JUDGMENT - B.N. SAPRE, J.:---The main question that falls for our consideration in these two Letters Patent Appeals is whether the temple of Siddhi Vinayak situated at Old Prabhadevi Road, Dadar, Bombay, is a private temple or it is a public temple and, therefore, a public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as "the Act". On an application of the Official Trustee, the Assistant Charity Commissioner of Bombay registered the temple as a public trust on 26th September, 1955. Deojee Kashinath Patil, the father of the present appellant Dattaram Deojee Patil, since deceased, preferred an application under section 70-A of the Act to the Charity Commissioner to revise the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner. The Charity Commissioner, by his order dated 17th June, 1965, set aside the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner and held that the temple does not constitute a public trust. Against that decision, the official Trustee preferred an application under section 72 of the Act in the City Civil Court at Bombay. That was Charity Application No. 16 of 1965. To this application, three individual persons joined the Official Trustee. Another similar application, being Charity Application No. 26 of 1965, was filed by two to other individuals persons, being aggrieved by the order of the Charity Commissioner. Both these applications were disposed of by a common judgment delivered by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay on 26th January, 1973. The learned Judge reversed the finding of the Charity Commissioner and held that the temple is not a private temple but is a public temple and, therefore, a public trust under the Act. It appears that Deojee Kashinath Patil died after the above decision. The present appellant Dattaram, therefore, filed two first appeals, being First Appeals Nos. 272 of 1973 and 273 of 1973, in respect to two Charity Applications. Those first appeals were summarily dismissed by a Single Judge of this Court. Hence these Letters Patent Appeals. The temple of Siddhi Vinayak situate at Old Prabhadevi Road, Dadar, Bombay, though at one time obscure, seems to have come into prominence in recent years. At present it attracts a large number of devotees, specially on particulars days, such as Chaturthi. We are told at the Bar that now a large number of devotees go to the temple to have Darshan every day. At present it attracts a large number of devotees, specially on particulars days, such as Chaturthi. We are told at the Bar that now a large number of devotees go to the temple to have Darshan every day. There are long queues of devotees waiting for Darshan and it takes about two to three or more hours for a devotee to have a Darshan. Prior to 1870, one Sunder Laxman Patil was managing the temple and its property. There is no direct evidence as to when exactly this temple was founded and as to who was the manager looking after the temple and its property prior to Sunder Laxman Patil. It appears that Sunder was managing the temple for about 15 to 20 years prior to 1870 in which year he died. He was survived by three son, Manek, Janoo and Tukaram. Tukaram died in 1895 and Manek in 1900. Kashinath was the son of Manek and he died in 1940. Deojee was the son of Kashinath and the present appellant Dattaram is the son of Deojee. Janoo died in the year 1928. His wife Jiwoobai survived him and she died in the year 1943. After the death of Janoo, disputes arose between Jiwoobai and Kashinath regarding the management of the temple. This led to the filing of Suit No. 217 of 1932 by Kashinath in the High Court of Bombay. In those proceedings, Jiwoobai was shown as defendant No. 1 and Deojee as defendant No. 5. In the plaint filed by Kashinath, it was mentioned that Sunder Laxman died in or about the year 1870 and he was for several years the Manager and Trustee of the property which was dedicated to God Ganpati. It was further mentioned that the said property consisted of a temple and the adjoining Chawl yielding rent and a Dharmashala and a tank known as Nardulla tank which were all situate in the same compound. It was further stated that the trust had been managed and looked after and the deity worshipped by the senior male member for the time being in the family of Sunder Laxman. The family had no property of its own. After the death of Sunder, this son Tukaram managed the property till his death in the year 1895. It was further stated that the trust had been managed and looked after and the deity worshipped by the senior male member for the time being in the family of Sunder Laxman. The family had no property of its own. After the death of Sunder, this son Tukaram managed the property till his death in the year 1895. After the death of Tukaram, the property came to be managed by Manek, the eldest male member of the joint family, who died in the year 1900. After the death of Manek, Janoo managed the property. It was further stated that on 24th September, 1918. Janu had presented a petition in the High Court under the Indian Trustees Act, 1866, praying for leave to sell a certain piece of land adjoining the trust property and the High Court passed an order on 15th October, 1918 granting the relief prayed for. The plaint further stated that after the death of Janoo, Kashinath was himself managing the property, but was wrongfully ousted by Jiwoobai. The prayer in the plaint was for a declaration that Kashinath was entitled to manage the said property as the senior male member of the family and that possession of the property be handed over to him. In her written statement, Jiwoobai raise several contentions disputing the claim of Kashinath, but stated at the end that show was willing if the Court thought it fit to frame a proper scheme for the management of the temple property. A consent decree was passed in that suit by the High Court and the Official Trustee was appointed the trustee of the property and the temple with powers to appoint Jiwoobai as his agent to carry out the religious ceremonies appertaining to the temple during her lifetime. After the death of Jiwoobai, the Official Trustee was to appoint Kashinath as his agent for the purpose of carrying out the religious duties. Jiwoobai managed the temple till her death. However, after the death of Jiwoobai, no member of the Patil family was appointed the agent or manger and the Official Trustee himself looked after the management of the temple and appointed a Pujari or an Archak for doing the worship at the temple. As we have stated, the Official Trustee, some time in the year 1955, moved the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bombay, for registering the temple as a public trust. As we have stated, the Official Trustee, some time in the year 1955, moved the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bombay, for registering the temple as a public trust. Kashinath had died by that time, but no notice of this application was given to his son Deojee and the temple was registered as a public trust behind his back. In the year 1961, therefore, Deojee approached the Charity Commissioner under section 70-A of the Act to revise the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner. He contended that the temple was private and was not public and could not be registered as a public trust. The Charity Commissioner, instead of setting aside the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner registering the temple as a public trust on the ground that no proper inquiry had been made by first giving notice of the application of the Official Trustee to Deojee Kashinath Patil and remanding the matter tot he Assistant Charity Commissioner for a fresh inquiry, retained the revision application (Revision Application No. 18 of 1961) on his file and framed and remitted three issues to the Assistant Charity Commissioner for giving his findings after recording evidence on both the sides, after giving due notice to them. The three issues framed and remitted were as follows :--- "(1) Whether this temple is dedicated to the public or a section of the public? (2) Whether members of the public go to this temple as of right? and (3) Whether subsequent events show that there is implied dedication by holding out on the principles laid down in (Laxman Couda v Subramanya Ayer)1, A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 44. ?" Before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, both documentary and oral evidence was adduced both on behalf of the Official Trustee and Deojee Kashinath Patil. Amongst the witnesses examined by the Official Trustee were A.W. 1 Govind Chintaman Phatak (Ex. 16), who had worked as a priest in the temple for over 26 years, and three devotees aged about 65-66 years. A.W. 2 Vishwanath Vinayak Puranik (Ex. 17), A.W. 7 Dattatray Gopal Wangakar (Ex. 30) and A.W. 8 Narayan Kaluji Patil (Ex. 31). On behalf of Deojee, he examined himself at Ex. 38 as the principal witness on his side. 16), who had worked as a priest in the temple for over 26 years, and three devotees aged about 65-66 years. A.W. 2 Vishwanath Vinayak Puranik (Ex. 17), A.W. 7 Dattatray Gopal Wangakar (Ex. 30) and A.W. 8 Narayan Kaluji Patil (Ex. 31). On behalf of Deojee, he examined himself at Ex. 38 as the principal witness on his side. Amongst the documents produced were the High Court decree in Suit No. 217 of 1932 and the pleadings of the parties in that suit; an extract from the Bombay City Survey Register and certain receipts of assessment. On appreciating the documentary and oral evidence adduced before him, the Assistant Charity Commissioner recorded findings in the negative on all the three issues. He held that it was not proved that the temple was dedicated to the public or a section of the public. It was not proved that members of the public go to the temple as of right. Thirdly, subsequent events do not show that there was implied dedication by holding out. He pointed out from the consent decree in Suit No. 217 of 1932 that the temple and its property had been dedicated by Sunder Laxman to God Ganpati as a private irrevocable religious trust for the worship of the idols installed therein which showed that the dedication was to God Ganpati and not to the public or a section of the public. The management of the temple was to remain with the members of the Patil family. The extract from the Bombay City survey records showed that survey No. 1209 on which the temple stood was a private site owned by Janu Sunder. Had it been a public temple, the site would have been recorded in the name of the deity. The receipts of assessment were in the name of Kashinath Patil. The assistant Charity Commissioner relied upon certain circumstances which, in his view, went to show that it was a private temple, and tried to explain other circumstances which were relied upon by the official Trustee as indicating that the temple was public. He pointed out that although the consent decree was passed by the High Court in the year 1936, till 1954 or 1955 the Official Trustee had not moved for the registration of the temple as a public trust. He pointed out that although the consent decree was passed by the High Court in the year 1936, till 1954 or 1955 the Official Trustee had not moved for the registration of the temple as a public trust. There was no evidence to show that contributions were collected from the public for construction of any part of the Ganpati temple. Though a Dharmashala and a tank were there just near the temple, a person owning a private temple could as well feel like building a Dharmashala and a tank near a temple and the existence of these would not show that it was a public temple. Deojee had stated in his evidence that the temple was never thrown open to the public. Although he admitted that three Utsavas used to be performed in the temple, yet those Utsavas could be performed even in a private temple and that was no circumstance to show that it was a public temple. The oral evidence adduced by the Official Trustee did not prove that members of the public use to go to the temple for worship as of right, because the witnesses admitted that they were never allowed to do the worship of God Ganpati. The Charity Commissioner upheld the findings of the Assistant Charity Commissioner on all the three issues and substantially for the same reasons. His conclusion that the temple was a private one and was not a public temple and, therefore, not a public trust as based mainly on these reasons. In the present case, there was no document creating the trust. On the other hand, the consent decree passed by the High Court in the year 1936 gave a clear indication that the origin of the trust was private. When the origin is private, the subsequent dedication, either express or implied, must be proved or it must be shown that the people go to the temple as of right. No material had been brought on record to prove these. The evidence did not prove that there was subsequent dedication, either express or implied, or that the people visited the temple as of right. No material had been brought on record to prove these. The evidence did not prove that there was subsequent dedication, either express or implied, or that the people visited the temple as of right. The evidence adducted was that members of the public visited that temple without being obstructed, but that was not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that it was a public temple, because Hindu sentiment prevents the owner from obstructing any devotee who desires to pay his respects to a particular deity in a particular temple. There were, of course, circumstances that the land was exempted from payment of assessment and a tank and perhaps also a Dharmashala form part of the property, but these are not necessarily consistent only with the theory of the temple being public. On the other hand, there were circumstances which a can be consistent only with the theory that the temple was private. In the Bombay City Survey records Janoo Sunder was shown as the beneficial owner. The municipal tax bills in respect of the property were issued to Kashinath Manek Patil as surviving trustee and manager. Before the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, a good amount of case law was cited with a view to show what tests have been generally prescribed for holding whether a temple is private or public. On the basis of the case law cited, the learned Judge drew a summary of the considerations which have to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding whether the temple in question is a public temple or a private temple. They were as follows:---(1) The historical origin, the manner in which the affairs of the temple had been managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received by the temple, the consciousness of the manager and the consciousness of the devotes themselves must be considered. (2) The question of intention to dedicate the place for the ;use of the public is a matter of inference. Once a long course of user by the public for worship is established and the fact of a separate endowment is proved, it is fair to infer that the institution must have been dedicated to the public. (2) The question of intention to dedicate the place for the ;use of the public is a matter of inference. Once a long course of user by the public for worship is established and the fact of a separate endowment is proved, it is fair to infer that the institution must have been dedicated to the public. Similarly, when user by the public generally to the extent to which there is a worshipping public in the locality is established, it is not unreasonable to presume that the user by the public was a of right, unless there are circumstances clearly suggesting that the user must have been permissive. (3) The fact whether the property is dedicated to the temple or to the individual who manages the temples is an important consideration for the purpose of determining whether the temple is a private temple or a public temple. (4) The fact that the idol is kept in a separate building is an indication that it is a public temple. The fact that the idol is installed permanently on a pedestal is also a relevant fact. Similarly, the fact that the Pooja is performed by an Archak would also show that it is a public temple. (5) Whether the management as well as the devotees had been treating the temple as a public temple or as a private temple is an important consideration. Similarly, whether the Sewas and Utsavas are those which are usually conducted in a public temple is also an important consideration. (6) The circumstances that the public have been regularly worshipping the temple is a matter of course, and that they can take part in the festivals and ceremonies conducted in the temple apparently as a matter of right is a strong piece of evidence to establish public character of the temple. Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the learned Judge found the following facts established by the evidence :--- From the survey records it appeared that the collector had not levied any tax and the property was exempted from paying the taxes. This was an indication that the temple must have been a public temple. It would also be seen from the records that the rent derived from the chawl was utilised for charitable purposes. This was an indication that the temple must have been a public temple. It would also be seen from the records that the rent derived from the chawl was utilised for charitable purposes. From the documents which formed part of Suit No. 217 of 1932 in the High Court, it was seen that Sunder Laxman Patil was only a manager and trustee and the property was transferred for the benefit of Good Ganpati. That indicated that, at the time when the present dispute had not arisen, a member from the Patil family was conscious that what he was establishing was in fact a charity. Such an indication was further available from the fact that, in the year 1918, an application for leave to sell a certain property under the Indian Trustees Act, 1866 was presented to the high Court. Only in the case of a charity, a question could arise of the trustees applying to the High Court for leave to sell the property under the said Act of 1866. Another incidence of the consciousness of the members of the Patil family that this was a public temple could be found in a letter written on or about 9th September, 1940 by Kashinath Manek Patil and Deojee to the Official trustee in which a complaint was made that the usual Utsavas in the temple were not being performed and because of the behaviour of the tenants occupying the chawl, the public dared not enter the temple. The oral evidence of the devotees then went to show that they had been visiting the temple for Darshan as of right and that was an indication of the consciousness on the part of the devotees, that is, the members of the public how they were treating the temple. In the year 1910, Maruti Mandir was built by the members of the public and new flooring was done also by the members of the public. The temple also gave an appearance of it being a public and not a private temple. Although the existence of a Dharmashala as part of the temple property was doubtful, the existence of a tank was clearly borne out by the evidence. The existence of the tank was an indication that it was a public temple and the devotees used to go to the tank to take bath before entering the temple for Darshan. Although the existence of a Dharmashala as part of the temple property was doubtful, the existence of a tank was clearly borne out by the evidence. The existence of the tank was an indication that it was a public temple and the devotees used to go to the tank to take bath before entering the temple for Darshan. The idol itself was placed on a pedestal. The members of the Patil family were not residing in the place where the idol was located. A regular Bhatt or Archak was engaged to perform the Pooja. The learned Judge, in short, held that having regard to the evidence of the consciousness of the members of the Patil family as to how they regarded the temple, similar consciousness of the members of the public; the appearance of the temple and the circumstances that the property was dedicated to God Ganpati and it was exempted from paying the taxes, an irresistible conclusion must be reached that it was a public and not a private temple,. The learned Judge accordingly held that the temple and the property are a public trust and he set aside the decision of the Charity Commissioner to the contrary. As we have noted, two separate first appeals were filed by the present appellant and were summarily dismissed by a Single Judge of this Court. Being aggrieved by that decision, the appellant has filed these two Letters Patent appeals. Mr. Shetye for the appellant has made the following four submissions before us :--- (1) In Charity application No. 16 of 1965, petitioners Nos. 2 to 4 as three individual persons had no locus standi to present that application. Similarly, in charity Application No. 26 of 1965, the two petitioners as two individual persons had no locus standi to present that application. Both the charity applications being thus not maintainable should have been dismissed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay. (2) The findings given by the Assistant Charity commissioner on the three issues were never challenged by the Official Trustee before the Charity Commissioner. They could not, therefore, be challenged before the city Civil Court, Bombay. (3) There is no evidence with regard to the creation of the trust. (4) There is no evidence---express or implied---with regard to the dedication of the temple to the public. They could not, therefore, be challenged before the city Civil Court, Bombay. (3) There is no evidence with regard to the creation of the trust. (4) There is no evidence---express or implied---with regard to the dedication of the temple to the public. The basis of the first submission was not at once clear to us. It appeared to us that there could be more than one basis for the submission. One was that because in the proceedings before the Charity Commissioner the only parties were the Official Trustee and Deojee Kashinath Patil, the three individual persons, who had joined the Official Trustee in Charity Application No. 16 of 1965, and the two individual persons who had filed Charity Application No. 26 of 1965 had no locus standi to make an application under section 72 of the Act to set aside the decision of the Charity Commissioner,. The second basis could be that these five individual persons could not be said to be persons aggrieved by the decision of the Charity Commissioner and could not have a locus standi to challenge his decision. On being asked to clarify the basis of his submission, Mr. Shetye stated that he was not putting forward the second basis and was putting forward only the first basis, namely, that these five individual persons, who were not parties to the proceedings before the Charity Commissioner, had no locus standi to file an application under section 72 of the Act before the city Civil Court, Bombay, challenging the decision of the Charity Commissioner. A Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us was a party (Deshmukh, J.), has held in (Khivaraj v. Shivshankar)2, 75 Bom.L.R. 523 that the jurisdiction exercised by the District Court under section 72 of the Act is not an exercise of appellate jurisdiction and the application under section 72 of the Act filed in the District Court is in the nature of original proceedings. If, therefore, Charity Application No. 16 of 1965 and Charity Application No. 26 of 1965 were fresh and original proceedings before the City Civil Court, Bombay, no objection can be entertained that persons, who were not parties in the proceedings before the Charity Commissioner, could not join in making an application under section 72 of the Act. If, therefore, Charity Application No. 16 of 1965 and Charity Application No. 26 of 1965 were fresh and original proceedings before the City Civil Court, Bombay, no objection can be entertained that persons, who were not parties in the proceedings before the Charity Commissioner, could not join in making an application under section 72 of the Act. When the application under section 72 of the Act is treated as an original proceeding, any party aggrieved by the impugned order has a right to make that application. It has not been disputed that these five individual persons as devotees of the temple could feel aggrieved by the order made by the Charity Commissioner that the temple is not a public temple, because that order would encroach upon their right to go to the temple as members of the public for the purposes of Darshan which they claim they have a right to do. In view of this position, the objection does not survive that petitioners Nos. 2 to 4 in Charity Application No. 16 of 1965 and the two petitioners in Charity Application No. 26 of 1965 had no locus standi to file those applications and those applications were not maintainable. Turning to the second submission, we are unable to understand what Mr. Shetye means when he says that the findings given by the Assistant Charity Commissioner on the three issues were never challenged by the Official Trustee before the Charity Commissioner. Deojee Kashinath Patil had moved the Charity Commissioner under section 70-A of the Act to revise the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner registering the temple as a public trust. Notice of this revision application was given to the Official Trustee. After the reciept of the findings from the Assistant Charity Commissioner, the Charity Commissioner had heard both the sides. In this argument, the Official Trustee had apparently challenged the findings recorded by the Assistant Charity Commissioner necessitating the Charity Commissioner to go into all the evidence and circumstances on the basis of which the Assistant Charity Commissioner had recorded his findings and the Charity Commissioner had given a long judgment consisting of about 36 types pages. All this would not have been there if the Official Trustee had not challenged the findings recorded by the Assistant Charity Commissioner before the Charity Commissioner. The second submission of Mr. Shetye must consequently fail. All this would not have been there if the Official Trustee had not challenged the findings recorded by the Assistant Charity Commissioner before the Charity Commissioner. The second submission of Mr. Shetye must consequently fail. The third and the fourth submissions of Mr. Shetye can be taken together. They constitute the main controversy in the case and that is whether the temple in question is a private temple or it is a public temple and, therefore, a public trust under the act. The tests pointed out by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, on the basis of the case law cited before him, which have to be applied tot he facts of the present case in order to find out whether the temple is a private temple or it is a public temple, have not been disputed before us on either side, although Mr. Shetye specifically drew our attention to four decisions, the tests laid down in which when applied to the facts of the present case, according to him would indicate that the temple in the present case is a private temple. We will deal with those four decisions at the proper stage. It may, however, be stated broadly that the list of tests which can be applied in order to find out whether the temple is a private temple or it is a public temple cannot be exhaustive. Similarly, if those tests are taken up individually, they may be capable of being explained in support of the theory, either that the temple is private or it is public. Again, some of the tests might indicate that it is a public temple and some others that it is a private temple. Therefore, what is important in such cases is what it is the total and cumulative effect of the circumstances considered together---whether they show it to be a public temple or a private temple. The first indication we get how the members of the Patil family had dealt with the temple and the property annexed to it is in the plaint (Ex. 61) which was filed by Kashinath in suit No. 217 of 1932. The recitals in that plaint show that the property was transferred for the benefit of God Ganpati and it was stated that Sunder Laxman Patil was only a manager and trustee of the property. 61) which was filed by Kashinath in suit No. 217 of 1932. The recitals in that plaint show that the property was transferred for the benefit of God Ganpati and it was stated that Sunder Laxman Patil was only a manager and trustee of the property. With this background, we have to consider the consciousness of the members of the Patil family whether they themselves were treating the temple and the property dedicated to God Ganpati as of their private ownership. Under the consent decree of the High Court, although the Official Trustee was appointed the trustee of the temple and the property, yet on the spot it was Jiwoobai who, as the agent of the Official trustee, was appointed to carry out the religious ceremonies appertaining tot he temple during her lifetime. She had lived up to the year 1943 and, therefore, the period up to that year would be relevant in regard to the conduct of Jiwoobai and, for the matter of that, of Kashinath who, if alive, or his son after him, was to be appointed the agent to carry out the religious ceremonies appertaining to the temple after Jiwoobai. The Official Trustee was nominally on the scene and so far as the carrying out of the religious ceremonies appertaining tot he temple was concerned, it was solely Jiwoobai and Kashinath, as the next expectant, who were the persons actually on the spot. If they wished, therefore, they could stop the members of the public from visiting the temple telling them that it was their private temple. An important piece of the conduct of Kashinath and his son Deojee at that time is to be found in a letter (Ex. 80) dated about 9th September, 1940. The letter was addressed to the Official Trustee and a grievance was made that Ramnavami Utsav, which has been celebrated for the last so many years, had been inexplicably discontinued. The letter shows that Kashinath and his son Deojee wanted the Utsav to be performed and the members of the public to attend it. They were anxious that the members of the public should not be deterred from going to the temple because of the nuisance which the tenants the Chawl belonging to the temple were creating. The letter shows that Kashinath and his son Deojee wanted the Utsav to be performed and the members of the public to attend it. They were anxious that the members of the public should not be deterred from going to the temple because of the nuisance which the tenants the Chawl belonging to the temple were creating. Such anxiety on the part of Kashinath and Deojee would not have been there for the sake of the public if they did not consider the temple to be public to which the public would come. Another piece of evidence showing the consciousness of the members of the Patil family to treat the temple as public is to be found from the recitals in the plant (Ex. 61) that Janoo Patil in the year 1918 had made an application to the High Court for leave to sell a certain property under the provisions of the Indian Trustees Act, 1856, which was necessary only if he treated the temple and the property as a charity. The third indication of the consciousness of the members of the Patil family to treat the temple as a public temple can be seen from the fact that in Suit No. 217 of 1932 both the contesting parties were claiming merely a right in the management of the temple and its properties. Then there is the evidence that the temple has all the appearance of a public temple. The evidence accepted by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court that the temple is situated in a place outside the residence of the members of the Patil family, has not been challenged before us by Mr. Shetye. This has been considered by judicial decisions to be a factory showing that the temple is public and is not private. The second circumstance is that a tank had been built in the vicinity of the temple. Deojee (Ex. 38) has given an admission in his evidence that the tank is 30 x 30. It has thus a fairly large size tank. He has also admitted that Chaukalse and Panchkalse used to bathe near the tank on Coconut Day. Dattatray Waingankar (Ex. 30) had stated that the tank has steps to it. Narayan Patil (Ex. 31 has stated that it was a big tank and people used to go there to bathe. It has thus a fairly large size tank. He has also admitted that Chaukalse and Panchkalse used to bathe near the tank on Coconut Day. Dattatray Waingankar (Ex. 30) had stated that the tank has steps to it. Narayan Patil (Ex. 31 has stated that it was a big tank and people used to go there to bathe. It is in evidence that the patil family did not own any other property. They did not come from a rich family and it is difficult to believe that they would have built a tank to be used by the members of their own family. The existence of the tank near the temple and the use to which it was being put---which evidence we see no reason to discard---is a clear indication that the temple was public. It was the case of the Official Trustee that there was also a Dharmashala near the temple and the existence of the Dharmashala want to show that it was a public temple. The learned Judge of the City Civil Court, however, found the evidence about the existence of the Dharmashala conflicting and doubtful and we, therefore, do not take into account the existence of Dharmashala near the temple as a factor in support of the theory of the temple being a public one. But there is evidence that two Deep Malas are standing near the temple. It is difficult to imagine that Deep Malas should be erected for a temple which was private. The existence of the Deep Malas is more consistent with the temple being public. Then, there is the evidence that the idol of Ganpati is placed on a pedestal and it has been permanently installed. In the case of a family temple when the diety is private, it is usually not placed on a pedestal and also not permanently installed. There is also the evidence that a Bhatt or an Archak has been engaged to perform the Pooja and this was the position even in the year 1929. There is next the evidence of the consciousness of the members of the public that this was a public temple and they were visiting this temple for Dharshan treating it as a public temple. There is next the evidence of the consciousness of the members of the public that this was a public temple and they were visiting this temple for Dharshan treating it as a public temple. As we have pointed out, four devotees in the age group 65-66 years have been examined on behalf of the Official Trustee to prove that since long before these proceedings were started, the members of the public had been gong into the temple for Dharshan and worship with the consciousness that it was a public temple. Govind Chintaman Phatak (65) had worked as a Pujari in the temple for 25 years from the time the Officials Trustee came on the scene. But even before that he was going to the temple since he was a boy of 15 or 16 years. He has stated that he used to go to the temple freely for Darshan. Vishwanath Vinayak Puranik (66), Dattatray Gopal Waingankar (65) and Narayan Patil (65) have deposed in a similar way. Their evidence was not disbelieved as such by the Assistant Charity Commissioner and the Charity Commissioner, but it has been pointed doubt by them that no end of them had stated that he was allowed to worship the deity. There seems to be some confusion between the word "worship", when construed in its narrow sense as denoting the ritual of the Pooja and the broad sense in which the word "worship" is understood as meaning going before the deity and paying respects to it by bowing down or by showing some such other mark of respect,. When the witnesses stated that the temple was never kept open to the public for worship; when they do not say anything about their having gone for worship or when they say that they were not going to the temple for worship and they had not seen anybody also performing the worship except the priest, they all are using the word "worship" in the narrow sense and not in the broad sense in which the word is understood, not only by the witnesses but by the public at large, as meaning going before the deity and paying respects to it by bowing down or by showing some such other mark of respect. In the broad sense of the words, all the witnesses have uniformly stated that they were freely going before the deity for Darshan and were paying respects to it in the manner in which the individual devotee chose. It the above distinction is borne in mind, then there can be no manner of doubt from the evidence of the witnesses, which was not otherwise disbelieved even by the Assistant Charity Commissioner and the charity Commissioner, that the public at large was freely going to the temple for Darshan, which is the same as worshipping the deity in its broad sense, as we have indicated. It is true that in the narrow sense of the word "worship", that is, performing the actual ritual of the Pooja, only a priest specially appointed for the purpose would perform the worship. This worship in the narrow sense may be banned to outsiders or may be allowed on a restricted scale. But in applying the test, whether the public at large was freely going to the temple for worship, we cannot construe the word "worship" in the narrow sense. Most devotees go to the temple to pay respects to the deity and are satisfied with the Darshan of the deity that is worship for them. Another piece of evidence of the consciousness of the public is their participation in the Utsavas which were performed at the temple annually. That indication is also to be found in the evidence that in the year 1940, Maruti Mandir was build by the members of the public. Another circumstance in favour of the temple being public and not a private temple of the members of the Patil family is that the property transferred to the deity was exempted from paying taxes. At Ex. 4 is an extract from the Bombay City Survey Register for Cadastral Survey Nos. 1208 and 1209. In Column No. 17 of this extract for the two survey members, it has been stated that the land is not assessable as it is covered by Aungiers convention. The argument on behalf of the Official Trustee was that this incidence of the land being not assessed to revenue is the result of the land being of the ownership of some charity. On the other hand, it was the contention of Deojee Kashinath Patil that this inference cannot be necessarily drawn. The argument on behalf of the Official Trustee was that this incidence of the land being not assessed to revenue is the result of the land being of the ownership of some charity. On the other hand, it was the contention of Deojee Kashinath Patil that this inference cannot be necessarily drawn. It will be seen from the extract, Column No. 5, that the tenure of the land is described as Pension and Tax. Our attention has been invited to Guptas Book on the Bombay City Land Revenue Act No. 1876, 1948 Edition. Chapter IV (Page 99) of this Book is on the subject of "The Existing Tenures". The Chapter begins with the statement that the existing tenures in Bombay include the term Pension and tax. In paragraph 2 it has been stated that the term Pension takes its origin from the Portuguese word Pencao which means a bonus or premium, paid for the fee-simple on the compromise of a doubtful tenure. The payment of Pension dates from Aungiers Agreement of 1672, which commuted, in consideration of the payment every year of 20,000 Xeraphins (Rs. 13,850/-) whatever rights the company possessed over the states which were in a state of cultivation and which were in consequence acknowledged by that instrument to be freehold property. The third paragraph states that the Tax of 10 per cent on the produce of all "landed estates" was introduce in the year 1758 to meet "the prodigious expenses" of fortifications and works for the security of the inhabitants. At page 100 in the second paragraph it is stated that some lands under this tenure pay only Pension, some only Tax,. It is difficult at this distance of time to assign a reason for such a distinction. Every square yard of ground in the occupation of individuals in 1672, should have been changed pension. Possibly an exception was made in the case of land whose profits were applied to charitable purposes and those lands which were charitable in 1672 and ceased to be so in 1758 were only taxed in that year. Some exemptions may also be due to omissions on the part of the Collectors office. Those lands which continued to be charitable have been and are to day exempt either from Pension or Tax. Some exemptions may also be due to omissions on the part of the Collectors office. Those lands which continued to be charitable have been and are to day exempt either from Pension or Tax. Thus, exceptions apart, by and large, we can trace this incidence of an exemption from payment of assessment to the fact that not only after 1758 but in 1672 also the lands which were charitable enjoyed exemptions from the payment of assessment. The Aungiers convention has been given in the Book as Appendix I at page 315. It is not necessary to go in details into the Aungiers convention. It will suffice to say that every owner of the land was liable to pay in proportion to the land owned by him towards the amount of Rs, 13,850/- which was agreed to be paid for the entire land on the island of Bombay. Ordinarily, therefore, the lands bearing Cadastral Survey Nos. 1208 and 1209 would have been liable to pay assessment. The reason why they were not made so liable was that they were meant for charitable purposes. This circumstance, therefore, namely, that the land on which the temple stands exempted from payment of assessment, would go to show that the temple was not a private one but was a public temple which, in a broad sense, was a charitable object. It is true that there is no evidence with regard to the creating of the trust and also no evidence of the express dedication of the temple to the public, but there is ample evidence of the implied dedication of the temple to the public. Implied dedication is a matter of inference to be legitimately drawn from proved circumstances and in the instant case, there are the following clinching circumstances from which a legitimate inference can be drawn that there was implied dedication of the temple in question to the public :--- (1) The property was dedicated for Ganpati idol and Sunder Laxman Patil was only a Manager and Trustee of the temple premises. (2) There was consciousness of the members of the Patil family that the temple was a public temple and they were anxious that the public at large should visit the temple and participate in the Utsavas as they would in the case of a public temple. (2) There was consciousness of the members of the Patil family that the temple was a public temple and they were anxious that the public at large should visit the temple and participate in the Utsavas as they would in the case of a public temple. (3) There was consciousness of the public at large that this was a public temple and they were visiting the temple for Darshan freely. They were taking part in the Utsav performed in the temple and were also contributing towards the construction of additional portions (such as, Maruti Mandir and a new flooring in the year 1940). (4) The temple had all the appearance of a public temple. It was situated at a place which was outside the residence of the members of the Patil family. There was a large size tank near the temple where the devotees used to take bath before going to the temple for Darshan. Two Deep Malas were erected near the temple The idol was placed on a pedestal and was permanently installed in the temple. A Bhatt or an Archak was engaged to perform the Pooja of the deity. (5) The property was exempted from paying taxes and this can be reasonably traced to its being connected with charity. In our view, therefore, the learned Judge of the City Civil Court rightly came to the conclusion on a consideration of these circumstances that the temple in question was not a private temple but was a public temple and, therefore, a public trust under the Act. We then turn to the four decisions to which our attention has been invited by Mr. Shetye on behalf of the appellant. The first is (Bhagwan Din v. Har Saroop)3 , A.I.R. 1940, P.C. 7. Mr. Shetye has relied upon the following observations in that case :--- "Where a grant of a temple is made to an individual or family and the family has treated the temple as family property, dividing the various forms of profit whether offerings or rents, it is not enough to deprive the family of their private property to show that Hindus willing to worship have never been turned away or even that the deity has acquired considerable popularity among Hindus of the locality or among persons resorting to the annual mela. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as sufficient proof of dedication of a temple as a public temple, must be considered in their historical setting in such a case and dedication to the public is not to be readily inferred when it is known that the temple property was acquired by grant to an individual or family. Such an inference if made from the fact of user by the public is hazardous, since it would not in general be consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice that worshippers should be turned away; and as worship generally implies offerings of some kind it is not to be expected that the managers of a private temple should in all circumstances desire to discourage popularity. In that case, the party, which contended that the temple is public, relied strongly on the fact that for many years Hindu members of the public had resorted to the temple for worship and Darshan without let or hindrance. About 46 years before the trial, a mela or fair had been started by some musicians and dancers and had become an annual function towards which public subscriptions were collected. There was some evidence that part of these moneys had been spent upon white-washing and repairing the temple. Although the chief Court at Oudh did not consider this to be established, yet there was no doubt that the temple and its Goshains had profited from the increased resort of the temple during the mela. On the other hand, it was pointed out by the opposite party that there had been no previous interference with the temple on behalf of the public ; that the Goshains took the offerings for themselves; that they divided them according to their shares as members of different branches of the family; that they spent money on repairs ; that they gave leases in their individual names and not in the name of the idol; that they close the temple when they had occasion to go to their native village for family ceremonies, e.g. marriages ; and that tombs of certain members of the family were put up though they could not claim to be famous saints. In holding that there was no grant to the idol or an endowment of a temple or a gift made by way of trust for a public religious purpose, Their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that the grant was to Darayo Gir and his heirs in perpetuity. Had it been intended as an endowment for an idol it would have been very differently expressed; the reference to the grantees heirs, and the Arabic terminology that descendant after the descendant and generation after generation were not reconcilable with the view that the grantor was in effect making a wake for a Hindu religious purpose, even if it be assumed that this was not otherwise an untenable hypothesis. In view of the circumstances pointed out on behalf of the opposite party, therefore, the temple was not a public temple. That case was, therefore, decided on its own facts. As to the principles, there can be no dispute. The second decision is (Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar)4, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 133 Mr. Shetye has relied upon this decision only to show that under the Hindu Law, an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and the properties endowed for the institution vest in it. But it does not follow from this that it is to be regarded as the beneficial owner of the endowment. It is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner of the endowed properties and it cannot have any beneficial interest in the endowment. Mr. Shetye, therefore, argues that merely because the property in the instant case was dedicated to the idol, the temple does not become a public temple. But it is not on this consideration alone that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court has arrived at the conclusion that the temple is a public temple. The test in the case of dedication of the property to the temple is whether it is for the benefit of the members of the family only or the intention is to benefit a large section of the community or a section thereof. Having regard to the evidence adduced in the case there can be no manner of doubt that the benefit of the dedication of the property to the idol was to go to a large section of the community and was not restricted to the members of the Patil family. Having regard to the evidence adduced in the case there can be no manner of doubt that the benefit of the dedication of the property to the idol was to go to a large section of the community and was not restricted to the members of the Patil family. The next two decisions are (Martand v. Charity Commissioner, Bombay)5, 63 Bom.L.R. 274 and (Goswami Mahalaxmi v. Shah Ranchhoddas)6, 73 Bom.L.R. 53 the latter a Supreme Court decision. They have been referred to in paragraphs 25 and 26 respectively of the judgment of the learned Judge of City Civil Court. Mr. Shetye has simply referred to the tests laid down in these cases which have to be applied to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand for reaching a conclusion whether a particular temple is a public temple or a private temple. One can have no quarrel with the propositions of a law and the tests laid down in these cases. We have indicated that the overall and cumulative effect of the circumstances that have been established in the case justified the conclusion reached by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court that the temple in question was a public temple and could not be a private temple. The order passed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, declaring that the temple and the property annexed to the temple are a public trust and the decision of the Charity Commissioner to the contrary cannot be accepted is correct. In that event, the dismissal of the two first appeals against the above judgment and order by a Single Judge of this Court was proper and we, therefore, dismiss both these Letters Patent Appeals. So far as the costs in the two appeals are concerned, the appellant to pay costs in one set of the Official Trustee (respondent No. 1 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 83 of 1973); in one set of respondents 1 and 2 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 83 of 1973 and in one set to respondent No. 3 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 82 of 1973 and respondent No. 5 in letters Patent Appeal No. 83 of 1973. ------