JUDGMENT C. P. Sinha, J. This application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) is on behalf of the members of the second party in the proceeding pending before the Magistrate under section 145 of the Code. The opposite party here is the first party in the proceeding. The application is directed against the Magistrate's order dated 21.2.1975 drawing up this proceeding. The prayer in the application is to quash this order and make the rule absolute. The impugned order shows that this proceeding has been started on the petition of the first party. As the Magistrate has said in it, from a perusal of that petition it appeared to him bona fide land dispute between the parties for the land concerned existed and there is serious apprehension of the breach of the peace between the parties with respect to this dispute. On being so satisfied, he has drawn up this proceeding against the members of both the parties restraining them from going upon or near the disputed land till a final decision in the case. In this very order, he has further ordered that since it is a case of emergency nature, lands are attached under section 146 of the Code. Parties have been directed to file their written statements by a certain date. 2. Mr. Kailash Roy, learned counsel for the petitioners, has confined his argument here to the quashing of these portions of this order under which the Magistrate has restrained the parties from going upon the land till the final decision of the case and regarding its attachment under section 146 of the Code. According to him, under section 145 of the Code no power is given to the Magistrate to restrain the parties from going upon the land till the final disposal of the proceeding. Secondly, he has also no power to attach this land simultaneously with the initiation of the proceeding. The power of attachment, as given to the Magistrate under section 146 (1), is available to the Magistrate subsequently and not at the very time he draws the proceeding. Both these contentions of Mr. Roy appear to be well founded. Secondly, he has also no power to attach this land simultaneously with the initiation of the proceeding. The power of attachment, as given to the Magistrate under section 146 (1), is available to the Magistrate subsequently and not at the very time he draws the proceeding. Both these contentions of Mr. Roy appear to be well founded. There is nothing in section 145 of the Code which empowers the Magistrate while drawing the proceeding under this section to restrain the parties from going upon the land till the proceeding has been finally decided. In the same way, the power of attachment of the land under section 146 is on the condition that if the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of section 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof (those provisions of the section which are not relevant at present have been omitted). It is, therefore, clear from the wording of section 146, as it stands on this point the Magistrate's power to effect such attachment is any time after the making of the order under section 145 (1) in case he considers the case to be one of emergency nature and not simultaneously with the making of the order under section 145 (1) of the Code. As shown above, the Magistrate's attachment holding the case to be of emergency has been made in the very same order in which he has directed drawing of this proceeding under section 145 (1). 3. In the circumstances stated above, there seems no doubt that those portions of his order as they relate to his restraining the parties from going upon the land till the final disposal of the proceeding and attaching it under section 146 (1) at that very time are against law and must be struck down. To this position of law, Mr. Kameshwari Nandan Singh representing the opposite party has also conceded. Learned counsel of both the parties, however agree that the proceeding so drawn by the Magistrate under section 145 (1) of the Code continue with the direction from this Court that it must be disposed of expeditiously, which will be in the interest of both sides. 4. Kameshwari Nandan Singh representing the opposite party has also conceded. Learned counsel of both the parties, however agree that the proceeding so drawn by the Magistrate under section 145 (1) of the Code continue with the direction from this Court that it must be disposed of expeditiously, which will be in the interest of both sides. 4. In the result, this application is allowed in part and the impugned order in so far as it relate to the restring of the parties from going upon the land till the final decision of the proceeding and its simultaneous attachment under section 146 (1) is quashed, retaining the 145 proceeding so drawn to be disposed of according to law as expeditiously as possible. Court's office will send down the record of that court without any delay. Application allowed in part.