JUDGMENT G.D. Srivastava, J. - This is a habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by six students of the Allahabad University. The facts, as disclosed from the affidavits of the petitioners, are that these petitioners and the students of the Allahabad University were complaining against corruption and nepotism prevailing in the University and they were also dissatisfied with the altitude of the executive authorities, particularly their failure to trace out the culprits responsible for the murder of two students of the University. The various allegations in this regard are to be found in paras 1 to 32 of the affidavit, but for the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to mention in detail the particulars in this regard. The students prepared a charter of demands including demands of an open enquiry into the charges of embezzlement, corruption and nepotism and tracing out the culprits of the aforesaid two murders. The students first attempted to present their charter of demands to the Vice-Chancellor, but because he was not available in this office, this charter was pasted outside his office. Thereafter it was decided that on 15-1-1975 the student would stage a peaceful demonstration in front of the District Magistrate for redress of their grievances. Consequently thousands of students staged a demonstration on the aforesaid date and presented their charter of demands and they also warned the authorities that if no action was taken, they would, resort to dharna and other peaceful agitation methods. It is said that when nothing was done by the executive authorities, there was a meeting of the students in the University campus on 16-1-1975 and it was decided that 17-1-1975 would be observed as a day of demands demonstration. On 17-1-1975, therefore, a big procession of students started from the University and as soon as it came out from the gate, the Police posted there at once swooped upon the students and arrested these six petitioners who were taken on a Police Van to Police Station Cantt., and thereafter they were sent to Jail. Inside the Jail, proceedings under Sections 107/117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were also taken against the petitioners. Inside the Jail, proceedings under Sections 107/117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were also taken against the petitioners. The petitioners have, therefore, challenged their detention on the following grounds: (1) the arrest and detention of the petitioners is mala fide; (2) the petitioners were not informed about the reasons for their arrest at the time of arrest or immediately thereafter; (3) the petitioners were not presented before any Magistrate within 24 hours of their arrest; (4) there is no proper order of remand authorising their detention inside the Jail. 2. The petitioners have also challenged the authority of the Police to arrest them at the University gate and they have also questioned the validity of the proceedings under Section 107/117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At this very stage it may be noted that because the petitioners were committing a cognizable offence, punishable under Section 188, I.P.C. the Police had authority to arrest them without warrants and at any place where the offence was being committed. So far as the proceedings under Section 107/117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are concerned, the legality of those proceedings cannot be considered by the court in this petition, simply because the petitioners have their remedy by preferring an appeal or revision, as the case may be, in a higher court. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed by Suresh Singh, who is the complainant in Crime Case No. 63 under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, and who is at present posted as Inspector In-charge of Police Station, Colonelganj, Allahabad. In the counter affidavit, it has been stated that on 17-1-1975 these petitioners and some other students were taking out a procession in violation of the prohibitory order promulgated under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and when the deponent wanted to stop the procession, the possession replied that they required no permission and that they would defy the orders of the Government, and, therefore, there was no alternative but to arrest the petitioners. In the counter affidavit it has been stated that the petitioners were informed of the grounds of their arrest, as mentioned in the First Information Report (Annexure 1). In the counter affidavit it has been stated that the petitioners were informed of the grounds of their arrest, as mentioned in the First Information Report (Annexure 1). It has then been said that immediately after their arrest, the petitioners were produced before Sri D.B. Mathur, Judicial Magistrate, who remanded them to custody on 17-1-1975 at 4.30 p.m. Regarding the proceedings under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it has been said that they were dropped by the Magistrate on 1-2-1975. Out of these six petitioners, Sarvashri Bal Ganga Dhar, Sarvesh Chandra and Brijesh Kumar were released on bail in crime No. 63 under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act on 25-1-1975. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed, in which the allegations contained in the original affidavit have been repeated. 4. We have already referred to the two grounds regarding proceedings under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the authority of the Police to arrest them and they have been held to be without any substance. We have now to consider the other four grounds which have been mentioned above. 5. Briefly speaking, the allegation regarding mala fide is that the petitioners were arrested by the executive authorities under the directions of some political party, which did not favour the petitioners and other students of their group. To us it appears that this ground cannot now be taken, simply because the present position is that all these six petitioners have been granted bail and, therefore, they are in the custody of the Magistrate who granted bail. We have looked into the judicial record of Crime No. 63 and have found that bail has been granted to all the six petitioners. There being no allegation of mala fide against the Magistrate, who granted bail, the allegation of mala fide against the Police or the executive authorities has now, therefore, become irrelevant. 6. Our attention was drawn to Article 22(1) of the Constitution and it was pointed out that in Annexure `1' it was not at all mentioned that the petitioners were informed of the grounds of their arrest soon after, as alleged in the counter affidavit. 6. Our attention was drawn to Article 22(1) of the Constitution and it was pointed out that in Annexure `1' it was not at all mentioned that the petitioners were informed of the grounds of their arrest soon after, as alleged in the counter affidavit. Article 22 (1) runs as follows: - "No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of such arrest................................" A perusal of this provision of law will make it clear that this provision will come into play only when a person, who is arrested, is being detained in custody. Because the petitioners have now been granted bail, it cannot be said that they are being detained in custody and, therefore, this provision of law has no application to the case of the petitioners. It cannot also be said that the notional custody of the petitioners after the grant of bail can be said to be detention in custody. Even if this notional custody be interpreted to mean detention in custody, we think that this provision of law has not been violated. It is true that in Annexure (1) it is not mentioned that the petitioners were informed of the grounds of their arrest immediately thereafter, but Annexure does show that when the procession was being taken out, Suresh Singh Inspector-in-charge and the other Police Officers intercepted the procession and told the procession that an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been promulgated by Sri B.K. Gupta, City Magistrate, on 13-1-1975 and that taking of procession was prohibited. But in spite of this information, the students insisted on taking out the procession and said that they did not require any permission and they also said that they would defy the orders, if any. Annexure 1 further shows that the students were informed that if they defied the Government Order, they would be liable to be punished under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, whereupon these petitioners incited their companions to resort to violence and then from these contents of Annexure 1 it is quite evident that before being arrested, these petitioners were informed that they were going to commit an offence punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code if they insisted on taking out. the procession. the procession. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioners were ignorant of the ground of their arrest and if before being arrested, the petitioners were informed that they were going to be arrested for such and such reason, there was no sense in informing them about the grounds of their arrest afterwards also. In our opinion, therefore, the fundamental right of the petitioners was not violated as envisaged in the aforesaid Article of the Constitution. The question whether any order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was promulgated or not is not a question which can be gone into by us in this case. 7. The third ground taken up by the petitioners is not at all correct. We have looked into the judicial record of Crime No. 63 and it appears to us that on 17-1-1975 a remand was granted by Sri B.B. Mathur. This obviously means that the petitioners were produced before the Magistrate on that very date. 8. Coming now to the last ground, it seems to us that the legality of the remand orders is now out of question, simply because at present the petitioners are in the custody of the Magistrate having been granted bail in Crime No. 63. Even if the detention of the petitioners was illegal on account of any defect in the remand orders, the present position is that the illegality, if any. has ceased to exist. Even if the original detention was illegal, the court cannot pass any order if the detention has now become legal by means of any subsequent order. As observed by the Federal Court in the case of Basanta Chandra Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 18. "The analogy of civil proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be ascertained as on the date of the institution of the proceedings cannot be invoked here. If at any time before the court directs the release of the detenu, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause of detention." It is the fact of the illegal detention which gives the court jurisdiction and this question has to be answered on the date when the court is going to pass an order on the petition. It is needless to say that the petitioners have not questioned the validity of the bail, which has been granted to them. In other words, it is not the case of the petitioners that there is no case under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code pending against them. The petitioners have also not questioned the legality of the provision of law under which they are said to have been arrested. The notional custody of the petitioner's after they have been granted bail could be questioned by the petitioners only on these two grounds, and the question whether the original detention of the petitioners on account of any defect in the remand orders or on account of any defect in the authority of the person or persons arresting them cannot be gone into by the Court now. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners then relied on a ruling reported in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State, AIR 1968 All 100 and argued that even if the petitioners had been released on bail they were entitled to the relief claimed. In this case, which has been cited on behalf of the petitioners, it has been laid down that even after the bail had been granted, the petition of habeas corpus does not be come infructuous. Reference was made to the following observations :- "A personal bond as a condition of release involves restrictions on liberty just as bail does and if a person already on bail may present a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a person released on bail subsequent to the presentation of such petition, may have his petition decided on merits, there appears to be no reason why a person who has been released on his furnishing a personal bond may not present a petition................if he is otherwise entitled to do so." The question whether a person who has been released on bail can present a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was specifically raised in Zahir Ahmad v. Ganga Prasad, AIR 1963 All 4 , and it was held that such a person remains under the control of the court and notionally in the custody of the court and he can, therefore, present a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In the case of Babu Lal v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 , it has been laid down that a writ of habeas corpus can be presented by a person who has been released on bail. 10. We have, examined the principle, which has been laid down in the aforesaid rulings. It is true that a person, who is on bail, can also present a petition of habeas corpus, but the question still remains what relief can be granted to such a petitioner. In the case of Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1968 All 100 and so also in the case of Babu Lal it appears that the petitioner has challenged the legality of the provision of law under which the case was pending against him. It has been noted above that in the instant petition the legality of the provision of law has not been challenged and it has also not been said that there is no case under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code pending against petitioners. Now the reliefs which have been claimed by the petitioners in the instant case are: (i) that the petitioners be released from jail and (ii) that the opposite parties should be restrained from enjoyment of the fundamental rights by the petitioners. Further, the petitioners have prayed that the detention should be declared illegal and invalid. So far as the first relief is concerned, it is obvious that it has become infructuous because the petitioners are already out of jail. The question of the validity of their detention has already been answered above, in the sense, that at present the petitioners are only under the notional custody of the Magistrate who has granted them bail. This notional custody could be challenged by the petitioners only on two grounds, which have already been indicated above. The question whether the detention of the petitioners prior to the granting of bail was valid or not is not relevant now. The prayer that the opposite parties should be restrained from the enjoyment of fundamental rights by the petitioners is quite vague and the Court cannot pass any such order. Thus, in brief, it is evident that the Court is unable to grant any relief whatsoever to the petitioners in the instant petition. 11. The prayer that the opposite parties should be restrained from the enjoyment of fundamental rights by the petitioners is quite vague and the Court cannot pass any such order. Thus, in brief, it is evident that the Court is unable to grant any relief whatsoever to the petitioners in the instant petition. 11. If a person who is alleged to have committed a bailable offence is produced before a Magistrate, as provided by Section 436 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the person so arrested shall be released on bail, if at any stage of the proceedings before the court he is prepared to give bail. This provision of law also empowers the court to release the person on executing a bond, even without sureties. Similarly Section 437 of the Code makes a provision for persons who have been arrested in a non-bailable offence and have been produced before a Magistrate. Thus the policy of the law is that wherever a person is arrested ether for a bailable offence; or for a non-bailable offence, he shall remain either in actual physical custody to which he may be remanded under the various relevant provisions of the Code, namely, Sections 167, 209 or 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or he may be released on bail on personal bond with or without sureties, which would mean that the person shall remain in the notional custody of the court. No third course is open to the Magistrate. Thus, the position is that once a person has been validly arrested in connection with an offence, he has either to remain in physical custody, and if that physical custody comes to an end, he will have to remain in notional custody so long as the proceedings are pending. Accordingly if at any stage it is found that there was some defect in the order or orders remanding the arrested person to physical custody, the order placing him in the notional custody of the court will not be necessarily vitiated. The physical restraint which once originated validly can come lo an end only by placing him under the notional custody of the court. If the physical custody becomes vitiated for some reason or the other, the court can order release of the arrested person while issuing a writ of habeas corpus. The physical restraint which once originated validly can come lo an end only by placing him under the notional custody of the court. If the physical custody becomes vitiated for some reason or the other, the court can order release of the arrested person while issuing a writ of habeas corpus. But the court cannot order the release of the person from physical custody unconditionally, and it can only direct that the person be placed in notional custody of the court by admitting him to bail. In the instant case, the petitioners are in notional custody, and unless they could succeed in showing that this notional custody is illegal for some reason or the other, no order in their favour can be passed in these proceedings, even though there might be some defects in the order or orders remanding the petitioners to physical custody prior to the granting of bail to them. 12. The petition has been filed against the State of U. P. and the Superintendent of Central Jail, Naini. Because the petitioners are not confined in the Jail at all, it is evident that no relief can be granted against the Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini. It cannot also be said that the petitioners are in the custody of he State of U.P. In fact the petitioners are in the notional custody of the Magistrate who has granted bail to them, and no relief has been claimed against the Magistrate. If the petitioners are not in the custody of any of the opposite parties, the Court is unable to grant any relief. The object of a writ of habeas corpus is not to punish previous illegality but to release a man from present illegal detention, and the writ must be directed to the person who is having the actual custody of the detenu. 13. We should not, however, fail to observe that this case seems to be an instance of the carelessness and negligence, which is often displayed by the Magistrates in dealing with the matters of remand. Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that when an arrested person is produced before a Magistrate, he may order detention of such a person from time to time, as he thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days. Sub-sec. Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that when an arrested person is produced before a Magistrate, he may order detention of such a person from time to time, as he thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days. Sub-sec. (3) of this Sec. clearly lays down that a Magistrate authorising detention under this Section shall record his reasons for so doing. This provision of law, however, is invariably ignored. The Magistrate seldom applies his judicial mind to find out whether further detention is justified of not and whether any prime facie case is made out, as alleged. In most of the cases, remand orders are recklessly and thoughtlessly granted; and in the instant case, it appears that the Magistrate did not care even to pass a proper remand order. The first remand, which is said to have been granted on 17-1-1975, was examined by us. On this remand, there is a prayer that remand for fourteen days should be granted, and then there is an endorsement to the effect that a remand was granted on 17-1-1975. But there is nothing on the record to show for how many days this remand was granted and whether any remand was really granted or not. In this application for remand, only Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code is mentioned. In the copy of the First Information Report attached to this remand application. Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act is also no doubt mentioned, but prima facie the allegations contained in the First Information Report do not make out a case under Section 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act, we have then perused an order of 31-1-1975 which indicates that remand was granted upto 13-2-1975. The remand granted on 31-1-1975 expired on 13-2-1975. We have then an application of 14-2-1975 praying for a remand for a further period of 14 days. On this application for remand, there is an endorsement to the effect that this application should he filed. The order-sheet of 14-2-1975 simply indicates that remand upto 28-2-1975 was granted. But there is in fact no order granting remand upto 28-2-1975. The offence punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code was bailable and the petitioners were entitled to bail as of right. The order-sheet of 14-2-1975 simply indicates that remand upto 28-2-1975 was granted. But there is in fact no order granting remand upto 28-2-1975. The offence punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code was bailable and the petitioners were entitled to bail as of right. There is nothing on record to show that the applicants refused to furnish bail and that is why they were sent to jail. All these things show that no proper care at all was taken to see whether remanding of the petitioners to judicial custody was justified or not, and similarly no care was taken to pass proper remand orders authorising detention of the petitioners from time to time in accordance with law. 14. In view of the fact that at present no relief can be granted to the petitioners, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.