Judgment :- 1. A preliminary order dated 5-3-1975 passed in M.C. 13/75 initiating proceedings under S.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, attaching the properties concerned and appointing the village officer, Venmony as the court agent in respect of the properties is sought to be quashed in this original petition. 2. The petitioner is said to be in possession of the properties concerned. He has taken proceedings under S.72B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (shortly stated the Act) for purchasing the right, title and interest of the land owner on whose behalf, in the meanwhile, a suit has been filed in the Munsiff's court for declaration of his title and possession. In the suit on the petitioner's contention, an issue was raised whether the petitioner is a cultivating tenant or not. The said issue has been referred to the Land Tribunal under S.125 (3) of the Act. 3. While the matter is thus seized by the Land Tribunal, petitioner received the preliminary order in the proceedings under S.145 Cr.P. C. Though the petitioner immediately is alleged to have moved the Executive First Class Magistrate bringing to his notice the existence of the proceedings under the Act, the learned Magistrate has not cared to vacate the preliminary order passed by him marked in this proceedings as Ex-P4. Therefore this writ proceedings has been filed seeking to quash the same. 4. Sri Siby Mathew, learned counsel for 'petitioner contends that in view of S.29A(1) of the Act, Ex-P4 is void and passed without jurisdiction. S.29A(1) reads as follows: "29A. Bar of proceedings under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure in certain cases: (1) Where a person claiming to be a tenant applies for the preparation of a record of rights or for the determination of the fair rent or for the purchase of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries if any, in respect of the land cultivated by him, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, no Magistrate shall have jurisdiction under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in respect of a dispute between that person and any other person claiming to be in possession of that land relating to that land pending disposal of the application. 5. The jurisdiction of the Executive First Class Magistrate to take proceedings under S.145 Cr. 5. The jurisdiction of the Executive First Class Magistrate to take proceedings under S.145 Cr. P.C. is expressly taken away by the above section in cases where any person claims to be a tenant and applies for the preparation of a record of rights or for the purchase of the right, title and interest of the land owner in respect of the land cultivated by him. Here the petitioner has filed an application under S.72B of the Act for the purchase of the landowner's right. Hence I have no hesitation in holding that Ex-P4 is without jurisdiction and quashing the same. The second respondent shall also take no further proceedings in pursuance of Ex-P4. 6. It is no doubt true that S.29A was struck down by this court a Full Bench of this court in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 659). The section was struck down solely on the ground that the same is bad for offending Art.14 of the Constitution. I will quote here what Raman Nayar, C. J. said about the section: "By S.29A, the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take action under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of a dispute between a person who, claiming to be a tenant, has applied for the preparation of a record of rights or for the determination of fair rent or for the purchase of the right of the landowner, and any other person claiming to be in possession of the land, is ousted pending disposal of the application, and, if in any proceedings under that Chapter of the Code possession was handed over to the other person and a suit regarding the right to possession of the land was pending on the date of the publication of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 1968 the applicant is entitled to continue on the land or obtain possession thereof till the final decision in the suit. What this amounts to is this. If there is a dispute as to possession of the land between a person claiming to be a tenant of the land and another, a Magistrate's power to interfere, even if the dispute threatens a breach of the peace, so long as the person claiming to be a tenant has made certain application in pursuance of his claim is taken away. A person has only to make an application of the kind mentioned putting forward a claim of tenancy to forcibly trespass on another's land with impunity. To encourage trespass and consequent breaches of the peace under a false claim of tenancy is surely not a measure of agrarian reform and we can think of no reason why disputes regarding possession under a claim of tenancy should, so far as the preservation of the peace is concerned, be placed on a different footing from disputes regarding possession under other claims. In our view, no reasonable classification can be made between threats to the peace or a peaceable possession of property arising out of a displaced claim of tenancy and such threats arising out of some other disputed title. We consider this section to be bad for offending Art.14 it cannot have the protection of Art.31A-and it must be struck down accordingly." 7. By the inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, the section has revived with the operation effective from the date of the Act see L. Jaganath v. Authorised Officer, L. R. Madurai (AIR. 1972 S. C. 425). 8. Sri Siby Mathew has also brought to my notice the decision of my learned brother Mr. Justice Khalid in Somadasa Pandiyar v. Krishna Kurup (1912 KLT 863) where this question had been dealt with and it was held that S.29A is a live section from the date of its enactment. 9. Sri Thomas V. Jacob appearing for the 3rd respondent put forth the plea, that S.29A is invalid not because it was held to be void being violative of Art.14 of the Constitution but also because by the section the Legislature is usurping judicial power. The basis of his contention is again the reasoning of Raman Nayar, C. J., in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (cited supra) in holding S.125 (7) of the Act as invalid. 10. His Lordship said: "worse still is the provision in the sub-section by which any injunction granted, or appointment of a receiver made, by the civil court before the coming into force of the amending Act stands cancelled: This is not merely an encouragement to trespass but is a usurpation of judicial power see in this connection Basanta Chandra v. Emperor (AIR.1944 F.C. 86 and Shri P. C. Mill v. Broach Municipality AIR. 1970 S.C.192)." 11. 1970 S.C.192)." 11. This observation of the learned Chief Justice as regards S.125 (7) is clearly inapplicable in considering S.29A of the Act, because by S.29A no existing order of the court is cancelled, rescinded or interfered with. Subject to the constitutional limitation, the Legislature is competent to take away or abridge the right to move the courts. That will not amount to usurpation of judicial power. The O. P. is therefore allowed, but I make no order as to costs. Allowed.