Judgment :- 1. The Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, has referred the following question of law for our opinion: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in holding that the reopening of the assessment under S.147(b) is valid?" For the assessment year 1965-66 the assessee, a Company, was assessed by the Income-tax Officer by his order dated 30th November 1965. That order shows, among other things, that rebate on export profits was granted to the assessee Company at 4.6 per cent. There was an inconsequential order of rectification dated 11th August 1966. An appeal against this order was dismissed on 25th June 1968. Meanwhile, by an order dated 29th February 1968, there was a further rectification of the order of assessment, the officer holding that the assessee should be treated not as a Public limited Company but only as one in which the public are substantially interested, and that therefore the assessee would be entitled to rebate only at 20 per cent on export profits and not at the higher rate of 30 per cent. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner contending that it was a manufacturing Company and not a trading Company. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeal and directed the Income-tax Officer to examine the question. The officer, by his order dated 22nd February 1969 (Annexure-F) held that the assessee was a manufacturing Company entitled to rebate at 30 per cent on its export profits. The succeeding officer took the view that the question whether a Company was mainly engaged in the business of manufacture in accordance with the provisions of the Finance Act, 1965, had not been considered at all by his predecessor Income-tax Officer; and therefore, he revised the assessment holding that the Company was not mainly engaged in the manufacture or processing of goods as the income from these operations came to less than 51 percent, (Annexure-G). Against the said order the assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, which was rejected by him (Annexure-H), The Tribunal also rejected the assessee's appeal on this point, (Annexure-I). It, however, formulated the question of law noticed earlier and forwarded the same for the opinion of this Court. 2. Against the said order the assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, which was rejected by him (Annexure-H), The Tribunal also rejected the assessee's appeal on this point, (Annexure-I). It, however, formulated the question of law noticed earlier and forwarded the same for the opinion of this Court. 2. There is no controversy that the question as to whether the assessee was a trading Company or a manufacturing Company, had to be decided in the light of the provisions of the Finance Act, 1965. Under the provisions of that Act rebate is to be allowed in the case of a Company which is not a Company in which the public are interested and which is wholly or mainly engaged, inter alia, in the manufacture or processing of goods at 30 per cent. There was a proviso to this provision, and Explanation I to the said proviso enacted that "For the purposes of this provision or paragraph, a Company shall be deemed to be mainly engaged in the business of generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power or in the construction of ships or in the manufacture or processing of 'goods or in mining, if the income attributable to any of the aforesaid activities included in its total income for the previous year is not less than fifty-one per cent of such total income." The Income-tax Officer who issued the reassessment order (Annexure-G) dated 8th October 1970 was of the view that the original assessment order dated 30th November 1965 was passed without reference to the provisions of the Finance Act, 1965, and for that reason, required rectification. It was this view that was sustained on appeal by the Appellant Assistant Commissioner and on further appeal, by the Tribunal. 3. In Raman and Company's case 67 ITR.11 it was observed by the Supreme Court: "The condition which invests the Income-tax Officer with jurisdiction has two branches; (i) that the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment; and (ii) that it is in consequence of information which he has in his possession that he has reason so to believe. Since the learned judges of the High Court have concentrated their attention upon the second branch of the condition and have reached their conclusion in favour of the assessees on that branch, it would be appropriate to deal with the correctness of that approach. The expression "information" in the context in which it occurs, must, in our judgment, mean instruction or knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts or particulars, or as to law relating to a matter bearing on the assessment. ......jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to reassess income arises if he has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. That information, must, it is true, have come into the possession of the Income-tax Officer after the previous assessment, but even if the information be such that it could have been obtained during the previous assessment from an investigation of the materials on the record, or the facts disclosed thereby or from other enquiry or research into facts or law, but was not in fact obtained, the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer is not affected". To our mind, the above observations make it clear that the information which was made the foundation for reassessment may well be obtained from the material on record or the facts disclosed thereby, or from other enquiry or research into the facts or law. even if these could well have been obtained on the earlier occasion. The position was stated by a Division Bench of this Court in United Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Kerala 64 ITR. 218. The learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment referred to the Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd.'s case 42 ITR. 547 of the Madras High Court and observed "' To inform' means 'to impart knowledge' and a detail available to the Income-tax Officer in the papers filed before him does not by its mere availability become an item of information. It is transmuted into an item of information in his possession only if, and only when, its existence is realised and its implications are recognised. It is transmuted into an item of information in his possession only if, and only when, its existence is realised and its implications are recognised. We consider the the awareness of the Income-tax Officer, for the first time, after the assessment order of the 19th November, 1957, that the bonus shares were issued not out of premiums received in cash and the consequent result in the light of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1957, as information within the meaning of that expression as used in S.34 (1) (b) of the Indian Income-tax Act Act, 1922." Attention was also called to the Imperial Tobacco Company's case 61 ITR. 461. The Supreme Court there referred to the Salem Provident Fund Society's case 42 ITR. 547, Rathinasabapthy Mudaliar's case 51 ITR. 204 and to various other cases, and restated the position that if there is information leading to the belief that income has escaped assessment, the mere fact this information has resulted in a change of opinion will not make S.34 inapplicable. A change of opinion is not sufficient for initiating proceedings under S.34, only when such change of opinion is the result of a different method of reasoning, and not based on 'information'. 4. The principle laid down in these decisions is clear enough, and we find nothing contrary in the decisions in Reform Flour Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.'s case 88 I.T.R. 150, Dinesh Chandra H. Shah and others' case 82 I.T.R. 367, Bankipur Club Ltd.'s case 82 I.T.R 831 and Raja Priyanand Prasad Singh's case 32 I.T.R. 320 to which our attention was drawn. On the facts, the principle of these latter set of decisions, on which reliance was placed by the assessee, can have no application. 5. We are of the opinion that on the facts disclosed, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in its view. We answer the question of law referred to us in the affirmative, i. e., in favour of the department and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference.