JUDGMENT M. P. Mehrotra, J. - Both the courts below have dismissed the suit of the plaintiff and, therefore, he has come up in the instant second appeal to this Court. The facts of the case will appear from the following pass ages which have been extracted from the judgment of the lower appellate court. 2. The plaintiff's case briefly stated in the plaint is as follows:- The plaintiff was appointed substantively to the permanent post of Sainik in the Special Intelligence Branch, Northern Railway, by the Chief Security Officer Sri S. N. Agha, Northern Railway, New Delhi in December, 1956 and he joined his duty on 8-1-1957 and the plaintiff was confirmed on the above post after completing two years of probation period. The plaintiff was transferred to Allahabad in the same branch in the year 1959 and he had been serving in the intelligence force to the satisfaction of the superior authorities. On 15-6-1962 at about 16 hours, the plaintiff from the ceremonial platform to the Railway Station, Allahabad saw a number of ladies passing with Coal bundles on their head and the Railway Protection Force Sainik Sri Jageshwar Singh passing them. The plaintiff immediately rushed to the place and asked the ladies to accompany him to the Railway Station and in the meantime the Railway Protection Force Sainik Sri Jageshwar Singh requested the plaintiff to leave the ladies which he totally refused to do. The Sainik named above having no other alternative refers (sic) the allegations upon the plaintiff in collusion with Rakshak Sri P. D. Misra and Sub-Inspector Railway Protection Force Sri B. K. Mitra and they managed to make a false entry in the General Diary of Railway Protection Force Roznamcha to the effect that the plaintiff was passing coal in connivance with the ladies about which the plaintiff had no knowledge prior to the service of the charge-sheet dated nil July 1962 received on 4-7-1962. A criminal case against the ladies mentioned above was got registered under Section 379 I.P.C. by the Sub-Inspector Railway Protection Force in the presence of the plaintiff in the G. R. P. Allahabad and the plaintiff was one of the recovery witnesses and the Sub-Inspector Railway Protection Force and other Sainik did not mention anything at all against the plaintiff either in the First Information Report or in the statement cinder Section 161 Cr. P. C. On 4-7-1962, the plaintiff was served with a charge-sheet dated 25-6-1962 by Sri Harmohan Singh, Assistant Security Officer, Intelligence, New Delhi. The plaintiff in his reply dated 11-7-1962 requested the authorities to supply the entire materials on which the charges have been framed. The Assistant Security Officer did not supply the papers on the basis of which the charges were framed. 3. The plaintiff sent telegrams dated 2-3-1963 and 12-3-1963 for personal interview and made representations to the Chief Security Officer and Security Officer for personal hearing in his case but the punishing authority did not give the aforesaid facility of the personal hearing and as such they ignored the statutory provisions of the Railway Protection Force Act and the rules framed thereunder. 4. The Inspector Special Intelligence; Northern Railway Workshop, Lucknow sent a letter dated 2-8-1962 to the plaintiff that a departmental enquiry would be conducted against the plaintiff and further informed that the plaintiff might appoint a defence counsel. The plaintiff sent his reply dated 12-9- 1962 by which he again requested to the authorities to supply the papers on the basis of which the charges were framed against him. The Assistant Security Officer gave a copy of the report dated 18-6- 1962 regarding the charge No. 4 but did not supply any material regarding the remaining three charges. The Assistant Security Officer sent a letter to the plaintiff informing him that a departmental enquiry would he held against him on 8-3-1963 at 10. A. M. on which date the plaintiff fell ill and consequently 10th and 11th April 1963 were fixed for enquiry. In the meantime, the plaintiff asked for personal interview from the Assistant Security Officer and the Chief Security Officer which they refused. Regarding charge No. 4 the plaintiff sent a registered notice through Sri Ram Nath, Advocate at Allahabad and requested him to stay the departmental enquiry which were to be held on 10th and 11th April, 1963, The plaintiff unfortunately again fell ill on 9-4-1963 so he could not attend the departmental enquiry and the plaintiff submitted a medical certificate the same date for adjournment of the enquiry. 5. The Assistant Security Officer conducted the enquiry ab initio and himself cross-examined the witnesses and gave his findings against the plaintiff on all the four charges. 5. The Assistant Security Officer conducted the enquiry ab initio and himself cross-examined the witnesses and gave his findings against the plaintiff on all the four charges. The plaintiff on 20-6- 1963 informed the Assistant Security Officer that he was not given the second show cause notice and the materials on which the charges were based. Therefore, he could not reply to the departmental enquiry. The plaintiff was informed by the Divisional Inspector, Special Intelligence, Northern Railway, Allahabad on 4-7-1963 that if he failed to submit his explanation by 10-7-1963 ex parte actions would he taken against him. Thereupon, the plaintiff submitted his explanation on 9-7- 1963. 6. The Assistant security Officer did not give second show cause notice to the plaintiff and removed him from service by letter dated 1-8-1963. Being aggrieved by the order of removal passed by Assistant Security Officer, the plaintiff appealed to the Chief Security Officer. 7. Though the plaintiff was appointed by the Chief Security Officer but the Assistant Security Officer ignored mandatory Provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India as he has no right to remove being inferior to the Chief Security Officer. The Chief Security Officer dismissed the appeal on 27-8- 1963 which was communicated to the plaintiff on 7-9-1963. 8. As the Assistant Security Officer did not supply the materials on the basis of which the charge Nos. 1 to 4 were framed so the entire proceedings of enquiry are illegal ab initio and consequently are liable to be quashed. The plaintiff being denied the right of personal hearing the Assistant Security Officer violated the statutory provisions of Railway Protection Force Act and rules framed thereunder and the principles of natural justice. The Assistant Security Officer had no right to cross-examine the witnesses in the absence of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, being entitled for the second show cause notice before removal which was not given to him the order of removal is illegal. 9. The plaintiff still treats himself in service and is entitled to realise Rupees 2750/- as pay from August, 1963 to February, 1964 and July 1964 to December, 1965 along with Rs. 1000/- expenditure on the treatment of self, wife and children and Rs. 1000/- mental and physical loss and Rs. 100/- arrears due to worries and gross-negligence of the department and other dues to the plaintiff. 1000/- expenditure on the treatment of self, wife and children and Rs. 1000/- mental and physical loss and Rs. 100/- arrears due to worries and gross-negligence of the department and other dues to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has filed this suit seeking permission to sue in forma pauperis. 10. The suit was contested by the defendant No. 1 only on the various pleas namely with the allegations briefly stated as follows:- 11. The plaintiffs allegation that he was appointed substantively by Sri S. N. Agha, Chief Security Officer is incorrect and he was confirmed in his appointment with effect from 3-7-1958 by the Assistant Security Officer, Special Intelligence, Northern Railway, Allahabad. The plaintiff was removed by a officer of the same rank by which he was appointed. He was appointed by Assistant Security Officer. The matter was dealt with in the departmental enquiry and all the reasonable facilities were given to the plaintiff by the Assistant Security Officer and all the documents relating to the matter as asked for by him were correctly made over to him Since the case was under departmental enquiry so the question of interview of the Chief Security Officer does not arise at all. There was no personal grudge and no false entry was made. The private medical certificate produced by him was not accepted by the enquiry officer as he was convinced that Sri Dubey tried to prolong the enquiry. The plaintiff received show cause notice on 13-5-1963 and submitted his defence on 9-7-1963. All the materials were supplied to him. He was removed from service after following the correct procedure prescribed under the rules. No law, procedure and principles of natural justice or the provisions of the Article 311 of the Constitution of India have been violated. The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief." 12. The trial Court framed the necessary issues and tried the same. The suit was dismissed on the finding that the plaintiff was appointed by the Assistant Security officer and, therefore, the enquiry conducted by him was not bad in law. It was also held that full and adequate opportunity was given to the plaintiff in the course of the departmental proceedings against him. In the appeal before the lower appellate court, the said findings of the trial court were confirmed by the lower appellate court. 13. In the instant appeal, Dr. It was also held that full and adequate opportunity was given to the plaintiff in the course of the departmental proceedings against him. In the appeal before the lower appellate court, the said findings of the trial court were confirmed by the lower appellate court. 13. In the instant appeal, Dr. Gyan Prakash, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, has raised three contentions: 1. The Chief Security Officer was the appointing authority and henco the departmental proceedings conducted by the Assistant Security Officer were invalid, 2. The second show-cause notice was never served upon the appellant and he complained to the said effect in his letter dated 20th June, 1963 which is Ex. 22. 3. No adequate opportunity was given to the appellant to defend himself and on 10-4-1963 his absence was validly explained by the production of a medical certificate and yet the Enquiry Officer disregarded the same and proceeded to give an ex parte decision. 14. So far as the second contention is concerned, that raises a pure question of fact and the courts below have given a clear finding of fact that such a notice was serve upon the plaintiff. In the trial court judgment, it is stated: "Ex. A8 is the receipt given by the plaintiff when he was given show cause notice dated 25-4-1963. It may be pointed out that the plaintiff has denied the receipt of any show cause notice after the charge-sheet.This Ex. A8 falsifies the plain. tiff's case. Paper 52 C filed in by the plaintiff himself shows that he had given reply after obtaining the show cause notice. "It may also he stated here that in the grounds of appeal. no point has been taken that the second show cause notice was not served upon the appellant. In the circumstances. the second contention of the learned counsel appears to be untenable. 15. So far as the third point is concerned, again there seems to be nothing in it. Both the courts below have disclosed the circumstances in which the enquiry Officer was compelled to proceed ex parte in the course of the departmental proceedings. The Enquiry Officer was entitled to reject the private medical certificate which was produced on behalf of the appellant. Earlier, the certificate of the Railway Doctor had been produced on his behalf, but subsequently a private Doctor's certificate was obtained. The Enquiry Officer was entitled to reject the private medical certificate which was produced on behalf of the appellant. Earlier, the certificate of the Railway Doctor had been produced on his behalf, but subsequently a private Doctor's certificate was obtained. In the circumstances, the Enquiry Officer was entitled to proceed in the manner that he had. It has not been shown that the appellant was residing beyond the jurisdiction of the Railway Doctor and, therefore, the particular circular upon which the counsel sought to place reliance (touching upon the question of the medical certificate and the Doctor from whom the same is to be obtained) cannot be said to be relevant. Otherwise also, no authority can be compelled to adjourn the date merely because an application supported by a medical certificate is filed seeking postponement. The matter rests in the discretion of the authority and there is nothing to show that in the instant case such discretion was perversely exercised. 16. Now, I come to the first contention raised by the learned counsel. He has placed reliance on Union of India v. Nar Bahadur, 1972 All LJ 640 = (1972 Lab IC 945). The head note of the said case lays down as under: "Rule 20 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 is clearly inconsistent with the sepcific provision of Section 6 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957. It is settled law that statutory rules framed under an Act cannot override or nun counter to any specific and mandatory provision of the statute itself. In case of such inconsistency or anomaly, the provisions of statute must prevail over the provisions of the particular rule or rules. It is therefore not possible to hold on the strength of Rule 20 that the Assistant Security Officer was the appointing authority." In the said case a learned Single Judge of this Court had the occasion to interpret Section 6 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957. He held that the said section requires an express delegation to be made on that account by the Chief Security Officer by order. There was no such order before the learned single judge in the said case. In my opinion, the said case will not he applicable to the instant case. He held that the said section requires an express delegation to be made on that account by the Chief Security Officer by order. There was no such order before the learned single judge in the said case. In my opinion, the said case will not he applicable to the instant case. There is nothing to show from the judgment of the learned single fudge that any appointment letter was placed before the Court in the said case. Therefore, the Court, proceeded on the basis of a presumption so to say under Section 6 of the said Act. In the instant case, both the courts below have recorded a finding which is basically a finding of fact that the appellant was appointed by the Assistant Security Officer and not by the Chief Security Officer. The courts have considered the evidence tendered by the parties on the said question. It has to be seen that no appointment letter had been placed in the said case. On the other band, the respondents have relied upon Ex. A10 dated 7th January, 1957 which is said to he the appointment letter. It is important that this document hears the signature of the appellant himself in token of his admission that e was being appointed on the terms and conditions contained in the said document. In view of this situation. I am of the view, that the case reported in 1972 All LJ 640 = (1972 Lab IC 945) will not apply to the facts of the instant case. An argument has been made that the Assistant Security Officer did not personally signed this document, but somebody else signed on his behalf. Still, in my opinion, that fact, even if correct, will not make any difference because whoever has signed has purported to do so on behalf of the Security Officer. Therefore, the Assistant Security Officer should be deemed to he the appointing authority. The mere fact that some how he did not sign this document will not bring about a change so fair as the status of the appointing authority is concerned. It will be seen that this appointment letter clearly shows that the appointment was a temporary one. Therefore, the Assistant Security Officer should be deemed to he the appointing authority. The mere fact that some how he did not sign this document will not bring about a change so fair as the status of the appointing authority is concerned. It will be seen that this appointment letter clearly shows that the appointment was a temporary one. This is brought out of clause 3 of the document where it is stated, "you will not be eligible for any pension nor any benefit under the State Railway Provident Fund or Gratuity Rules or to any compensatory allowance beyond those admissible to temporary employees under the rules in force from time to time during such temporary service." Coupled with this clause in the document is the own admission of the plaintiff in the plaint, in clause 4 of which it is stated that the plaintiff was confirmed on the above post after completing two years probation period. 17. In Dr. Ishwar Narain Sinha v. Union of India, AIR 1957 All 439 = 1956 All LJ 233, it is laid down as under:- "Where an officer has the power of confirmation of it servant and issues the letter of confirmation, even though the letter is issued under the orders of it higher authority, the confirming authority should be deemed to be the person who has actually issued the letter of confirmation. The general directions relating to the manner in which confirmation is to be ordered is one thing but the confirmation of an individual servant from a particular late in compliance with those general directions is another matter and the officer who does the latter part of the work, if authorised, should he taken to be confirming officer, and as such, the appointing authority for the purposes of Article 311 (1)." 18. In Nand Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 Raj 148 = 1957 Raj LW 243, it has been laid down as under:- "Where the petitioner was appointed as Sub-Inspector of police on probation by Inspector General of Police and on completing his training, is confirmed in his substantive appointment by the Deputy Inspector General Police, the petitioner must be taken to have been appointed as sub-Inspector on the substantive post by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and his dismissal by the Deputy Inspector General of Police is not by art authority subordinate to the appointing authority, and as such does not contravene Article 311 (1)." Now, the plaintiff while in the witness box admitted that he was confirmed by the Assistant Security Officer. Therefore, taking into account all these admissions, in the pleading and in the evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff's appointment was a temporary one or on Probation of two years and he was confirmed later on by the Assistant Security Officer. Therefore the aforesaid cases will clearly be applicable and in a situation like the present one, the appointing authority must be deemed to be the Assistant Security Officer. 19. It may be stated here that the appointment of the appellant was made prior to the enactment of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 and, therefore, Section 6 will not get attracted. Counsel's contention that Rule 3 of the Rules trained under the said Act will make the initial appointment to be one under the provisions of the said Act of 1957 is not correct. The said rule merely lays down that the persons who were already appointed to the Railway Protection Force at the commencement of the Act shall hold corresponding posts wider the new Act, but this does not mean that a person who was all pointed by the Assistant Security Officer initially before the Act came into force shall be deemed to have been appointed by the Chief Security Officer after the Act came into force. Such an interpretation is not possible. i In this view of the matter, there is no question of proving any delegation in the instant case. The appointment was made prior to the enactment of the aforesaid Act and, therefore, the question of delegation does not arise. Such an interpretation is not possible. i In this view of the matter, there is no question of proving any delegation in the instant case. The appointment was made prior to the enactment of the aforesaid Act and, therefore, the question of delegation does not arise. If the appointment letter was not forthcoming their the situation might have been different and one might have presumed under Section 6 of the new Act that even the initial appointment was made by the Chief Security Officer, but in the facts of the case, such a presumption cannot be made as a finding of fact has been recorded by the courts below that the appointment was made (Ex. A10) by the Assistant Security Officer. 20. Dr. Gyan Prakash sought to argue that the courts below should have drawn an adverse inference against the defendants respondents on account of their failure to produce the entire file dealing with the appointment of the appellant despite an order of the trial court to do so. He drew my attention to 62C and 76C in this connection. He placed reliance on Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohd. Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413 = (1968) 3 SCR 863. In my opinion, this contention is not tenable. Such a presumption could have been drawn only if it were shown or admitted that some other appointment letter apart from Ex. A10 was in the possession of the Union of India and was being suppressed. The defendant-respondents were throughout contending that there was no other appointment letter apart from Ex. A10 and, therefore, there was no question of drawing air adverse inference from the non-production of a paper whose existence itself was being denied. I am also not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel that 62C and 76C should to deemed to be applications under Order 11 C.P.C. In my opinion. Order 11, Rules 12, 13 and 14 C.P.C. are not attracted to the said applications. I also feel that it is not open to the plaintiff to summon the entire file without specifying the particular of the document or paper. Order 11, Rules 12, 13 and 14 C.P.C. are not attracted to the said applications. I also feel that it is not open to the plaintiff to summon the entire file without specifying the particular of the document or paper. Therefore, in my opinion, the appellant is not entitled to rely upon Union of India v. Nar Bahadur, 1972 Lab IC 945 (All) = 1972 All LJ 640 (supra) and the finding recorded by the courts below that his appointment was made by the Assistant Security Officer is not vitiated in any manner. Once the said finding is accepted as correct then no infirmity is shown in the impugned order of his removal from the service. 21. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.