JUDGMENT K.B. Srivastava, J. - The important point of law involved in this revision is whether this Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the appellate order of a District Registrar, purporting to he made under Sec. 73, Registration Act ordering a document to be registered, after refusal by the Sub-Registrar to register it on the ground of dental of execution. 2. The only power of revision this Court has got is under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under that section, his Court can revise any decision made in any case by any Court subordinate to this Court, and in which no appeal lies thereto. The subsidiary questions involved are firstly, whether the District Registrar acts judicially; secondly, whether he acts as a Court; and thirdly, whether if he is acting as a Court, he is subordinate to this Court. 3. The term `Court' has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. There is, however, a real distinction, though it may often be fine and difficult to define, between a tribunal or authority and a Court. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, the word Court originally meant among other meanings, the sovereign's palace but subsequently came to acquire the meaning of the place where justice is administered and persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived either immediately or mediately from the sovereign. While judicial functions are essential for a Court, the mere fact that a person exercises judicial functions is not sufficient to constitute him a Court. This proposition was propounded by Lord Sankey, L.C. In Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, (1931) A.C. 275, where he observed that there a may be tribunals with many of the trapping of a Court which, nevertheless, would not be Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. He elaborated this proposition in a negative form and said that a tribunal is not necessarily a Court because it gives a final decision, nor be cause it hears witnesses on oath, nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide, nor because it gives decisions which effect the rights of subjects, nor because there is an appeal to a Court, nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. A tribunal or authority may have many of the powers of a Court, but it will not be a Court unless it exercises judicial functions under a duty to exercise in a judicial manner. It was observed by their Lords of the Supreme Court in Brijnandan Sinha v. jyoti Narain, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 66, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal/power to give a decision or a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. In Virendar Kumar v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 153, the Supreme Court observed that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definite judgment. The same ratio can be gathered from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188, Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 Supreme Court 325, Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder Mills, A.I.R. 1961, Supreme Court, 1669; Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1963, Supreme Court, 416; Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand, A.I.R. 1963, Supreme Court, 677; Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 874. and Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank, A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court, 1494. 4. It becomes necessary to find out whether a District Registrar exercises judicial functions and in exercising such functions, he is charged with a duty to decide in a judicial manner. The preamble to the Registration of documents. Clause (4) of Sec. 2 defines the term `District Court'. Sec. 6 relates to appointment of Registrars and Sub-Registrars and empowers the State Government to appoint such persons, whether public officers or not, as it thinks proper, to be Registrars and Sub-Registrars. Sec. 7 provides for establishment of offices and authorises the State Government to establish in every district an office to be styled `the office of the Registrar' and in every sub-district an office or offices of the Sub-Registrar. Sec. 10 provides for the contingency during a period of vacancy in the office of the Registrar. Sec. 7 provides for establishment of offices and authorises the State Government to establish in every district an office to be styled `the office of the Registrar' and in every sub-district an office or offices of the Sub-Registrar. Sec. 10 provides for the contingency during a period of vacancy in the office of the Registrar. It empowers the Inspector General to appoint a person to act during the period of vacancy, and it further says that if no such appointment is made by the Inspector General, the Judge of the District. Court shall be the Registrar. Sec. 15 provides for seals of Registering Officers. It will be apparent, therefore, from an analytical study of the said sections that Parliament has made a distinction between a `Court and a Registrar'. The Act has defined District Court so as to distinguish it from the office of a Registrar. No section, so far described, mentions him as a Court; and indeed he is described, as `an officer', and his place of business is described as an `office", and not as a `Court'. In a temporary vacancy, an appointment has to be made by the Inspector General and not by the High Court or the State Government; and if the Inspector General omits to make an appointment, the District Judge has to act as a Registrar. What I mean to say is that the same distinction has been observed. Sec. 30 prescribes for registration of documents by Registrars in certain cases. Sec. 34 provides for the manner of inquiry before registration by a registering officer. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 34 casts a duty upon a registering officer to inquire whether or not the document presented for registration was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed, to satisfy himself as to the identity of the person appearing before him and alleging that he has executed the document, and in the case of any person appearing as a representative etc., to satisfy himself of the right of such person go to for appear. Sec. 35 contains the procedure to be followed on admission or denial of execution. In a case of admission of execution, the registering officer is under a duty to register the document. Sec. 35 contains the procedure to be followed on admission or denial of execution. In a case of admission of execution, the registering officer is under a duty to register the document. He may, in order to satisfy himself that the person appearing before him is the person he represents himself to be, or for any other purpose, examine anyone present in his office. In the reverse case, where there is a denial of execution or where the person is a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or is dead, the registering officer is under a duty to refuse to register the document as to the person so denying, or so appearing to be a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or who is dead. Under Sec. 36, if any person presenting any document for registration etc. desires the appearance of any person whose presence or testimony is necessary for the registration of such document, the registering officer may, in his discretion call upon prescribed officer or Court to issue a summons requiring him to appear at the registration office. Under Sec. 63, every registering officer may, at his discretion, administer an oath to any person examined by him. Under Sec. 71, every Sub-Registrar refusing to register a document has to make an order of refusal and record his reasons and endorse the words `registration refused' on the document. A registering officer has thus two powers, namely, to register a document or to refuse to register a document. Either of the two powers has to be exercised in accordance with the contained procedure. He has the trappings of a Court in that he has the power to summon a witness. The power, however, is discretionary and not mandatory. Sec. 36 says that "the registering officer may, in his discretion" issue a summons. He has thus the power to summon or to refuse to summon a witness. Under Sec. 63. He has the trappings of a Court in that he has the power to summon a witness. The power, however, is discretionary and not mandatory. Sec. 36 says that "the registering officer may, in his discretion" issue a summons. He has thus the power to summon or to refuse to summon a witness. Under Sec. 63. likewise, the registering Officer "may, at his discretion, administer an oath to any person examined by him." It comes to this, therefore, that the procedure is not judicial because even though a party may desire to examine a witness, the registering officer may refuse to oblige him, and in a case where he accedes to that request, he may refuse to administer oath to him; all these matters are in his individual discretion and this completely negatives his functioning as a Court. There is no right in a party to compel the attendance of witnesses; there is no right to compel a witness to state the facts under the sanctity of an oath : There is no right to cross- examination: and possibly there is no right of appearance through a legal practitioner. The registering officer is no doubt under a duty to give his reason for refusal, but that will not convert his office into a Court. He can, at best, be called an officer under a duty to act quasi-judicially but not judicially. In an appeal under Sec. 73, the District Registrar has to follow the procedure prescribed under Sec. 74 which requires him to enquire-(a) whether the document has been executed; (b) whether the requirements of the law for the time being in force have been complied with on the part of the applicant or person presenting the document for registration, as the case may be, so as to entitle the document to registration. Under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 75, the Registrar may, for purposes of any inquiry under Sec. 74, summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses, and compel them to give evidence, as if he were a civil Court, and he may also direct by whom the whole or any part of costs of any such inquiry shall be paid, and such costs shall be recoverable as if they had been awarded in a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure. The procedure of hearing an appeal under Secs. The procedure of hearing an appeal under Secs. 73, 74 and 75 is also not such as to convert the Registrar into a Court. His duty lies in deciding one question of fact, and if necessary, some questions of law. The question of fact will be whether the document has been executed: and the question of law will be whether the requirements of the law for the time being in force have been complied with so as to entitle the document to registration. True, he has the power to summon witnesses and to compel them to give evidence. This power also, however, is discretionary because the statute uses the word `may', that is to say, he may or may not record evidence, in his individual judgment. The above summary of the scheme of the Act negatives the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Registrar, while hearing an appeal, acts as a Court. The legal fiction suggested by the words "as if he were a civil Court" as occurring in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 75, will not make him a Court. It was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income Tax v. The Bombay Trust Corporation, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 54, that when a person is "deemed to be something", the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something, the legislature requires him to be treated as if he were". See also Commissioner of Income Tax v. Express Newspapers Ltd., A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 33. The words "as if he were a civil Court" clearly indicate that Parliament did not intend to clothe the Registrar with the robes of a Court. In my view, therefore, the Registrar exercises appellate jurisdiction not as a Court but as appellate authority. His functions are quasi-judicial and not strictly judicial. He does no, give a final or definitive judgment. 5. It has been held in a large number of cases that the Registrar does not function as a Court: and these cases give additional strength to the conclusion at which I have arrived. These cases are Krishnammal v. Krishna Iyengar, 23 M.L.J. 50 F.B.; Queen Empress v. Ram Lal, I.L.R. 15 Allahabad 141; Mohimachunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhuttacharji, I.L.R. 7 Cal. These cases are Krishnammal v. Krishna Iyengar, 23 M.L.J. 50 F.B.; Queen Empress v. Ram Lal, I.L.R. 15 Allahabad 141; Mohimachunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhuttacharji, I.L.R. 7 Cal. 736; Madan Lal v. Ganga Bishun, A.I.R. 1938 Lahore, 255; Udit Upadhia v. Imam Bandi Bibi, I.L.R. 24 Allahabad, 402 F.B.; Manavala Goundan v. Kumarappa Reddy, I.L.R. 30 Madras, 326 and Nagappa Nayudu v. Pattabhiramayya, A.I.R. 1928 Madras 475. In Mohima's case, the observation made was that it is impossible to say that the proceedings of the Registrar, when he inquired whether the document had been executed, are in any sense proceedings of a Court, was held that they are the proceedings of an Executive Officer vested with the quasi-judicial functions for the limited purposes of the Registration Act. 6. I have observed earlier that the Code of Civil Procedure does not define the term "Court". The absence of a definition, however, will not clinch the issue. The preamble to the Code states that it is an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature. Now, as to what are civil Courts and as to what is their hierarchy, can admit of no doubt. Sec. 3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 provides the classes of Courts. This section says that there shall be the following classes of civil Courts, namely : (1) The Court of the District Judge; (2) The Court of the Additional Judge; (3) The Court of the Civil Judge; and (4) The Court of the Munsif. The matter is thus concluded by statutory provisions as to what are civil Courts. The position is not different under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts (Extension to Oudh) Act, 1955. The Registrar is thus not a Court under either of the aforesaid two enactments. The matter is thus concluded by statutory provisions as to what are civil Courts. The position is not different under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts (Extension to Oudh) Act, 1955. The Registrar is thus not a Court under either of the aforesaid two enactments. Sec. 3, Code of Civil Procedure, relates to the subordination of Court's. It declares that- "(1) The District Court is subordinate to the High Court; (2) and every Court of Small Causes and every Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court, is subordinate to the High Court and the District Court." That being so, in order to attract the applicability of Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary that the decision which can be interfered with on the revisional side by this Court, must be a decision of a Court and of a Court which is subordinate to this Court. The Registrar while deciding an appeal under Sec. 73 of the Registration Act, is not a Court; and in any case, is not a Court subordinate to this Court and consequently no revision is competent against his appellate order, 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to Ahmad Ali v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1932, Oudh, 180. for the proposition that the ratio in that case makes it amply clear that a revision will lie if the decision is that of a Court or of a tribunal or authority. The Oudh Chief Court, in Ahmad Ali's case was of the opinion that as the proceedings are judicial, the reference by the Collector under Sec. 18, Land Acquisition Act, which starts the proceedings, should be treated as a judicial order. It was assumed that if the Collector was acting judicially, he must be a Court and must further be a Court "subordinate to the High Court". The Oudh Chief Court relied upon the cases of Secretary of State v. Jiwan Baksh, 36 I.C. 213 and T.K. Parmeshwara v. Land Acquisition Collector, 49 I.C., 659. It was, however, not brought to the notice of the Oudh Chief Court that both these cases had been overruled by subsequent decisions of the same High Courts. The Oudh Chief Court relied upon the cases of Secretary of State v. Jiwan Baksh, 36 I.C. 213 and T.K. Parmeshwara v. Land Acquisition Collector, 49 I.C., 659. It was, however, not brought to the notice of the Oudh Chief Court that both these cases had been overruled by subsequent decisions of the same High Courts. The opinion of the Oudh Chief Court stands alone, all by itself: while the other High Courts have taken a contrary view, that is to say, that a Collector dealing with an application under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not a Court. See Bhagaban Dass v. Land Acquisition Collector, A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 705 (D.B.); Khetsidas v. F.L.A. Collector, A.I.R. 1924 Madras 442 F.B.; Messrs Best & Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Collector, A.I.R. 1917, Madras, 824 (D.B.); Jagannath v. L.A. Deputy Collector, A.I.R. 1940 Patna, 102 F.B., B.D. Gupta v. Collector, Bombay Subarban, A.I.R. 1923 Bombay, 290 D.B.; Rafiuddin v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1915, Lahore, 94 D.B., Mushtaq Ali v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1930 Lahore 242 (Single Judge), Amar Nath v. Governor General, A.I.R. 1940 Lahore 299 (D.B.); Kashi Prasad v. Notified Area, A.I.R. 1932 Allahabad 598 (Single Judge); Bhajan Lal v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1932 Allahabad 568 (F.B.); M.H. Mayet v. Land Acquisition Collector, A.I.R. 1934 Rangoon 118 D.B. and Goverdhan Das v. Collector of Bhandara, A.I.R. 1930, Nagpur, 271 (Single Judge). A majority of the High Courts have thus taken a different view from that taken by the Oudh Chief Court. I, therefore, see no reason to take a different view when individually speaking also, I disagree with that view, and am also bound to follow the view taken by this Court in the Full Bench decision referred to above. 8. The result is that the revision is not competent and is dismissed in limine; however, as prayed for by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I give two months time to the petitioner to apply that the revision may be treated as a writ petition' under Article 226 or 227 or under both.