JUDGMENT - J.R. VIMADALAL, J.:---This is an application filed by a detenu for a writ of Habeas Corpus directing the respondents, who are the commissioner of Police, the Superintendent of the Thana Central Prison in which he is detained, and the State of Maharashtra, to produce the petitioner before this Court, and to quash the Detention order, and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith. The facts of the petitioners case are, that a detention order under section 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was passed against the petitioner on the 3rd of August, 1974, whereby the petitioner was directed to be detained in order to present him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. A copy of that order is annexed to the petition and marked "A". That Detention Order was, however, served upon the petitioner on the 19th of October, 1974, it being the case of the respondent No. 1 in paragraph 3 of his affidavit in reply dated the 25th of April, 1975 that the same could not be served on the petitioner earlier, as he was absconding. On the same day, the petitioner was served with the grounds of detention, a copy of which is annexed to the petition and marked "C". The petitioner made a representation to the Government under section 8(1) of the Act on the 6th of January, 1975, but that representation was rejected by the Government on the 21st of April, 1975. The petitioner has thereafter filed the present petition for the reliefs already set out above. It may, at this stage, be stated that ground (m) in para XI of the petition whereby the validity of the Detention Order was sought to be impugned on the ground of the delay on the part of the Government in disposing of the representation made by the petitioner under section 8(1) of the Act has not been argued before us by Mr. Samant, in view of the presidential order dated 26th June, 1975, a copy of which was shown to us by the learned Government Pleader, because under that Presidential Order the right to move a Court for the enforcement, inter alia, of the right under Article 22 of the Constitution has been suspended during the subsistence of the emergency proclaimed on 3rd December, 1971 as well as on 25th June, 1975. The Detention Order, in the present case, has been passed under section 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Act which provides that the Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied in respect of any person, that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the "maintenance of public order" it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. Sub-section (2) of section 3 empowers, inter alia, the Commissioner of Police to exercise that power, as he has done in the present case. It is pertinent to note that an order of detention cannot be passed not merely for the maintenance of law and order, but for the maintenance of "public order", and it is now well-settled by several decisions that in order to exercise that power, there must be an apprehension that it is necessary to prevent a disturbance by the petitioner of the current life of the community, and that acts directed against individual persons by themselves would not come within the mischief of the said provision. I may only refer, in that connection, to the observation of Hidayatullah, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Arun Ghosh v. The State of West Bengal)1, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1228 in which he has observed that public order is the even tempo of the life of the community, taking the country as a while or even a specified locality, that disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity, and that acts of a similar nature may not differ from one another in the quality of each of them, but their respective potentiality may be very different. The learned Chief Justice observed that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order, or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order, is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the at upon the society. It must, however, be noted that the learned Chief Justice has laid down that a large number of acts directed against persons or individuals "may total up into a breach of public order." On the facts of the case before him, the learned Chief Justice, who ever, came to the conclusion that since all the acts of molestation were directed against a particular family and we not directed against women in general from the locality, the conduct of the detenu, however reprehensible, "did not add up to the situation where it could be said that the community at large was being disturbed so as to amount to a breach of public order". These observations of Hidayatulla, C.J., in Arun Ghoshs case have been set out and followed in the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ram Ranjan v. The State of West Bengal)2, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 609 in which Sarkaria, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench of the Supreme Court, went on to make the further observation that if the contravention in effect was confined only to a few individuals directly involved, as distinguished from a wide spectrum of the public, it would raise a problem of law and order only, and that the concepts of "law and order" and "public order" might have a common "epicentre", but it was the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helped to distinguish it as an act affecting "public order" from that concerning "law and order". In the light of these judicial dicta of the highest Court, I will now proceed to consider the grounds of detention served upon the petitioner in the present case. Before doing so, I may make my own observation in regard to the form of those grounds of detention. In the light of these judicial dicta of the highest Court, I will now proceed to consider the grounds of detention served upon the petitioner in the present case. Before doing so, I may make my own observation in regard to the form of those grounds of detention. The grounds of detention contain, in the first two paragraphs thereof, the statement that the present petitioner, along with three others persons named Mohan, Vithal and Jagdish and 8 or 10 others had formed a "golden gang" of goondas who were continuously indulging in anti-social, violent and criminal activities in the localities falling within the limits of the N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station and the Dadar Police Station in Bombay, and as a result of those activities of the petitioner and his said associates, the citizens of those localities were terror-stricken and were living under constant shadow of fear, with the result that those activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in those localities. After stating these general facts, the third paragraph of the grounds of detention proceeds to set out in six sub-paragraphs what had been termed therein as "glaring incidents" for which the petitioner and his associates were responsible. What the Commissioner of Police has, therefore, done is that, instead of setting out in each ground that it was calculated to disturb public order, he has made the above statements at the beginning so as to be applicable to each of the instances which he has set out in the grounds. I see nothing wrong in the Detention Order being in such a form, and I have no hesitation in rejecting Mr. Samants argument that the effect of such incident as being prejudicial to the maintenance of public order should have been stated in each of the narration of these incidents by the police Commissioner. Before dealing with each of the incidents, I may, however, set out that the legal position in this matter is too well-settled to need authority, viz., that the Court is not concerned with considering the sufficiency or otherwise of the material on which the Detaining Authority has acted, but the test which the courts must apply in cases of preventive detention is, whether the Detaining Authority had before it material on which a reasonable person could possibly form the opinion at which that authority claims to have arrived. Vide (Govind Gupta v. M.C. Mugwe)3, 77 Bom.L.R. I. and (Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal others)4 , A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550. I will now proceed to deal with each of, what the Police Commissioner has called, the "glaring incidents" of the activities of the petitioner and his associates which are said to have been prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. As far as the first of those incidents is concerned, it relates to what occurred at a little past midnight on the 9th of September 1973. In the course of that incident, the petitioner along with Mohan and Jagdish as well as one other person are alleged to have assaulted one Pawar merely because Pawar ventured to inquire from them as to why a man named Ramdas had been assaulted by the petitioner and has associates. The assault on the said Pawar is stated to have taken the form of a blow with an iron bar by Jagdish and a stab would inflicted on Pawar by the petitioner. The said incident resulted in the petitioner and his associates being charged with an offence under section 324 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code, but the said case was compounded on the 8th of April, 1974. In connection with this incident, two things may be noted. First and foremost, that there was hardly any provocation, and if at all there was provocation, it was so slight that there would be no justification for the petitioner to have stabbed the said Pawar, except for the purpose of creating terror in the locality. The other fact which must be observed is, that apparently the petitioner and his associates were moving about together at a little past midnight with weapons of offence like an iron bar and a knife. In connection with this incident, two points were sought to be made by Mr. Samant. One was that since the case was compounded and, under section 320-B of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the compounding of an offence results in the acquittal of the accused, the same cannot be made a ground for the preventive detention of the petitioner. It is true that the effect of sub-section (8) of section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, is that the petitioner stands acquitted in respect of the offence which was the subject-matter of that incident. It is true that the effect of sub-section (8) of section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, is that the petitioner stands acquitted in respect of the offence which was the subject-matter of that incident. Sub-section (i) of section 320, however, only lays down the legal effect of the compounding of a case, but an acquittal by a Court of an accused person under that sub-section as a result of the case being compounded is, by no means, an acquittal on merits. In any event, the Supreme Court has now laid down in unequivocal terms in the case of (H. Shah v. The State of West Bengal)5, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2154 that an order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation and after discharge or "even acquittal". In that connection, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the purposes of the two proceedings are different, the nature of the proceedings is different, and the authorities dealing with those proceedings are different, and that in preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for drawing an inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu. An earlier decision of a Bench of two judges of its own to the contrary has not been approved by the Supreme Court in the said case which was presided over by five learned judges of that Court. This contention of Mr. Samant cannot , therefore, stand and must be rejected. The second contention of Mr. Samant in regard to the first ground of detention was that it is stale insofar as it refers to something which transpired as far back as September 1973, whilst the detention order in the present case is dated the 3rd of August, 1974. As far as that contention is concerned, it is true that if this incident stood by itself, it would be stale and, therefore, not relevant for the purpose of justifying a detention order made eleven months later. The position in the present case is, however, different. The said incident is only one in the chain of activities of the petitioner which have been set out in the incidents that follow in the grounds of detention. The position in the present case is, however, different. The said incident is only one in the chain of activities of the petitioner which have been set out in the incidents that follow in the grounds of detention. Reference may be made, in that connection, to my own observations in the main judgment of the Division Bench delivered by me in the case of Govind Gupta v. M.G. Mugwe, in which I have, after considering the relevant authorities, stated that if the Detaining Authority was able to show that a ground which by itself may appear to be stale, taken along with other grounds disclosed to the detenu manifested a chain of activities extending upto a reasonably prominent point of time to the detention order, the position would be different and the detention order would not be invalidated on the ground of staleness. As stated in the same judgment, in other words, there must be "a live link" or a rational connection between the activities set out in the grounds and the purpose of the detention. If, therefore, the other grounds mentioned in the Detention Order are valid grounds, there would be no substance in this contention of Mr. Samant and the staleness of Ground No. 1, taken by itself, cannot be of any avail to him. As far as the facts stated in Ground No. 1 are concerned; it is significant to note that the incident itself is no denied by the petitioner. All that he has stated in para XI of his petition is that narration of the incident is highly exaggerated and false in "material particulars". In other words, what the petitioner has said is that his own version of the incident would be different, but he has not ventured to set out in the affidavit what that version is. Under those circumstances, a bald statement what the narration of the incident as set out in the ground is exaggerated or not accurate cannot be of any use to the petitioner, and in the absence of any other version before it, the Court must proceed on the footing of the version of the incident as set out by the Detaining Authority in the first ground before us. On that footing, in my opinion, there can be no doubt that the use of an iron bar and a knife on a public road at dead of night on a very slight provocation was calculated to disturb the even tempo of public life by striking terror in the citizens of the locality. I will now deal with incident No. (ii) which relates to an incident of the 13th of September, 1973 in the course of which the petitioner along with his associates Mohan and Jagdish, attacked one Balkrishna at about 3 p.m. In the course of the said incident, the petitioner whipped out a chain and gave two blows with that chain to the said Balkrishna which his associates followed up with blows and kicks. The incident also resulted in a criminal case under section 324 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code which was compounded on the 2nd of May, 1974. All the observations which I have made in regard to the first ground apply to this ground also, except one, viz. that whereas the first incident occurred at dead of night, this incident occurred sometime in the afternoon, but insofar as it was an incident which took place on a public road, the fact that it occurred in broad day light would, perhaps, enhance its effect in terrorising the inhabitants of the locality. It may also be pointed out that whereas in the case of the first incident it could, perhaps, be said that there was some slight provocation, there was certainly none in the use of this incident, and under the circumstances, the unprovoked assault of Bhalchandra could only have been intended to strike terror amongst the citizens of the locality. The fact that the case was compounded cannot, for the reasons stated above, make any difference. It may be mentioned that the occurrence of this incident has also not been denied in the petition, and since the petitioner has not chosen to give his own version of the incident, the version as stated in the ground furnished by the Detaining Authority must be accepted. That brings me to the third incident mentioned by the Detaining Authority which is dated the 6th of June, 1974, and occurred at a little past mid-night. That brings me to the third incident mentioned by the Detaining Authority which is dated the 6th of June, 1974, and occurred at a little past mid-night. In that incident, what happened was that the petitioner, along with Mohan, Vithal and one other person, want only attacked two persons with instruments of stabbing, and out of the said incident also criminal proceedings under section 324 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code ensued which, we are told, were ultimately compounded on the 24th of March, 1975, though they were still sub judice at the date when the grounds were furnished to the detenu and have been stated in the ground to have been so. For the reasons stated above, the fact that the said criminal case was compounded cannot help the petitioners. As far as this ground is concerned, the position is the same as in the case of the first incident, insofar as the fact of its correctness has not been disputed in the petition, and also in so far as it resulted in the compounding of the cases. This incident also occurred at dead of night and the observations which I have made in regard to the first ground are, therefore, equally applicable to this incident also. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the unprovoked assault with a knife and other stabbing instruments in the course of this incident on the two persons was intended to strike terror amongst the citizens of that locality and thereby disturb public peace. The only difference, if it can be called a difference, is that whereas in the case of the first incident it could be said that there was a slight provocation in the form of an inquiry by the person who was assaulted by the petitioner and his associates, in the ground now under consideration there was none at all, with the result that the petitioners position in regard to it is worse. Turning next to the fourth incident mentioned by the Detaining Authority, the incident set out therein is stated to have occurred at 6 p.m. on the 7th of July, 1974, and what happened was that one Parmar was accosted by the petitioner who was accompanied by Mohan and two other persons, and Parmar was stabled with a knife not only by the associates of the petitioner, but by the petitioner himself, and had actually to be removed to hospital. Out of this incident also a criminal case under section 324 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code ensued which, we are told, was compounded on the 31st of January, 1975, thought that fact is not stated in the ground itself since the compounding of the case took place after the grounds were furnished to the detenu. For the reasons stated in connection with ground No. (i), the fact that the case was compounded can make so difference as far a the validity of the Detention Order is concerned. This incident also has occurred on a public road and is in the nature of an unprovoked assault with knives on the said Parmar, and all the observations which I have made in regard to the second incident mentioned above apply to this incident also with, perhaps, this difference that the assault which is mentioned in the incident I am now considering appears to have been of a graver nature. The occurrence of this incident is also not denied by the petitioner in the petition, though he has disputed the version set out in the grounds without having chosen to set out his own version of the said incident. Under those circumstances, accepting the incident as set out on the grounds, there can be no doubt that the incident shows that the petitioner and his associates were indulging in activities which were calculated to disturb the maintenance of public peace by striking terror in the locality. That brings me to incidents Nos. (v) and (vi) which stand on a slightly different footing, but may conveniently be dealt with together. That brings me to incidents Nos. (v) and (vi) which stand on a slightly different footing, but may conveniently be dealt with together. In incident Ground No. (v) what is stated is that about 4 or 5 days after the Holi festival in the month of March, 1974, a landlord of Old Prabhadevi Road, whose name has not been disclosed in the grounds, was going along Dhan Mill Naka at about 7 or 8 p.m. when the petitioner and his three associates, viz. Mohan, Vithal and Jagdish and three or four others called the landlord and asked him as to whey he was after them and warned him not to be after them. It is further stated in incident No. (v) that thereafter the petitioner and his associates started assaulting the said landlord, but he managed to run away in order to save his life. As far as incident No. (vi) is concerned, it took place in the first week of May 1974 when at about 7-30 p.m. a resident of Gokhale Road, whose name is also not disclosed in the grounds, was passing by, and the petitioner along with Mohan, Vithal and Jagdish called him an inquired of him as to why he was keeping a watch on their activities, and the petitioner and his associates then rushed on him and assaulted him with a cycle chain, but he ran away in time to save his life. As far as these two grounds mentioned in the Detention Order are concerned, it has been stated in paragraph VI of the petition that they are wholly imaginary and false, and it was strongly urged by Mr. Samant on behalf of the petitioner that they were non-existent, and had been invented by the police in order to bring the earlier alleged activities of the petitioner in proximity in point of time to the Detention Order. It was the contention of Mr. Samant that it was for that purpose that the police appear to have procured some sort of evidence which, in the absence of any particulars mainly in regard to the name and the date, the petitioner could not possibly check or reply to. It was the contention of Mr. Samant that it was for that purpose that the police appear to have procured some sort of evidence which, in the absence of any particulars mainly in regard to the name and the date, the petitioner could not possibly check or reply to. In paragraph 15 of the Police Commissioners affidavit it reply dated 25th April, 1975, it has been stated that the statements of the two persons involved in the said incidents were recorded in camera, as they were unwilling to give evidence for fear of their life, and in the public interest the names of those persons could not be disclosed in the grounds. Under those circumstances, we first called for the statements to satisfy ourselves that such statements really existed, and having done so, we suggested to the learned Government Pleader that there would be no objection to his furnishing copies of those statements to the petitioner and his Counsel in Court, without the names of the informants being stated therein. That was done, and yesterday afternoon such copies (without the names of the informants) were furnished by the learned Government Pleader to Mr. Samant, and the hearing thereafter proceeded. In the course of his arguments, Mr. Samant, however, contended that he was entitled to know in what circumstance those statements came to be recorded by the police, and whether they have been recorded in the proceedings in connection with the detention of the petitioner, or in some the proceedings. We, therefore, called upon the learned Government pleader to file a further affidavit of the office before whom the said statements were recorded setting out what circumstances and in what proceedings those statements came to be recorded. That was also done, and an affidavit of one R.S. Chavan Police Sub-Inspector before whom those statements were given was filed in Court and a copy thereof furnished to Mr. Samant. That was also done, and an affidavit of one R.S. Chavan Police Sub-Inspector before whom those statements were given was filed in Court and a copy thereof furnished to Mr. Samant. In the said affidavit, it is stated that some time in the middle of July, 1974 it was reliably learned by C.I.D. that a group of goondas was indulging in acts of violence within the jurisdiction of the N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station and the Dadar Police station, and he was asked to look into the matter, and he accordingly made inquiries, and in the course of investigation came to know that several persons who had suffered at the hands of the petitioner and his associates were reluctant to come forward to lodge complaints for fear of reprisals at the hands of the petitioner and his associates. Through his own sources the deponent of the said further affidavit was, however, able to contact other persons, and it was only on the assurance that their names would not be disclosed that they gave statements to him in their own handwriting the original of which, as already stated above, we have called for seen for ourselves yesterday. I have, therefore, no hesitation in accepting the police Commissioners statement that it would not be, in the public interest, safe to disclose their names. Mr. Samant repeatedly urged that incidents Nos. (v) and (vi) suffer from vice of vagueness, but, I am afraid, in view of the statements of the said two persons, copies of which have now been furnished to Mr. Samant, and in view of the further affidavit field today, there is, in my opinion, no tinge of Vagueness left in incidents Nos. (v) and (vi). On this further affidavit and on the statements of the said two persons which we have seen, I am satisfied that the police Commissioner had a material before him on which, together with the other material discussed above, he could come to the conclusion that the dension of the petitioner was necessary to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is not for me to assess the probative value of that evidence. As already stated above, it is sufficient if there was material before the Detaining Authority on which a reasonable person could possibly take the view which he did. It is not for me to assess the probative value of that evidence. As already stated above, it is sufficient if there was material before the Detaining Authority on which a reasonable person could possibly take the view which he did. In my opinion, on a totality up of the various activities of the petitioner mentioned in the grounds of detention, a course which the Court is entitled to adopt as stated by Hidayatullah, C.J. in Arun Ghoshs case already cited above, the following facts which emerge from them are eloquent.--- (1) The said incident show that the petitioners and his associates, including all or some of the names persons, were acting in concern, armed with weapons of offence; (2) That they were operating in particular localities close to one another viz., localities within the jurisdiction of the N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station and the Dadar Police Station in Bombay and appear to have assumed to themselves a certain territorial jurisdiction for the purpose of their activities; (3) That they were doing so at all odd hours, including dead of night, as the first and third incidents which occurred at a little past midnight show; (4) That they used the weapons of offence which they carried on very slight provocation, as in the case of first incident, or even without provocation, as in the case of the remaining incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention with a view to terrorise the people of those localities and exercise some sort of authority over them; and (5) These instance make out a chain of activities on the part of the petitioner and his associate which extent up to a reasonably proximate point of time in relation to the Detention Order. I may repeat, and it can certainly bear repetition, that the first four incidents mentioned in the grounds are admitted incidents in regard to the function of their occurrence. In judging whether the chain of activities is a continuous chain, regard must be had to the nature of the activities, as stated by me in my judgment (at P. 8) in Gopal Guptas case already cited above. In judging whether the chain of activities is a continuous chain, regard must be had to the nature of the activities, as stated by me in my judgment (at P. 8) in Gopal Guptas case already cited above. The nature of the activities shows that a people would be unwilling to come forward and inform the police, except where the incident is such that, in a sense, it discloses itself by reason of the injuries suffered by the victim, as in the case of the first four instance. Apart from the very nature of the activities which would preclude persons from coming forward and making complaints to the police for fear of reprisals, that fact is expressly stated in the further affidavit filed by R.M. Chavan today. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that there is no such gap of time in the incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention as to snap the connection between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention, in that view of the matter, no question of staleness survives in regard to the grounds of detention relied upon by the Detaining Authority. Some other contentions were urged by Mr. Samant in the course of arguments before us, but I do not think it necessary to deal with them, for, frankly speaking, I have been unable to understand their relevance. In the result, I would dismiss this petition. Per P.S. Shah, J. :---I agree. By the Court :---Petition dismissed. Rule discharged. ------