S. K. MUKHERJEE, M. N. RAO ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against a judgment order dated March 7, 1974 passed in Civil Rule No. 7279 (W) of 1972 by Anil Kumar Sen J. By his decision the learned Judge was pleased to make the rule absolute and directed the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner dated June 23, 1972 and two adverse entries dated January 11, 1972 and April 21, 1972 respectively, as entered in the Confidential Character Roll of the petitioner, to be set aside and issued a mandate on the Respondents in the Rule to forbear from giving effect to or in any manner acting upon the said impugned order of compulsory retirement and the said adverse entries. ( 2 ) ON or about May 16, 1944, by an order made by the General Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway, the petitioner was appointed as a Cipher Operator on a consolidated pay of Rs. 140/- per month. It was stipulated in the said order that after successful completion of training, the petitioner would be posted as a Cipher Operator on the usual terms of temporary railway employees and he would be entitled to such of the allowances that are admissible under the Rules at the stations where he would be posted and such appointment would be liable to be terminated on 24 hours' notice if either during the period of training of after appointment the services of the petitioner was not satisfactory. Thereafter by order No. 470-E/115/fg dated February 1, 1947 issued for and on behalf of his appointing authority, the petitioner was transferred to Watch and Ward Department (Mechanical) as a Sub-Inspector at a pay of Rs. 100-10/2-120/- and was posted at Saidpur Workshop. Thereafter, on or about November 24, 1955, he was promoted as Inspector Grade III and was confirmed in the said post by order No. D. O. 296 dated April 24, 1962 and from a reference to the said order it would appear that such confirmation was effective from January 1, 1960. By an order dated December 12, 1969 the petitioner was directed to be transferred as Inspector Railway Protection Force from Gaya to Burdwan Circle. On such transfer, the petitioner duly joined the said transferred post. By an order dated December 12, 1969 the petitioner was directed to be transferred as Inspector Railway Protection Force from Gaya to Burdwan Circle. On such transfer, the petitioner duly joined the said transferred post. Upto this time petitioner, trouble started thereafter and more particularly as soon as he addressed a confidential note on May 6, 1970 to the Assistant Security Officer, Howrah, requesting him thereby to have the transfers effected in the cases of certain staff at Burdwan for better and efficient working of the administration. In the said note the petitioner alleged that he has come to the definite conclusion that the sudden increase in crimes at Burdwan was mainly due to the staff as mentioned in his report and that those employees were in league with the local criminals. He opined that if those employees were transferred then that would certainly help in the improvement in detection and incidence of crimes. On the complaint made by him, the petitioner has alleged that he was transferred from Burdwan to Asansol as Divisional Inspector by Order No. 227/71 dated June 5, 1971. The petitioner has challenged the said order as not being bonafide and he has alleged that the same was procured at the instance of some members of the force, whose transfers as mentioned hereinbefore were recommended by him. On receipt of the said order of transfer, the petitioner on June 8, 1971 made a representation. He has also pointed out in the said representation that the impugned order of transfer was incomplete. It appears that ultimately on December 1, 1971, the petitioner obtained Civil Rule No. 4007 (W) of 1971 from this Court against the said order of transfer and the order directing him to vacate his quarters at Burdwan. The said order directing the petitioner to vacate his quarters was passed on August 19, 1971. It has been alleged by the Respondents that the petitioner, after the order of transfer was not competent to hold over possession of the quarters at Burdwan. The said Rule is still pending. In the said Rule an order of injunction has been issued restraining the Respondent railway authorities from compelling the petitioner to vacate the quarters in question. It has been alleged by the Respondents that the petitioner, after the order of transfer was not competent to hold over possession of the quarters at Burdwan. The said Rule is still pending. In the said Rule an order of injunction has been issued restraining the Respondent railway authorities from compelling the petitioner to vacate the quarters in question. In the meantime, on the representation of the Petitioner as mentioned hereinbefore, by D. O. No. 228/71 dated June 6, 1971 the petitioner was informed by the Assistant Security Officer (II), Howrah that the transfer order was issued by the Security Officer with the approval of the Chief Security Officer, Calcutta and in the said order one Shri B. N. Bose was first directed to relieve the petitioner. Before moving this Court in Civil Rule No. 4007 (W) of 1971, it appears that on June 9, 1971 the petitioner made a representation to the Chief Security Officer and requested him to keep the order of transfer in abeyance for 6 months and he also requested for a personal hearing. Nothing was done. On the other hand by Memo No. ASO/ii/con/g71 dated June 14, 1971 the petitioner was directed by the Assistant Security Officer, Howrah, to hand over charge to Shri S. N. Pandey. It further appears that the petitioner by Memo No. ASO/ii/hwh dated June 15, 1971 made a further representation for withholding the said order for handing over charge to the said Shri Pandey as directed till the disposal of his appeal. The petitioner has alleged that the said Shri Pandey informed the Respondent No. 3, the Assistant Security Officer on June 15, 1971 that the petitioner has reported sick and strangely enough on the said date the said Assistant Security Officer informed the petitioner that his appeal was not received by the Chief Security Officer and he was again informed to hand over charge to the said Shri Pandey on or by June 16, 1971. Immediately on receipt of the said communication the petitioner addressed a letter to the said Assistant Security Officer intimating that the appeal in question was sent to him and the same was duly received by the receiving clerk of his office. Immediately on receipt of the said communication the petitioner addressed a letter to the said Assistant Security Officer intimating that the appeal in question was sent to him and the same was duly received by the receiving clerk of his office. But all the said representations of the petitioner became fruitless and by Memo, No. ASO/ii/12 dated June 16, 1971, he was ultimately shown as "spared" on transfer with effect from June 16, 1971 as he reported sick, by the said Assistant Security Officer. Against the said order and the order of transfer, a further representation was made by the petitioner to the Chief Security Officer on June 28, 1971 but by his Memo No. ASO/ii/e/12 dated July 2, 1971, the petitioner was informed by the said Assistant Security Officer that his representation was rejected by the Chief Security Officer by Order No. SC/30/14-E Pt. IV dated July 1, 1971. There having been no other alternative, the petitioner on July 6, 1971 reported for duty at his transferred post and since he had not vacated his quarters, on July 8, 1971 he made a further representation to the Chief Security Officer and informed him that as per verbal orders of the Divisional Superintendent, Howrah, he has not vacated the quarters and he will retain the same till the end of the scholastic year. As even after the said representation he was asked by the Assistant Security Officer under the alleged orders and instructions of the Security Officer to vacate the quarters, the petitioner, as stated hereinbefore, moved and obtained the Rule and orders in Civil Rule No. 4007 (W) of 1971. In this appeal we are neither concerned with the same nor are we making any determination on the same. ( 3 ) THE petitioner has alleged that even after the issue of the said Civil Rule, the Assistant Security Officer concerned by his D. O. No. ASO/ii/g/34 (II) dated January 14, 1972 instructed the Assistant Security Officer, Asansol, to deduct penal rent from the petitioner for his occupation of the quarters at Burdwan. ( 3 ) THE petitioner has alleged that even after the issue of the said Civil Rule, the Assistant Security Officer concerned by his D. O. No. ASO/ii/g/34 (II) dated January 14, 1972 instructed the Assistant Security Officer, Asansol, to deduct penal rent from the petitioner for his occupation of the quarters at Burdwan. It has been further alleged by the petitioner that as disputes and differences arose between him and the authorities over the said occupation of the quarters at Burdwan, two adverse entries in his confidential character roll for 1970 were recorded, one by the Respondent No. 1, the Chief Security Officer and the other by the Respondent No. 2, the Security Officer, Calcutta. The said adverse entries were, in terms of the requirement of the rules communicated to him on January 11, 1972 and April 21, 1972 respectively. The petitioner has challenged the bonafides of the said adverse entries and he has also alleged that such entries were incorporated in his record with the ulterior motive of creating a foundation for selecting him for premature retirement. In fact the petitioner has contended that such apprehension of his was substantiated when by the impugned order dated June 23, 1972 the Chief Security Officer, Respondent No. 1 directed him to go on forced retirement at the age of 55 in exercise of his powers under Rule 2046 (h) (ii) of the Railway Establishment Code. Rule 2046 is equivalent to Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules. The relevant portion of Rule 2046 (h) (ii) is in the following terms: (2046), (FR 56)????????????????. ????????????????. . " (h) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the appointing authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, have the absolute right to retire any railway servant by giving him notice or not less than three months in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice (i) if he is in Class I or Class II service or post and had entered Government service before attaining the age of thirty-five years, after he has attained the age of fifty years, (ii) in any other case after he has attained the age of fifty-five years. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid mentioned adverse entries and the impugned order of compulsory retirement, the petitioner moved and obtained Civil Rule No. 7299 (W) of 1972, which after completion of the affidavit came up for hearing before Anil Kumar Sen, J. and by his judgment and order dated March 7, 1974, particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore, the learned Judge made the said Rule absolute. It appears that before the learned Judge it was urged firstly on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order of compulsory retirement as issued by the Chief Security Officer was beyond jurisdiction inasmuch as the General Manager, who was the appointing authority of the petitioner was superior in rank and the said point has been answered in the negative as the learned Judge has held and found that there cannot be any dispute that power under Rule 2046 (h) can be exercised only by the appointing authority. But the term "appointing authority" in the Rules does not mean the authority who had actually appointed the person who is sought to be compulsorily retired. The term has been defined by the "note" added to the proviso to mean the authority competent to make the first appointment to the grade which the Railway servant for the time being holds. As at the relevant time when the order was made, the Chief Security Officer was competent to make the appointment to the grade of Inspector grade III, so even if the petitioner was appointed by the General Manager, yet the Chief Security Officer would be competent to direct his compulsory retirement under the Rules. The learned Judge has further held that the "note" is an integral part of the Rule itself having been incorporated by the Rule making authority and it would not be proper to construe the Rule without giving effect to the "note" itself. Secondly, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was not within the scope of or in accordance with Rule 2046 (h) and the learned Judge has held that the position is not so because in order to be valid, such order must be based on considerations relevant to public interest. Secondly, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was not within the scope of or in accordance with Rule 2046 (h) and the learned Judge has held that the position is not so because in order to be valid, such order must be based on considerations relevant to public interest. The learned Judge has found that in spite of clear challenge thrown by the petitioner, such requirement has not been established and the necessary opinion in the instant case was not formed duly. It has been further held that Rule 2046 (h) does not invest any arbitrary power in the hands of the competent authority and such power can be exercised only within the limits specified viz. , when it is necessary in the public interest. Formation of opinions has also been found to be a condition precedent to the exercise of powers precedent to the exercise of powers under Rule 2046 (h) and such opinion, it has been held, is to be formed with reference to an objective test of public interest. The learned Judge has further held that the decision may be subjective but the same is not beyond judicial review. It has further been held that though the Court cannot go into the question of correctness of the decision, yet where a challenge is put forward before it, the Court has to see that the order is based on considerations of relevant and not irrelevant, collateral or extraneous materials. Thus the learned Judge has held that on the basis of the challenge by the petitioner, it was incumbent on the Respondents viz. , the authorities concerned to disclose the reasons or the grounds on which such compulsory retirement was considered to be in public interest. In support of his determination, the learned Judge has placed reliance on the case of Col. , the authorities concerned to disclose the reasons or the grounds on which such compulsory retirement was considered to be in public interest. In support of his determination, the learned Judge has placed reliance on the case of Col. J. N. Sinha v. Union of India, 1971 S. L. R. 70; J. D. Raje v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 Labour and Industrial Cases 682; Daulatram S. Rane v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 Labour and Industrial Cases 932; P. Sankar Rao v. Government of India, 1971 (1) M. L. J. 302 and also on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of A. C. Bose v. Union of India (F. M. A. 432 of 1973, disposed of on November 26, 1973) and since reported in 1974 (29) Indian Factories and Labour Reports 269, apart from the fact that it was found that the principle as enunciated is also supported by the determination in the case of Union of India v. J. N. Sinha, reported in AIR 1971 S. C. 40. The learned Judge has also dwelt on the requirements which have to be satisfied, particularly as laid down in the case of A. C. Bose v. Union of India (supra) viz. , that before an order for compulsory retirement is made, the appropriate authority must form an opinion that it is in public interest to make the order and such opinion, cannot also be formed arbitrarily but must depend on some grounds or materials germane to the issue of compulsory retirement and when such an order is challenged, the Court has the right to examine whether some grounds or materials germane to the issue exist, although the Court is not to go into the sufficient of those materials. ( 5 ) BEFORE the learned Judge, the petitioner not only claimed the order of compulsory retirement to be not bonafide but he categorically claimed the said order to be not in public interest. The petitioner has further alleged that there cannot be any "public interest" involved in his case as admittedly he had an uniformly good service career and in fact service as rendered by him have all along been duly appreciated by the relevant authorities. The petitioner has further alleged that there cannot be any "public interest" involved in his case as admittedly he had an uniformly good service career and in fact service as rendered by him have all along been duly appreciated by the relevant authorities. In fact, he alleged that there were commendations in his record and no contrary remarks and such would at least be the state of the records prior to 1972 and the purported adverse entries in his record after 1972 were not bonafide but were maliciously entered at the machination of the Assistant Security Officer concerned, through Officer like the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It was further argued that apart from the above-mentioned infirmities the said entries were not made in accordance with law. It appears that the learned Judge was of the view that the Respondent No. 1, in view of the specific allegations, was obliged to produce the relevant records and to disclose the primary materials on the basis of which the opinion, if any, in terms of Rule 2046 (h) was formed and such obligation has not been discharged inasmuch as the documents and records as mentioned hereinbefore were not produced before the Court for the purpose of necessary scrutiny and thus to find out whether they succeeded in discharging the initial onus. The learned Judge has further found that the affidavit-in-opposition which was also filed by the Respondents was unsatisfactory and the same also disclosed no grounds or reasons which could prima facie establish that the petitioner's premature and compulsory retirement was necessary in public interest. The Respondents in the Rule at the time of the hearing took a plea that the decision was arrived at after a review by the Review Committee formed by the General Manager but noting was disclosed regarding the proceedings before the Review Committee or its recommendations. In their affidavit however, the Respondents made it clear that during his entire service career the petitioner was awarded one petty and two minor punishments and six commendations for good work. That apart, it has also been mentioned that the petitioner had also some adverse reports in his Confidential Character Roll for which his integrity has been doubted. In their affidavit however, the Respondents made it clear that during his entire service career the petitioner was awarded one petty and two minor punishments and six commendations for good work. That apart, it has also been mentioned that the petitioner had also some adverse reports in his Confidential Character Roll for which his integrity has been doubted. The learned Judge has held these statements to be very vague and he has further found that no adverse entry which can even suggest lack of integrity, was disclosed or particulars of them have been furnished. The learned Judge has also found that in any event it was not the case of the Respondents that any such ground of suspected integrity constituted the basis of the order in question. In view of the above, the learned Judge has held and found that the impugned decision was not based on appropriate and relevant considerations and furthermore the same was passed in excess of the jurisdiction and sanction of the Rule. ( 6 ) REGARDING the two adverse entries in the petitioner's Character Roll, which were argued by the petitioner as the third point of attack alleging that those entries were not only not bonafide but if those entries constituted any compulsory retirement then the same was equally malafide, the learned Judge, on consideration of the pleadings and records has held that there was ample substance in those contentions and found the said orders to be made in unfair haste and being motivated by bias and further held that the first adverse entry was baseless, incorrect and not bonafide apart from the fact that the same was not recorded in accordance with the relevant regulations. As for the second adverse entry, the learned Judge has also held that the same was also like the first one and apart from that, the second adverse entry was also bad because the same was recorded without giving the petitioner any opportunity to show cause in terms of the requirements of Railway Protection Force Regulations, 1966, and in particular there was positive infringement of Regulation 2 (d) of Chapter 17 and the Board's Circular dated December 18, 1969. Non compliance with the said regulations has also been dealt with and severely criticised by the learned Judge while making the Rule absolute and setting aside the order of compulsory retirement and the said two adverse entries. Non compliance with the said regulations has also been dealt with and severely criticised by the learned Judge while making the Rule absolute and setting aside the order of compulsory retirement and the said two adverse entries. Against such determination, the Railway authorities have preferred this F. M. A. No. 559 of 1974 on June 5, 1974. ( 7 ) BEFORE making our determination, we would also like to indicate the circumstances in which a supplementary affidavit, rejoinder to the same and reply thereto were filed at the hearing of this appeal. From the determination of the learned Judge it would appear that he has recorded in no uncertain terms that the relevant records showing the formation of opinion or the materials on which opinion, if any was formed, were not produced. Mr. Mukul Gopal Mukherjee, the learned Advocate for the appellants led by Mr. Sankardas Banerjee submitted that he asked for time from the learned Judge to enable him to produce the required records but that prayer was not granted. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee appearing for the Respondent has of course strongly denied the correctness of the statements. Nothing of course appears from the records in support of the contentions of the appellants. Since we felt that even at the appellate stage we can look into and consider the records and that too for the purpose of assessing the state of affairs, to come to a definite finding, we gave the appellant leave not only to produce the relevant records but also to file supplementary affidavit disclosing the materials and the entries in the confidential character rolls and also the materials which were placed the Review Committee for assessment of the petitioner's conduct, on the basis of which the necessary opinion to retire him compulsory under Rule 2046 (h) was formed. After taking some adjournments, the said supplementary affidavit was filed on or about February 5, 1975 and further affidavits to the same were completed on or by February 20, 1975. We further record that no objection was taken by the parties to the above procedure being adopted and furthermore the confidential reports thought to be relevant by the appellants, which were considered, have also been filed by means of a supplementary Paper Book by consent of parties and we have taken into consideration those materials in our judgment. We further record that no objection was taken by the parties to the above procedure being adopted and furthermore the confidential reports thought to be relevant by the appellants, which were considered, have also been filed by means of a supplementary Paper Book by consent of parties and we have taken into consideration those materials in our judgment. ( 8 ) THE whole question in this appeal boils down to the consideration, whether in terms of Chapter XVII of The Railway Protection Force Regulations, 1966, which deals with the Record of Service of Confidential Report ad particularly para. 2 (d) of the same which is in the following line :-2 (d)"copies of Character Rolls should not be given to the members, but every entry which may adversely affect promotion of a member should be communicated to him and a note that this has been done must be made below the entry itself. Before such an entry is made, an opportunity must be given to the member concerned to show cause either verbally or in writing as to why it should not be made. "the employee, against whom unfavourable entries are made, is entitled to an opportunity of showing cause against such entries and information on the salient features of those entries and more particularly whether such entries as were made in the instant case in the prescribed form in Appendix XVIII to the said Regulations were different from the Character and Service Rolls. ( 9 ) MR. Banerjee for the appellants contended that the unfavourable report of the Security Officer or of the Chief Security Officer for the years 1970 and 1971 in the Confidential Character Rolls of the Respondent petitioner were confidential reports made in the prescribed form as found in Appendix XVIII of the Regulations and they were different from his Character and Service Roll and such Rolls are maintained in terms of paragraph 3 of Chapter XVII of the Regulations. He submitted that those confidential reports are maintained only in respect of Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors and Assistant Sub-Inspectors. Mr. He submitted that those confidential reports are maintained only in respect of Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors and Assistant Sub-Inspectors. Mr. Banerjee submitted further that item 6 of the Instructions at the bottom of the form in Appendix XVIII clearly stipulates that communication of the substance of an unfavourable report is at the discretion of the Security Officer and in the instant case the communication of the unfavourable reports was not considered necessary by the competent authority in terms of the said item 6 of the form in Appendix XVIII. Mr. Banerjee, further and in the alternative argued that the employer has an absolute and unfettered right to retire an employee and in the facts of the instant case, when such right has been exercised, the same is not justiciable. The relevant provisions of paragraph 3 of the Regulations dealing with Confidential Reports of employees like the petitioner in Appendix XVIII as referred to hereinbefore are quoted hereunder for the sake of convenience. 3. Confidential Reports :-appendix XVIII (see para. 3 (i) (a) of Ch. XVII)railway Protection Force. ******** ******** ******** ******** instructions ******** ******** ******** ******** ******** ******** 6. "the substance of an unfavourable report will, at the discretion of S. O. , C. S. O. be communicated to the person concerned and he will at the same time be informed in what respects improvement is necessary, a note to this effect being recorded herein which he should sign". ( 10 ) AS stated hereinbefore, for the purpose of producing the documents necessary for the determination of the appeal and disclosing how and on what materials the relevant opinion was formed and what documents and records were placed before the Review Committee not only affidavits were filed but a supplementary Paper Book incorporating those documents was also filed pursuant to the leave granted by us. From the documents as disclosed in the supplementary Paper Book and the statements available from the subsequent affidavits it appears that the Confidential Character Rolls of some employees including those of the Respondent petitioner were sent to the Review Committee, with the periods of review mentioned against the employees therein. In the case of the Respondent petitioner, as appear from the list, that Confidential Reports for the years 1969, 1970 and 1971 were sent. In the case of the Respondent petitioner, as appear from the list, that Confidential Reports for the years 1969, 1970 and 1971 were sent. It further appears from the documents disclosed in the supplementary Paper Book that by D. O. No. CPO/cc/ Review Security dated May 31, 1972 addressed to the Security Officer Head Quarter, Eastern Railway, by the Assistant Personnel Officer (Ruling), that 19 cases were reviewed by the Review Committee and the Respondent petitioner amongst few others could not be recommended for retention beyond 55 years of age or 30 years of service, whichever is earlier and as such necessary action was directed to be taken in terms of Office Circular No. 8/393/0/2 Confidential dated December 30, 1969 and Railway Board's letter as circulated under Serial No. 7659. It may further be mentioned that in the statement showing particulars of Class III staff of Railway Protection Force Department for review by the Committee in terms of Chief Personnel Officer's Confidential Circular No. E. 393/0/2 Confidential dated December 30, 1969, the name of the Respondent petitioner appeared at serial No. 7. ( 11 ) AS stated hereinbefore the provisions of Rule 2046 are in the same terms as Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules and thus the determinations as made under the said Rules can safely be looked into and the principles as enunciated in the determinations on the several questions which arose for consideration by the Supreme Court and other High Courts can also be applied to and relied on in a case arising under Rule 2046 for the purpose of an effective and complete determination. Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules and the effect of adverse entries in the Confidential Reports came up for consideration in the cases mentioned hereinafter at different stages for determination of the principles underlying them. In the case of Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S. C. 1305 it has been laid down that two tests are to be applied for ascertaining whether the termination of service by compulsory retirement amounted to removal or dismissal so as to attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S. C. 1305 it has been laid down that two tests are to be applied for ascertaining whether the termination of service by compulsory retirement amounted to removal or dismissal so as to attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The first test is whether the action is by way of punishment and to find out that, it was necessary that a charge or imputation against the officer is made the condition of the exercise of the power and the second is whether by compulsory retirement the officer is losing the benefits he has already earned as he does by dismissal or removal. While misconduct and inefficiency are factors that enter into consideration when the order is one of dismissal or removal or of retirement, there is this difference that while in the case of retirement they merely furnish the background and the enquiry, if held - and there is no duty to hold an enquiry - is only for the satisfaction of the authorities who have to take action, in the case of dismissal or removal, they form the very basis on which the order is made and the enquiry thereon must be formal, and must satisfy the rules of natural justice and the requirements of Article 311 (2 ). The above case was under the provisions of Patiala State Regulations (which does not fix the age of compulsory retirement) and action was taken under rule 278 of the said Regulations. In the impugned order it was only stated that the compulsory retirement was for "administrative reasons" and it was only after the employee's insistence to be supplied with the grounds that led to the decision that certain charges were communicated to him, there is no basis for saying that the order of retirement contained any imputation or charge against the employee. The fact that consideration of misconduct or efficiency weighed with the Government in coming to its conclusion whether nay action should be taken under rule 278 does not amount to any imputation or charge against the officer. The fact that consideration of misconduct or efficiency weighed with the Government in coming to its conclusion whether nay action should be taken under rule 278 does not amount to any imputation or charge against the officer. It has also been held that a retirement under a service rule which provides for compulsory retirement at any age whatsoever, irrespective of the length of service, should be regarded as dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Thereafter, in the case of Prakash Chandra Sharma v. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Ors. , 1970 (IV) Services Law Reporter 116 it has been held that no interference is possible or required with an order for promotion when adverse remarks in Confidential report were not conveyed to an employee and no chance was given to him to represent against the adverse remarks. In that case the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Rules, established by the Central Act 43 of 1959 and section 12 (1) empowered the Commission to appoint such number of employees as it considered necessary. In exercise of its powers under the Act, a regulation dated May 10, 1963 was made by the Commissioner laying down the principles for the determination of seniority of officers of the staff of the Commission. Rule 11 (ii) (b) of the said regulations relating to departmental promotees provided that if promotion was to be made on the basis of seniority cum merit i. e. seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit, the Departmental Promotion Committee should place the candidates into a consolidated seniority list based on the total length of service rendered in that grade/cadre and make recommendations for promotion on the basis of the test. A common seniority list in the Junior Transportation Inspectors Grade (renamed as Inspector Grade II) was prepared and the employee concerned was placed at serial No. 4. The employee concerned was appointed in the said post on April 5, 1971 and after him two other employees were appointed. Thereafter regulation No. 16 (16)62 was framed on April 29, 1963 to the effect that no employee would be considered for promotion to a higher post in the Commission, unless he had completed a minimum period of two years service in the existing post. Thereafter regulation No. 16 (16)62 was framed on April 29, 1963 to the effect that no employee would be considered for promotion to a higher post in the Commission, unless he had completed a minimum period of two years service in the existing post. It appears that there was a meeting of the said Committee on April 26, 1963 which had to consider the case of promotion of four junior Transportation Inspectors to officiate as Senior Transportation Inspectors and consequently on June 22, 1963 necessary order was passed. The employee concerned challenged the said order as discriminatory. After a series of representations, a proceeding was initiated at the instance of the employer concerned. It transpired that although the said employee was admittedly senior to the others, the Departmental Promotions Committee did not recommend his name for promotion on account of certain adverse remarks in his confidential reports and the said decision remained unaltered even at a later meeting of the said Committee. Although Instructions regarding Confidential reports were not also suggested that the Committee in making the determination had acted in a malafide manner and in such circumstances the determination as has been referred to above was made. The scope and purpose of confidential reports and adverse remarks in confidential reports come up for consideration against in the case of R. L. Butail v. Union of India and Ors. 1970 (IV) Services Law Reports 926=1970 (2) S. C. C. 876. In that case the appellant was confirmed in the post of Director in 1963 in the Central Water and Power Commission (Power Wing ). Adverse entries against him were made in the confidential reports for 1964 and 1965. On the communication of those entries, he made unsuccessful representations. He alleged that he was not considered for promotion though entitled to the same. In 1967 he was compulsorily retired under Rule 56 (J) at the age of 55 years. The Writ petition Mr. Butail challenging the validity of the adverse entries and that of the order of compulsory retirement was rejected and thereafter on being moved, the Supreme Court held inter alia amongst others that under Rule 56 (J), Government has absolute right to retire a Government servant at the age of 55 years in public interest. If the authority concerned bonafide forms that opinion, the correctness of the same cannot be challenged before Courts. If the authority concerned bonafide forms that opinion, the correctness of the same cannot be challenged before Courts. Thereafter, came the case of State of Punjab v. Dewan Chuni Lal, AIR 1970 S. C. 2086. In that case certain charges of inefficiency and dishonesty were based on the reports against the employee concerned for the years 1941 and 1942 on the basis of adverse reports of superior officers and such officers, though available, were not examined to enable the employee concerned to cross examine them. Furthermore, in that case the employee concerned was allowed to cross the efficiency bar and it appears that charges were framed against him on the basis of adverse confidential reports relating to a period earlier than the year i. e. 1944 when he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar. In such circumstances it has been held that reports earlier than 1944 should not have been considered at all inasmuch as the employee was allowed to cross the efficiency bar in that year. On the facts of that case it has further been held that it is unthinkable that if the authorities took any serious view of the charges of dishonesty and inefficiency contained in the confidential reports of 1941 and 1943 they could have overlooked the same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the efficiency bar in 1944 and it was further found on the facts that the officer concerned was given reasonable opportunities of conducting his defence before the enquiry officer and charges based on the report for the years 1941 and 1942 should not have been leveled against him. It was further found that the denial of the right to examine a witness who had made general remarks against his character and was available for examination at the enquiry, amounted to denial of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action. In the case of Union of India v. Col. J. N. Sinha and Anr. , 1970 (IV) Service Law Reporters 748, the provisions of rule 54 (J) of the Fundamental Rules again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of India. In the case of Union of India v. Col. J. N. Sinha and Anr. , 1970 (IV) Service Law Reporters 748, the provisions of rule 54 (J) of the Fundamental Rules again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of India. In that case it has been reiterated that under the said rule the appropriate authority has the absolute right tot retire a Government Servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so and such right is an absolute one. It has of course been held that the said power can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule, one of which is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so. If the authority bonafide forms that opinion, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before Courts and it is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decisions. In that case it has been further held that compulsory retirement involves no civil consequences and the said rule is not intended to authorise penal action against Government Servants and furthermore the said rule merely embodies one of the facets of the pleasure doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution of India. The said rule holds the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interests of the public. While a minimum service is guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government is given power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsory retiring those, who in its opinion should not be there in public interest. In some cases, the Government may feel that a particular post may be more usefully held in public interest by an Officer more competent than the one who is holding. It may be that the officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a more efficient Officer. After the determination in the case of Union of India v. Col. J. N. Sinha (supra), the case was reheard on remand and again in the case of Col. J. N. Sinha v. Union of India and Anr. After the determination in the case of Union of India v. Col. J. N. Sinha (supra), the case was reheard on remand and again in the case of Col. J. N. Sinha v. Union of India and Anr. , 1971 (2) Services Law Reporter 470, a Bench decision of the Delhi High Court has held that the Fundamental Rule 56 (j) provides that the right to retire a Government Servant given to the appropriate authority thereunder can be exercised if the said authority is of opinion that it is in the public interest to so retire the concerned Government servant. It has further been held in that case that the right conferred on the appropriate authority to retire a Government servant compulsorily is an absolute one, but that right or power can be exercised only subject to the conditions mentioned in the said Rule, one of which is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it was in the public interest to do so. If the authority bonafide forms the opinion, the correctness of the same cannot be challenged before Courts. But it is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision. It has also been held in that case that the formation of requisite opinion by the appropriate authority is one of the conditions for the exercise of the power conferred by Rule 56 (j) and that the decision to retire a Government servant under the said Rule should not be arbitrary i. e. the same must be based on some ground or material which is germane to the question whether it is in the public interest to retire him. If the decision is based on such ground or material which is not germane to the issue, it would be an arbitrary decision. Since the Rule provides for the formation of the requisite opinion by the appropriate authority and not by a Court, the sufficiency of the ground or material is not justifiable. If the decision is based on such ground or material which is not germane to the issue, it would be an arbitrary decision. Since the Rule provides for the formation of the requisite opinion by the appropriate authority and not by a Court, the sufficiency of the ground or material is not justifiable. But some grounds or materials germane to the issue must exist and it is open to a Court to examine whether such ground or material exists or not As stated earlier it is open to the Government servant concerned to contend that the decision is arbitrary and when such a contention is raised, the Court has to examine the materials placed before it and decide whether the decision to retire the Government servant concerned was arbitrary or not. In the case of State of U. P. v. Shyam Lal Sharma, AIR 1971 S. C. 2151 it has been held by the Supreme Court that if the order of compulsory retirement does not contain any stigma, resort cannot be had to Government files to discover any remark amounting to stigma. It has also been held that in ascertaining whether the order of compulsory retirement is one of punishment, it has to be found out whether in the order itself there was any element of charge or stigma or imputation or any implication of misbehaviour or incapacity against the officer concerned. Secondly, the order itself should be indicative of punishment or penalty it the order will involve loss of benefits already earned. Thirdly, an order for compulsory retirement on the completion of 25 years of service or an order of compulsory retirement made in the public interest to dispense with further services will not amount to an order for dismissal or removal as there is no element of punishment. Fourthly, such an order will not be held to be an order in the nature of punishment or penalty on the ground that there is possibility of loss of future prospects, namely, that the officer will not get his pay till he attains the age of superannuation, or will not get an enhanced pension for not being allowed to remain a few years in service and being compulsorily retired. It has also been held in that case that there where there are no words in the order of compulsory retirement which throw any stigma, three should not be any enquiry into Government files to discover whether any remark amounting to stigma could be found in the files. The reason is that it is the order of compulsory retirement which alone is for examination. If the order itself does not contain any imputation or charge against the officer, the fact that "considerations of misconduct or misbehaviour weighed with the Government in coming to its conclusion to retire him compulsorily does not amount to any imputation or charge against the Officer". When the authority can make an order of compulsory retirement for any reason and no reason is mentioned in the order it cannot be predicted that the order of compulsory retirement has an inherent stigma in the order. Unless it is established from t he order of compulsory retirement itself that a charge or imputation against the officer is made, the condition of the exercise of that power or that by the order the officer is losing benefit already earned, the order retirement cannot be said to be one for dismissal or removal in the nature of penalty or punishment. Thereafter, in the case of Dr. N. V. Putta Bhatta v. The Stage of Mysore and Anr. , AIR 1972 S. C. 2185, which was a case under the Mysore Civil Services Rules it has been held that when Government forms bonafide opinion from the confidential reports to retire a person compulsorily in public interest and there is no provisions for appeal in the Rules against adverse remarks in Confidential Reports, no show cause notice against the order of retirement is necessary. The right under the provisions of the Mysore Civil Services Rules to retire an Officer compulsorily is absolute and is similar to those under Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules. It appears that there is another Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mallinath Jain v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. 1973 (1) Services Law Reporter 413 on the question of Confidential Report and the adverse remarks therein not having been communicated to the officer concerned is disregard of administrative instructions. It appears that there is another Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mallinath Jain v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. 1973 (1) Services Law Reporter 413 on the question of Confidential Report and the adverse remarks therein not having been communicated to the officer concerned is disregard of administrative instructions. In that case the adverse remarks or entries in the Confidential reports relating to the petitioner for the year 1966 and 1968 were not communicated to him within a reasonable time after they were made, but were communicated to him as late as on October 13, 1969. In the meantime i. e. even before they were so communicated, they were taken into consideration by the Departmental Promotions Committee on August 22, 1969 in assessing the respective merits of the petitioner and other respondent employees and preparing a penal in order of merit. As such it was held that such action was in contravention of principles of fair play and natural justice. It has been held that when the competent authority issued the administrative instructions regarding the preparation and maintenance of confidential reports, they were intended to be followed and applied by all the concerned departments. It was further held in the facts of that case that the instructions relating to communication of adverse remarks within reasonable time and the submission of representations against the adverse remark, are based upon and are intended to give effect to principles of fairness and natural justice. Thereafter, the interpretation of the said Rule 56 (J) came up for consideration in this Court in the case of S. S. Gagaa v. The Coal Controller, reported in 77 C. W. N. 304 and in Bench decision in the case of A. C. Bose v. Union of India (supra ). In the first case it has been held that Fundamental Rule 56 (J) no doubt invests absolute power in the prescribed authority to direct an employee's retirement. But such powers should not be misread to mean any arbitrary power in the hands of the prescribed authority. The Rule itself lays down a limitation that such power can be exercised when it is necessary in the public interest. Formation of the opinion in this respect is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power. The opinion against is to be formed with reference to an objective test of public interest. The Rule itself lays down a limitation that such power can be exercised when it is necessary in the public interest. Formation of the opinion in this respect is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power. The opinion against is to be formed with reference to an objective test of public interest. The decision itself may be subjective and as such is not open to judicial review. What is beyond judicial review is the correctness of the decision but it is always open to the Court, when a challenge is brought before it, to see that the order is based on an appropriate opinion and that opinion again is based on consideration of relevant and not collateral or extraneous materials. It is so because an order not so based or an order based on an opinion founded on irrelevant consideration would be ultra vires the rule itself and the person aggrieved has always the rights to challenge an order which is not within the sanction of the Rule. In the other Bench decision in A. C. Bose v. Union of India (supra) it has been held that the legal position is that before an order for compulsory retirement is made, the appropriate authority must form an opinion that it is in public interest to make the order. The opinion cannot be based on collateral grounds. The opinion cannot also be formed arbitrarily but must depend on some grounds or materials germane to the issue of compulsory retirement and when such an order is challenged in a Court of law, the Court has the right to examine whether some ground or materials germane to the issue exists although the Court is not interested in the sufficiency of the materials. It has further been held that in determining whether the order for compulsory retirement is justified, the Court will have to consider not only the provisions of the said rules but also the directions, instructions and notifications of Government from time to time issued to supplement the rule on matters on which the rule is silent. The case of S. S. Garga v. Coal Controller and Ors. (supra) has been affirmed in the Bench decision of this Court in Coal Controller and Ors. v. S. S. Garga, reported in 1975 (1) C. L. J. 285. The case of S. S. Garga v. Coal Controller and Ors. (supra) has been affirmed in the Bench decision of this Court in Coal Controller and Ors. v. S. S. Garga, reported in 1975 (1) C. L. J. 285. The question of maintenance of Character Rolls, adverse entries therein and the effect of non-communication of the same also came up before the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of S. S. Venkatarao v. State of Orissa and Ors. , (1974) Labour and Industrial Cases 1192 and there, in the facts of that case, it has been held that maintenance of Character Rolls is not enjoined by any statute or rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Principles regarding record of Confidential Reports and communication of adverse remarks have been laid down in administrative instructions issued from time to time. The circular which holds the field at a particular point of time is to be followed in its entirety. It has further been held that character rolls are maintained primarily for the benefit of the Government. Government as the master is to make its own estimate of the calibre of its servants and to exploit the talents of its servants for its own end. Instructions, if any, prescribe guidelines for subordinate officers in making assessment of the worth and calibre of their subordinates. Those circulars bind the departments under the administrative control of the Government. At the time of record of confidential reports the employee is not entitled to any hearing. It is only after the record of the confidential reports and the communication thereof, that he is given an opportunity to make a representation against the adverse entry. If the adverse entry is not communicated in time, it is not wiped out and such entry would become final if the employee fails to make any representation after communication. Character rolls can be acted upon before final disposal of the representation and if the representation is ultimately rejected, the action taken on the basis of the confidential report would stand and if on representation the adverse entry is set aside or substantially modified, the case is to be reconsidered and the earlier action taken on such adverse entry is to be quashed if a different view is taken on reconsideration and retrospective benefits are conferred. It has further been held that the Government in maintaining the character rolls is exercising administrative function in which it is to act justly and fairly. That is not a elements in the exercise of both the function are similar. ( 12 ) APART from the above cases, the decision in J. D. Raje v. State of Maharashtra (supra), Daulatram S. Rane v. State of Maharastra (supra) and P. Sanker Rao v. Government of India (supra) to which reference have been made by the learned Judge would also be of relevant consideration. In the said Raje's case, a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court has held that when public interest does not require compulsory retirement in the case of a servant then he is entitled to continue in service under rule 161 (1) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules until he completes 58 years. It has further been held in that case that the Court can held in that case that the Court can interfere with the discretion when it is satisfied that the requisite opinion was not formed or that the order was based on collateral or arbitrary grounds. In Daulatram S. Rane's case, the same Bench of the High Court which made the determination in Raje's case has held that an order of compulsory retirement, made under the said Rule 161 without any material to support the opinion of the Government that it was "in the public interest" to retire the Government servant compulsorily, would be invalid. When an order under that Rule, is challenged in a Writ petition, it is the duty of the State to satisfy the Court that it formed an opinion that it was not in the public interest to continue the petitioner in service on the basis of some material which can be considered to be relevant. When the State is called upon to meet the challenge that there was no material for such a decision to retire an employee compulsorily in public interest, it is incumbent on the State to produce whatever material is relevant. When the State is called upon to meet the challenge that there was no material for such a decision to retire an employee compulsorily in public interest, it is incumbent on the State to produce whatever material is relevant. In the other case of P. Sanker Rao (supra) which incidentally arose out of an action of compulsory retirement taken under the provisions of rule 16 (3) of All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules 1956 it has been held by a Bench decision of the Madras High Court that compulsory retirement under the said rules would not be a punishment so as to require the Central Government to adopt the procedure enjoyed by Article 311 of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary to give the employee concerned a reasonable opportunity of making a representation as to why the order should not have been passed. There are two reasons why an order of compulsory retirement will not be a punishment so as to attract Article 311. The first is that, when the order does not itself contain any stigma on the officer, it cannot be considered as a punishment for attracting Article 311. Secondly, an order of compulsory retirement such as the order passed under rule 16 (3) does not result in forfeiture of the benefits which the officer has already, earned, whereas an order of dismissal or removal would entail such forfeiture. It has also been held in that case that though it is the Central Government which is to make the decision under the said rule to retire an officer in the public interest and its decision is based on subjective opinion, the Court will set aside the decision on some limited grounds. If it could be shown that there were no reasons before the Central Government for taking the action or if the reasons given by them turn out to be nonexistent or invalid in the eye of law, the order cannot be supported. In public regulations of this sort, there is no such thing as absolute or untrammeled 'discretion' that is, that action can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator. In public regulations of this sort, there is no such thing as absolute or untrammeled 'discretion' that is, that action can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator. The underlying reasons is obvious, namely, that though it is left to the Central Government to form its opinion about retiring an officer prematurely in public interest, still there must be some reasons for taking such action. Otherwise there would be room for caprice and arbitrariness which will undermine the morale of the public services. ( 13 ) THE determination in the aforementioned cases and their ratio and findings would thus apply with equal efficiency against an action under rule 2046 (h) of the Railway Establishment Code. So under the said rule the employers, in the instant case, the Railway authorities, have the right to retire an employee on attaining the age of 55 years in public interest if it is of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so and such right is ordinarily an absolute one. Such power can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule itself, namely that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so. If the authority bonafide forms the opinion, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before Courts. It is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision. The rule holds the balance between the rights of the employee concerned and the interests of the public. While a minimum period of service is guaranteed to the employee, the authorities are also given power to energise the administrative machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those, who in their opinion should not be there in public interest. The authority concerned may feel that a particular post may be more usefully held in public interest by an officer more competent than the one who is holding. It may be that the officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a still more efficient officer. The authority concerned may feel that a particular post may be more usefully held in public interest by an officer more competent than the one who is holding. It may be that the officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a still more efficient officer. The right to retire an employee given to the appropriate authority under the rules as stated hereinbefore can be exercised if the authority is of the bonafide opinion that it is in the public interest to so retire the concerned employee subject to the exception as mentioned above and also the exceptions as envisaged is the rule. Such formation of opinion as stated hereinbefore can be challenged on the ground that requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision. The formation of requisite opinion by the appropriate authority is thus one of the conditions precedent for the exercise of the powers conferred by rule 2046 (h) and such decision to retire the employee concerned under the said rule should not be arbitrary the same must be based on some ground or material which is germane to the question whether it is in public interest to retire him. If the decision is not based on such ground or material or is based on a ground or material which is not germane to the issue, it would be an arbitrary decision. Since rule 2046 (h) provides for the formation of the requisite opinion by the appropriate authority and not by Court, the sufficiency of the ground or material is not justiciable. But some grounds or materials germane to the issue must exist and it is open to a Court to examine in the circumstances as mentioned hereinbefore and find out whether such grounds or materials exist or not. It is open to the employee concerned to contend that the decision is arbitrary and when such a contention is raised, the Court has to examine the materials placed before it and to decide whether the decision to retire the employee was arbitrary or not. The absolute power of the authorities concerned to retire an employee compulsorily should not be misread to mean any arbitrary power in the hands of the prescribed authority. The absolute power of the authorities concerned to retire an employee compulsorily should not be misread to mean any arbitrary power in the hands of the prescribed authority. The limitation for the use of the said power only in public interest is embodied in the rule itself. The decision itself may be subjective and as such is not open to judicial review. But what is beyond judicial review is the correctness of the decision. It is always open to Court, when a challenge is brought before it, to see that the order is based on an appropriate opinion, the bonafide formation of the same and that the opinion is based on considerations of relevant and not collateral or extraneous materials. An order not so based or an order based on an opinion founded on irrelevant considerations would be ultra vires the rule itself and the person aggrieved will always have the right to challenge an order which is not within the sanction of the rule. The formation of opinion by the appropriate authority thus cannot be based on collateral grounds. If on a charge being brought, the Court finds arbitrary action being taken or the opinion has not been duly formed on consideration of materials germane or relevant to the matter in issue, then, although the Court is not interested in the sufficiency of evidence or the materials, can interfere. In determining whether the order for compulsory retirement is justified, the Court will have to consider not only the provisions of the rules but also the directions, instructions and notifications issued from time to time to supplement the rules or matters on which the same is silent. The Court, on a challenge being thrown, in the light or in the manner as stated hereinbefore, would be entitled to determine and find out whether the act of compulsory retirement is a mere ruse or a pretence and a clock under which the services of the employee is going to be determined. The Court will have jurisdiction in such a case to find out and determine whether the apparent is the real or not? The order complained of may be innocuous on the face of the record but the real intention may be otherwise. In such a case when challenge is duly thrown, the Court will certainly have the jurisdiction to determine the fact and come to appropriate findings. The order complained of may be innocuous on the face of the record but the real intention may be otherwise. In such a case when challenge is duly thrown, the Court will certainly have the jurisdiction to determine the fact and come to appropriate findings. If it appears to Court that the order of compulsory retirement by its terms would attach a stigma against the employee, it will be entitled to enter into the bonafides and validity of the order and to find out in such a case, if principles of natural justice have been violated or not or whether the employee concerned has been afforded adequate, proper and reasonable opportunities to make effective representations against the allegation which would possibly be the basis for such stigma. In case the order for compulsory retirement is found to have been inflicted as a penal measure, the Court would be under eh obligation to see that the employee concerned is afforded opportunities to controvert and contradict the evidence, forming the basis of the alleged charges. ( 14 ) THUS in the instant case, although the Railway authorities have the power to compulsorily retire the respondent petitioner, the bonafides of such order, the validity of the same will have to be looked into by the Court for the purpose of coming to a conclusion whether there exists any material for the formation of the necessary opinion or materials germane to the issue of the impugned order or whether such order was an arbitrary or a baseless and malafide one or whether such order was an arbitrary or a baseless and malafide one or whether the same was based on no opinion or material or was passed on considerations of extraneous or collateral matters. It seems that the necessary opinion in the instant case was not formed duly. The order was void as the adverse entries which were the alleged basis for the recommendation for the compulsory retirement of the petitioner, were not duly communicated or made known to him. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that rule 2 (d) of Chapter XVII of the Railway Protection Forces Regulations, 1966 viz. The order was void as the adverse entries which were the alleged basis for the recommendation for the compulsory retirement of the petitioner, were not duly communicated or made known to him. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that rule 2 (d) of Chapter XVII of the Railway Protection Forces Regulations, 1966 viz. , the Chapter dealing with the record of service and confidential reports has two parts and the same further requires the communication of the adverse entries when they are against an employee concerned if the basis of the action taken or the material relevant for the formation of the opinion are such adverse entries. He submitted further that non-communication of the adverse entries would make them honest and as such no action can be taken on the basis of them under rule 2046 (h) of the rules. Mr. Mukherjee took us through the petition and the other records appearing form the records of this proceeding and submitted that the period under review for petitioner's conduct, as appears from the proceeding before the Review Committee were 1969, 1970 and 1971 and the relevant adverse entries, if at all and as recorded respectively by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for the year 1970 were communicated to him on January 11, 1972 and April 21, 1972 only and not the other entries which were taken into consideration by the said Committee or relied on by them in recommending the case for compulsory retirement and as such the entire action was not only irregular and illegal and void, being contrary to the requirements of rule 2 (d ). ( 15 ) MR. Mukherjee in fact submitted that the other unfavourable reports of the Chief Security Officer for the year 1970 and 1971 and that of the Security Officer for the year 1971 made in the Confidential Roll of the Respondent petitioner were not communicated to him and hence he was denied the opportunity of showing cause as to why such entry should not be made. Mr. Mukherjee further argued that such communication was mandatory in terms of rule 2 (d) of Chapter XVII of the Regulations as the said rule, on scrutiny would show that the same relates to communication of every entry which may adversely affect promotion of the members of the Force made in their Chapter and Service Roll. ( 16 ) MR. Mr. Mukherjee further argued that such communication was mandatory in terms of rule 2 (d) of Chapter XVII of the Regulations as the said rule, on scrutiny would show that the same relates to communication of every entry which may adversely affect promotion of the members of the Force made in their Chapter and Service Roll. ( 16 ) MR. Banerjee appearing for the appellants contended in reply that apart from the absolute right of the authorities to retire an employee, a combined Character and Service Roll is maintained for all members of the Force from the rank of Rakshaks to that of the Inspector in Form RPF/e/17 in terms of paragraph 2 (a) of the Regulations and that too in terms of the requirement of the entries in such Character Roll as are mentioned in paragraph 2 (f ). He submitted that paragraph 2 (d) is not applicable in the instant case. It was further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the unfavourable reports of the Security Officer or the Chief Security Officer for the years 1970 and 1971 in the Confidential Character Roll of the Respondent petitioner, were confidential reports made in the prescribed form in Appendix XVIII of the Regulations and the same is different from the Character and Service Roll maintained in terms of paragraph 3 of Chapter XVII of the Regulations. Mr. Banerjee submitted that these confidential reports are maintained only in respect of Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors and Assistant Sub-Inspectors. He further referred to item 6 of the instructions provided at the bottom of the Form in Appendix XVIII and submitted that the same clearly stipulates that communication of the substance of an unfavourable report is the discretion of the Security Officer/chief Security Officer and in the instant case the communication of the unfavourable reports was not considered necessary by the competent authority in terms of the item 6 of the instructions in the Form in Appendix XVIII. ( 17 ) THUS from the respective contentions of the parties as indicated above it is clear that some such entries which were unfavourable to the employee and which were considered at the time of making the recommendations were not admittedly communicated to him. The question thus is how far and if at all, the same is justified? ( 17 ) THUS from the respective contentions of the parties as indicated above it is clear that some such entries which were unfavourable to the employee and which were considered at the time of making the recommendations were not admittedly communicated to him. The question thus is how far and if at all, the same is justified? Principles of natural justice and fair play require that when an action is to be taken against an employee on the basis of some adverse entries or reports, they must be made known to him and such principle is also supported in the instant case from paragraph 2 (d) of the Regulations. Character rolls are maintained primarily for the benefit of the Railway authorities. They as the master are to make their own assessment of the calibre and quality of their servants and to exploit the talents for their benefit. At the time of making the adverse entries the employee concerned may not be entitled to a hearing but thereafter when the said entries are going to be relied on or steps are to be taken prejudicial to his interest or right on such basis, the employee concerned, on application of the principles as mentioned hereinbefore, should be given necessary opportunities. If such adverse entry is not communicated in time, it is not wiped out but such entry would reach finality if the employee fails to make any representation after communication. Character Rolls can be acted upon before final disposal of the representation and if the representation is ultimately rejected, the action taken on the basis of Confidential report would stand and if on representation the adverse entries are set aside, or substantially modified, the case is to be reconsidered and the action taken on such adverse entries is to be set aside. In maintaining the character rolls the authorities would be acting in exercise of their administrative functions but even then they will have to act justly and fairly by communicating the substance of adverse entries to the employee concerned. ( 18 ) THE main elements of the principle of natural justice and the essence of them are (1) notice, (2) adequate opportunity of being heard, (3) a fair consideration of evidence of either side to admit or to criticise and (4) a reasoned judgment. ( 18 ) THE main elements of the principle of natural justice and the essence of them are (1) notice, (2) adequate opportunity of being heard, (3) a fair consideration of evidence of either side to admit or to criticise and (4) a reasoned judgment. The aforesaid principles are very old and the most important on the point is the decision of the House of Lords in General Medical Council v. Spaciman (1943) A. C. 627. There are General Medical Council was considering the removal of a doctors' name from the medical register for "infamous conduct" in his personal capacity. There was a finding by the Divorce Court about the guilt of the doctor and the General Medical Council wanted giving the doctor an opportunity to prove that he was innocent. The House of Lords set aside the proceedings and directed the Medical Council to determine the question afresh after permitting the doctor to produce evidence. The principle appeared to be that the previous decision of the Matrimonial Court, although providing a prima facie case yet was rebuttable and the decision of the Matrimonial Court was not a decision between the same parties and there was no question of estoppel or res judicata. The terms "natural justice" is usually regarded as coming down from the Roman concept Jus Naturali. Natural Justice however does not mean the artificial and technical rules of law of evidence. Modern administrative jurisprudence has shown a decisive leaning in favour of a more liberal action on the principles of natural justice and fair hearing in recent decisions of the House of Lords in Kanda v. Government of Malaya, (1962) A. C. 322 P. C. and Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 AII E. R. 66. The rule of natural justice is not a rule of law that can override the actual laws of the land. It is the rule of fairness to ensure administrative justice. It comes into operation when there is noting in the contract or any statute either specifically or by necessary implications overruling the application of the principles of natural justice. The rule of natural justice is not a rule of law that can override the actual laws of the land. It is the rule of fairness to ensure administrative justice. It comes into operation when there is noting in the contract or any statute either specifically or by necessary implications overruling the application of the principles of natural justice. As stated hereinbefore those principles would include that a party should have (a) the opportunity of adducing evidence on which he relies (b) that the evidence should be taken in his presence, (c) that in proper cases he should be given the right of cross-examining witnesses examined against him and (d) that no materials should be relied on against him without giving an opportunity of explaining them. In taking proceedings and disciplinary action against employees the principles of natural justice have to be applied. The doctrine of audi alteram partem means that no man should be condemned unheard. A part of this principle is that if any reliance is placed on evidence or record must be placed before him for his information, comment and criticism. Natural Justice imply that any statement of a person before it is accepted against any body else that somebody else should have an opportunity of meeting it whether it by way of interrogation or by way of comment. So long as the party charged has a fair opportunity to see, comment and criticise the evidence, statement or record on which the charge is being made against him, the demands of natural justice, as has been found in a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Kissanlal Agarwalla v. Collector of Land Customs, 69 C. W. N. 864, would be satisfied. ( 19 ) THUS even if the Railway authorities had absolute right to retire the respondent petitioner subject to the requirements as mentioned hereinbefore and in terms of paragraph 3 of Chapter XVII of the Regulations read with item 6 of the instructions in the Form in Appendix XVIII in the admitted position of the case viz. , certain adverse entries were taken into consideration in having him compulsorily retired, the action as taken is thus certainly against all principles of natural justice and norms of fair play and as such the action so taken cannot be supported. , certain adverse entries were taken into consideration in having him compulsorily retired, the action as taken is thus certainly against all principles of natural justice and norms of fair play and as such the action so taken cannot be supported. The said right under paragraph 3 of Chapter XVII read with item 6 of the instructions in the Form in Appendix XVIII can be used and those principles can be applied or resorted to subject to the princi0les of natural justice, which incidentally is the restraint put on the pretended misuse of power. Power being a heavy thing should not be absolute. All power needs some restraint, some check, lest, as it has been observed by William C. Douglas in his Tagore Law Lecture (from Marshall to Mukherjee), it becomes an instrument of oppression. The order in the instant case seems to be innocuous in its nature but from the attending circumstances it is clear and definite that the same was passed on consideration of certain materials alleged to be adverse against the petitioner without any corresponding opportunity given to him either to rectify or contradict them. Such act which affects the cause of an employee prejudicially cannot and should not be allowed to be taken in the manner as has been done. If it was not the admitted position that the impugned action was taken behind the back of the Respondent petitioner and without any opportunity to him then the case would have been different. But when steps have admittedly been taken on consideration of adverse entries not communicated to the employee concerned, such steps cannot be sustained unless it can be shown that he was given ample opportunity to make effective representations against them and such representations have been duly considered before the final order is passed. In other words, any prejudicial steps on the basis of adverse entries cannot be taken unless the principles of natural justice, as has been put graphically by Coke and which consists in (1) vacate, (2) interrogate and (3) adjudicate, are complied with or fulfilled. In view of the above, the points as raised by Mr. Banerjee must fail. The appeal is therefore dismissed. The judgment and order of Anil Kumar Sen J. is affirmed subject to the modification that in the facts of the case the parties should bear their respective costs althroughout. As prayed for by Mr. In view of the above, the points as raised by Mr. Banerjee must fail. The appeal is therefore dismissed. The judgment and order of Anil Kumar Sen J. is affirmed subject to the modification that in the facts of the case the parties should bear their respective costs althroughout. As prayed for by Mr. Mukherjee, the operation of this order will remain stayed for three rules. S. K. Mukherjee, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.1