( 1 ) THE petitioner was the President of Sadalga Town Municipal Council. Oh the allegation that he had allowed a third party to make use of a licence issued in favour of the Municipal Council for buying 300 bags of cement at a time when cement was a controlled commodity, proceedings were initiated by the Divisional Commissioner against the petitioner under sub-sec. (10) of S. 42 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and he was called upon to show cause as to why he should not be removed from his office. After considering the explanation given by the petitioner the Divisional Commissioner came to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct "in mis-utilising the cement permit obtained by him in the name of the Town Municipal Council, Sadalga", and directed his removal from the office of the President by his order dated 28-10-1973. In this writ petition, the petitioner has questioned the correctness of the said order. ( 2 ) THE fact that the petitioner had allowed a third party by name R. J. Patil to purchase cement with his own money on the strength of a permit issued in favour of the Town Municipal Council is not in dispute. It is also not disputed that the law governing the distribution of cement did not allow trafficking in such permit. It may be that on a later date R. J. Patil had placed at the disposal of the Municipal Council a quantity of cement equivalent to the quantity that he purchased on the strength of the permit. But that however does not absolve the petitioner from the irregularity committed by him. ( 3 ) THE question urged by Sri Krishna Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the petition is that the Divisional Commissioner had no competence to remove the petitioner under S. 42 (10) of the Act. S. 42 (10) reads:" Every president and vice-president shall, after an opportunity is afforded for hearing him, be removed from his office as such president or vice-president by the Government for mis-conduct in the discharge of his duties or for neglect of or incapacity to perform his duties or if he is unable to pay bis debts, and a president and vice-president so removed who does not cease to be a councillor under Sub-sec. (2) of s. 41, shall not be eligible for re-election as president or vice-president during the remainder of his term of office of councillor specified in section 18". ( 4 ) THE power conferred on the State Government under sub-sec. (10) of S. 42 has been delegated by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred on it by sub-sees. (1) and (3) of S. 321 of the Act to the Divisional commissioner in the case of Town Municipal Councils. It is contended by Sri Krishna Murthy, that an enquiry into the allegations of mis-conduct made against the president can be held only by the goverment as contemplated under Sec. 310 of the Act, and that, therefore, the Divisional Commissioner could not exercise the power under sub-sec. (10) of S. 42 notwithstanding the fact that the said power has been delegated to him as mentioned earlier. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that since under sub-sec. (1) of S. 310, the Government may order an enquiry by an officer appointed by it into any act or conduct of any municipal authority, officer or servant, an enquiry into allegations of mis-conduct made against a president preceding his removal has also to be held by an officer appointed by the Government. Since the power under S. 310 has not been delegated to the Divisional Commissioner, it is urged that the divisional Commissioner could not hold an enquiry into the allegations made against the petitioner. I find it difficult to agree with the submission made on behalf of the petitioner. ( 5 ) S. 310 confers power on the State Government generally to order an enquiry to be held into matters concerning municipal administration and into any act or conduct of any municipal authority, officer, or servant. There are several other provisions in the statute which confer powers on the State Government, the Divisional Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner to discharge the prescribed statutory functions. S. 316 confers the power on the State Government to supersede a Municipal council. S. 306 (1) confers the power on the Deputy Commissioner to suspend a resolution passed by a Municipal Council, the execution of which would be unlawful or would cause injury or annoyance to the public or would lead to a breach of the peace. Sub-sec. S. 316 confers the power on the State Government to supersede a Municipal council. S. 306 (1) confers the power on the Deputy Commissioner to suspend a resolution passed by a Municipal Council, the execution of which would be unlawful or would cause injury or annoyance to the public or would lead to a breach of the peace. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 306 confers on the state Government the power tc affirm or modify the order passed by the deputy Commissioner under Sub-sec. (1 ). S. 309 confers power, corresponding to the power of the Deputy Commissioner under Sub-sec. (1) of S. 306, on the Divisional Commissioner in the case of City Municipal Councils. S. 303 confers power on the Commissioner to act as the Chief Controlling authority in respect of all matters relating to the administration of the act. The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner or any officer of the government authorised by the Government by a general or special order, is entitled to exercise the power of supervision under S. 304. Under S. 322 the Government or the Commissioner may call for any record of any proceedings taken under the Act by any subordinate officer and to pass such appropriate orders as it or he deems fit. Under Sec. 41 the Government if it thinks fit on the recommendation of the municipal council may remove any councillor elected or appointed under the Act, after giving an opportunity of being heard. Under Sub-sec. (10) of S. 42 the State Government is empowered to remove the President or Vice-President. ( 6 ) A perusal of the above provisions would show that the State government and other officers referred to in them have been empowered to discharge several specific duties and functions, not referred to in S. 310 of the act, as stated in the said provisions. It is well settled that when a statute makes a special provision, a general provision which may be to some extent overlapping would not be applicable. The application of S. 310 of the act to the matter referred to above would not therefore arise. I therefore, held that the Divisional Commissioner was entitled to remove the petitioner under sub-sec. (10) of S. 42, ( 7 ) IT is no doubt true that sub-sec. (10) of S. 42 does not contain the procedure in detail which the Divisional Commissioner should follow while taking action under it. I therefore, held that the Divisional Commissioner was entitled to remove the petitioner under sub-sec. (10) of S. 42, ( 7 ) IT is no doubt true that sub-sec. (10) of S. 42 does not contain the procedure in detail which the Divisional Commissioner should follow while taking action under it. Still rules of fair-play and justice have to be followed in deciding a case under that provision. The sub-section itself provides for an opportunity being given to a person against whom action is taken. It is also provided that a president or a vice-president is removable only on proof of facts specified therein. It cannot therefore, be said that the provision is vitiated on the ground that it does not provide for a reasonable procedure for holding an enquiry into acts of misconduct of a president or a vice-president. ( 8 ) IT was lastly urged that the Divisional Commissioner was in error in not giving an opportunity to the petitioner to examine R. J. Patil. Having regard to the admitted facts in this case, I do not think that the petitioner has been prejudiced. The examination of R. J. Patil would not have in any way improved the position of the petitioner who had admitted that he had allowed R. J. Patil to buy cement on the strength of the permit issued in favour of the Municipal Council. There is thus no merit in this writ petition. It is dismissed. --- *** --- .