S. K. Choudhuri, J. In this revision the petitioner has challenged his conviction under section 16 (l) (b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, (Act No. 37 of 1954) (hereinafter called 'the Act' ) and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months passed by the trial court which were affirmed in appeal by the lower appellate court. 2. The prosecution case, in short, is that on 29.1.1967 the Food Inspector (P.W. 1) visited the shop of the petitioner along with his two subordinates, namely, Mithu Mahto (P.W. 2) and Ratan Ram (P.W. 3) and demanded samples of turmeric (Haldi) which were exposed for sale in his shop. The further prosecution case is that the petitioner refused to give the samples and obstructed P.W. 1 from taking the sample and also pushed him out of the shop. 3. The defence, in short, is that the petitioner has been falsely implicated because the petitioner who was called by P.W. 1 through P.W. 3 refused to go to the residence of P.W. 1. The further defence is that the petitioner did not prevent P.W.1 from taking the samples. The trial court after taking evidence convicted the petitioner as aforesaid which has been affirmed in appeal by the judgment passed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Gaya. 4. In support of this application the first point raised by Mr. Belwariar is that no proper sanction having been accorded in the case the whole trial is vitiated and the conviction and sentence passed upon the petitioner is, therefore, liable to be set aside. In this case on a perusal of Ext. 2 it appears that sanction for prosecution was accorded by District Medical officer of Health, Gaya. It does not appear from the judgment of the trial court or from the papers exhibited in the case that the District Medical Officer of Gaya who accorded sanction had no authority to sanction prosecution. His authority was never challenged at the trial. Mr. 2 it appears that sanction for prosecution was accorded by District Medical officer of Health, Gaya. It does not appear from the judgment of the trial court or from the papers exhibited in the case that the District Medical Officer of Gaya who accorded sanction had no authority to sanction prosecution. His authority was never challenged at the trial. Mr. Belwariar for the first time raises this point by contending that the District Medical Officer of Health, Gaya, who accorded sanction, was an employee of the District Board, Gaya and as District Board has been held in Sarjug Soh V. The State of Bihar 1973 BBCJ 560 to be not a local authority as defined in section 2 (viii) of the Act, sanction granted by such medical officer is invalid and will be deemed to be no sanction in the eye of law. Learned counsel has referred to me a true copy of the order dated 30.9.66. passed by the Administrator, District Board, Gaya. From this paper he wants me to hold that the medical officer who has accorded sanction in this case is an employee of the District Board, Gaya. But as this paper has neither been exhibited nor referred to by the trying Magistrate, it is not possible for me on the basis of this unexhibited document to hold that the medical officer who has accorded sanction is an employee of the District Board, Gaya and, therefore, the sanction granted by such person is invalid in my opinion, at this stage the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise this point to the great prejudice of the prosecution. If this point would have been raised at the trial then the prosecution could have got an opportunity to show that the medical officer who had accorded sanction was empowered under the law to grant such sanction. In that view of the matter it is not possible to accept this contention raised by the petitioner's counsel. 5. The next point urged by Mr. Belwariar is that the Food Inspector (P.W.1) having admitted that he took sample from the shop of the petitioner, the prosecution case to the effect that the said Food Inspector was prevented from taking sample becomes false and as such the conviction and sentence passed by the courts below cannot be upheld. 5. The next point urged by Mr. Belwariar is that the Food Inspector (P.W.1) having admitted that he took sample from the shop of the petitioner, the prosecution case to the effect that the said Food Inspector was prevented from taking sample becomes false and as such the conviction and sentence passed by the courts below cannot be upheld. In this connection he has referred to paragraph 4 and 5 of the deposition of P.W. 1. This argument has been dealt with by the lower appellate court in paragraph 5 of its judgment. It has discussed the evidence as recorded in paragraph 4 and 5 and has rightly come to the conclusion that the taking of sample as spoken of by P.W.1 in paragraphs 4 and 5 related to some other shop and not that of the shop of the petitioner. I have perused the statement recorded in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the deposition of P.W. 1 and I do not find any reason to differ from the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate court. I, therefore, negative this contention also. 6. It has been next contended by Mr. Belwariar that the Food Inspector (P.W.1) having admitted in evidence that he went to the shop of the petitioner along with his two subordinates, namely, Mithu Mahto (P.W. 2) and Ratan Ram (P.W. 3) and having further admitted that he did not call any independent person to witness the taking of the samples the conviction of the petitioner, which is based on the evidence of interested witnesses only, cannot be maintained. In other words, his argument is that there was a chance of independent witnesses being available if the Food Inspector would have followed the mandatory provisions of section 10 (2) of the Act. In, my opinion, this contention has substance. Relevant portion of section 16 of the Act, is quoted below: "16. In other words, his argument is that there was a chance of independent witnesses being available if the Food Inspector would have followed the mandatory provisions of section 10 (2) of the Act. In, my opinion, this contention has substance. Relevant portion of section 16 of the Act, is quoted below: "16. (1) If any person- * * * * (b) prevents a food inspector from taking a sample as authorised by this Act * * * * he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to six years, and with fine which shall 'not be less than one thousand rupees" It is also necessary to quote the relevant portion of section 10 : "10 (1) A food inspector shall have power : (a) to take samples of any articles of food from – (1) any person selling such article X X X X (7) where the food inspector takes any action under clause (a) of sub-section (1), sub-section (2), sub-section (4) or sub section (6), he shall, call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures. X X X The aforesaid sub-section (7) of section 10 was the subject matter of discussion in Ram Labhaya v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another AIR 1974 SC 789 where it has been held that section 10 (7) is a mandatory provision and the Food Inspector, must call one or more independent person to be present at the time when such action is taken. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court is quoted below : "....There can be no doubt that 'one or more persons' must mean one or more independent persons. The legislative history of sub-section (7) further shows that at the least, the Food Inspector ought to try and secure the presence of one of more independent persons when he takes action under any of the provisions mentioned in the sub-section..... The legislative history of sub-section (7) further shows that at the least, the Food Inspector ought to try and secure the presence of one of more independent persons when he takes action under any of the provisions mentioned in the sub-section..... X X X We are of the opinion, particularly in view of the legislative history of Section 10 (7), that while taking action under any of the provisions mentioned in the sub-section, the Food Inspector must call one or more independent persons to be present at the time when such action is taken. We are, however, unable to agree that regardless of all circumstances, the non-presence of one or more independent persons at the relevant time would vitiate the trial or conviction. The obligation which section 10 (7) casts on the Food Inspector is to 'call one or more persons to be present when he takes action. The facts in the instant case show that the Food Inspector did call the neighbouring shop-keepers to witness the taking of the sample but none was willing to co-operate. He could not certainly compel their presence. In such circumstances, the prosecution was relieved of its obligation to cite independent witnesses....." In the aforesaid Supreme Court decision their Lordships have approved the decision of Ram Sarup Tara Chand V. The State AIR 1965 Punj 366. In the latter case the conviction was set aside as the Food Inspector did not ask any independent person to witness the transaction. In the present case P.W.1, the Food Inspector, has admitted that he did not call any independent witness at the time of taking samples. P.W. 3 has also corroborated P.W.1 by saying that only he and P.W.2 were present when the Food Inspector demanded for samples. Neither the Food Inspector nor any of the prosecution witnesses have said that it was not possible to secure attendance of any of the independent witnesses. Thus, the Food Inspector has not discharged the statutory obligation on his part calling one or more independent persons to be present at that time. As such, there has been non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of section 10(7) of the Act. Only three witnesses have been examined by the prosecution in this case, namely, the Food Inspector as P.W.1 and his two subordinate as P.Ws.2 and 3 who accompanied him. None of them are independent witnesses. As such, there has been non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of section 10(7) of the Act. Only three witnesses have been examined by the prosecution in this case, namely, the Food Inspector as P.W.1 and his two subordinate as P.Ws.2 and 3 who accompanied him. None of them are independent witnesses. The petitioner has been greatly prejudiced for non-compliance of section 10 (7) of the Act. Further, the courts below have found material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and, therefore, they have disbelieved the prosecution case to the effect that the Food Inspector was pushed out of the shop when he went there to take samples. Thus, in my opinion, on such evidence the judgment of the courts below cannot be upheld. 7. From what has been discussed above, I hold that the petitioner’s conviction under section 16(1) (b) of the Act, and sentence passed by the courts below cannot be maintained. In the result, the conviction and sentence passed upon the petitioner are set aside and this application is allowed. The petitioner is discharged from his bail bond. Application allowed.