JUDGMENT - V.S. DESHPANDE, J.:---The two petitions are directed against the orders of the Tahsildar, Jalgaon, dated 24th May, 1975, under which "the Fair Price Shop" belonging to the petitioners have "been suspended till further Orders". The petitioner in Special C.A. No. 1223 of 1975 was permitted to run "the Fair Price Shop" by an order of the Collector, Jalgaon, dated 14th July, 1970. While the petitioner in Special C.A. No. 1224 of 1975, claims to have been an authorised to run the fair price shop by an order dated 20th October, 1964. It is not however, in dispute that an authorisation as contemplated under Clause 2-A of 1968 Order, was also issued in the name of both the petitioners under the Maharashtra Scheduled Articles (Regulation of Distribution by Card System) Order, 1968, (hereinafter referred to as "the 1968 Order"). It is not in dispute that such an authorisation can only be granted under 1968 Order, to the retail dealer having a licence granted under the Maharashtra Food Grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, (hereinafter referred to as "the Licensing Order, 1963). 2. It appears that there was a police raid on the house of one Padmakar Wani at about 2-30 p.m. on 20th May, 1965. 35 bags of wheat were recovered from the house of the said Padmakar Wani. On the earlier day, i.e. on 19th May, 1965, 15 bags of wheat were delivered to each one of these "Fair Price Shops". In terms of the authorisation, the wheat could have been stored only at the shops premises. After seizure of the said 35 bags of wheat, arrest of Padmakar Wani and representative of the other shop, and further investigation the police seems to have instituted prosecutions against both the salesmen. The Tahsildar was apprised of this. It is on the strength of this material that the Tahsildar seems to have passed the impugned orders against both the holders of these "Fair Price Shops". 3. Mr. Rijhwani the learned Advocate for the petitioners, raised several contentions in support of these petitioners. His first contention is that the impugned orders seek to cancel the licence obtained by the petitioners under the 1963 Order. 3. Mr. Rijhwani the learned Advocate for the petitioners, raised several contentions in support of these petitioners. His first contention is that the impugned orders seek to cancel the licence obtained by the petitioners under the 1963 Order. The said 1963 Order enabled all licence dealers such as the petitioners to change the godown or place of storage and then to make an application later for effecting a change in the location of the godown intended for storing the food grains so obtained, within 48 hours from the time when the goods or the articles were actually received by the shopkeepers The wheat in the present case was delivered to the petitioners at about 7-30 p.m on 19th May, 1975, and both the petitioners claim to have already made the applications to the Tahsildar at 11-00 a.m. on 20-5-75, intimating the change of the places of storing the grains as the shops in dispute were unable to accommodate the wheat so delivered to them on the earlier day. It was made clear therein that wheat was stored at the house of Padmakar Wani instead to in the shop. 4. Mr. Rijhwani contends that the petitioners had not committed any breach of the licence or breach of law by storing the wheat not in the shops but at the house of the said Padmakar Wani. This is how according to Mr. Rijhwani, the impugned orders are high handed and arbitrary unwarranted and are in violation of Clause 4 of the 1963 Order, which prevents the officers from Taking any action without issuing a show cause notice and without giving a hearing to the affected shopkeepers. The reading of the orders, however, cannot leave any manner of doubt that the orders, could not have been passed under the 1963 Order. The order refers to the "Fair Price Shop", as also the suspension with regard to the said "Fair Price Shop". We have not been able to trace any clause in the 1963 Order dealing with the authorisation of "Fair Price Shop" of running thereof. The 1963 Order only deals with obtaining of the licence by any wholesaler or retailer for dealing in the articles or the food grains mentioned in the said Schedule. We have not been able to trace any clause in the 1963 Order dealing with the authorisation of "Fair Price Shop" of running thereof. The 1963 Order only deals with obtaining of the licence by any wholesaler or retailer for dealing in the articles or the food grains mentioned in the said Schedule. Even if it is assumed that such applications were made and were otherwise in order, the same cannot be of any help for the alleged breach or 1968 Order, nor provision of Clause (4) of 1963 Order as to notice etc., can have any application. 5. Mr. Hegde and Mr. Deonani, the learned Advocates for the respondents, drew our attention to the provisions of the 1968 Order, which indeed directly deals with the authorisation of Fair Price Shops and granting of authorisation therefore. The impugned orders dated 24-5-75 also do not deal with any licence as such but only speaks of the suspension of the "Fair Price Shops" of the petitioners. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to go into the details of as to what are the requirements for suspension and cancellations under the 1963 Order. 6. Mr. Rijhwani then contended that the impugned orders are so vague that legally speaking the same cannot be said to be effective in any manner either to affects the right of the petitioners to carry on the business or even affect the authorisation granted to them under the 1968 Order. Now, it is true that the orders do not refer to the suspension of any authorisation. The orders directing the suspension of the "Fair Price Shops" really do not make any precise sense. The shops belong to the petitioners. It is very difficult to understand how the shops can be suspended. The impugned orders do not refer to the 1968 Order directly or indirectly nor do they refer to any clause thereof indicating why the orders have been passed. Notwithstanding all these infirmities, it is difficult to hold the orders to be invalid merely on this ground alone. It is not in dispute that the petitioners are running the "Fair Price Shops" and that the running of the said "Fair Price Shops" has been authorised under the authorisation issued under 1968 Order. Notwithstanding all these infirmities, it is difficult to hold the orders to be invalid merely on this ground alone. It is not in dispute that the petitioners are running the "Fair Price Shops" and that the running of the said "Fair Price Shops" has been authorised under the authorisation issued under 1968 Order. The addresses to whom these impugned orders are addressed, cannot reasonably find any difficulty in understanding what the orders indeed convey to them. 7. Mr. Rijhwani then contends that the petitioners have been carrying on the business of the "Fair Price Shops" not under the authorisations granted under Clause 2-A of the 1968 Order but under some other orders of the Collector, to which a detailed reference has been made by the petitioners in their counter affidavit. Copies of these orders are also enclosed along with the counter affidavit. These orders do throw light as to how the petitioners initially started running the "Fair Price Shops". Whatever be the reasons, both the petitioners appear to have started running the "Fair Price Shops" under some order which do purport to have been issued under the 1968 Order. We are, however, not been able to see how this circumstance can be of any assistance to the petitioners. This at the most may enable us to accept the contention of Mr. Rijhwani that the petitioners should be deemed to have been the "approved retail dealers" within the meaning of Explanation to Clause 2-A of the 1968 Order. Even, if the petitioners were considered to be "authorised or approved retailers", that by itself cannot mean that such authority to run the "Fair Price Shop" cannot be interfered with by the Collector or his delegate, the Tahsildar if otherwise suspension or cancellation of the said authority becomes necessary under the provisions of the 1968 Order. Secondly question of the petitioners being the deemed dealers, cannot arise when authorisation under the 1968 Order were in fact issued and accepted by the petitioners at some later stage. 8. Mr. Rijhwani also contended that the 1968 Order contemplates the exercise of the powers by the Collector and not by the Tahsildar. He even went to the length of contending that the Tahsildar had no powers under the 1968 Order. Now the word "Collector" has been defined in section 2(c) of the 1968 Order. 8. Mr. Rijhwani also contended that the 1968 Order contemplates the exercise of the powers by the Collector and not by the Tahsildar. He even went to the length of contending that the Tahsildar had no powers under the 1968 Order. Now the word "Collector" has been defined in section 2(c) of the 1968 Order. "Collector" means the Collector of the District and includes the District Supply Officer and the Assistant District Supply Officer and any other officers as may be authorised by the State Government or the Collector in this behalf". In their petitions, the petitioners did not raise any factual contention about the Tahsildar, not having been so authorised under Clause 2(c) of the order by the State Government or the Collector. 9. Mr. Hegde appearing for the respondents showed to us an order indicating how the Tahsildar was authorised to exercise the powers of the Collector under this 1968 Order. 10. Mr. Rijhwani then contended that by permitting the petitioners to run the fair price shop long before the authorisation was granted under Clause 2-A of the 1968 Orders, the petitioners were misled in thinking that the 1968 Order did not have any application to them and that is why the petitioners never took care to ensure and see that the provisions of this 1968 Order were complied with. Mr. Rijhwani relied upon the judgments in the case of (Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh)1, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 43, and in the case of (Kishori Lal Bhawani v. The Addl. Collector and District Magistrate, Kanpur and others)2, A.I.R. 1969 All. 159. Both these cases deal with the situation where the appellants were prosecuted for certain offence and a question therein arose whether mens rea was the essential ingredient of the offence with which they were charged. It is difficult to see how these cases can have any application whatsoever to the points that arise for our consideration in the present case. In this connection Mr. Rijhwani relied on the contents of the licence itself. The licence granted under the 1963 Order indicate that the petitioners were entitled to deal in the articles converted by the 1968 Order also. It appears that an authorisation under the 1968 Order is granted only to the retail dealers who are otherwise granted dealers licence under the 1963 Order. Rijhwani relied on the contents of the licence itself. The licence granted under the 1963 Order indicate that the petitioners were entitled to deal in the articles converted by the 1968 Order also. It appears that an authorisation under the 1968 Order is granted only to the retail dealers who are otherwise granted dealers licence under the 1963 Order. It is only to such licensee that an authorisation under the 1968 Order, contemplated to be granted. It is not therefore, surprising that these very articles which are meant for sale under the 1968 Order are also mentioned in the licence granted to the petitioners under the 1963 Order. It is difficult to see how the question of petitioners being misled arises. 11. Mr. Rijhwani then contends that the provision as to suspended the authorisation is penal in nature and as such no orders of suspension of the authorisation of the shop could have been passed without issuing a show cause notice and without giving a hearing to the petitioners. Now, it is true in certain cases the order of suspension can be passed by way of penalty while in other, such orders also can be passed pending departmental or criminal proceedings. Whether the orders can of the first category or of the second category, depends on the provisions of the Act as also the attendant circumstances. There is no presumption that whenever any suspension orders are passed they are necessarily passed by way of penalty. In the present case, the 1968 Order, does not deal either with any offence or with breaches of the provisions of the order or terms of authorisation directly. Even the sub-clause (4) of Clause 2-A of the 1968 Order, can not be strictly said to be penal in nature, which reads as follows : "The State Government or the Collector may, at any time, whether at the request of the authorised fair price shop or authorised establishment, or suo motu, after making such enquiries as may be deemed necessary, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, add to, amend, vary, suspend or cancel the authorisation or deemed to be issued to him under this clause". 12. This sub-clause deals with powers of additions, amendment, varying, suspension and cancellation of the authorisation. It is difficult to conceive how the other contingencies than the contingencies of cancellation of authorisation, can even operate as penalty. 12. This sub-clause deals with powers of additions, amendment, varying, suspension and cancellation of the authorisation. It is difficult to conceive how the other contingencies than the contingencies of cancellation of authorisation, can even operate as penalty. Even the cancellation, may not operate as a penalty in all situations. Thus, for example, it may not operate as penalty where the cancellation becomes necessary as a result of the reduction of the population of the area concerned. Read in the context, the suspension seems to have been intended to cover a situation where cancellation of the licence on some ground is contemplated. Pendency of the criminal proceedings also may warrant the suspension of such an authorisation in a given case. It is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Rijhwani that suspension is contemplated as penalty in the 1968 Order. 13. He further contends that even so, the suspension affects the right of the petitioners to carry on the business and as such affects them prejudicially and adversely and as such no order of suspension should have been passed without observing the principles of natural justice. Emphasis was particularly placed by Mr. Rijhwani on the inquiry having been made a condition precedent before any authorisation can be suspended or cancelled, under any contingencies. It is true that even an order of suspension could not have been passed without making some inquiries. The nature of such inquiries, however, depends upon the facts and facts of each case, and the requirements of the situation. Show cause notice or hearing cannot be held to be indispensible in every situation. As indicated earlier, the suspension under sub-clause (4) of Clause 2-A of the 1968 Order, appears to have been designed to meet a contingency where some proceedings for cancellation of the licence were imminent or contemplated. In the very nature of things, an elaborate inquiry that is to follow at the time of cancellation cannot be expected when the authorisation is merely required to be suspended. All that is necessary at this stage is that there exists some prime facie material and Tahsildar applies his mind to it before the order of suspension is passed. The affidavit of the Tahsildar does indicate that the order of suspension was passed by him after some inquiry. All that is necessary at this stage is that there exists some prime facie material and Tahsildar applies his mind to it before the order of suspension is passed. The affidavit of the Tahsildar does indicate that the order of suspension was passed by him after some inquiry. We have already indicated how there was a raid at the house of the salesman of the 1st petitioner and how 35 bags were found in his house and how the police have investigated into the offence and thought it necessary to prosecute the Petitioners. We have also indicated that 15 bags of wheat were delivered to each of the petitioners from the warehouse in the evening of the earlier day i.e. on 19th May, 1975 this wheat was liable to be stored only at the shop premises under the authorisation. It is difficult to hold that this inquiry and the material could not have been sufficient for the limited purpose of suspending the licence. It is not necessary for the Tahsildar to give a show cause notice to the affected persons and give hearing to them at this stage. 14. Mr. Hegde and Mr. Deonani have made it clear that the present suspension is only temporary and is intended to cover the period of an inquiry against the petitioners for the proposed cancellation of the licence. There is no merit in these applications. 15. In the result, rules discharged. No order as to the costs. Per P.M. Mukhi, J. 16. These petitions disclose a somewhat distressing state of affairs, in so far as the authorities concerned, do not appear to have known that under what provisions of law they were action. Even though I agree that the petitions are liable to be dismissed by reason of the view that we are taking as to the interpretation of sub-clause (1) of Clause 2-A of the Maharashtra Scheduled Articles (Regulation of Distribution by Card System) Order, 1968, (hereinafter referred to as "the 1968 Order), I wish to make a few observations, of my own. 17. First of all Mr. Rijhwani, the learned Advocate for the petitioners, in both the petitions has drawn our attention to the fact that so far as Petition No. 1223 of 1975 is concerned, a fair price shop No. 10, was granted to the petitioner as a retailer for distribution of O.S. Wheat, Rice and other food-grain? 17. First of all Mr. Rijhwani, the learned Advocate for the petitioners, in both the petitions has drawn our attention to the fact that so far as Petition No. 1223 of 1975 is concerned, a fair price shop No. 10, was granted to the petitioner as a retailer for distribution of O.S. Wheat, Rice and other food-grain? and sugar on the conditions appearing in the Order dated the 23rd October, 1971, signed by Shri R.L Pardeep, Collector, Jalgaon. Now the 11th condition mentioned in this order provides that the petitioner Shri Bhagwan Bhudhaji Kandare, was to obtain a foodgrains licence under the Maharashtra Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, (hereinafter referred to as "the 1963 Order"). This licence was to be obtained from the Tahsildar, Jalgaon, and we are informed that such a licence was applied for by the petitioner on the 8th October, 1971, and granted to him on the 28th February, 1972. 18. Now, on this licence having been obtained by the petitioner under the 1963 Order, the "grant" to him of a fair price, shop No. 10 became effective under the order of the Collector dated the 23rd October, 1971, to which reference has been made. 19. It requires to be noticed that the 1968 Order does not deal with grant of any authorisation for running a fair price shop but the explanation to section 2(b) of the 1968 Order provides that on the commencement of this order every dealer in foodgrains who is an approved retailer shall be deemed to be an authorised fair price shop in the relevant area in respect of the relevant articles 20. It requires to be stated that at this time the Collector and his officers at Jalgaon, do not appear to have applied their mind to the matter because if they had done so, they would have discovered that Clause 2-A had already been inserted in the 1968 Order with effect from 27th March, 1969, so that what was really required to be done in the case of the petitioner in Special C.A No. 1223 of 1975, was not to allow him to be a deemed authorised fair price shop under the explanation to Clause 2(b) of the 1968 Order, but to issue to him a regular authorisation order under Clause 2-A of that Order. Now someone must have looked into the matter thereafter because it would appear that on the 27th February, 1973, a regular authorisation for a fair price so was issued to the petitioner although according to him, he had made no application therefore. It is appropriate to notice that was the manner in which the matter was regularised. 21. In Special C.A. No. 1224 of 1975, the petitioner therein, Newandram Asandas Bhagwani, had been granted a licence under the 1963 Order as far back as the 28th October, 1964, so that on the coming into effect of the 1968 order, the said petitioner as an approved retailer, was deemed to be an authorised fair price shop under the explanation. However, even in this case, the respondents appear to have issued to him a regular authorisation for running a fair price shop under Clause 2-A on the 14th July, 1970. 22. It can therefore, be said that even though there were irregularities because of lack of comprehension of what the law provided as to grant of a licence to a dealer and an authorisation for running a fair price shop, matters were regularised in the sense that both the petitioners became possessed of required authorisations under the provisions of Clause 2-A of the 1968 Order. 23. Now it requires to be noticed that the impugned order which is dated the 24th May, 1975, also discloses that the Tahsildar, Jalgaon, who issued the order was not clear in his mind as to what he was doing, and under what provision of law he was acting. 24. My brother Deshpande, J. in his judgment has held that on a proper interpretation of sub-clause (4) of Clause 2-A of the 1968 order, the authorities could suspend the authorisation for running a fair price shop pending the holding of a regular inquiry to determine whether it should be cancelled. I agree with my brother Deshpande, J. that a proper interpretation of sub-clause (4) reveals the power to suspend pending further action and it follows that the kind of inquiry that would be necessary for the Collector to decided to suspend the authorisation pending the inquiry will be very much different in its scope and nature than an inquiry (which is yet to be held) for taking an action of a punitrve nature like cancellation of the authorisation. 25. 25. The impugned order, in my view, would have been found to be invalid and liable to be set aside if it were held to have been an order for a permanent suspension or cancellation of the authorisation. But if as the learned Advocates Mr. Hegde and Mr. Deonani who have appeared for the respondents, have contended the suspension is pending the holding of an inquiry then the impugned order can reasonably be read to show that there is Prima facie enough material for suspending the authorisation pending an inquires as to what is to be done next. 26. It is in this context that the contention of Mr. Rijhwani, the learned Advocate for the petitioners, that the petitioners were not given a reasonable opportunity of being heard against the suspension order is to be considered. 27. It is well settled that rules of natural justice are flexible and what is the requirement as to natural justice would always depend on the facts of each case and have to be determined in the context of the relevant provisions of law. 28. In the present case, there can be no doubt that the State was required to Act immediately in public interest and in order to prevent-misuse of scarce food supplies. It can never be contended with any show of reason that an elaborate inquiry would require to be held by the authorities even before an order of suspension of the nature challenged can be passed under sub-clause (4) of Clause 2-A of the 1968 Order. Even though the impugned order is badly worded and leaves much to be desired, the facts as disclosed by the record and in the affidavits filed by the respondents, clearly show that there was a reasonable apprehension that 35 bags of wheat were in danger of being misused and that immediate action was called for. In addition, there is a police inquiry and no one can deny that the 35 bags of wheat were found at the residence of the salesman of the 1st petitioner in Special C.A. No. 1223 of 1975. How they came to be there and whether they were properly and lawfully stored in those premises, would be matters to be inquired into when the proposed full inquiry is held. How they came to be there and whether they were properly and lawfully stored in those premises, would be matters to be inquired into when the proposed full inquiry is held. But there can be little doubt that a summary action for the maintenance of public interest even in normal times is permissible and to that extent the strict rules of audi alteram partem can legitimately be excluded. 29. A contention was taken that although sub-clause (4) of Clause 2-A of the 1968 Order entrusts the powers contained therein into the hands of the State Government or the Collector, the impugned order has been made by the Tahsildar. As referred to by my brother Deshpande, J. the definition of the word “Collector” provides an answer to this challenge and indeed the learned Advocates for the respondents produced for our inspection an order of the Collector, Jalgaon, empowering the Tahsildar to issue the authorisation to a fair price shop. Even though the Collectors order of delegation does not specifically refer to the power as to suspension contained in the 1968 Order of the Collector, still the powers of suspension or cancellation contained in sub-clause (4) of Clause 2-A of the 1968 Order, would be included on general principles and it can be held that such a power also be exercised by the Tahsildar. 30. In any event, it is my view and I feel strongly that whenever any action of a punitive nature is to be taken against a citizen, it is the duty of the authorities to word their orders and communications in such a way as to give complete information to the citizen as to what is being done. This will prevent any grievance on the part of the citizen to say that he did not know what exactly was proposed to be done against him or his interests. It will also enable him to seek a proper remedy. 31. This will prevent any grievance on the part of the citizen to say that he did not know what exactly was proposed to be done against him or his interests. It will also enable him to seek a proper remedy. 31. It is only now in the affidavits-in-reply that the Respondents have stated in terms that what was sought to be suspended was only the authorisations for running a fair price shop (and that the licence to act as a retailer under the 1963 Order which were granted to the petitioners (in Special C.A. N. 1223 of 75, on the 28th February, 1972 and in Special C.A. No. 1224 of 1975, on the 28th October, 1964), are not in any manner affected. 32. If the impugned orders had been property worded with appropriate references to the law under which they were issued and what was the purport thereof no difficulty would have arisen and valuable time saved. -----