JUDGMENT Narendran, J. 1. The appellants in Shop Appeals Nos. 29 and 30 of 1969 before the 1st respondent-Additional Deputy Labour Commissioner and Appellate Authority, Trivandrum are the petitioners in this Original Petition. The 1st petitioner was the depot assistant and the 2nd petitioner the depot attender in the F.A.C.T. Central Depot at Haripad. They were dismissed from service with effect from 25th September 1969 and the shop appeals filed by the petitioners before the 1st respondent were also dismissed by Ext. P-1 order dated 11th May 1973. The main contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Appellate Authority under section 18 (2) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960 (for short, the Act) cannot ignore the evidence adduced before it in deciding the appeals. 2. The charge against the petitioners was that on 8th February 1969 when they were working in the Central Depot of the 2nd respondent-Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd., Haripad they were responsible for the issue of one bag of ammonium sulphate nitrate to a party without preparing the cash bill for the sale and they did this with the motive of appropriating the value of the article issued. The explanation of the 1st petitioner was that on 8th February 1969 the 2nd petitioner wanted a bag of ammonium sulphate nitrate for his own purpose and that the amount available with him was not sufficient. So, he promised to pay the amount the next day and accordingly he was permitted to take one bag of ammonium sulphate nitrate. It was further stated that the 2nd petitioner brought the balance amount the next day and that the bill was written on that date. The 1st petitioner in his explanation has stated that this was a concession given to a member of the staff and also requested that the above lapse may be excused. The explanation of the 2nd petitioner was that a friend of his one Sukumara Pillai required one bag of ammonium sulphate nitrate urgently and as the party had not sufficient money with him, with the knowledge of the 1st petitioner one bag of ammonium sulphate nitrate was released to the party on the understanding that the bill could be written on 10th February 1969 when the money would be paid by the party. An enquiry was conducted by the Area Manager of the 2nd respondent-company and the petitioners were directed to appear before him at 2 p.m. on 12th March 1969. The petitioners also were informed that they were at liberty to vindicate their position by examining their witnesses and cross-examining the witnesses produced on behalf of the management. The enquiry was conducted on 12th March 1969 and 4th July 1969. Witnesses were examined and the statements made by the witnesses were signed by the petitioners, the enquiry officer and the witnesses concerned. The enquiry officer in his report found the petitioners guilty on their own admission and on the strength of the statements of the witnesses examined on the side of the management. The enquiry officer also recommended that the petitioners may be dismissed. Accordingly the petitioners were dismissed. Against the dismissal orders the petitioners filed Shop Appeals Nos. 29 and 30 of 1969 before the 1st respondent. 3. The petitioners contended before the 1st respondent that the domestic enquiry conducted was a false and they were not given opportunity to adduce their evidence. The enquiry officer did not consider the explanations given by them. The enquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore the petitioners contended in the appeals that the dismissal orders may be set aside and they may be directed to be reinstated. The 2nd respondent contended before the 1st respondent that the services of the petitioners were terminated on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at a domestic enquiry. The petitioners were given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined in support of the party and to adduce their evidence. The petitioners were found guilty by the enquiry officer and moreover the petitioners admitted the misconduct in the various statements given by them. The findings in the domestic enquiry were fully supported by materials made available in the enquiry. The petitioners filed a rejoinder before the 1st respondent stating that there was no evidence in the domestic enquiry that one bag of ammonium sulphate nitrate was removed from the depot on 8th February 1969. It was also stated in the rejoinder that the enquiry officer was highly interested in the 2nd respondent and therefore he threatened the petitioners to give written statements admitting the guilt. It was also stated in the rejoinder that the enquiry officer was highly interested in the 2nd respondent and therefore he threatened the petitioners to give written statements admitting the guilt. Before the 1st respondent, six witnesses were examined on the side of the petitioners and one exhibit was marked. On the side of the 2nd respondent two witnesses were examined and 23 exhibits marked. The 1st respondent heard the arguments and came to the conclusion that the termination of services of the petitioners was in conformity with section 18(1) of the Act and refused to interfere with the findings in the domestic enquiry. It was thereupon that the petitioners approached this court with this Original Petition to quash the above decision of the 1st respondent which is produced as Ext. P-1 in the case. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners before me is that the 1st respondent having allowed the parties to adduce evidence before it was bound to consider that evidence also in desiding the appeals. This the Appellate Authority did not do and therefore there is a failure of exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the 1st respondent. Ext.P-1 is an illegal order since it is passed without considering the evidence adduced by the petitioners. 5. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision of the High Court of Madras in S.U.S. Davey Sons v. Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation 1960 (1) LL.J. 485. In the above decision under section 41(2) of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 Rajagopalan, J. said: "Neither section 41(2) nor rule 9(2) confines the appellate authority to the evidence already recorded in the enquiry for which section 41(2) provided. As I said, it was an appellate jurisdiction that was conferred, and the rule made it expressly clear that the appellate authority had jurisdiction to take such further evidence as it considered necessary. It was enough if the enquiry held by the appellate authority was summary. In the face of these provisions I am unable to accept as correct the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to take further evidence. It was enough if the enquiry held by the appellate authority was summary. In the face of these provisions I am unable to accept as correct the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to take further evidence. Of course, in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction the appellate authority had also to consider the record of the enquiry conducted by the management to verify if the evidence placed on record at that stage was sufficient to support the finding reached by the management in this case that the charge of misconduct established. It was, however, open to the appellate authority to review that evidence afresh, and also to review that in the light of the further evidence taken in the enquiry before him and come to his own conclusion independent of and even at variance with the finding recorded by the management. Of course, as the appellate authority it should take into consideration the fact that the management had jurisdiction to hold an enquiry and to reach its conclusions; and those conclusions of the management with its right to terminate the services of an employee for misconduct proved to its satisfaction, should be treated with respect by the appellate authority, and should not be lightly brushed aside. But that is not equivalent to saying that the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to review the evidence afresh."� The learned counsel also refers to the decision of Issac, J. in Malayalam Plantation Ltd., Quilon v. Industrial Tribunal, Calicut 1968 (1) LL. J. 49 and the decision of Gopalan Nambiyar, J. in M. A. K. and Sons v. Kumara Pillai 1966 (2) LL. J. 628. The question that arose was whether the appellate authority under section 18(2) of the act has jurisdiction to conduct de novo enquiry into the charge and to take evidence. In deciding that question, Gopalan Nambiyar J. said: "On the terms of section 18 (1) and (2), it appears to me that the question whether the evidence at the enquiry was ˜satisfactory or not, is open to review in the appeal preferred under section 18 (2). For that purpose a re-appraisal and re-assessment of the evidence by the appellate authority, is called for and is justified. Rule 3(2) gives power to the appellate authority to take evidence. There was no case before me that the rule was ultra vires or illegal. For that purpose a re-appraisal and re-assessment of the evidence by the appellate authority, is called for and is justified. Rule 3(2) gives power to the appellate authority to take evidence. There was no case before me that the rule was ultra vires or illegal. On the terms of the section and of the rule, it would appear that the appellate authority has the power to review evidence adduced at the enquiry and to take additional evidence. The mode and manner of exercise of the power can alone be called in question in a proper case.� The learned Judge further held that the appellate authority did not exceed in its powers in taking evidence itself and entering a decision also on the strength of the evidence so taken. It is pertinent to note that in that case the evidence at the domestic enquiry was taken in the absence of the workmen who failed to be present at the enquiry. 6. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends that even if evidence was adduced before the appellate authority it is not incumbent upon the appellate authority to go into that evidence. If, on a review of the evidence in the domestic enquiry, the appellate authority comes to the conclusion that the findings in the domestic enquiry need not be interfered with, then there is no necessity for the appellate authority to go into the evidence adduced before it. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent also relies on the decision of Rajagopalan, J. in S. U.S. Davey Sons v. Additional Commissioner for Workmen Compensation 1960 (1) LL. J. 485 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The learned counsel also relies on a Bench decision of this Court in the Workmen of M/s Blundell Eomite Paints Ltd. v. Blundell Eomite Paints Ltd. 1974 (2) LL.J. 23 and contends that the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with Ext. P-1 order of the appellate authority in a proceeding under Article 226 of the constitution is very limited. This Court can interfere only if the decision is illegal, perverse or based on no evidence. Of course, this Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. On the strength of the above decision the learned counsel contends that there is no reason why this Court should interfere with Ext. This Court can interfere only if the decision is illegal, perverse or based on no evidence. Of course, this Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. On the strength of the above decision the learned counsel contends that there is no reason why this Court should interfere with Ext. P-1 order of the appellate authority. The fact that the appellate authority did not consider the evidence adduced before it cannot be a reason for this Court to interfere. The appellate authority has reviewed the evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry and has come to the conclusion that the findings in the domestic enquiry need not be disturbed. 7. The learned counsel also refers to a decision of the High Court of Madras in The Indian Overseas Bank v. Nagiah (1973) I M.L.J. 341. In this decision Veeraswami, C. J. dealing with the powers of the appellate authority under section 41(2) of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 said: "The appellate authority may interfere with the order made in the domestic enquiry on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with the services, or on the ground that there was no room for finding misconduct. The Commissioner, who is the appellate authority, had a wide scope of enquiry. He could review the evidence to see whether a reasonable cause for dispensing with the first respondent services had been made out. He could also go into the question of misconduct and see whether the finding was well-founded. If the finding of the appellate authority in the appeal suffers from any error of law, that, of course, is subject to removal by this court in certiorari"�. 8. Section 18 of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960 reads : "18. (1) No employer shall dispense with the services of an employee employed continuously for a period of not less than six months, except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one month notice or wages in lieu of such notice, provided however that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for the purpose. (2) Any employee whose services are dispensed with may appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer. (3) The appellate authority may, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the employer and the employee, dismiss the appeal or direct the reinstatement of the employee with or without wages for the period he was kept out of employment or direct payment of compensation without reinstatement or grant such other relief as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. (4) (5) (6) [Sub-sections (4) to (6) being not relevant are omitted]. Rule 3(2) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Rules, 1961 reads: "3. (2) The procedure to be followed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner when hearing appeals preferred to him under subsection (2) of section 18, shall be summary. He shall record briefly the evidence adduced before him and then pass orders giving his reasons therefor. The result of the appeal shall be communicated to the parties as soon as possible. Copies of the orders shall also be furnished to the parties if required by them. The copies shall be on stamp papers to be furnished by the parties."� Section 18(1) of the Act permits the employer to dispense with the service of an employee on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for the purpose. Section 18 (2) gives a right of appeal to the employee whose services are dispensed with. As per section 18(3), the appellate authority has either to dismiss the appeal filed by the employee or to direct his reinstatement. The appellate authority has also the power to award compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Of course, under Rule 3(2) of the Rules framed under the Act the appellate authority has got power to record evidence if any adduced before it. If the parties want to adduce evidence, the appellate authority has to record the same briefly and only after that the appeal can be disposed of. But the point that has to be decided by the appellate authority in a case of misconduct is whether such an order can be supported on the evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry. If the parties want to adduce evidence, the appellate authority has to record the same briefly and only after that the appeal can be disposed of. But the point that has to be decided by the appellate authority in a case of misconduct is whether such an order can be supported on the evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry. Under section 18(1) of the Act, the employer has got the power to dispense with the services of the employee for misconduct and the only restriction on the above power of the employer is that the dismissal or the discharge for misconduct must foe after a domestic enquiry and there must be satisfactory evidence to support such an order. So, the primary responsibility of the appellate authority is to review the evidence adduced before the domestic enquiry and ascertain whether the dismissal or discharge as the case may be is supported by satisfactory evidence. If the appellate authority is of the view that the facts and circumstances brought out in the domestic enquiry fully justify the dismissal or discharge, then the appeal has to be dismissed. Though there is provision for adducing further evidence before the appellate authority and as a matter of fact evidence was adduced, that cannot be a reason why the appellate authority should consider that evidence also before passing orders on the appeal. So, if the appellate authority is of the view that the findings in the domestic enquiry which led to the dismissal or discharge are well-founded, then it is not incumbent on the part of the appellate authority to consider the evidence that has been adduced before it by the parties. If in a case where there is no sufficient material brought out in the domestic enquiry to justify an order of dismissal or discharge, it may be open for the employer to adduce further evidence before the appellate authority and satisfy it that the services of the employee had to be dispensed with. So, in a case where the appellate authority allows an appeal filed by an employee it will be imperative on its part to consider the evidence, if any, adduced before it before passing orders on the appeal. So, in a case where the appellate authority allows an appeal filed by an employee it will be imperative on its part to consider the evidence, if any, adduced before it before passing orders on the appeal. But in a case where the order of dismissal or discharge is not to be interfered with and the appellate authority is dismissing the appeal filed by the employee, the fact that the appellate authority did not consider the evidence adduced before it cannot be taken as an infirmity and there is no reason why this court should interfere with the order of the appellate authority on that ground. If the order of the appellate authority suffers from any error of law, that of course can be corrected by this court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this case, I am not satisfied that Ext. P-1 order of the 1st respondent suffers from any error of law apparent on the face of the record. 9. For the reasons stated above, the Original Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.