( 1 ) THE petitioners in all these petitions are or were teachers in Primary or higher Secondary Schools of the Education Dept of the Govt of Karnataka. They were allotted from the former State of Mysore to the New State of mysore (Karnataka) under sub-sec (1) of S. 115 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the S. R. Act ). Most of them are still in service and some of them have retired from service. In these petitions, their common grievance is about the reduction of age of their retirement from 58 years to 55 years sought to be effected by the Karnataka (Determination of the Retirement Age of Certain Teachers) Act, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The petitioners have sought for a declaration as void and invalid- (i) the Karnataka (Determination of the Retirement Age of certain teachers) Act, 1975; and (ii) the approval given by the Central Govt to the State Govt by the telex message d. 21-1-1974 for reducing the age of retirement of teachers of ex-Mysore State from 58 to 55 years. ( 2 ) THE consequential reliefs claimed by different petitioners will be adverted to later. We shall set out briefly the history of the fixation of age of superannuation of teachers of ex-Mysore State. In the former State of Mysore, the age of superannuation of teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools was raised from 55 to 58 years under sub-rule (4) of Rule 294 of the Mysore services Regulations. In the other integrating areas of the new State of mysore (Karnataka), the age of superannuation of teachers prior to 1-11-56, was 55 years. After 1-11-56 such disparity in the age of superannuation of teachers allotted from different integrating areas, continued till 14-4-1968 when uniformity was brought about by raising the age of superannuation of all teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools of the Dept of Education of the Govt of Karnataka, to 58 years by amendment of Rule 95 of the Karnataka civil Services Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as KCS. Rules ). Later, the age of superannuation of such teachers was sought to be reduced from 58 years to 55 years by the Karnataka Civil Services (Twenty- second Amendment) Rules, 1973, with effect from 17-11-1973. . However, cl (a) of amended Rule 95 of KCS. Rules ). Later, the age of superannuation of such teachers was sought to be reduced from 58 years to 55 years by the Karnataka Civil Services (Twenty- second Amendment) Rules, 1973, with effect from 17-11-1973. . However, cl (a) of amended Rule 95 of KCS. Rules provided that such reduction in the age of superannuation did not apply to teachers who were allottees from ex-Myscre State and their age of superannuation was allowed to remain as 58 years on account of the protection of their conditions of service under the proviso to sub-sec (7) of S. 115 of the S. R. Act. ( 3 ) ON 4-10-1973 the State Govt addressed the Central Govt seeking the letter's previous Approval for amending Rule 95 of KCS. Rules so as to i educe the age of superannuation of teachers who had the protection of their conditions of service under the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the S. R. Act. The Central Govt gave on 21-1-1974 its approval for such reduction of the age of superannuation of ex-Mysore teachers. Thereafter, the Governor of karnataka made the Mysore Services (Amendment) Regulation, 1974 (which came into force on 30-1-1974) purporting to amend Rule 294 of the mysore Services Regulations. By that amendment, the age of superannuation of ex-Mysore teachers was sought to be lowered from 58 to 55 yrs with effect from 1-3-1974. Pursuant to such amendment the Strte Govt sought to retire teachers from ex-Mysore State who had completed 55 years of age. Such action was challenged in WP. 525 of 1974 and connected writ petitions. A Division Bench of this Court allowed those petitions and held that the Mysore Services (Amendment) Regulation, 1974, was ineffective to achieve the intended object and that ex-Mysore teachers could not be retired before they attained 58 years of age Thereafter, the Governor of Karnataka promulgated the karnataka (Determination of the Retirement Age of Certain Teachers) Ordinance. 1975) Karnataka Ordinance 2 of 1975), (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) by which, the age of superannuation of ex-Mysore teachers was sought to be reduced to 55 years. The Ordinance was deemed to have come into force on 30-1-1974. It has since been replaced by the Act. 1975) Karnataka Ordinance 2 of 1975), (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) by which, the age of superannuation of ex-Mysore teachers was sought to be reduced to 55 years. The Ordinance was deemed to have come into force on 30-1-1974. It has since been replaced by the Act. ( 4 ) THE petitioners had asseiled the Ordinance and the approval given by the Central Govt on 25-1-1974 for reducing the age of retirement of ex- mysore teachors from 58 to 55 years on several grounds including the ground cf violation of Art. 14 of the Constn. The petitioners were permitted to amend their petitions so as to assail the Act instead of the Ordinance. In view of the proclamation of Emergency under Art. 352 of the Constn on 25-6-1975 and the Presidential Order d. 27-6-1975 under Art. 359 of the constitution suspending the enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed under arts 14, 21 and 22 of the Constn, the petitioners sought for permission to amend the petitions so as to challenge the Act and the approval given by the Central Govt on the ground of violation of Art. 16 inslad of Art. 14 of the Constn. We permited such amendment of the petitions. ( 5 ) MR. M. RAMA Jois, learned Counsel for the petitioners in WPs. 2162 to 2164, 2347 and 2439 of 1975, addressed leading arguments for the petitioners. Mr. R. Venkateswara Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner in wp. 2195 of 1975, adopted the arguments of Mr. Rama Jois. Mr. S. K. Venkataranga iyengar, learned Counsel for the petitioners in WPs. 2194 and 2188 of 1975, adopted the arguments of Mr. Rama, Jois and supplemented them by arguing a few more contentions. The learned Advocate General who appeared for the State Govt, argued in defence of the Act and the approval given by the Central Govt for reduction of the age of superannuation of ex-Mysore teachers. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the central Govt argued in support of the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General, to which we shall advert later. ( 6 ) MR. RAMA Jois urged the following contentions : (i) The Act as well as the approval given by the Central Govt for reducing the age of superannuation of ex-Mysore teachers, are violative of art. ( 6 ) MR. RAMA Jois urged the following contentions : (i) The Act as well as the approval given by the Central Govt for reducing the age of superannuation of ex-Mysore teachers, are violative of art. 16 and hence invalid inasmuch as they discriminate against ex-Mysore teachers among the allottees to this State who have higher age of retirement; (ii) the approval given by the Central Govt under the proviso to Section 115 (7) of the S. R. Act, is invalid- (a) as it was given by the Central Govt without applying its mind to all the relevant facts; (b) as the approval of the Central Govt proceeded upon a mis-representation by the State govt that among the allottees to the new State of mysore (Karnataka), only ex-Mysore teachers had the age of superannuation higher than 55 years; (c) as such approval was given by the Central Govt on collateral consideration; (d) on account of the failure of the Central Govt to give an opportunity to the petitioners to make representation against granting approval for reducing the age of retirement and on account of absence of proper consideration of such representation; and (e) as giving of such approval which has serious civil consequences against the petitioners, was done in violation of principles of natural justice. ( 7 ) MR. RAMA Jois also assailed the action of the State Govt seeking to give retrospective effect to the reduction of the age of retirement, on several grounds. We shall advert to them later while dealing with the grievances of individual petitioners in regard to retrospective application of the reduction of the age of superannuation. ( 8 ) MR. Venkataranga lyengar urged the following contentions : (i) As the Central Govt had, earlier declined to give its approval for reduction of the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, the Central Govt should have heard them before it gave, later, such approval; and (ii) such previous approval should hare been given by the President and since it was not so done, it was invalid. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate General raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners cannot seek to enforce the fundamenatl rights conferred by art. 16 (1) of the Constn in view of the Presidential Order d/. 27-6-1975 suspending the enforcement of the fundamenal rights guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate General raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners cannot seek to enforce the fundamenatl rights conferred by art. 16 (1) of the Constn in view of the Presidential Order d/. 27-6-1975 suspending the enforcement of the fundamenal rights guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 10 ) WE shall first deal with this preliminary objection. ( 11 ) THE Presidential Order d/. 27-6-1975 made under Art. 359 of the constitution, reads :" In exercise of the powers conferred by Cl (1) of Art. 359 of the constn, the President hereby declares that the right of any person (including a foreigner) to mave any Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Art. 14, Art. 21 and Art. 22 of the Constn and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the above mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency made under Cl (1) of Art. 352 of the constn on the 3rd Deer, 1971 and on the 27th June, 1975 are both in force. . . . . . . . . . . " ( 12 ) THE aforesaid Order docs not expressly state that the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Art. 16 of the Constitution have been suspended. But, the learned Advocate General argued that since enforcement of fundamental rights, conferred by Art. 14 of the Constitution have been suspended, it follows that enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Art. 16 of the Constitution also stand suspended, as Art, 16 is a mere projection in a smaller area, of the right to equality guaranteed by art. 14 of the Constitution. Elaborating this contention, he submitted that art. 14 is a general provision guaranteeing equality of treatment and equal protection of laws, while Art. 16 is a special provision guaranteeing such equality in the sphere of public employment and that hence suspension of the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Art. 14 of the Constitution necessarily brings abo,ut suspension of enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Article 16 of the Constitution and that when the general right of equality guaranteed by Art. 14 is suspended, such suspension reaches every field in which the right to equality of treatment is claimed. He maintained that when the enforcement of the general right to equality conferred by Art. 14 was suspended, there was no need to suspend expressly the enforcement of every provision guaranteeing right to equality in a limited sphere. It was also contended by the learned Advocate General that as the right conferred by Art. 16 is not independent of the right to equality conferred by Art. 14, the former right cannot be enforced when the enforcement of the latter right is suspended. ( 13 ) THE learned Advocate General referred to several pronouncements of the Supreme Court explaining the scope of Art. 14 and 16 of the Constition. ( 14 ) IN Banarasidas v. State of U. P. AIR. 1956 SC. 520, Sinha, J. (as he then was) explained the scope of Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution thus at page 522:"art. 16 of the Constn is an instance of the application of the general rule of equality laid down in Art. 14, with special reference to opportunity for appointment and employment under the Government. " ( 15 ) SIMILAR was the elucidation of the scope of Arts. 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution in Dasaratha Rama Rao v. State of A. P. , AIR 1961 SC. 564 . S. K. Das, J. , who, spoke for the Court, said thus at pages 569 and 570:"art. 14 enshrines the fundamental right of equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. It is available to all, irrespective of whether the person claiming it is a citizen or not. Art. 15 prohibits discrimination on some special grounds - religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. It is available to citizens, only, but, is not restricted to any employment er office under the State. Art. 16, clause (1), guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State; and clause (2) prohibits discrimination on certain grounds in respect of any such employment or appointment. It would thus appear that, Art. 14 guarantees the general right of equality, Arts. 15 and 16 are instances of the same right in favour of citizens in some special circumstances. " ( 16 ) THE same legal position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in general Manager, S. Rlys. v. Rangachari AIR. 1962 SC. It would thus appear that, Art. 14 guarantees the general right of equality, Arts. 15 and 16 are instances of the same right in favour of citizens in some special circumstances. " ( 16 ) THE same legal position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in general Manager, S. Rlys. v. Rangachari AIR. 1962 SC. 36. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) who spoke for (he Court, said thus at page 41:". . . . . . . Art. 16 (1) and (2) really give effect to the equality before law guaranteed by Art. 14 and to the prohibition of discrimination guaranteed by Art. 16 (1 ). The three provisions form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. " ( 17 ) IN C. A. Rajendra v. Union of India, AIR. 1968 SC. 507. Ramaswami, J, who spoke for the Court, explained that Art. 16 of the Constn is only an incident of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constn and that it gives effect to the doctrine of equality in the matter of appointment and promotion. ( 18 ) IN support of this contention that suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by Art. 14 of the Constn, brings about suspension of the rights conferred by Art. 16 of the Constn also, the learned Advocate general relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in Makhan Singh v. Staff of Punjab AIR. 1964 SC. 381. and the observations of the Division Bench (of which one of us was a member) of this Court in Rikabchand v. State of karnataka WP. 6065/74. ( 19 ) IN Makhan Singh's case (5), the Supreme Court posed the question whether the President's Order d/. 3-11-1962 under Cl (1) of Art. 359 of the constn suspending the right of a person to move any Court for enforcement of the rights conferred by Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constn, during the period of emergency (if such person was deprived of any right under the Defence of India Act, 1962, and any rules or order made thereunder) bars an order of detention being challenged on the ground of contravention of the provisions of the preventive Detention Act which merely incorporate the safeguards contained In Cls (4) and (5), of Art. 22 of the Constn. But, the Supreme Court left that question open observing as follows at page 402 :" Normally, as we have already held, a challenge against the validity of the detention on the ground that the statutory provisions of the act under which the detention is ordered have not been complied with, would fall outside Art. 359 (1) and the Presidential Order, but the complication in the hypothetical case under discussion arises because unlike other provisions of the Act, the mandatory provisiqns in question essentially represent the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 22 and it is open to argument that the challenge in question substantially seeks to enforce the said fundamental rights. In the context of the alternative argument with which we are dealing at this stage, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the challenge in question would have attracted the provisions of Art. 359 (1) and the Order or not. " ( 20 ) THE learned Advocate General next relied on the following observations of a division Bench of the Kerala High Court in O. P. 4357 of 1974. While dealing with the aforesaid question which was left open by the Supreme Court in makhan Singh's case (5) (a Division Bench of this Court concurred with those observations): " The correct approach in understanding the effect of the Order of the President is to seek and find out what,' in substance, is the nature and content of the rights the enforcement of which stands barred. If the rights sought to be enforced through Court are identifiable as or directly relatable to the rights mentioned in the President's Order it would be necessary tp hold that such rights, whether as embodied in the Articles of the constn mentioned in the President's Order or in any statute passed by Parliament would be unavailable after the passing of the order. . . . . . . . . . . So every statute providing for preventive detention must incorporate in its provisions the safeguards mentioned in Art. 22, (5 ). If this be so. the enumeration of the very same safeguards in the statute does not create in the detenue rights other than those conferred by Cl (5) of Art. 22 but can only amount to a reiteration or repetition of the same rights. We may perhaps justifiably use the expression 'reflection' of the same rights. If this be so. the enumeration of the very same safeguards in the statute does not create in the detenue rights other than those conferred by Cl (5) of Art. 22 but can only amount to a reiteration or repetition of the same rights. We may perhaps justifiably use the expression 'reflection' of the same rights. What we see in a statute would then be the image of Cl (5) of Art. 22. Carrying the analogy further, if the context, scope and ambit of the right under Cl (5) of Art. 22 is what Is contained in a section of a statute providing for preventive detention so as to constitute an image or reflection of the constitutional rights, would the reflection remain if the object reflected (by the constitutional right) was temporarily effaced. We do not think so. Unaided by authority therefore, we think, we will have to come to the conclusion that any provision contained in a statute providing for preventive detention which incorporates the safeguards conferred on detenues by cl (5) of Art. 22 will not be enforceable through Court during the period when the rights under Cl (5) of Art. 22 have been suspended by a Presidential Order under Art. 359. The suspension will obliterate the the reflection or the image as well. . . . . . So it was urged that S. 8 (1) of the Act must be complied with even after the right to move the court to enforce the rights conferred by Art. 22 (5) has been suspended' by the President by the order issued under Cl (1) of Art. 359. If this argument is accepted, the effect would be to hold that a constitutional compulsion which necessitates the incorporation of the minimum procedural safeguards guaranteed by Art. 22 (5) in every statute providing for preventive detention would defeat and virtually nullify the exercise of the important power conferred on the President by Cl (1) of art. 359 to suspend the said constitutional guarantee in times of emergency. In other words a compliance with Arts. 21 and 22 (5) and the enacting of law in conformity with these provisions would effectively neutralise the power of the President to suspend the rights conferred by the Articles in Part III of the Constn. Such a position cannot be accepted. 359 to suspend the said constitutional guarantee in times of emergency. In other words a compliance with Arts. 21 and 22 (5) and the enacting of law in conformity with these provisions would effectively neutralise the power of the President to suspend the rights conferred by the Articles in Part III of the Constn. Such a position cannot be accepted. We must therefore examine the true nature of the rights that are sought to be enforced by the detenue. There can be little doubt that Cl (5) of Art. 22 confers valuable rights. They are fundamental rights. They can be suspended by the President under Cl (1) of Art. 359. This power cannot be defeated by a law made under the Constn jn compliance with the constitutional provisions. To hold otherwise would mean that a creature of the Constn would destroy a part of the Constn itself. If the right sought to be established is essentially and basically the right under Cl (5) -of Art. 22, the process of the Court would not be available for that purpose during the period of operation of the Presidential Order suspending such right. These same rights cannot be allowed to reappear or re-assert themselves masquerading as safeguards provided to the detenue under S. 8 (1) of the Act". ( 21 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Rama Jois contended that though Art. 14 is in the nature of a general provision guaranteeing right to equality and art. 16 is in the nature of a special provision guaranteeing right to equality of treatment in the limited sphere of public employment, the two Articles are independent provisions in the Constitution and that the suspension of enfcrcement of the rights conferred by Art. 14 of the Constitution, does not ipsc facto bring about suspension of the rights conferred by Art. 16. Mr. Rama Jois added that when there is a general provision and a special provision, the abrogation or suspension of only the general provision, does not result in abrogation or suspension of the special provision also and that the special provision will continue to operate in spite of the general provision not operating. ( 22 ). Mr. Rama Jois further contended that suspension of enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Art. 14, does not result in suspension of the fundamental rights conferred by Arts. ( 22 ). Mr. Rama Jois further contended that suspension of enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Art. 14, does not result in suspension of the fundamental rights conferred by Arts. 15 or 16, that if the President intended that the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by art. 15 or 16 should also be suspended, those two Articles also would have been mentioned in the Presidential Order dated 27-6-1975 and that non- mention of those two Articles would clearly show that the President did not intend suspension of enforcement of the rights conferred by those two articles and other Articles, namely, Arts. 17 and 18, coming within the head 'right to Equality' in Part III of the Constitution. Mr. Rama Jois maintained that if the contention of the learned Advocate General that suspension of enforcement of the general right to equally u/art. 14, necessarily brings about suspension of every special instance of the right to equality, should be accepted. Art. 17 which provides for abolition of untouchability would also remain suspended and that such a result would not have been intended by the President. ( 23 ) BOTH Makhan Singh's case and the Kerala decision elucidate the legal position that the statutory provisions in the Act under which orders of detention were made, which incorporated the safeguards mentioned in art. 22 of the Constitution, essentially represented the fundamental rights guaranteed by that Article and that hence constituted an image or reflection of such constitutional rights. It is in the light of this legal position that this court held that suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by Art. 22 would necessarily lead to suspension of enforcement of rights, under those statutory provisions which are merely a reflection or image of those constitutional rights. But, can it be said that Art. 16 of the Constitution is merely an image or reflection of Art. 14 of the Constitution as contended by the learned Advocate General? Though Art. 16 is, as explained by the supreme Court, an instance or incident of the application of the general rule of equality enshrined in Art. 14, it would not be correct, in our opinion to say that Art. 16 is merely a reflection or an image of Art. 14. Though Art. 16 is, as explained by the supreme Court, an instance or incident of the application of the general rule of equality enshrined in Art. 14, it would not be correct, in our opinion to say that Art. 16 is merely a reflection or an image of Art. 14. The true position, in our opinion, is that Art. 14 is a general provision conferring right to equality in general, while Art. 16 is a special provision conferring right to equality in the limited sphere of service under the State. ( 24 ) DOES suspension of a general provision necessarily bring about suspension of all corresponding special provisions also? Does suspension of a general right necessarily result in suspension of all corresponding special rights also? We find it difficult to accept the proposition of the learned Advocate general that suspension of a general provision must necessarily result in suspension of all corresponding special provisions also or that suspension of a general right must necessarily result in suspension of all corresponding special rights also. Suppose the framers of the Constitution had not incorporated in the Constitution Article 14, but had incorporated only Articles 15 and 16, then why should not these Articles be effective in conferring or guaranteeing the right to equality in their respective limited spheres? Or suppose Art. 14 can be validly deleted from the Constitution by an amendment of the Constitution and is so deleted, but Arts. 15 and 16 are retained, then why should not Arts. 15 and 16 be effective to confer or guarantee the rights specified in them? ( 25 ) THE reasonable inference to be drawn from non-mention of Arts. 15 or 16 in the Presidential Order dated 27-6-1975 which suspends the enforcement of the rights conferred, inter alia, by Art. 14, is, in our opinion, that the Prseident intended that the right of equality in the limited spheres of special provisions like Arts. 15 and 16 should continue to be enforceable, but that the enforcement of the general right to equality outside the spheres of the special provisions like Arts. 15 and 16, should be suspended during the emergency. ( 26 ) HENCE, we over-rule the preliminary objection of the learned advocate General that the fundamental rights conferred by Art. 16 cannot be enforced during the period the enforcement of the rights conferred by art. 14 are suspended. 15 and 16, should be suspended during the emergency. ( 26 ) HENCE, we over-rule the preliminary objection of the learned advocate General that the fundamental rights conferred by Art. 16 cannot be enforced during the period the enforcement of the rights conferred by art. 14 are suspended. ( 27 ) WE shall first. deal with the second contention urged by Mr. Ven- kataranga lyengar, namely, that the previous approval for lowering the age' of retirement of ex-Mysora teachers, should have been given by the President. ( 28 ) AS stated earlier, the previous approval of the Central Government under the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the States Re-organisation Act for lowering the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, was conveyed to the State government by a Telex message dated 21-1-1974 and was confirmed by the letter dated 1-2-1974 addressed to the Chief Secretary to the State Government by a deputy Secretary to the Government of India. Such previous approval was not given by, or in the name of, the President of India. Mr. Venkataranga lyengar argued that as lowering the age of retirement of ex- mysore teachers, was sought to be done by legislation, the previous approval for such legislation should have been given by the President. He cited the instance of the previous approval of the President required under Art. 304 of the Constitution. ( 29 ) UNDER the proviso to S. 115 (7)of the S. R. Act, what is required for altering the conditions of service of allottees to their disadvantage, is the previous approval of the Central Government, even if such alteration is by a legislative enactment of the State Legislature. Tht proviso does not speak of the previous approval of the President. Hence, we have no hesitation in rejecting the aforesaid contention of Mr. Venkataranga lyengar, ( 30 ) THOUGH Mr. Tht proviso does not speak of the previous approval of the President. Hence, we have no hesitation in rejecting the aforesaid contention of Mr. Venkataranga lyengar, ( 30 ) THOUGH Mr. Rama Jois had also raised a contention that the central Government should have given an opportunity to the petitioners to make representation against granting its approval for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers and considered such representation and that omission to give such opportunity had vitiated such approval on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, he did not pursue that contention as he felt that that question had been concluded, so far as this court is, concerned, by the opinion of the Full Bench of this Court in N. K. Anandamma v. Union of India ILR. 1975 Kar, 781 FB, However, Mr. Venkataranga Iyengar contended that since the Central Government had, earlier, declined to grant its approval for reduction of age of retirement of Ex-Mysore teachers, it (the Central Government) should have heard ex-Mysore teachers before it altered its earlier decision and granted its approval for such reduction of the ago of retirement ( 31 ) IN N. K. Anandamma's case (7), the opinion of one of us (Venkataswami, J.) was that the power under the proviso to Sec 115 (7) of the s. R. Act, is a part of the legislative process and not quasijudicial and on a par with the power exercisable by the President under the proviso to art. 304 (b) of the Constn and that hence there can be no question of complying with any principle of natural justice Jagennatha Shetty, another member of that Full Bench, while concurring generally with the afore- said conclusion was, however, of the opinion that the power conferred by the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the S. R. Act, is administrative and not quasijudicial and that it is wholly unnecessary for the Central Govt, before exercising such power, to afford any opportunity to officials that may be affected by the exercise of such power No doubt, the minority opinion of malimath, J. . was that before according prior approval under the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the S. R Act. the Central Govt should afford en opportunity of making representation, to persons likely to be affected by such exercise. Whether the power under the proviso to 8. was that before according prior approval under the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the S. R Act. the Central Govt should afford en opportunity of making representation, to persons likely to be affected by such exercise. Whether the power under the proviso to 8. 115 (7) of the S. R. Act is regarded as legislative or administrative, we do not see how the mere fact that the Central Govt had, earlier, declined to grant its previous approval for reducing the age cf retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, can make any difference as to whether there was any obligation on the Central Govt to hear them before it gave such approval later. ( 32 ) THUS, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Venkataranga lyengar that the mere fact that the Central Govt had, earlier declined to give its approval for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, rendered it necessary for it (the Central Govt) to hear such teachers before giving such approval later. ( 33 ) WE shall now examine the attack on the approval given by the central Govt for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers. The main ground urged by Mr. Rama Jois was that the decision of the Cential govt in giving such approval, was influenced by the misrepresentation bv the State Govt to the effect that among the allottees to this State, only ex-Mysore teachers had the age of superannuation higher than 55 years. Mr. Rama Jois complained that the State Govt did not disclose to the Central Govt that among the allottees to this State, there are Class IV employees from the former bombay State and the former Hyderabad State whose age of retirement has remained at 60 years Mr. Rama Jois main- tained that the Central Govt gave its approval for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers on a mistaken premise that such reduction of the age of retirement would bring about uniformity in the age of retirement of all State Govt servants and that the Central Govt would not have given such approval if it knew that there would still be some allottees whose age of retirement would be 60 years. ( 34 ) IN the letter d/. 4-10-1973 addressed to the Central Govt by the chief Secretary to the State Govt (Ex. E in WP. ( 34 ) IN the letter d/. 4-10-1973 addressed to the Central Govt by the chief Secretary to the State Govt (Ex. E in WP. 2162 of 1975), the relevant portion reads :" Tht State Govt have now decided that the age of superannuation of all State Govt employees should be uniformly fixed at 55 years. I am, therefore, to request that approval of the Govt of India under the proviso to S. 115 (7) cf the States Re-organisation Act may kindly be communicated to reduce the age of superannuation of the trained teachers and other staff of the Education Dept of the former Mysore state from 58 years to 55 years, at an early date. " ( 35 ) THE Chief Secretary to the State Govt sent a reminder to the central Govt, by his letter d'| 20-12-1973 (Ex. F in WP. 2612 of 1975)) the relevant portion of which reads :" In accordance with the decision of the Govt, rules have already been amended by Govt fixing the age of retirement of all Govt servants at 55, except in the case of teachers in the Educational Dept allotted from the pre-Reorganisation State of Mysore. " ( 36 ) ON 29-4-1974 the Slate Govt addressed to the Central Govt seeking the approval of the latter for reducing the age of retirement of allottees other than those from the ex-Mysore state, in Class IV service. But, this letter was subsequent to the approval of the Central Govt for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers. ( 37 ) IN the letter d. 4-10-1973 (Ex. E ). all that is stated is thai the state Govt has decided that the age of superannuation of all State Govt employees should be uniformly fixed as 55 years. There is no representation in that letter that the only category of State Govt emplyoes who had a higher age of retirement than 55 years, were ex-Mysore teachers. The statement in the letter d/. 20-12-1973 (Ex. F) that the State Govt had already amended the rules fixing the age of retirement of all Govt servants at 55 years, except in the case of ex-Mysore teachers, was no doubt, not wholly correct, because the State Govt had not Amended the rules so as to reduce the age of retirement of allottees from integrating areas other than former Mysore State whose age of retirement was 60 years. On the other hand, the State Govt, by its letter d. 29-4-1974, sought for the previous approval of the Central Govt for reducing the age of retirement of that category of class IV State Govt employees to 55 years. ( 38 ) THERE was undoubtedly a factual error in the letter f the Chief secretary to the Central Govt d|. 20-12-1973 (Ex F) inasmuch as it was not stated therein that besides ex-Mysore teachers, there were also the aforesaid category of Class IV employees whose age of retirement was higher than 55 years. But, it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Rama Jois that the State Govt had not taken a decision prior to 4-10-1973 (the date of the Chief Secretary's letter to the Central Govt) that the age of retirement of all State Govt employees should be fixed at 55 years. It is very likely that while trying to implement that decision, the State govt had overlooked the cases cf Class TV Govt employees allotted from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore and had sought for the approval of the Central Govt for reducing the age of retirement of only ex-Mysore teachers and that later when it (the State/govt) realised that there "were such Class IV Govt employees whose age of retirement was 60 years which could be reduced only after obtaining the previous approval of the Central govt, it (the State Govt) sought for such approval by the letter d/. 29-4-1974 addressed to the Central Government. 29-4-1974 addressed to the Central Government. ( 39 ) EVEN if the omission of the State Govt to mention the cases of allottees from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore in Class IV serviee (whose age of retirement is 60 years) when it sought for the approval of the Central Govt for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, was an inadvertent or innocent error, the question still is whether the approval given by the Central Govt for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, was vitiated by non-consideration of relevant facts ( 40 ) IN the statement of objections filed on behalf of the Central govt, there is no explanation as to the basis on which it (the Central govt) decided to give its approval for reducing the age of retirement Of ex-Mysore teachers and whether its decision proceeded on the premise that such teachers were the only class of allottees whose age of retirement was more than 55 years. ( 41 ) RELYING on the observations of the Supreme Court in Rhotas industries Ltd v. S. D. Agarwal AIR. 1969 SCT 707 and M. A. Rasheed v. State of Kerala air. 1974 SC. 2249. , Mr. Rama Jois contended that the approval of the Central Govt for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers was vitiated on account of the aforesaid factual error in the letter of the State Govt to the central Govt. In those two decisions, what the Supreme Court aid down, is that even if a decision of an authority is administrative, the existence of circumstances which alone justify such decision, is open to judicial review. But, those two decisions of the Supreme Court do not in our opinion, bear on the point that arises here, because the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the S. R. Act does not specify the circumstances or the conditions precedent for the Central Govt giving its approval for altering the conditions of service of allottees. But, those two decisions of the Supreme Court do not in our opinion, bear on the point that arises here, because the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the S. R. Act does not specify the circumstances or the conditions precedent for the Central Govt giving its approval for altering the conditions of service of allottees. Moreover, in the light of the majority opinion of the Full Bench in ananda-mma's case (7) as to the nature of the power exercisable by the central Govt under the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the S. R. Act, it appears to us that the process by which and the material on which the Central Govt decides to grant or refuse its approval under that proviso, may not be open to scrutiny by Courts. It is also doubtful whether the petitioner can rely upon unpublished correspondence between the Central Govt and the state Govt in support of their contention as to the validity of the approval given by the Central Government under that proviso. ( 42 ) WE find it difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Rama Jois that if the Central Govt had known that besides ex-Mysore teachers, there were Class IV Govt employees from integrating areas other than old mysore State whose age of retirement was higher than 55 years, it (the central Govt) would not have given its approval for reducing the age of retirement of only ex-Mysore teachers or that, at any rate, it is doubtful whether it (the Central Govt) would have given such approval. Even if the State Govt wanted to remove disparity as to the age of retirement among teachers only by reducing the age of retirement of only one class of teachers, namely, ex-Mysore teachers, who had a higher age of retirement, it is very unlikely that the Central Govt would have refused its approval. Especially when ex-Mysore teachers were the only category of state Govt employees in Class-I to III who had a higher age of retirement, it is most unlikely that the Central Govt would have refused such approval on the ground that the State Govt had not proposed the reduction of the age of retirement of allottees in Class IV service from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore State. The distinction between Classes I to III on the one hand and Class IV on the other, in Govt service, is too obvious to require elucidation. Even in the respective parent States other than ex- mysore State from which allottees came to the new State of Mysore (Karnataka) the age of retirement of Govt employees in Classes I to III was only 55 years and it was only, in the case of Class IV employees, the age of retirement was 60 years ( 43 ) HENCE, we reject the contention of Mr. Rama Jois that the approval given by the Central Govt under the proviso to 3. 115 (7) of the S. R, act for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, is vitiated by any misrepresentation or erroneous representation by the State Govt or non-consideration by the Central Govt of any material fact ( 44 ) MR. RAMA Jois did not press his contention that such approval given by the Central Govt was also actuated by any collateral considerations and hence void. ( 45 ) THE other important contention urged by Mr. Rama Jois was that reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers only among the allottees who had hieher age of retirement than 55 years, constituted impermissible discrimination among allottees to the new State of Mysore (Karnataka) and hence was violative of Art. 16 of the Constn. Elaborating this contention, Mr. Rama Jois said that all the allottees to the new State of Mysore (Karnataka) who enjoyed under S. 115 (7) of the S. R. Act the protection of the condition of service of the higher age of retirement, formed one class and that it was not permissible for the State Govt to pick and choose arbitrarily amongst them only ex-Mysore teachers for the hostile treatment of reducing the age of retirement to 55 years leaving out other such allottees. He maintained that there was no reasonable classification between ex-Mysore teachers on the one hand and allottees from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore State in Class IV service, on the other hand, inasmuch as such classification had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. He maintained that there was no reasonable classification between ex-Mysore teachers on the one hand and allottees from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore State in Class IV service, on the other hand, inasmuch as such classification had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. He added that if the object of the State govt was to achieve uniformity in regard to the age of retirement of all state Government employees, there was no good reason to reduce the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers only from 58 to 55 years without reducing the age of retirement of allottees from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore in Class IV service whose age of retirement is 60 years. ( 46 ) IN answer to the above contention of Mr. Rama Jois, the learned advocate General urged that- (i) the mere circumstance that they enjoy the protection of their conditions of service under Sec. 115 (7) of the S. R. Act, does not put all allottees to the new State of Mysore (Karnataka) into one class to invoke art. 16 of the Constitution; (ii) having regard to the nature of the duties and responsibilities, educational qualifications, salary and other conditions of service, Class IV state Govt employees form a distinct class different from the State Govt employees in Classes I to III and hence it was permissible for the State govt to prescribe different ages of retirement for Class IV employees on the one hand and employees in Classes I to III on the other hand, without offending Art. 16 of the Constitution. (iii) the age of retirement of allottees from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore State in Class IV being higher than the age of retirement of other State Govt employees, was not due to any violation of the State gcvt, but duo to circumstances beyond the control of the State, namely, prescription of such age of retirement in their respective parent States and the protection of conditions of service of allottees under S. 115 (7) of the s. R. Act; (iy) the omission on the part of the State Govt to move the Central govt for approval for reducing the age of retirement of such allottees in class IV service, when it (the State Govt) moved the Central Govt for approval to reduce the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, was due to an inadvertent error and not any deliberate or conscious act of discrimination; and (v) even in regard to allottees from integrating areas other than ex- mysore State in Class IV service, the State Govt has subsequently moved the Central Govt for its (the Central Govt's) approval for reducing their age of retirement; any inequality as between allottees and the ex-Mysore teachers as regards the age of retirement, is only of a transitional character and hence does not offend Art. 16 of the Constitution. ( 47 ) WE shall take up first the last of the above grounds urged by the learned Advocate General. In its additional statement of objections filed on 29-8-1975, it is averred on behalf of the State as follows : ". . . . . . it is the policy of the State Govt to reduce the age of superannuation of all the officials and the Class IV servants whose age of superannuation at present remains at 60 years and their age of superannuation could be reduced only with the prior approval of the central Govt in terms of proviso to S. 115 (7) of the States Re-organisation Act. It has also been submitted that the Cenral Govt has been requested to give its approval for the reduction of the age of such class IV employees also to 55 years to make the age of superannuation uniform for all the Government servants. The request to the Central Govt is being pursued vigorously by the State Govt. It has also been submitted that the Cenral Govt has been requested to give its approval for the reduction of the age of such class IV employees also to 55 years to make the age of superannuation uniform for all the Government servants. The request to the Central Govt is being pursued vigorously by the State Govt. But the Central Govt has asked for information as regards the number of such Class IV employees who are likely to be affected by the modification in the age of superannuation. That information has been Called for and the concerned departments who have not yet responded are being reminded and all attempts are being made to collect the information called for by the Central Govt as expeditiously as possible. Immediately after collecting the necessary information, the same will be made available to the Central Govt for considering the request of the State Govt for the approval of the Central Govt to reduce the age of retirement of the abovesaid employees of the State Govt. It is therefore submitted that the State Govt has not practised any hostile treatment or intentional discrimination in relation to the petitioners- teachers in the matter of reducing their age of retirement after duly obtaining the prior approval of the Central Govt, and the action of the State Govt, it is respectfully submitted, is above reproach and taken in bona fide exercise of power and in public interest. The decision of the Govt to secure uniformity in the matter of prescribing the age of superannuation in respect of its employees and reduce it to 55 is being pursued and will be implemented as soon as the legal impediments in the way of the Govt attaining the said objective are removed. " ( 48 ) TO the above additional statement of objections on behalf of the state, the petitioners have filed a reply in which emphasis is laid on the following circumstances which, according to Mr. " ( 48 ) TO the above additional statement of objections on behalf of the state, the petitioners have filed a reply in which emphasis is laid on the following circumstances which, according to Mr. Rama Jois, show that ex- mysore teachers have been subjected to discrimination which cannot be regarded as of a transitional character : (i) After taking a policy decision in Sepr, 1973 to have the age of retirement of all civil servants of the State as 55 years, the State Govt, while moving the Central Govt, confined its request to reduction of the age of retirement to ex-Mysore teachers only and stated in its (the State govt's) letter that ex-Mysore teachers were the only allottees having a higher age of retirement and no explanation is given as to why the State govt sought for such approval of the Central Govt in regard to ex-Mysore teachers only; (ii) The letter of the State Govt to the Central Govt, d/. 29-4-1974 in regard to allottees from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore State in Class IV service was addressed only after an affidavit was filed on 18-4- 1974 in WP. 525 of 1974 pointing out that such officials had also a higher age of retirement; and (iii) Even though more than one year and four months have elapsed since the letter of the State Govt d 1. 29-4-1974, nothing has been done by the State Govt to reduce the age of retirement of such allottees in Class IV service. ( 49 ) THE above circumstances, either individually or cumulatively, are not sufficient to rebut the assertion on behalf of the State that it intends to reduce the age of retirement of allottees from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore State- in Class IV service also from 60 to 55 years and that any inequality as between them and ex-Mysore teachers regarding the age of retirement, is only transitional. The State Govt cannot be responsible for the delay in securing the approval of the Central Govt which has called for certain particulars, collection of which by the State govt must necessarily take some time. ( 50 ) THAT some incidental inequality during a transitional period, is not offensive of Art. 14 of the Constn is clear from the rulings of the Supreme court in Bishanbar Singh v. State of Orissa AIR. 1954 SC. 139. ( 50 ) THAT some incidental inequality during a transitional period, is not offensive of Art. 14 of the Constn is clear from the rulings of the Supreme court in Bishanbar Singh v. State of Orissa AIR. 1954 SC. 139. and Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR. 1955 SC. 514. In the latter case, it was urged that S. 21 of the rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jahgirs Act, 1952, was violative of art. 14 of the Constn inasmuch as it authorised the State to resume different classes of Jahgirs on different dates. Repelling that contention, the Supreme Court ruled that authorisation of assumption of different classes of Jahigrs by stages was obviously dictated by practical considerations such as administrative convenience and facilities for payment of compensation and hence could not be held to be discriminatory. These rulings though rendered in the context of Article 14, are equally applicable to Article 16. ( 51 ) AS we uphold the contention that any inequality as between ex- mysore teachers and allottees from integrating areas other than ex-Mysore state in Class IV service in regard to the age of retirement, is only transitional and hence cannot be held to be discriminatory, it is unnecessary to consider the other grounds on which the learned Advocate General sought to meet the plea of violation of Art. 16 of the Constn. ( 52 ) HENCE, we reject the contention of Mr. Rama Jois that the Act as well as the approval of the Central Govt for reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, are void on the ground of violation of Art. 16 of the Constitution. 52a. Mr. Venkataranga lyengar contended that there was discrimination between ex-Mysore teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools on the one hand, and Sanskrit Pandits in Sanskrit Colleges on the other in regard to their age of retirement. He submitted that the age of retirement of teachers in sanskrit Colleges even in old Mysore area was 60 yrs and that the State Govt had. not taken any steps to reduce the age of retirement of such teachers. He submitted that the age of retirement of teachers in sanskrit Colleges even in old Mysore area was 60 yrs and that the State Govt had. not taken any steps to reduce the age of retirement of such teachers. It was pointed out by the learned Advocate general that the age of retirement of teachers in Sanskrit Colleges is only 55 years and that on account of paucity of trained teachers in Sanskrit, the Government has granted extension to some of those teachers from year to year upto 60 years. 52b. Mr. Venkataranga, lyengar is not right in saying that the age of retirement of teachers in Sanskrit Colleges, is 60 years. Their age of retirement is also 55 years. The mere fact that some of those teachers have been granted extension of service from time to time will not hare the effect of raising their age of retirement beyond 55 years. Hence, we see no substance in this contention of Mr. Venkataranga lyengar. ( 53 ) WE shall now deal with the individual grievances of some of the petitioners in regard to retrospective application of the provisions of the act reducing the age of retirement. ( 54 ) PETITIONERS 1 to 4 in WP. 2439 of 1975 were sought to be retired on the basis of the Mysore Service (Amendment) Regulations, 1974, on their completing 55 years of age. Petitioners 1 and 2 presented WP. 525 of 1974 and petitioners 3 and 4 presented WP. 887 of 1974 challenging the proposed action of the State. Those petitions were allowed by this Court by its order d. 18-10-1974 and a writ in the nature of mandamus was issued directing the Sta,te to forbear from enforcing the provisions of those Regulations. They continued in service until they attained the age of 56 years and retired from service on 31-12-74, 25-12-74, and 19-11-74 respectively. The service rendered by each of them beyond 1-3-74 is sought to be excluded from the period of qualifying service for the purpose of computation of pension. The salary drawn by petitioners 1 and 2 in WP. 2439 of 1975 is sought to be recovered from their pension and gratuity. Petitioners 3 and 4 have not been paid their salaries for the period between 1-3-74 and the respective dates of their retirement. 54a. The salary drawn by petitioners 1 and 2 in WP. 2439 of 1975 is sought to be recovered from their pension and gratuity. Petitioners 3 and 4 have not been paid their salaries for the period between 1-3-74 and the respective dates of their retirement. 54a. Each of them has claimed that the entire period of his service upto the date of his retirement (including the period after 1-3-74) should be included in his qualifying service for the purpose of computation of pension payable to him. Petitioners 1 and 3 in WP. 2439 of 1975 have also claimed that the amounts so deducted from their pension and gratuity should be refunded to them. Petitioners 3 and 4 in WP. 2439 of 1975 have also claimed that they should be paid their salary between 1-3-74 and the respective dates of retirement. ( 55 ) ON behalf of the State Govt, the learned Advocate General defended what the State Govt has sought to do in regard to petitioners 1 to 4 in WP. 2439 of 1975, on the ground that the impugned Act has given retrospective effect to the reduction of the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers from 1-3-74 and that hence the service rendered by those petitioners beyond 1-3-74 could not be regarded as valid for the purpose of either salary or pension. ( 56 ) MR Rama Jois assailed such purported retrospective application cf reduction of the age of retirement of those petitioners, on the following grounds : (i) The impugned Act, in so far as it gives retrosnective effect to reduction of the ase of retirement, from 1-3-1974, is invalid as it contravenes the qualified previous approval given by the Central Government; (ii) The impugned Act, in so far it takes away the salary earned and excludes the period of actual service rendered in reckoning the qualifying service for the purpose of pension, is violative of Art. 31 of the Constn; (iii) The impugned Act, in so far as it takes away the financial benefits due to the petitioners pursuant to the orders of this Court in the earlier writ petitions, is violative of Cl (e) of Art. 202 of the Constn; and (iv) The impugned Act, in so far as it denies salary to the petitioners who retired before 31-3-75, is void as violative of Art 16 (1) of the Constn. ( 57 ) THE previous approval of the Central Govt for this State reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, conveyed by the Telex message d/. 21-1-1974. reads : ". . . . . The Central Govt approved proposal to reduce retirement age of teachers of Mysore area from 58 years to 55 years protectively. " (Underlining italics is ours ). ( 58 ) THUS, the Central Govt, while granting its previous approval for reduction of the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers, expressly stipulated that such reduction of the age of retirement should be only prospectively. The necessary implication of such stipulation is that the Central govt did not give its approval for so reducing the age of retirement retrospectively. ( 59 ) SUB-SEC (2) of Section 1 of the Act reads :" (2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 30th day of January, 1974. "the Ordinance also contained a similar provision. ( 60 ) SUB-CLAUSE (a) of Cl (iii) of S. 2 (1) of the Act provides, inter alia, that every ex-Mysore teacher who has continued in service after the appointed day (the date of commencement of the Ordinance and the Act. i e. , 30-1-1974) shall retire from service on the date on which he attains the age of 58 years or on 1-3-1974, whichever is earlier. ( 61 ) THE learned Advocate General contended that the word ' prospectively' occurring in the Telex message of the Central Govt d/. 21-1-1974 has reference only to the point of time when the State takes action to reduce the age of retirement and that the Central Govt could not have intended to impose any limitation on the normal power of the State Leg's ature to make laws with retrospective effect. In that view, the learned advocate General maintained that it was competent for the State Legislature to provide, as it had done, for retirement of ex-Mysore teachers with retrospective effect from 1-3-1971. ( 62 ) WE are unable to accent the above contention of the learned advocate General. What the proviso to 8. 115 (7) of the S R. Act requires for altering the conditions of service of allottees to their dis-advantage, is the previous approval of the Central Govt and not ex-pout facto approval. ( 62 ) WE are unable to accent the above contention of the learned advocate General. What the proviso to 8. 115 (7) of the S R. Act requires for altering the conditions of service of allottees to their dis-advantage, is the previous approval of the Central Govt and not ex-pout facto approval. Hence, it was hardly necessary for the Central Govt to state that it gave approval for prospective action of the State in reducing the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers. The word 'prospetively' cecurring in the approval of the Central Govt could only mean that the action taken by the state subsequent to such approval should have only prospective effect and not retrospective effect. ( 63 ) THE first and effective law reducing the age of retirement of ex- mysore teachers, was the Ordinance which was promulgated by the governor on 22-5-1975. In view of the express stipulation by the Central govt that reduction of age of recrement should be made only prospectively, the State could not validly reduce the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers with effect from any date prior to 22-5-1975 i. e. , the date on which the Ordinance vas promulgated. By merely providing in the Ordinance and the Act that they should be deemed to have come in to force on 30-1-74, the State could not validly reduce the age of retirement with effect from that date or 1-3-1974 or any other date priod to the date on which the Ordinance was promulgated i. e , 22-5-1975 ( 64 ) IT follows that petitioners 1 to 4 in WP. 2439 of 1975 who actually retired between 12-8-1974 and 31-12-1974, on their attaining the age of 58 years, could not be treated as having retired on 1-3-1074, nor could they be denied the salary for the period between 1-3-1s74 and the respective dates of their retirement, during which they actually worked as teachers. Since they could not be deemed to have retired, prior to the dates on which they actually retired in the year 1974, the respective periods of their service subsequent to 1-3-1874 cannot be excluded for reckoning the respective lengths of their qualifying service for the purpose of computing their person. In the view we take, we consider it unnecessary to pronounce on the other grounds on which Mr. In the view we take, we consider it unnecessary to pronounce on the other grounds on which Mr. Rama Jois assciled such denial of salary and exclusion of the period of service for reckoning the qualifying service of petitioners 1 to 4 in WP. 2439 of 1975. In the result, we allow partly WP. 2439 of 1975 and issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State Government to- (i) forbear from deducting from pension and gratuity payable to petitioners 1 and 2 therein the salary paid to them between 1-3-1974 and the respective dates of their retirement and in rase such deductions have already been made, to refund to them the respective amounts so deducted; (11) to pay to petitioners 3 and 4 their salaries for the respective periods between 1-3-1974 and the respective dates of their retirement; and (iii) to forbear from excluding the period of their actual service between 1-3-1974 and the respective dates of their ; retirement, for reckoning their qualifying service for the purpose of pension. We dismiss the other writ petitions. In the circumstances of these petitions, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .