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1975 DIGILAW 138 (KAR)

M. v. SUNDAR RAJ VS KAMALAMMA

1975-09-11

K.J.SHETTY

body1975
( 1 ) A non-residential premises occupied by a tenant M. V. Sundar Raj was the subject-matter of the eviction proceedings on the ground, among others, that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord. The Courts below accepted the plea of the landlord and made an order of eviction agaisnt Sundar Raj. The said order of eviction has been challenged in this revision petition under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent control Act, 1961. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of the revision petition, Sundar Raj died. His wife and children were brought on record as his legal representatives. When the petition was taken up for hearing, counsel for the landlord raised a preliminary objection that the legal representatives of Sundar Raj have no right to challenge the validity of the eviction order. His contention was that Sundar Raj was a statutory tenant at the time of his death and his legal representatives did not derive any right therefrom. In support of the contention, Counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in S. P. Hamidsha v. Seshagiri, (1973) 1 Myslj. 127. There is no doubt that the question in controversy is covered by the above decision wherein it was observed that haying regard to the definition of the word ' tenant' in S. 3 (r) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, the legal representatives of the statutory tenant occupying non-rseidential premises have no protection from eviction. But Mr. Dayananda Kumar, counsel for the petitioners submitted that the premises were originally leased to the father of Sundar Raj and on his death, Sundar Raj was recognised as tenant; but the lease of the premises was in favour of the joint family consisting of Sundar Raj, his wife and children, and therefore, the legal representatives of Sundar Raj have an independent right to challenge the validity of the eviction order. In support of these contentions, he relied upon the decision of the supreme Court in J. C. Chatterjee v. S. K. Tandon, AIR 1972 SC. 2526 . It is true that if the legal representatives of the deceased tenant have any independent tenancy rights, they could be impleaded not merely as legal representatives of the deceased tenant, but also, in their own personal capacity. 2526 . It is true that if the legal representatives of the deceased tenant have any independent tenancy rights, they could be impleaded not merely as legal representatives of the deceased tenant, but also, in their own personal capacity. In Chatterjee's case, Palekar, J. , while dealing with the scope of the definition of the "tenant" in Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and Rule 4 of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, observed:" Under sub-cl (ii) of Rule 4 of Order 22, Civil Procedure Code, any person so made a party as a legal representative of the deceased respondent was entitled to make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased respondent. In other words, the heirs and the legal representatives could urge all contentions which the deceased could have ugred except only those which were personal to the deceased. Indeed this does not prevent the legal representatives from setting up also their own independent title, in which case there could be no objection to the Court impleading them not merely as the legal representatives of the deceased but also in their personal capacity avoiding thereby a separate suit for a decision on the independent title. "the Supreme Court in Chatterjee's case has reiterated the principles stated in Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji's Pedhi, AIR. 1965 SC. 414. wherein shah, J. while speaking for the Court observed at Page 422:"a person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a statutory tenant. Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal: It is not capable of being transferred or assigned; and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal: It is not capable of being transferred or assigned; and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. The right of a lessee from a landlord on the other hand is an estate or interest in the premises and in the absence of a contract to the contrary is transferable and the premises may be sublet by him. But with the determination of the lease, unless the tenant acquires the right of a tenant holding over, by acceptance of rent or by assent to his continuing in possession by the landlord, the terms and conditions of the lease or extinguished, and the rights of such a person remaining in possession are governed by the statute alone". In S. P. Hamidsha v. Seshagiri, Narayana Pai, C. J. , applied the above principles stated by the Supreme Court in Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. 's case while dealing with the scope of the definition of the "tenant" given in clause (r) of S. 3 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and held that the legal representatives of a statutory tenant occupying the non-residential premises have no protection from eviction It seems to me that the case on hand is in no way different from the one dealt with in Hamidsha's case. ( 3 ) SECTION 51, of course, provides for continuation of the eviction proceedings against the legal representatives of the deceased tenant. That does not, however, confer any right on the legal representatives of the deceased statutory tenant, which they do not otherwise have it. Unless the legal representatives set up an independent right of tenancy to the non-residential premises, they cannot be heard to contend that they should be recognised as tenants. Now, in the instant case, there is hardly any scope for the legal representatives of Sundar Raj to set up an independent right of tenancy because sundar Raj died after he suffered an order of eviction. Sundar Raj never urged before any one of the Courts below that the tenancy rights belonged to his family and not personally to him. The fact that the father of Sundar raj was a tenant of the premises is no ground to hold that on his death, the tenancy rights were inherited by Sunday Raj and his wife and children. Sundar Raj never urged before any one of the Courts below that the tenancy rights belonged to his family and not personally to him. The fact that the father of Sundar raj was a tenant of the premises is no ground to hold that on his death, the tenancy rights were inherited by Sunday Raj and his wife and children. The landlord accepted the rent from Sundar Raj, and recognised him as the tenant. The same was not the case with the wife and children of Sundar raj. The landlord has not accepted them expressly or impliedly as his tenants. Sundar Raj died as a statutory tenant with a personal right to remain in possession till the eviction. The wife and children could not inherit any estate or interest in the tenancy because, it is well established that a statutory tenant is not a tenant at all, he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him, and his right to remain in possession is not capable of being transferred or assigned in favour of anybody. The petitioners, therefore, have no right, much less any independent title to remain in possession. ( 4 ) IN the result, the revision petition fails and is dismissed. The petitioners, however, are given six months time to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the respondent. In the circumstances, I make no order for costs. --- *** --- .