Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the accused in C. C. No. 632 of 1973 on the file of the Sub Magistrate, Quilon. The Health Inspector, Quilon Municipality, filed a complaint against him on the ground that he packed and sold cashewnut kernels using an electric motor during the year 1971-72 without taking a licence from the Quilon Municipality, as required by a notification published under S.284 (1) of the Kerala Municipalities Act. The contention of the petitioner was that he was processing cashewnut kernels and selling the same. The notification, which is Ext. P-1, required only licence for "storing, packing, pressing, cleansing, preparing or manufacturing by any process whatever of cashewnuts". According to the petitioner, cashewnut was different from cashewnut kernel and as such no licence was necessary for bis trade. The trial Court repelled the contention and held that Ext. P-1 required licence for cashewnuts, which took in cashewnut kernel also and as such the petitioner was guilty. The petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 days. The court also directed realisation of licence fee from the petitioner. This was confirmed in appeal by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. 2. When this revision came before Kader J. he felt that the question of law involved is very important and therefore referred the petition to a Division Bench and thus the case has come before us. 3. The prosecution is "under S.284 read with S.355 of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960 (Act 14 of 1961), for short the Act. S.284 deals with purposes for which places may not be used without licence and S.355 deals with penalties. In Schedule III of the Act, purposes for which premises may not be used without licence are specified. The relevant entry for our purpose is, entry 16, which reads: "Cashewnuts Storing, packing, preparing or manufacturing by any process whatever." It was in pursuance to this that Ext. P-1 notification was issued. In Ext. P-1 item 16 is as follows: The accusation against the accused-petitioner is that during the year 1971-72 be packed and sold cashewnut kernels by using an electric motor in building No. M.C. 187 in Cutchery Ward, Quilon Municipality without taking any licence from the Quilon Municipality and that an amount of Rs. 115/- is due to the Municipality on this account. 115/- is due to the Municipality on this account. As stated above, the accused's case is that he was storing and selling only cashewnut kernel and that he was not processing or packing cashewnut which is the item mentioned in Schedule III of the Act. 4. The only point for our determination is as to what exactly is the meaning of the expression'cashewnut kernel.' The petitioner is emboldened to contend that cashewnut is different from cashewnut kernel on the strength of a Division Bench ruling of this Court reported in Karim v. S.T.A. Tribunal 1962 KLT 725. There the question at issue was the impost of sales tax. It is true that the case related to the interpretation of the term'cashewnut including its kernel', which was item 37 in schedule I of the General Sales Tax Act, 1125. This commodity was taxable only at a single point. The item as it originally stood read as "cashew and its kernels". The expression cashewnut including its kernel was a subsequent substitution. The rival contentions put forward in that case by the assessee and the revenue were that since cashewnut including its kernel was taxable only at a single point, that is, the last purchase in the State, both the cashewnut and kernel cannot come within the mischief of the tax and only one of them can be assessed. The revenue contended that both the last purchase of the whole nut and the last purchase of the kernel extracted therefrom will attract sales tax and not the former alone, as contended by the assessee. The Division Bench considered the words "and including" and held that the substitution of the word "and including" expressed the intention of the Legislature to tax only either of the two articles, since an additive power is not a necessary attribute of the word 'including'. The Court therefore held that the whole or unshclled nut with the kernel inside is cashewnut and it is such nut and not the kernel after shelling which attracted taxation, 5. The above decision must apply to the facts of that case only. There, different considerations prevailed. It was a case of sales tax and the Court had to consider the object of substitution of the earlier entry by adding the words 'and including'. The above decision must apply to the facts of that case only. There, different considerations prevailed. It was a case of sales tax and the Court had to consider the object of substitution of the earlier entry by adding the words 'and including'. The legislative object was therefore made clear by holding that sales tax will be attracted only on the last purchase of the whole nut. Here we are concerned with the entry No. 16 contained in Schedule III, which is cashewnut. Its Malayalam equivalent is IipAn Dealing with such entries, we have to consider the popular meaning of the word IipAn or cashewnut. One does not think of the whole nut with the shell when one speaks about IipAn The usage in common parlance has to be looked into in matters like this. It is the popular sense of a word that should guide construction of such entries. The words are to be understood in common language. Critical refinements and subtle distinctions are to be avoided, and the obvious and popular meaning of the language should, as a general rule, be followed. Meticulous criticism must not be allowed to wreck an enactment. The following observation in'Craies on Statute Law' at page 163 will be serviceable to understand the above discussion: "In other words, as was said by Pollock B. in Grenfell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners if a statute contains language which is capable of being construed in a popular sense, such "a statute is not to be construed according to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it, but is to be construed in its popular sense' meaning, 'of course' by the words 'popular sense that sense which people conversant : with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it". But "if a word in its popular sense and read in an ordinary way is capable of two' constructions, it is wise to adopt such a construction as is based on the assumption that Parliament merely intended to give so much power as was necessary for carrying out the objects of the Act and not to give any unnecessary powers." In other words the construction of words is to be adapted to the fitness of the matter of the statute. "I base my decision," said James L. J. in Cargo ex. "I base my decision," said James L. J. in Cargo ex. Schiller, "on the words of the statute as they would be understood by plain men who know nothing of the technical rule of the Court of Admirally, or of flotsam, lagan and jatsam"'. Thus, in Sherwood v. Ray, it was held that the expression, "a suit which shall be depending at the time of the passing of this Act' as used in S.1 of Lord Lyndhursts' Act (the marriage Act 1835), was not to be understood as an equivalent for the technical term'lis pendens,'or "to be construed in any other than their ordinary, and popular sense.". And in Att.-Gen. v. Bailey, it was held that the word "spirits"; being "a word of known import is used in the Excise Acts in the sense in which it is ordinarily understood." "We do not think", said the Court, "that, in common parlance, the word 'spirits' would be considered as comprehending a liquid like 'sweet spirits of nifre', which is itself a known article of commerce not ordinarily passing under the name of 'spirits"'. So the popular or commercial sense has been adopted for the expressions, "children" "gas" "Sohea tea", "five miles square", "grain", "park" "premises", "rubbish", "the working classes", "gin", trailer", "purchasing", "court. Though dictionary meanings ate normally not safe guides for understanding the meaning or interpreting a particular word in a statute, sometimes they give necessary guidance. The word 'nut' is described in the Webstef's Dictionary as: 1 (a)(i) a hard-shelled dry fruit or seed having a more or less distinct separable rind or shell and interior kernel or meat-used to include various form (as peanuts and Brazil nuts) not botanically true nuts. 2. The word 'nut' is described in the Webstef's Dictionary as: 1 (a)(i) a hard-shelled dry fruit or seed having a more or less distinct separable rind or shell and interior kernel or meat-used to include various form (as peanuts and Brazil nuts) not botanically true nuts. 2. The kernel of a nut be a dry indehiscent one-seeded fruit (as an acora, hazelnut or chestnut) with a woody pericarp developing an interior syncarpous every see fruit." In shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the meanings given to the wort nut are: 1 A fruit which consists of a hard or leathery (indehiscent) shell enclosing an adible kernel; the kernel itself" From these meanings, it is clear that the word 'nut' takes in the kernel as well as shell We have distinguished the decision reported in 1962 KLT 725 on the ground that the modification of the entry by adding the words "and including" alongwith the word nut indicated a deliberate intention on the part of the Legislature in the matter of imposition of tax. In the case on hand the entry is comprehensive enough and cashewnut kernel cannot be excluded from its ambit. 6. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence and we hold that the entry 16 in Schedule III of the Act relates to both cashewnut and its kernel. 7. In order to avoid such arguments as we have in this case and thereby deprive municipalities of their revenue, it will be desirable for the Government to make it clear that entry 16 relates to both cashewnut and its kernel. A copy of this order will be communicated to the Chief Secretary to the Government under the seal of the High Court and signature of the Registrar, for his information. Dismissed.