ORDER Hari Swarup, J. - This petition has been moved by an erstwhile employee of the District Cooperative Federation Ltd., Ghazipur, against an order passed by the Administrator removing him from service. Petitioner was working as Assistant Accountant with the Federation. Under Section 35 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, the committee of management was superseded and an Administrator was appointed. The Administrator served on the petitioner a notice to show cause in respect of certain charges framed against him. The petitioner filed an explanation in reply to the charge-sheet on 14-4-72. On 16-4-1972 an order was passed by the Administrator stating that the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not satisfactory and that the petitioner could appear in person before the authority concerned on 18-4-1972.. In this notice it was mentioned that charges 1 and 2 had been satisfactorily explained qua a part of the amount, but there was no satisfactory explanation qua the remaining amounts. In respect of charges Nos. 3 and 5 it was stated that they had not been explained at all. Petitioner appeared before the Administrator on 18-4-1972 for personal hearing. He also produced some documents. The Administrator ultimately found that the charges had been established and accordingly passed the impugned order of dismissal. Petitioner has now come up before this Court against that order. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised four contentions: (1) that the order of dismissal has been passed by an authority not competent to pass the same, (2) that opportunity of hearing was not provided before the charges were held proved against the petitioner; (3) that the second show cause notice for imposing penalty was not given; and (4) that proceedings under Sections 70 and 71 of the Act having ended in favour of the petitioner the order was unjustified. 3. 3. The contention as regards the first point is that the order had been passed by the Administrator exercising the powers of the committee of management and not by the Board constituted under Section 122(1) of the Act which provides : "The State Government may constitute an authority or authorities, in such manner as may be prescribed, for the recruitment, training and disciplinary control of the employees of co-operative societies, or a class of co-operative societies and may require such authority or authorities to frame regulations regarding, recruitment emoluments, terms and conditions of service including disciplinary control of such employees and, subject to the provisions contained in Section 70, settlement of disputes between an employee of a cooperative society and the society." The relevant rule is No. 389-A, which runs as under : "The authority or authorities under Section 122 may be constituted by the State Government by notification published in the Official Gazette." On 4-3-1972 a notification was published in the Gazette regarding the constitution of the authority. The relevant portion thereof runs as under: "In pursuance of the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 122 of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (U.P. Act No. XI of 1966) read with Rule 389-A of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968 the Governor is pleased to constitute the following authority known as the U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board............... for the recruitment, training and disciplinary control of the employees of the Apex Level Societies Central or Primary Societies, whose area of operation extends to more than one District or State...........District Co-operative Federations " The notification thereafter provides that the Board shall consist of a chairman and two members to be appointed by the State Government. There is no evidence on behalf of the petitioner to show whether the appointments had been in fact made on the basis of this notification before the date of the order of dismissal. According to the respondents, the Board was not constituted and the Rules and Regulations were not framed till the date of the passing of the final order i.e. April 18, 1972. The regulations were framed and published in the U.P. Gazette dated July 3, 1973. According to the respondents, the Board was not constituted and the Rules and Regulations were not framed till the date of the passing of the final order i.e. April 18, 1972. The regulations were framed and published in the U.P. Gazette dated July 3, 1973. According to this notification the regulations had to take effect from the date of their publication in the Gazette and the regulation, if any, made under Section 122 of the Act was superseded with effect from that date. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that even in these regulations the authority of taking disciplinary proceedings and passing the order of dismissal has been vested in the committee of management whose powers in the present case are being exercised by the Administrator. 4. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that as soon as the notification is issued under Section 122 of the Act, the "authority" will be deemed to be constituted, and since thereafter the authority alone will have the power to pass the order. It is, however, not possible to accept the contention raised by him because the law cannot be expected to create a hiatus. The notification issued under Section 122 could have immediately created the authority, but it left the task of appointing the personnel to man the board to a future date. So long as these appointments were not made it could not be deemed that an authority had come to exist which may exercise the jurisdiction exercisable by it by reason of Section 122 of the Act. There is no denial in the rejoinder affidavit of the allegation in the counter affidavit that the Board had not been constituted before 18-4-1972. The assertion is that now, after the constitution of the Board, the order must be deemed to be bad. The Board itself had to frame regulations and to function according to them. The regulations had admittedly not been framed till July, 1973. The assertion is that now, after the constitution of the Board, the order must be deemed to be bad. The Board itself had to frame regulations and to function according to them. The regulations had admittedly not been framed till July, 1973. Section 132 (2) of the Act provides : "Any power, function or duty required to be exercised performed or discharged under this Act by an authority different from the authority provided for that purpose under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (Act II of 1912), shall until such authority is constituted or appointed under this Act, continue to be exercised, performed or discharged by the authority hitherto exercising, performing or discharging the power, function or duty and the Registrar shall have the power to take measures in the manner prescribed for the early constitution or appointment of the authority under this Act." In the present case as there was no complete constitution of the authority within the meaning of Section 122, it must be deemed that on the relevant date the power vested in the committee of management to take disciplinary proceedings and not in any other body. The power had always remained and still under the new regulations continues to remain with he committee of management. The Administrator is exercising the powers of the committee of management. The first contention, therefore, cannot be accepted. 5. As regards the opportunity of hearing, it is not denied that opportunity of oral hearing was provided and the petitioner actually led some evidence in support of his contention. The argument of learned counsel is that the evidence relied upon by the authority was not disclosed to the petitioner at any stage and hence there was in fact no enquiry. According to the petitioner only an opportunity of explanation was provided and not any opportunity of hearing. In support of his contention learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. P.C. Jain, AIR 1969 SC 983 = (1969 Lab IC 1380) wherein it was held that the facts sought to be proved must be laid down in the presence of the person against whom the enquiry is held and statements made behind the back of the person charged cannot be treated as substantive evidence. The other case relied upon by learned counsel was Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1111 . The other case relied upon by learned counsel was Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1111 . In this case it was held that the evidence to be relied upon against the petitioner should be taken in his presence so that he may have the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses and that no material should be relied upon against the petitioner without giving him an opportunity of explaining it. The principles laid down in these two cases do not seem to have been violated in the present case. The charges framed in this case, as well as the explanation given by the petitioner and the findings recorded by the Administrator do not go to show that any oral evidence was considered, only the records of the society and the judgment of the civil court were taken into account. The charge-sheet and the explanation submitted by the petitioner go to show that he had been given every opportunity to explain the documents. In the Phulbari Tea Estate case (supra) their Lordships, approving of an earlier decision of the Court in Union of India v. T.R. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882 , observed : "No material should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them." It has not been shown that any undisclosed material was utilised. In the present case the petitioner appeared before the Administrator and also produced the documents in his support and in rebuttal of the charges. In these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the petitioner was denied the opportunity of hearing so as to vitiate the enquiry. 6. Taking the last point, the contention of learned counsel is that certain matters which were the subject-matter of the present charge were referred to the arbitration of an Arbitrator under Sections 70 and 71 of the Act. Although the arbitrator had held against the petitioner in appeal it was held that the petitioner was not liable to pay the amount. Revisions against this appellate order are pending. The contention is that the appellate order should be deemed final. It is, however not open to this Court to set aside the order of dismissal on the ground that during arbitration proceedings petitioner was not held liable for the amounts. This cannot be the basis for holding that the order of dismissal passed earlier was illegal. The contention is that the appellate order should be deemed final. It is, however not open to this Court to set aside the order of dismissal on the ground that during arbitration proceedings petitioner was not held liable for the amounts. This cannot be the basis for holding that the order of dismissal passed earlier was illegal. Further, the charges in the present case were such which were not in fact the subject-matter of arbitration proceedings. According to charge No. 3, certain coal had been obtained from the railway, the petitioner had received it on behalf of the society but had shown in the Society's books a lesser quantity. The Society had to file a civil suit which was dismissed on the ground that the railway had supplied the entire goods. The decision of the civil court has been relied upon and the explanation given by the petitioner was not accepted. Another charge was that in connivance with Jeut Lal funds had been embezzled. The finding in the arbitration case is that Jeut Lal is liable and not the petitioner. The charge itself showed that the petitioner had so acted that misappropriation could be possible through Jeut Lal. Hence the arbitration case cannot be deemed to have acquitted the petitioner of the charges on the basis of which the removal order was passed. 7. There is also another charge about false maintenance of the proceedings of the society. This too has nothing to do with the arbitration matter. The order of dismissal cannot therefore be set aside on the ground that in proceedings under Sections 70 and 71 the liability against the petitioner has not been established. 8. The contention of learned counsel about the second show cause notice was based on R. 21. It provides that before a punishment awarded to an employee he should be given a notice of the proposed punishment. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated that this rule never came into force. Bye-law 36 provided that rules could be made by the board of directors subject to the approval of the Registrar. According to the counter-affidavit the Registrar never gave approval to the rules. But even if Rule 21 was operative it was not attracted in the present case because it was a case to which Rule 22 was applicable. Bye-law 36 provided that rules could be made by the board of directors subject to the approval of the Registrar. According to the counter-affidavit the Registrar never gave approval to the rules. But even if Rule 21 was operative it was not attracted in the present case because it was a case to which Rule 22 was applicable. According to Rule 22, where an employee is found guilty of misconduct as defined in this rule, no notice would be necessary as the only penalty impossible was that of dismissal. Relevant portion of R. 22 provides : "Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 21 above, if any employee is guilty of any misconduct as defined herein, he shall lie liable to be dismissed without notice or any compensation in lieu of notice. The following acts and omissions shall be treated as misconduct: (a) .......................... (b) Theft, fraud, or dishonesty in connection with the business or property of the District Co-operative Federation. (c) Wilful damage to or loss of goods or property of the District Co-operative Federation. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that if Rule 21 was not in force, Rule 22 too was not in force and hence the rights of the parties should be left to be controlled by principles of natural justice. He contends that after a person is found guilty, another opportunity should be given to him before he is punished. Fie has referred to the decision in Arunachalam Pillai v. R.D.O. Kovilpatti, (1968) 1 Lab LJ 776 (Mad). In that case the Court was considering Sections 7 and 8 of Act III of 1895 which provided for a second show cause notice. It was found that as the rule regarding show cause notice was not observed it could not be deemed that proper opportunity was given to the petitioner. That was a case of statutory requirement and not about the principle of natural justice. 10. It was found that as the rule regarding show cause notice was not observed it could not be deemed that proper opportunity was given to the petitioner. That was a case of statutory requirement and not about the principle of natural justice. 10. Learned counsel relied also on the decisions in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 and in Sayeedur Rehman v. State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 239 = (1973 Lab IC 197); in these cases it was held that the principles of natural justice were applicable to enquiries where action is taken against a party, but in neither of these two cases it was held that the principles of natural justice in the case of a disciplinary proceeding includes the giving of a second notice to show cause why a particular penalty be not imposed. To the contrary, in the Full Bench case of this court Mohammad Ahmad Kidwai v. Imperial Trust, 1958 All LJ 160 = ( AIR 1958 All 353 ) it was observed : "No authority was shown to us on which it could be said that the rule of natural justice required that the plaintiff should have been given a second opportunity of showing cause against the proposed punishment. To that opportunity the plaintiff could be entitled only if the plaintiff's appointment can be held to fall within the category of services referred to in Section 240 of the Government of India Act." The omission to give notice to show cause against the proposed penalty cannot accordingly be deemed to vitiate the dismissal order on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. 11. The action taken in the present case cannot, therefore, be said to suffer from either an error of jurisdiction or manifest error of law so as to make the impugned order invalid. 12. Petition accordingly fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case parties will bear their own costs.