JUDGEMENT Applicant has by this revision petition challenged the judgement of the learned Sessions Judge, Goa, Daman and Diu rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 74/71 by which the learned Sessions Judge confirmed applicant's conviction and sentence of the month's simple imprisonment under Section 353 I.P.C. 2. Applicant at the relevant time was a journalist and editor of a fortnightly namely "The Blade" published from Panaji. The alleged incident took place on 23-7-1968 at about 4 p.m. in the office of the Director of Information and Tourism. It was alleged that on the date and time of the incident the applicant was talking loudly in the office of the above department and disturbing the staff working there. Ramesh Jatkar who was the Information Officer in the Department of Information and Tourism came out of the Director's room and asked the applicant to leave the Office as he was causing disturbance. The applicant instead of leaving the office assaulted Jatkar by catching hold of his neck-tie and shaking him. 3. The defence of the applicant in the trial Court was that the entire case was concocted. The applicant had been criticising the working of the Department of the Information and Tourism and in particular the conduct of then Director Kohli and Information Officer Jatkar in his fortnightly paper. The Blade Peeved by this the complainant maliciously made a false report of assault and mischief. The applicant had gone to the office of the Department of Information and Tourism on the date and time in question to deliver two copies of his fortnightly paper as required by law When he entered the office, complainant Jatkar arrogantly ordered him to get out. The applicant left the office. Thereafter this false case was cooked up. 4. The learned trial Magistrate found the applicant guilty of the offence under Section 353 I.P.C. and sentenced him to one month's simple imprisonment. The learned Sessions Judge affirmed the conviction and sentence. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant at the outset criticised the judgement of the trial court on the ground that the learned Magistrate's approach was perverse in as much as he in flagrant disregard of the principles of criminal jurisprudence started by examining the defence evidence first, instead of assessing the prosecution evidence. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant at the outset criticised the judgement of the trial court on the ground that the learned Magistrate's approach was perverse in as much as he in flagrant disregard of the principles of criminal jurisprudence started by examining the defence evidence first, instead of assessing the prosecution evidence. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Lahore High Court in Ghulam Nabi v. Emperor AIR 1938 Lah 850 : (40 Cri LJ 185). 6. It is true that the learned Magistrate started discussion of the evidence in a reverse order which was improper and contrary to the well known principles of criminal jurisprudence. The proper course would have been to examine and scrutinise the prosecution evidence first and then to pass on to the defence case. But this irregularity does not help the applicant in this revision petition. Firstly it does not vitiate the judgement. In the Lahore case supra their Lord-ships referred to this irregularity but confirmed the judgement. Secondly the judgement which is the subject matter of this revision is that of the Sessions Judge who fully examined the evidence in proper senesce. The trial therefore was not vitiated by the irregularity, noticed in the trial Court's judgement. I find that this objection is inconsequential. 7. Next point made by the learned counsel for the applicant was that the first information report Exh. A dated 23-7-1968 and forwarded and received at the Police Station on 24-7-1968 was inadmissible in evidence under Section 162 Criminal P.C. as the first information of the offence had been given telephonically by the complainant Jatkar to the Police. That telephonic message, the learned counsel submitted, should be treated as the first information report and as that report was not produced, an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution case. It was submitted that in that telephonic message there was no allegation against the applicant. That message was a complaint against one Wilfred an employee of the Tourism Department and not against the applicant. 8. The learned Sessions Judge in his judgement has addressed himself to the question of admissibility of the telephonic message as a first information report. It was submitted that in that telephonic message there was no allegation against the applicant. That message was a complaint against one Wilfred an employee of the Tourism Department and not against the applicant. 8. The learned Sessions Judge in his judgement has addressed himself to the question of admissibility of the telephonic message as a first information report. He has observed that the telephonic report can never be treated as a first information report because the requirements postulated by Section 154, Criminal P.C. with regard to obtaining the signature of the person on the report cannot be complied with in a telephonic report. There is no authority for this proposition. It is true that a telephonic report cannot be signed as per the requirements of Section 154, Criminal P.C. But this requirement is a technical formality and does not affect the admissibility of the document. On the question whether a telephonic message at the Police Station can constitute a first information report or not their Lordships of the supreme Court in Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 1566 : (1070 Cri LJ 1415) observed in para 4 as follows : - "But prima facie this cryptic and anonymous oral message which did not in terms clearly specify a cognizable offence cannot be treated as first information report. The mere fact that this information was the first in point of time does not by itself clothe it with the character of first information report. The question whether or not a particular document constitutes a first information report has, broadly speaking, to be determined on the relevant facts and circumstances of each case. In that case an unknown person had given on telephone a cryptic information about the commission of the offence without disclosing all the facts or the names of the culprits. Their Lordships therefore, refused to treat it as an F.I.R. The question has to be decided with reference to the facts in each case. If a telephonic message is given by a known person who discloses his identity and it contains all the necessary facts which can constitute an offence, and is reduced to writing by the Station House Officer it can he treated as a first information report, (Shwe Pru v. The King, AIR 1941 Rang 209 : 43 Cri LJ 157). 9. If a telephonic message is given by a known person who discloses his identity and it contains all the necessary facts which can constitute an offence, and is reduced to writing by the Station House Officer it can he treated as a first information report, (Shwe Pru v. The King, AIR 1941 Rang 209 : 43 Cri LJ 157). 9. Applying the above tests to the facts in this case, it will be seen that Jatkar P.W. 1 had phoned up the Dy. S.P. and not the officer-in-charge of the Police Station. There was nothing to show that the information was duly recorded in writing. It cannot therefore be said that the report contained all the facts which constituted an offence under Section 353 I.P.C. The first information report made in writing subsequently is therefore not inadmissible under Section 162 Criminal P.C. 10. But assuming that some report was made on telephone and that was the real first information report, this by itself would not affect the appreciation of the evidence made by the learned Sessions Judge and the conclusions of fact drawn by him. The F.I.R. under Section 154 Criminal P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence. Its only use is to contradict or corroborate the maker thereof. (Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 366 ) : (1957 Cri LJ 550). The absence of a first information report therefore, by itself cannot destroy the prosecution case. The objection about the first information report therefore must be rejected. 11. The learned counsel for the applicant discussed the finding of fact recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. I have carefully gone through the discussion of prosecution and defence witnesses made by the learned Sessions Judge. The appreciation of evidence at least so far as the statements of Jatkar P.W. 1. Vaikunth Naik P.W. 2, Nurjeahan Khan P.W. 3, Ciriano Valles P.W. 5 and John Menezes P.W. 7 are concerned, no fault could be found therein. Presence of these witnesses in the office was an undisputed fact. It is true that one prosecution witness Azavedo P.W. 4 while speaking about exchange of hot words between Jatkar and the applicant made no reference to the fact of assault on atkar. This witness stated that at the time of the incident Jatkar's back was towards him. It is probable that he could not notice the assault made by the applicant. This witness stated that at the time of the incident Jatkar's back was towards him. It is probable that he could not notice the assault made by the applicant. Thus the statement of Azavedo in no way contradicts the testimony of other eye witnesses who were believed by the learned Sessions Judge. The mere fact that all these witnesses were employees under the Director of Information and Tourism did not detract from their credibility as witnesses of truth. Their presence was natural and they could not be dubbed as interested witnesses merely because they were in the same Department where the complainant was employed as an Information Officer. 12. The scope of inquiry in a revision application under Section 439 Criminal P.C. is very limited. In Amar Chand v. Shanti Bose, AIR 1973 SC 799 : (1973 Cri LJ 577) following observations have been made :- "The jurisdiction under Section 439 is normally to be exercised only in exceptional cases, when them is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." It is not for this Court to enter into a reappraisal of all the oral and documentary evidence on record and re-assess the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In the present case I am satisfied that the learned Sessions Judge did not commit any error of law or procedure in recording the finding that the applicant assaulted Jatkar in the office of the Director of Information and Tourism. 13. Next question is what offence has been committed by the applicant on proved facts. The applicant did assault complainant Jatkar by holding his neck-tie and shaking him. It is also true that Jatkar on the relevant date was a public servant. The question however which still reaming for consideration is whether Jatkar was acting in the exercise of his official duty. The official duty of the Information Officer in the Directorate of Information and Tourism was not stated before the trial Court. In any case when the assault was made, Jatkar was not performing any duty qua an Information Officer. He had come to he office from the Director's room after hearing some loud noises in the office. He had found one of the employees viz. Wilfred in an intoxicated state. In any case when the assault was made, Jatkar was not performing any duty qua an Information Officer. He had come to he office from the Director's room after hearing some loud noises in the office. He had found one of the employees viz. Wilfred in an intoxicated state. He had noted that the applicant was joking and making fun at the cost of one Antao, probably an employee of the Department. Others present were laughing on the jokes. Ordinarily this should have not led the complainant to fly in a fit of fury and insult the applicant by ordering him to get out. The applicant a journalist and a publisher of a paper had a right to be present in the public office which dealt with Information an Publicity. According to the applicant he had gone there to deliver copies of his newspaper at per law and this statement was not challenged as false. Obviously the Director and probably other officers had an animus against the applicant who had been publishing unsavory tit bits against them. That could be the only possible reason why, for an harmless act like joking and laughing, the applicant was unceremoniously asked to get out. The complainant did not prove that when he came to the office and asked the applicant to leave the place, he was acting in execution of his duty, as such public servant i.e. as an Information Officer. The act of the applicant therefore did not come within the mischief of Section 353 I.P.C. His act came within the ambit of Section 358 I.P.C. because he assaulted the complainant on grave and sudden provocation caused by the insulting tone of the complainant in shouting at him to leave the office. 14. The conviction of the applicant under Section 353 I.P.C. is therefore set aside and altered into one under Section 358 I.P.C. The sentence of one month's simple imprisonment is also set aside. Taking into consideration the fact that the incident took place about 7 years ago and having regard to the circumstances in which the assault was made and the character of the offender, it is expedient that instead of sentencing him to any punishment, the applicant may be given the benefit of Section 3 of the Probation of Offender's Act. The applicant is therefore released after due admonition. Revision allowed.