JUDGMENT Chandrasekhara Menon, J. In the property of the petitioner comprised in Sy. No. 545/4A and 545/2 there is a coconut tree standing which according to the 2nd respondent in this O.P. is in such a condition that it is likely to fall and thereby cause injury to persons living in the neighbourhood. On this allegation the 2nd respondent moved under section 133 Cr.P.C. before the Executive First Class Magistrate, Alleppey for cutting and removing the tree. On being satisfied from the report of the Circle Inspector of Police, Pulincunnu a preliminary order under section 133 Cr. P.C. was passed by the learned Magistrate directing the petitioner herein to cut and remove the coconut tree, within three days from the receipt of the order or to appear before the court on 29th May 1973 and to show cause why the said order should not be made absolute. A copy of the order was duly served on the petitioner who filed objections and his statement was taken on 29th September 1973. The witnesses produced by the petitioner were also examined. After hearing the parties the Executive Magistrate passed an order directing the petitioner to cut and remove the tree involved in the case within 3 days of the receipt of said order and if he fail to comply with the order he was to be liable to the penalty under section 188 I. P.C. and consequences under section 140 (2) Cr. P.C. Ext. P-l marked in this case is the copy of that order. Against that order a criminal revision petition was filed in the matter before the Sessions Court, Alleppey on 30th August 1974. Ext. P-2 is the copy of the order of the Sessions Judge. As there is no right of appeal or revision before this court under the new Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioner has moved this application under Article 227 of the Constitution for quashing Exts. P-l and P 2. Sri K. Raman, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Executive 1st Class Magistrate had adopted a procedure inconsistent with section 137 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (old codeSection 137 of the Code provides that if the respondent appears and show cause against the conditional order, the Magistrate shall take evidence in the matter as in a summons case. Section 244 of the Code deals with summons cases and enacts that if the Magistrate does not convict the accused under section 243 if the accused does not make admission of the nature mentioned in that section, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the complainant and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and also to hear the accused and take such evidence as he produces in his defence. According to the petitioner, the complainant did not lead any evidence in support of the allegations, nor did he make his own statement. Therefore in such circumstances, the Magistrate should have stopped the proceedings in the case rather than proceed to examine the petitioner herein and the witness cited by him. Therefore, Mr. Raman contends that the course adopted by the Magistrate is clearly in violation of the statutory provisions enacted in section 244 and 137 Cr. P.C. and the entire proceedings stand vitiated. This contention of Sri Raman is supported by a Division Bench decision of this court in Velayudhan v. Kesavan Nair 1968 K.L.T. 889. Previously in a decision rendered by Justice Anna Chandy in Ambiv. State 1961 K.L.T. 617 had been laid down that under section 137 the conditional order cannot be made absolute without the party (complainant) being called upon to substantiate the allegation, which necessitated the passing of the conditional order by producing legal evidence. Subsequently in 1966 K.L.T. 1100 Justice Madhavan Nair took a different view. His Lordship stated in the above decision that section 137 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates proof not of reasonableness and propriety of the conditional order passed but of its unreasonableness and impropriety. If evidence therefore is not forthcoming the section requires the Magistrate to make the conditional order absolute. In other words it is for the person against whom a conditional order as been made to convince the Magistrate that the conditional order was not reasonable or proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and not for the other party to lead evidence to satisfy the Magistrate that his conditional order was reasonable and proper. 1968 K.L.T. 889 was in respect of a case under section 137 and 139A Cr. 1968 K.L.T. 889 was in respect of a case under section 137 and 139A Cr. P.C. Under section 139A where an order is made under section 133 for the purpose of preventing obstruction, nuisance or danger to the public in the use of any way, river, channel or place, the Magistrate shall, on the appearance before him of the person against whom the order was made, question him as to whether he denies the existence of any public right in respect of the way, river, channel or place, and, if he does so, the Magistrate shall, before proceeding under section 137 or section 138, inquire into the matter. If in such inquiry the Magistrate finds that there is any reliable evidence in support of such denial, he shall stay the proceedings untill the matter of the existence of such right has been decided by a competent civil court; and, if he finds that there is no such evidence, he shall proceed as laid down in section 137 or section 138, as the case may require. The Division Bench of this court in the aforementioned case said that, 'a combined reading of sections 137 and 139A shows that there are two distinct stages in the inquiry contemplated by those sections, the first being that under section 139A(2) and the second that under section 137. Entering on the second stage arises only if the party against whom the conditional order was passed defaults to adduce reliable evidence in support of his denial of the existence of a public right. In the scheme of the inquiry the proper place for the provisions in section 137 is after section 139A. Then the court said that when they go straight to the question whether a Magistrate who makes a conditional order absolute under section 137(3) can do so without taking the evidence of the party at whose instance he passed the conditional order, the court was of the opinion that it cannot be done. Then the court said that when they go straight to the question whether a Magistrate who makes a conditional order absolute under section 137(3) can do so without taking the evidence of the party at whose instance he passed the conditional order, the court was of the opinion that it cannot be done. Their Lordships said: "That is firstly because there is scope for the application of section 137(2) and (3) only after the conclusion of the inquiry contemplated by section 137(1) and the provision in section 137(1) that in an inquiry under it evidence should be taken as in a summons case indicates that the Magistrate has to take the evidence of the party at whose instance the conditional order was passed before the disposal of the case Section 244 which comes in Chapter XX dealing with the trial of summons cases says that the Magistrate should hear the complainant, if any, and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and thereafter take the evidence adduced by the accused. The words evidence in the matter employed in section 137(1) mean evidence of the complainant. Secondly, at the beginning of the stage of the inquiry under section 137(1) the only material before the Magistrate in support of the conditional order he passed is the information or ex parte statements he received under section 133(1) and they cannot take the place of legal evidence for passing a final order. And thirdly, if even without taking the evidence of the party at whose instance the conditional order was passed that order is to be made absolute on the default to let in evidence of the party against whom it was passed it works out as a penalty for his default and such a penalty is not provided for in section 139A(3) which deals with penalties for defaults in such cases. We therefore respectfully agree with the statement of the law on the subject in Ambi v. State of Kerala (1961 K.L.T. 617) and disagree with that in Balan v. State of Kerala (1966 K.L.T. 1100). We therefore respectfully agree with the statement of the law on the subject in Ambi v. State of Kerala (1961 K.L.T. 617) and disagree with that in Balan v. State of Kerala (1966 K.L.T. 1100). Again in another decision of this court reported in Bhaskaran Nair v. Samuel 1974K.L.T. 591 Justice Janaki Amma went to the extent of saying that even in cases the person concerned does not pursue his objections, the complainant should lead evidence on his side and should not leave the Magistrate to base his order on materials placed before him when the preliminary order was passed. With regard to this later decision, Mr. M. N. Sukumaran Nair, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it may not be quite consistent with the section itself, which says that only if the person concerned appears and shows cause against the order the Magistrate has to take evidence in the matter. However, in the view that I am taking in the matter I need not go into that question as such. The learned District Judge in Ext. P-2 has said that the present case is distinguishable from the rulings reported in 1968 K.L.T. 889 and 1974 K.L.T. 591. They were proceedings instituted on complaints preferred by private parties whereas in this case the complaint was taken to file on the foot of a police report. How the learned District Judge approached the matter and resolved the question could best be given in his own words: "On getting the police report the Executive 1st Class Magistrate had issued notice to the Cr. Petitioner and the Cr. Petitioner was called upon to show cause why the preliminary order should not be made absolute. He had filed his written objections and he had also let in evidence which had been taken by the learned Magistrate. So that merely because the complainant had not been examined in the case it cannot be said that the trial itself is vitiated. As far as I could see there is no illegality in the matter of disposal of this case by the Executive 1st Class Magistrate. On the foot of the police report the preliminary order contemplated by the code had been passed calling upon the present revision petitioner to show cause why it should not be made absolute. Then the Cr. Petitioner had let in evidence. On the foot of the police report the preliminary order contemplated by the code had been passed calling upon the present revision petitioner to show cause why it should not be made absolute. Then the Cr. Petitioner had let in evidence. That evidence had been perused by the learned Executive 1st Class Magistrate. It was after a proper enquiry that the order was made absolute. So that there is nothing illegal in the procedure adopted by the Executive 1st Class Magistrate. On the merits also the revision petitioner has no case. The mahazar prepared by the police would clearly show that the tree, even though tied by ropes, is standing in a dangerous condition that it may at any time fall on the residential building of the petitioner there. So that it is a case where the coconut tree belonging to the revision petitioner is standing in his compound in such a condition that it is dangerous to the occupants of the neighbouring house. There is absolutely nothing made out to show that the entries in the mahazar are false. So that on merits also the revision petitioner had no case. That being so, there is no merit in interfering with the order.� Assuming this to be a case where squarely the decision of the Division Bench of this court earlier mentioned would apply and a mistake had been committed by the Magistrate in the disposal of the proceedings before him the question that arises for consideration in this court is whether the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 is called for. The power of superintendence given to this court under Article 227 is not a power given to correct errors as Rankin, C. J., pointed out in the case of an analogous provision, section 107 of the Government of India Act, in Manmathanath v. Emperor A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 132. Pointedly referring to this decision Trevor Harris, C. J. presiding over a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court said in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukerjee A.I.R. 1951 Cal.193. that High Court power to interfere with decisions of courts and Tribunals under its power of superintendence under Article 227 must be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases. Pointedly referring to this decision Trevor Harris, C. J. presiding over a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court said in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukerjee A.I.R. 1951 Cal.193. that High Court power to interfere with decisions of courts and Tribunals under its power of superintendence under Article 227 must be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases. The power of superintendence is a power of a known and well recognised character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words the High Court power of superintendence is a power to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. The observations of Chief Justice Harris that the power conferred by Article 227 has to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep subordinate courts within their bounds .of authority was accepted without demur by the Supreme Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath A.I.R.1954 S. C. 215 where the history of the Article and its scope were considered in detail. The Supreme Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam A.I.R.1958 S.C. 398 distinguished the powers of High Court under Articles 226 and 227. Sinha, J., (as he then was) said there, "that powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.� Bachwant, J., said in Lonand Gram Panchayat v. Ramgiri A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 222. at pp. 223 and 224: "..But the High Court is vested with the power of judicial superintendence over the Tribunal under Article 227 of the Constitution. This power is not greater than the power under Article 226 and is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority The High Court may refuse to interfere under Article 227 unless there is a grave miscarriage of justice."� The power is not to be exercised merely for the purpose of correcting errors of law or of fact. High Court cannot assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law. In this case, in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, though the court below might have acted in an irregular fashion by not strictly adhering to the procedure laid down in section 133 Cr. P.C. I do not consider that an injustice has been caused to the petitioner to warrant this court interference under Article 227. The Executive First Class Magistrate might not be far wrong in inferring that the tree concerned is leaning over the petitioner (2nd respondent herein) building and might endanger his life and property, as seen from the statements made by the petitioner herein and his own witnesses in their evidence and quoted in Ext. P-1. No case for interference under Article 227 is made out in this case and the original petition is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case without costs.