pending suits in the City Civil Court, in one of which the second defendant, as plaintiff, is contesting the no confidence motion against him brought at the Board of management, and in the other an order made by the Board of Trustees suspending the Principal was under challenge. Mr. Vasantha Pai for the appellants stated that the plaintiffs have not even established that they are old students, which they should, have, according to him, proved by deposing to that effect. Since they did not do so, as it happened in Gayanchand v. Jagdish Chandra 40 A.L.J. 334, the suit should, on this limited ground, be dismissed. We are unable to accept this contention. The plaintiffs have averred that they are old students of the college and there is no specific denial of this in the written statement. The appellants could only draw our attention to the general denial contained in Para 1 of the written statement. Then again, it is said that the plaintiffs are not even on the electoral rolls of the old students of the college and their have no locus standi to institute the suit. It may be that it would have been better if the plaintiffs had gone into the box and proved the fact that they were the old students of the college. But their failure to do so does not lead us to the inference that they are not old students of the college, which is not seriously challenged in the written statement. Further, Issue No. 1 itself has proceeded on the basis that the plaintiffs were old students of Thygaraya College, and the only point under that issue to be decided was whether, as such old students, they had any subsisting or real interest in the trust, so as to enable them to maintain the suit under S. 92 C.P.C. We agree with the learned trial Judge that the plaintiffs were old students of the college and the fact that their names are not found in the electoral rolls of the old students will not derogate from the interest they have as such old students of the college. 3. The next question is whether, as old students of the college, they can be said to have an interest in the trust. 3. The next question is whether, as old students of the college, they can be said to have an interest in the trust. Under S. 539 C.P.C. 1888, the expression ‘persons having direct interest to the trust’ was used. But in S. 92 C.P.C. 1908, we find the phraseology ‘having an interest in the trust’. This change in the phraseology may not, however, make much difference to the true import to the word ‘interest’ in respect of the trust. All that it, in our opinion, means is that the persons figuring as plaintif fs in a suit under S. 92 must have an interest in the trust, that is to say, an interest special or particular as distinct from the generality of the interest which the public may have in the trust. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar v. Parameswaran Unni 42 Mad. 360 decided by a Full Bench of this Court, held that ‘interest’ under S. 92 C.P.C. denoted an interest which was substantial and not sentimental or remote and that the English decisions under Lord Romillys Act, which laid down that the petitioners under the Act must have an interest which was clear or direct, should be a guidance in interpreting the provisions of S. 92 C.P.C. That was a case where a Hindu residing in Madras and another residing in Tellicherry instituted a suit in the District Court, North Malabar, under S. 92 C.P.C. in respect of a Hindu temple situated in Tellicherry in North Malabar, after obtaining the requisite sanction of the Advocate General. The former would appear to have gone to the temple for worship on one or two occasions in the past and might possibly go there to worship in future if business took him to Tellicherry. When a question of maintainability of the suit by them was raised, one of them who had claimed to have worship in the temple relied on his right as a Hindu to worship in the temple as entitling him to institute the suit. The majority held that though, as a Hindu, he might have the right to worship in the temple, he had not, on that ground alone, the interest required by S. 92 of the Code, to maintain the suit. It is obvious from this decision that the general interest a person, as a Hindu, may have in a temple in that he might possibly worship. It is obvious from this decision that the general interest a person, as a Hindu, may have in a temple in that he might possibly worship. In the temple, would not by itself be sufficient to satisfy the requisite that he must be a person who has an interest in the trust. In other words, something more than the generality of interest, which he had, should be established as a kind of a special factor to establish interest as is required by S. 92. This is what Wallis, C.J. observed: “I am clearly of opinion that to entitle him to sue under that section, it is not enough that the plaintiff is a Hindu by religion, but he must have a clear interest in the particular trust over and above that which millions of his country men may be said to have by virtue of their religion.” The learned Chief Justice went on further: “That interest (interest for purposes of Lord Romillys Act) it seems to me, if the provisions is not to be altogether illusory, must arise from some special relation in Which the plaintiff stands to the endowment in question as compared with the whole body of religious community throughout India; in other words, he must be in a position to derive some benefit from the trust in respect of which the suit is filed.” We are not quite sure whether the last requisite, namely, that the person must be in a position to derive some benefit from the trust in respect of which the suit is filed, in order to qualify himself that he is a person having interest in the trust, is entirely correct. All that the majority of the Full Bench meant to say was that the plaintiff must stand on a special relationship with the trust as distinct from the rest of the community in respect of the suit trust, so that he may have a particular direct relationship with the institution. To hold that any member of the public, who may have a distinct or Indirect connection or relationship with the institution, is a person having interest in the trust, would dilute the requirement of S. 92. That was the ratio of T.R. Ramachandra Iyer v. Parameswaran Unni 42 Mad. 360. Vaidyanatha Iyer v. Swaminatha Iyer 47 Mad. To hold that any member of the public, who may have a distinct or Indirect connection or relationship with the institution, is a person having interest in the trust, would dilute the requirement of S. 92. That was the ratio of T.R. Ramachandra Iyer v. Parameswaran Unni 42 Mad. 360. Vaidyanatha Iyer v. Swaminatha Iyer 47 Mad. 884; 70 L.W. 803 a decision of the Privy Council, agreed with the view of the learned Chief Justice in T.R. Ramachandra Iyer v. Parameswaran Unni 42 Mad. 360 and said that to hold that the bare possibility, however remote, that a Hindu might desire to resort to a particular temple, gave him an interest in the trust, appeared to defeat the object with which the Legislature inserted those words in the section. The Privy Council noted the change in the language employed by S. 539 of the old Code and S. 92 of the new Code. On facts, in that case, the respondents were descendants in female lines of a Hindu who was the founder of a chattram, which was a public charity. The respondents before the Privy Council, with the consent of the Advocate General, instituted the suit under S. 92 to remove the trustees. The Privy Council held that the respondents were ‘persons having an interest in the trust’ within the meaning of S. 92 and consequently were entitled to maintain the suit, even though they might never themselves make use of the chattram. They came to that conclusion because the plaintiffs were descendants, although only in the female line of the founder of th e chattram, and that gave them an interest in the proper administration of the trust sufficient to enable them to maintain the suit. Harnam Singh v. Gudial Singh A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1415 also reviewed the earlier decided cases and accepted the view of Wallis, C.J. in Ramachandra Iyer v. Parameswaran Unni 42 Mad. 360 as correct. The whole object of S. 92 is to prevent people from interfering, by virtue of the Section, with the administration of charitable trusts merely in the interest of others and without any real interest of their own. 4. In the instant case, the plaintiffs, as old students of the college, would naturally be interested in the proper administration of the entire trust. 4. In the instant case, the plaintiffs, as old students of the college, would naturally be interested in the proper administration of the entire trust. As old students they stand distinguished from the generality of the community and that association gives them a particular direct and distinctive Interest in the public charitable trust, to which their old Alma Mater belongs and in the proper administration of which they will be interested. What is more is that in the scheme settled by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., old students of the college were entitled to elect from among themselves one as a trustee to represent them on the Board of Trust. We are satisfied, therefore, that the plaintiffs are persons having interest in the trust and have locus standi to maintain the suit. 5. It is next pressed for the appellants that the plaintiffs were motivated in instituting the suit to satisfy the private vendetta of the principal of the College, who is an ex-officio trustee and in order to support his case. We have carefully looked into the record and do not find any basis for this contention. It is true that if that was the motive with which the plaintiffs came to court, they would not be entitled to maintain the suit. In Parmathanand Saraswati v. Tripathi A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2141 it was pointed out:— “It is clear that the plaintiffs are not suing to vindicate the right of the public but are seeking a declaration of their individual or personal rights or the individual personal rights of any other person or persons in whom they are interested, then the suit would be outside the scope of Sec. 92.” That is not the case here. We have already mentioned the broad scope of the plaint, which is based on two main allegations (1) that the existing scheme is invalid and, therefore, it is necessary to frame a fresh scheme for the proper administration of the trust and (2) that the Board of Trustees was guilty of mismanagement, breach of trust, malfeasance, misfeasance etc. That is certainly not to vindicate the plaintiffs own interest or even that of the principal. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs had the necessary locus standi, since they had interest in the trust, and in this respect, they fully satisfy the requirement of S. 92 C.P.C. 6. That is certainly not to vindicate the plaintiffs own interest or even that of the principal. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs had the necessary locus standi, since they had interest in the trust, and in this respect, they fully satisfy the requirement of S. 92 C.P.C. 6. The next question is whether the finding of the learned trial Judge that the scheme settled by Stone, J. and amended by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. was invalid, is correct or not. The order of Stone, J., dated 12th November 1931, was made on a petition presented by P.T. Chengalvaraya Chetti and Rao Bahadur P.T. Kumarasami Chetti, both members of the family of the donors, for appointment of additional trustees and vesting the properties in them. Stone, J. by his order, directed that one, Dewan Bahadur C.V. Viswanatha Sastriar, M. C.M. Chidambaram Chettiar, K. Venkataswami Naidu, R. Krishnadass Lala and M.C. Munuswami Chetti, be appointed as additional trustees for the management of the trust, besides the petitioners who were existing trustees and that the trust properties be vested in and managed by the committee of management. The second order of Stone, J. dated 26th November 1931, was made on the same petition on the date to which it stood adjourned. The learned Judge directed a scheme to be settled and approved for filling up future vacancies in the Board of trustees appointed by his earlier order. In making these orders, the court purported to act in exercise of the powers under Ss. 35 and 36 of the Indian Trustees Act. Panehapakesa Ayyar J. in modifying the scheme by his order dated 16th July 1953, also purported to act under those sections. We may mention that on the day Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., had made his order, by virtue of Central Act 48 of 1952, the Indian Trustees Act 1866, bad been repealed with effect from 2nd August 1952. Sethuraman, J. was of opinion that Ss. 35 and 36 of the Indian Trustees Act did not give the court the power to validly make the above orders. With respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to agree with him. It is true that the preamble to the Indian Trustees Act, 1866 is rather vague, and would suggest that the Act is only limited to the scope envisaged by the preamble. With respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to agree with him. It is true that the preamble to the Indian Trustees Act, 1866 is rather vague, and would suggest that the Act is only limited to the scope envisaged by the preamble. From a perusal of the various provisions of the Act, we are led to think that they are of much wider scope than what is comprehended by the preamble. One thing is certain, and that is, that where to a trust and its management, Hindu Law will apply or any other personal law the provisions of the Act cannot be made use of contrary to such laws. Subject only to this, we are of opinion that Ss. 35 and 36 of the Act did give the necessary power under which Stone, J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. could validly make the orders which they did. The Act deals with various trusts and different contingencies. S. 3 defines when the powers under the Act could be exercised by the High Court. It says that the powers and authorities given by the Act to the High Court shall and may be exercised only in cases to which English law is applicable, and may be exercised with respect to property within the local limits of the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction of the said courts respectively. This section, in our opinion, does not mean that the powers and authorities could be applied or exercised only in respect of Englishmen or English trusts. Where personal laws, which may apply to a charitable trust, are not interfered with or do not come into conflict, there is room for English law to apply. In fact the laws relating to trusts of different kinds in this country have been largely borrowed from the English law. That this is the scope of the law and applicability as well as limitation thereto, has been brought out by some of the decided cases. Radha Kissen Chamaria v. Keshardeo Chamaria I.L.R. 1949-1 Cal. In fact the laws relating to trusts of different kinds in this country have been largely borrowed from the English law. That this is the scope of the law and applicability as well as limitation thereto, has been brought out by some of the decided cases. Radha Kissen Chamaria v. Keshardeo Chamaria I.L.R. 1949-1 Cal. 461 held that the Indian Trustees Act of 1866, excluded from its scope only such trusts as were created and governed wholly under Hindu and Mohammedan Law, to the incidents of which the principles of English law would not be applicable, and that where, however, the trust was in the English form and the application of the principles of English law would not violate any provision of Hindu Law, the Indian Trustees Act 1866 would be applicable and an application under that Act could be maintained, notwithstanding that the trust was for religious and charitable purposes or for the benefit of charitable or Hindu religious institutions. 7. S. 33 of the Act gave power to the High Court to make an order appointing new trustees. It says that in all cases in which it shall be expedient to appoint a new trustee or new trustees, and it shall be found inexpedient, difficult or impracticable so to do without the assistance of the High Court, it shall be lawful for the said court to make an order appointing a new trustee or new trustees, whether there be any existing trustee or trustees or not at the time of making such order, and, if there be such trustee or trustees, either in substitution for or in addition to him or them. It seems to us that this Section conferred a power which could be exercised summarily, and in the circumstances mentioned by the section. The second paragraph of S. 35 is important. It says that the person or persons who upon the making of such order shall be trustee or trustees, shall have the same rights and powers as he or they would have had if appointed by decree in a suit duly instituted. That means that the power of appointing new trustees is not confined to mere appointment, but its significance is fully brought out by the second paragraph. That means that the power of appointing new trustees is not confined to mere appointment, but its significance is fully brought out by the second paragraph. In our opinion, the order made by Stone J., by which he is not only appointed additional trustees but recognised the then existing two, and also framed what he called a brief scheme or management by which he provided for filling up vacancies, duration of the offices, etc., is valid. If the trustees appointed by exercise of the power under S. 35 shall have the same rights and powers as they would have, had they been appointed by a decree in a suit duly instituted, that would, in our opinion, cover the entire ambit of the trustees powers which may be controlled and guided and limited by the scheme of management. S. 36 gave the High Court the power to vest immovable property in the trustees appointed by the same court in exercise of its powers under S. 35. Here again, we have the second paragraph in the section, which says that such order shall have the same effect as if the person or persons who, before such order, was or were the trustee or trustees (if any) had duly executed all proper conveyances of such property for such estate. We agree that these two sections are not a substitute for S. 92, which relates to a suit. The powers under Ss. 35 and 36 were exercised on an application. That will meet the reasoning of Sethuraman, J., who thought that because of sub-S. (2), S. 92 of the orders made by Stone, J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. were invalid. Sub-S. (2) of S. 92 only provides that no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-S. (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section. The orders of Stone, J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. are not hit by sub-S. (2) of S. 92 which relates to institution of a suit for the reliefs contemplated by sub-S. (1) of S. 92. The applications made before Stone, J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. were not of that nature and the orders made by them were also not in a suit. We are of opinion, therefore, that the orders of the two learned Judges aforesaid were competent and were valid. The applications made before Stone, J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. were not of that nature and the orders made by them were also not in a suit. We are of opinion, therefore, that the orders of the two learned Judges aforesaid were competent and were valid. On that view, it is not necessary, to deal with the other contentions of the appellants based on Ledgard v. Bull 9 All. 191 and the fact of the orders having been in operation over a long period of years. 8. Sethuraman, J., came to the conclusion that a fresh scheme should be settled only because he found that the orders of Stone, J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. were incompetent and were invalid. The learned Judge has, after a full consideration of the allegations of mismanagement, breach of trust, misfeasance etc., and the related record of evidence, found that none of those allegations was established, either the allegations in paragraph 17 of the plaint or rest of the allegations directed against defendants 2, 8 and 9 in connection with the prayer to remove them from trusteeship. 9. We have been taken through parts of the judgment of Sethuraman, J., and the related evidence. We are of opinion that his finding that none of the allegations was proved is well-founded. Broadly speaking, these allegations are covered by issues 4 and 5 and relate to (1) the property in Korrukkupet, (2) construction of a building in the High school premises, (3) acts of favouritism, (4) absence of property qualification of the trustees, (5) impropriety of the Principal of the college and the Headmaster of the High school being members of the Board of management, (6) impropriety of there being two trustees from the family of Sir Thiagaraja Chetti contrary to the partition deed of 1917 and (7) alleged wrongful payment to the relations of Thiagaraja Chetti contrary to the object of the trust. So far as the first item is concerned, what appears to have happened is that in recent years some vagrants and boyees had come into occupation of this land. The charge is that the Board of trustees did not take any steps to remove them. But in these days, as we know, it is a common feature that those who are horseless, vagrants and others, who belong to the lower strata of society, trespass into others lands and persist in continued occupation thereof. The charge is that the Board of trustees did not take any steps to remove them. But in these days, as we know, it is a common feature that those who are horseless, vagrants and others, who belong to the lower strata of society, trespass into others lands and persist in continued occupation thereof. This is a problem which is commonly noticed these days. But, the defendants have shown that they have taken steps to have these people evicted, though somewhat belatedly. As to the construction of the building in the High school premises without calling for tenders, Sethuraman, J. has found that though it would be desirable to call for tenders, which would rule out the possibility of making an allegation of favouritism, he could not find any basis for the charge of favouritism or any loss to the institution. He considered that, on the record of evidence as it stands, he could not find fault with the Board of Management on this ground. We are inclined to agree with him. On the whole, there appears to be no impropriety or mismanagement or malversation of trust funds because in constructing a building no tenders were called for. The allegation of favouritism under item 3 relates to the appointment of one Ganapathi, nephew of the second defendant, who happened to be the President of the Trust Board. But then, as pointed out by Sethuraman, J., though Ganapathi was only a third class M.Sc., in Mathematics, he was recommended by the Principal and his appointment as Assistant Professor was made with the approval of the Board, and the Board had accepted the recommendations of the Principal. We find no serious impropriety on this score as well, for, in academic matters, the Board would be normally expected to be guided by the advice of the Principal The next item relates to the want of property qualification in the trustees. But, the scheme framed by Panchapskesa Ayyar, J. in modification of the earlier orders of Stone, J., proceeded not on property qualification but on certain other qualifications, which would well meet the requirement of the proper conduct of the affairs of the trust. But, the scheme framed by Panchapskesa Ayyar, J. in modification of the earlier orders of Stone, J., proceeded not on property qualification but on certain other qualifications, which would well meet the requirement of the proper conduct of the affairs of the trust. We also find no impropriety in the Principal of the College and the Headmaster of the school being members of the Board of Management, because this is a trust which is managing educational institutions, and their presence would be advisable and in fact, necessary. The trust deed itself provided for representation of the donors family on the Trust Board, and there was nothing wrong in two trustees being put on the Board who were from the family of Thyagaraja Chetti. The allegations that certain amounts were wrongly paid to the relations of Thiagaraja Chetti was also not made out, because though it left some acrimony between the parties, the matter was dealt with by the Board and ultimately no amount was paid to the relations. In the circumstances, therefore, we agree with Sethuraman, J., that the ground of mismanagement, breach of trust, misfeasance etc., for settling a fresh scheme falls to the ground. A great deal was sought to be made out of the fact that for the admission of a candidate to the college at the instance of one Dr. Murugesan and his brother-in-law, Shanmugbam, a sum of Rs. 1,000 was received as donation, and this was misappropriated eventually. We find that there was conflicting evidence on this point and that the donation itself was returned as acknowledged by Dr. Murugesan himself. No misappropriation was, therefore, established. 10. As the scheme as settled by Panchapakesa Ayyar J., was a valid one, as we have held it was, and the ground of mismanagement, breach of trust, etc., fails, there is no other reason for settling a fresh scheme on the basis of the plaint such as it has been presented. 11. We, therefore, allow the appeals. But before we part with the matter, we should like to observe that having seen a great deal of acrimony and fight, a tendency towards conflict as between members of the management, it will be in the interest of the trust that a fresh scheme is settled in a properly instituted suit and in a more peaceful surrounding and atmosphere. But before we part with the matter, we should like to observe that having seen a great deal of acrimony and fight, a tendency towards conflict as between members of the management, it will be in the interest of the trust that a fresh scheme is settled in a properly instituted suit and in a more peaceful surrounding and atmosphere. The scheme, such as it is, appears to be inadequate in certain particulars, though the lacuna may be filled up by-framing bye-laws which the Board has power to do. In the circumstances, we direct that the learned Advocate-General may look into the affairs of the administration of the trust, and if he felt advisable, himself institute a suit under S. 91, C.P.C. for settling a fresh scheme by the proper administration of the trust, since its foundation, has grown into such huge proportion. No costs.