JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---The above two appeals are directed against the judgment and decree dated January 31, 1966, passed by the Second Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Poona, in Special Civil Suit No. 52 of 1963. 2. The suit was filed on June 4, 1963, by the plaintiff respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in First Appeal No. 2008 of 1966 to recover the amount of Rs. 18,925.31 by sale of the mortgaged property, as the said sum was, according to the plaintiffs, due under a mortgage deed executed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who are appellants Nos. 1 and 2 in the said appeal, and their grandfather (fathers father) Bhivrao Abaji Deshpande. The mortgage deed was executed as security for a debt of Rs. 14,000/-. The mortgaged property consisted of the land bearing Survey No. 133 of Baramati. 3. Plaintiff No. 1 is a registered firm of which plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 are the partners. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the sons of the deceased Gajanan and as such the surviving coparceners in the joint family consisting of them selves and Bhivrao Abaji who died on July 26, 1950, shortly after the execution of the mortgage deed. Out of the lands, however, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 sold 5 acres to defendants Nos. 3 to 6, on April 3, 1956; 3 acres of the lands were further sold by them to defendant No. 5 on April 3, 1959. Some further lands were sold to defendant No. 6 by two sale deeds dated May 10, 1960 and June 8, 1960. Some portion of the lands was acquired by defendant No. 7, Maharashtra Electricity Board. Baramati, who is shown as respondent No. 4 in First Appeal No. 2008 of 1966. 4. In view of these facts, it was submitted by the plaintiffs that all the defendants were liable for the dues to the plaintiffs. The mortgage amount was to be paid by instalments during the period of 9 years. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 paid only an amount of Rs. 394-11-0 on August 2, 1951. Defendant No. 1 had filed Civil Suit No. 217 of 1953 in Baramati Court. In the course of that suit the plaintiffs had produced the original mortgage bond; and it was lost. Hence the plaintiffs relied on the certified copy of the mortgage bond produced at Exhibit 170 in this case. 394-11-0 on August 2, 1951. Defendant No. 1 had filed Civil Suit No. 217 of 1953 in Baramati Court. In the course of that suit the plaintiffs had produced the original mortgage bond; and it was lost. Hence the plaintiffs relied on the certified copy of the mortgage bond produced at Exhibit 170 in this case. That suit which was transferred subsequently to the Court of the Senior Division, Poona, and numbered as Suit No. 167 of 1954, was withdrawn by defendant No. 1, though it was the contention of the defendant No. 1 that the consideration for the mortgage bond in the form of the pre-existing debt was extinguished under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. Further it was also the case of the plaintiffs that the debtor Bhivrao Abaji Deshpande had passed a writing in favour of the plaintiff admitting that he was not a debtor under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, because his debts exceeded Rs. 15,000/- In these circumstances, the plaintiffs prayed for a personal decree against the defendants if the mortgage amount was not satisfied by the sale of the property. 5. The suit was resisted by all the defendants. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement (Exhibit 36) denying all the allegations of the plaintiffs; and defendant No. 2 adopted the contentions made by defendant No. 1 defendant No. 1 denied having executed the mortgage bond and even the allegation that the original mortgage bond was lost. He pleaded that Ramchandra Gajanan, Defendant No. 2, was not a minor on the date of the mortgage bond, though he was described in the mortgage bond as a minor by guardian defendant No. 1, his brother. According to defendants Nos. 1 and 2, this mortgage bond was not binding on defendant No. 2 for this reason. It was further contended that the deceased Bhivrao Abaji had become blind before July 22, 1950; that he and defendants Nos. According to defendants Nos. 1 and 2, this mortgage bond was not binding on defendant No. 2 for this reason. It was further contended that the deceased Bhivrao Abaji had become blind before July 22, 1950; that he and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had never kept Khata; that the had not taken any loan from the plaintiff; that no settlement of accounts was made; that no amount was payable by Bhivrao Abaji or defendant No. 2; that the suit mortgage bond was bogus and without consideration; that Anandibai, widow of deceased Gajanan who died in 1942 during the life time of Bhivrao Abaji, had no interest in the suit property and was, therefore, a necessary party to the suit land; that Bhivrao Abaji was an agriculturist and debtor under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act; that his debt did not exceed Rs. 15,000/-; that he had never passed any writing admitting that he was not a debtor or his debts exceeded Rs. 15,000/-; that defendant No. 1 withdrew Suit No. 167 of 1954, as he could not arrange for evidence; that the debt payable before 1947 had been extinguished under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act and the mortgage hond which was got executed for the debt was a fraud and not enforceable. The defendant No. 1 further denied having paid any Vasul and contended that the plaintiffs had no license under the Money Lenders Act; that they had not kept the accounts and submitted statements as required by the Act and that the accounts should be taken from the beginning. He even denied that the plaintiff No. 1 was a registered firm and claimed that the suit was liable to be dismissed even on that ground. 6. Defendants Nos. 3 to 5 put in their written statement at Exhibit 50, though it did not bear the signature of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 defendant No. 4, who was a minor was not properly represented at the time when that written statement was filed. The lower Court therefore, treated it as the written statement of defendant No. 5 only. In that written statement the defendant No. 5 denied the allegations submitting that he had no knowledge of the transactions between the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The lower Court therefore, treated it as the written statement of defendant No. 5 only. In that written statement the defendant No. 5 denied the allegations submitting that he had no knowledge of the transactions between the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 and 2. He had raised the same contentions as those raised by defendant No. 1 regarding the status of Bhivrao Abaji, as a debtor and the extinguishment of the debt. He also contended that Gajanan had another son by name Prabhakar, who was also a necessary party and that the suit was barred by time. He further alternatively pleaded that the mortgage debt, if any, may be recovered from the property of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 which was in their possession or acquired by defendant No. 7. 7. Defendant No. 6 adopted the written statement of defendant No. 5. 8. Defendant No. 7 by its written statement (Exhibit 23) contended that the suit was not valid or proper and was not competent under law and that it was unnecessarily joined as a party. It denied that the portion of the property had been acquired by it and pleaded that it had no interest in the equity of redemption. It was the case of defendant No. 7 that the portion of the land Survey No. 133 had been suggested for acquisition and the plaintiffs had no remedy against this defendant in the Court. 9. The learned Civil Judge framed as many as 15 issues in view of these rival contentions. 10. On behalf of the plaintiffs Ramchandra Laxman Damodare was the main witness. He produced the certified copy of the mortgage bond at Exhibit 170 in the evidence as in the earlier suit the original mortgage bond was produced at Exhibit 52(3), but it was lost. He fully supported the plaintiffs case against all the defendants except defendant No. 7 with respect to whom he stated that the acquisition proceedings in respect of one acre of the land remaining after the portions were sold to defendants Nos. 3 to 6 was being acquired for the use of defendant No. 7. According to him, there was first a settlement of account of respect of the dealings with respect to the family of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and Bhivrao Abaji on May 26,1950, when Rs. 16,750/- was found due to them. 3 to 6 was being acquired for the use of defendant No. 7. According to him, there was first a settlement of account of respect of the dealings with respect to the family of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and Bhivrao Abaji on May 26,1950, when Rs. 16,750/- was found due to them. The settlement of account was signed by Bhivrao Abaji and defendant No. 1, who made the endorsement that the account was settled, in the Khatavni relating to S.Y. 2007 of page 45. Thereafter the suit mortgage deed was passed on July 22, 1950 for Rs. 14,000/-; and the balance of the dues was remitted by the plaintiffs at the request of Bhivrao Abaji. 11. Defendant No. 1 who had filed Civil Suit No. 167 of 1954 in Baramati Court withdrew it after its transfer to Poona. In the suit he had prayed for a declaration that the mortgage bond was not binding on him, but the suit was withdrawn; and during the time of the suit the original mortgage bond which was produced in that suit was lost. In support of this the plaintiffs produced the list of document Exhibit 53/3 which bore the signature of the deceased pleader of the plaintiffs one Mr. L.E. Saphai. Plaintiffs, therefore, produced as certified photo-stat copy of the mortgage deed. The plaintiffs witness stated that the document was written by one Ramchandra Ganpat Daskut who was not alive and that it was read out to the executants and thereafter Bhivrao Abaji and defendant No. 1 signed it. 12. He produced the money lending licence and the certificate of registration of the plaintiff No. 1 partnership firm. He admitted in cross-examination that Bhivrao Abaji had held about 40 to 50 acres of land at Baramati; that Bhivrao Abaji was personally cultivating she lands and that the had no other means of livelihood except agriculture. The khata of the joint family of Bhivrao Abaji was with the plaintiffs for more than 10 to 1 2 years and the turnover was about Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- per year. The last transaction in that khata took place in May 1950. The khata of the joint family of Bhivrao Abaji was with the plaintiffs for more than 10 to 1 2 years and the turnover was about Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- per year. The last transaction in that khata took place in May 1950. In cross-examination at great length with regard to the question as to whether the consideration for the mortgage deed was extinguished under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, he stated that he could not say without looking at the account books whether Bhivrao Abaji had borrowed any amount from July 31, 1947 till May 1950, but he admitted that dues were payable by Bhivrao before July 31, 1947 and they were brought forward year to year in May 1950. He admitted further that out of the balance found due in May 1950. Rs. 1 6,000/- was for principal and Rs. 500/- to Rs. 600/- was for the interest and that the amount due before July 31, 1947, did not include interest; but he later on stated that he did not remember whether it included any interest. 13. He could not say whether the account books for the years prior to 1950 were in tact. He stated that the previous account books were untraceable for the last 7 or 8 years It was also his case in the cross-examination that when he told Bhivrao that an application would be filed under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, Bhivrao persuaded the plaintiffs not to file an application and gave a writing stating that his debts exceeded Rs. 15,000/-, but that latter, was lost, though it was produced in the earlier Suit No. 167 of 1954. It was not taken back by him, but he had to admit that there was no evidence except his word to show that what amount was due from Bhivrao in 1947. He also stated that although he had instructed his pleader to take back all the documents which he had produced in the earlier suit, he had not asked him to take back Bhivraos letter. In other words, he had to admit that the major portion of the consideration for the mortgage deed was for a period prior to July 31, 1947. 14. The plaintiffs also examined witness Dattatraya Pathak who had attested the original mortgage deed. 15. In other words, he had to admit that the major portion of the consideration for the mortgage deed was for a period prior to July 31, 1947. 14. The plaintiffs also examined witness Dattatraya Pathak who had attested the original mortgage deed. 15. As against this evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs, the only evidence led by the defendants was that of defendant No. 1 and one Balavant Purshottam Lonkar, a neighbour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Their evidence showed that Bhivrao was an agriculturist which, as already stated above, the plaintiffs witness had admitted. 16. The defendants also examined one Prabhakar Keshav Deshpande, the brother of defendant No. 1, who appears to have been given in adoption to one Keshav Deshpande. Dhondiba Mahadue Lalge was also examined to show that Bhivrao was an agriculturalist. The defendants witness Shivlal Langarekar was examined only for the purpose of showing that he once attested a document signed by Bhivrao and defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Another witness on behalf of the defendants was Dr. Pol, who had attested the will Exhibit 195 made by the deceased Bhivrao one Hansanbhai, a fruit merchant was the last witness who also was examined only to show that Bhivrao was an agriculturist. 17. The learned Civil Judge by his aforesaid judgment and decree passed a preliminary mortgage decree declaring that Rs. 14,000/- only was due under the suit mortgage bond, as he came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim interest on the said amount as they had filed to comply with the provisions of section 19 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act fully. He found that the plaintiffs firm was a registered firm and the plaintiffs were entitled to sue the defendants. He also overruled all the other contentions of the defendants Nos. 1 to 6. He held that defendant No. 7 could not be made a party to the suit, as the acquisition proceedings were still going on; and it was neither a necessary party, nor a proper party to the suit. 18. First Appeal No. 2008 of 1966 was filed by defendants Nos. 1 to 6 challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge. The only ground which Mr. 18. First Appeal No. 2008 of 1966 was filed by defendants Nos. 1 to 6 challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge. The only ground which Mr. Nargolkar in support of that appeal was that the learned Civil Judge erred in law in holding that the suit mortgage bond was for good consideration although Bhivrao Abaji was a debtor as defined under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947, and although the plaintiffs witness had admitted that a substantial part of the mortgage money, to secure which the mortgage was executed, was relating to a debt which existed prior to July 31, 1947. According to Mr. Nargolkar, the learned Civil Judge ought to have held that the debt prior to July 31, 1947, was extinguished under section 15(1) of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act; and, therefore, the mortgage was without consideration and was unenforceable and void. He attacked the reasoning of the learned Civil Judge based on the Hindu Dharamshastras like Narad Smriti and Katyayana Smriti and on treating the extinguishment of a debt as on par with the barring of the remedy under the Limitation Act. 19. It is true that the reasoning adopted by the learned Civil Judge, although it sounds very learned and ancient, was erroneous, because there is a well established distinction between the extinguishment of a right and the barring of a remedy. An extinguishment of a right could not be treated by the learned Civil Judge on the same footing as a time-barred debt as he appeared to have done in this case. It is father unfortunate that the learned Judge ignored the actual wording of section 15 and went on the consider Narada and Kityayana ignoring what was stated in the legislation. 20. It is father unfortunate that the learned Judge ignored the actual wording of section 15 and went on the consider Narada and Kityayana ignoring what was stated in the legislation. 20. Section 15 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1947, runs as follows :--- "(1) Every debt due from a debtor in respect of which no applications has been made under section 4 within the period specified in the said section 4 or in respect of which no application for recording a settlement is made under section 8 within the period specified in the said section 8 or in respect of which an application made to the Court is withdrawn under section 12 and no fresh application is made under section 4 and every debt due from such debtor in respect of which a statement is not submitted to the Court by the creditor in compliance with the provisions of section 14 shall be extinguished. (2) Nothing in this section shall apply to any debt due from any person who has by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted his creditor to believe that he is not a debtor for the purposes of this Act or that no application under section 4 can be entertained in respect of any debt owed by such person to such creditor by reason of the provisions of section 11." 21. It is, therefore, clear from the wording of section 15 that one of the essentials for the application of that section is that the debt must be one in respect of which no application has been made under section 4 within the period specified in the said section 4. Section 4 required that the application for adjustment of the debts by the debtor or creditor should be made before August 1, 1947. By necessary implication, therefore, it means that section 15(1) can have no application to a debt in respect of which an application could not have been made under section 4. It is clear that the suit mortgage bond having been executed on July 22, 1950, no application could be made in respect of the mortgage deed or debt under section 4 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. 22. It is clear that the suit mortgage bond having been executed on July 22, 1950, no application could be made in respect of the mortgage deed or debt under section 4 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. 22. In our view, therefore, section 15(1) has no application at all to the debt due under the mortgage, particularly when the mortgage deed is executed not only by Bhivrao Abaji, but also by defendant No. 1 and it is stated in the mortgage deed itself that the consideration of Rs. 14,000/- was in respect of an account kept by Bhivrao and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 or the agricultural expenses and also for family expenses as well as for the expenses of relatives and the accounts were settled on the date of the mortgage. So far as defendant No. 1 is concerned, it was not his case that he was debtor or that the debt was extinguished against him. He had also executed the mortgage bond and therefore, he would be bound by the mortgage bond and he is responsible for what was due under the mortgage. 23. It was, however, very strenuously urged by Mr. Nargolkar that as the substantial portion of the debt found due as result of the settlement of accounts prior to the execution of the mortgage deed was relating to a period prior to 1947, and admittedly, the plaintiffs had failed to produce the accounts upto the year 1947, the debt itself was extinguished; and the settlement of the accounts after August 1, 1947 or the execution of the mortgage and would not revive what was extinguished by law. He argued that the mortgage bond did not stop defendant No. 1 from contenting that the mortgage debt was extinguished. 24. In view of what we have stated above, these questions are academic. Even assuming for the sake of argument that it is open to defendant No. 1 to contend that any portion of the mortgage debt was extinguished prior to the settlement of accounts and execution .of the mortgage bond, sub-section 2 of section 15 would prevent him from raising a contention under section 15(1), as he executed the mortgage bond admitting the settlement of accounts and the debt permitting the creditors, i.e. plaintiffs to believe either that Bhivrao and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were not debtors for the purpose of the Act or that no application under section 4 could be entertained in respect of any debt owned by them by reasons of the provisions of section 11 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, which stated that no application could be entertained by any Court on behalf of or in respect of any debtor, unless the total amount of debts due from him on the date of the application was not more than Rs. 15, 000/-. 25. It is true that the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge are not correct. But his finding is correct. Mr. Nargolkar submitted that as the creditors had not acted to their prejudice when the mortgage bond was executed, subsection (2) of section 15 is not attracted. We are unable to read any words in sub-section (2) of section 15 which lays down that the creditor must act to his prejudice before he can set up a defence under section 15(2). It is not open to the courts to add words which are not found by them. 26. It is true that Mr. Nargolkar is right in his contention that the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge amounted to holding that even though the debts were extinguished under section 15(1) of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947, having regard to the belief of Hindus based on Dharmashastra which involved among other beliefs that a debtor would be born as a slave, or a servant or a woman or a beast in the house of a creditor and, therefore, defendant No. 1 undertook the pious and legal obligation to pay off the debts of his grandfather were totally irrelevant. It was not open to the learned Civil Judge to speculate with regard to the motive and intention of defendant No. 1. No questions were put to defendant No. 1 as to whether he held any belief with regard to birth or re-birth as stated by Katyayana, Narada, or any other Dharmashastra. In the absence of such question, it was not open to the learned Civil Judge to rely merely on Katyeyana and Narada and presume that defendant No. 1 had acted on the belief that was stated in those Smritis, particularly when there was nothing on the record to show that defendant No. 1 knew anything about those Smritis. 27. In the absence of such question, it was not open to the learned Civil Judge to rely merely on Katyeyana and Narada and presume that defendant No. 1 had acted on the belief that was stated in those Smritis, particularly when there was nothing on the record to show that defendant No. 1 knew anything about those Smritis. 27. The learned Civil Judge also erred in treating the provisions of section 25 of the Contract Act as in pari materia with the provisions of section 15 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, because there was nothing in the mortgage deed (Exhibit 170) to indicate that the executant wanted to revive the debts which were extinguished under section 15. 28. The learned Civil Judge, in our opinion, was wrong in not taking into consideration the recitals contained in the will of the deceased Bhivrao Abaji. In para 3 of that will, which was relied upon by the defendants. Bhivrao had categorically stated that there was no debt due and payable to the plaintiffs and even assuming that there was any such debt, it was extinguished under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. The will was written in Marathi. It ends with the usual words that the will was executed, by the deceased Bhivrao after understanding everything that was contained in the will. The learned Civil Judge ignored this will because it was relied upon by defendant No. 1 for showing that the debt was extinguished, and the will was intended more as a pleading for some legal proceedings started by the creditors and in imaging that this must have happened because the writer of the will was an experienced pleaders clerk Balwant Purshottam Lonkar, who was examined by the defendants. 29. Instead of helping the defendants, in our opinion, what is recited in para 3 of the will supports the plaintiffs case that Bhivrao represented to the plaintiffs that the debt exceeded Rs. 15,000/- and, therefore, no application could be made under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. 29. Instead of helping the defendants, in our opinion, what is recited in para 3 of the will supports the plaintiffs case that Bhivrao represented to the plaintiffs that the debt exceeded Rs. 15,000/- and, therefore, no application could be made under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand how a person like Bhivrao, who was not an ordinary, agriculturist, but an agriculturist of Baramati cultivating considerable acres of land who described himself as a Bhrahmin Shetkari, who had full knowledge of the effect of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, would ignore the provisions of that Act and sign the mortgage bond (Exhibit 170) on July 22, 1950. 30. Mr. Nargolkar tried to explain away this conduct of Bhivrao by submitting that the mortgage bond was executed only 4 or 5 days before the death of Bhivrao which took place on July 26, 1950; and, therefore, Bhivrao could not have been in a fit condition of mind to appreciate what was being done or to realise that what he was doing was contrary to what he had recited in the will. It is not open to Mr. Nargolkar to make this submission because there is no foundation in the pleadings of defendant No. 1 in his written statement showing that the deceased Bhivrao was not in a fit condition of mind to execute the mortgage bond or to appreciate the consequences of what he was doing, when he signed the mortgage bond stating that it was being executed for the balance due on taking account which was maintained by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and Bhivrao with the plaintiffs. 31. For these reasons and not for the reasons stated by the learned Civil Judge, we agree with the conclusion of the learned Civil Judge that the contention raised on behalf of defendants Nos. 1 to 6 that a substantial portion of the consideration of the mortgage deed was for a debt which was extinguished, must be rejected. 32. 31. For these reasons and not for the reasons stated by the learned Civil Judge, we agree with the conclusion of the learned Civil Judge that the contention raised on behalf of defendants Nos. 1 to 6 that a substantial portion of the consideration of the mortgage deed was for a debt which was extinguished, must be rejected. 32. Once we hold that section 15 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act has no application to the suit mortgage, which was executed subsequent to August 1, 1947, there is no answer for repelling the claim made by the plaintiffs on the basis of the suit mortgage deed (Exhibit 170) The learned Civil Judge appears to have passed a personal decree only against defendant No. 1 for reasons which are not clear to us; but we do not wish to go into the question as that part of the decree was not challenged by the plaintiffs. Once it is held that defendant No. 1 had executed the mortgage bond; and it was not even his contention that he was a debtor, there should have been a personnel decree also against him for the mortgage amount. But on the basis of his reasoning with regard to instalments, the learned Civil Judge has come to the conclusion that defendant No. 1 would be liable only to the extent of Rs. 5,000/-. We have to confirm that part of the decree only because the plaintiffs have not challenged that decree and not because we agree with the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge. 33. Turning now to the first Appeal No. 87 of 1967 filed by the plaintiffs challenging the portion of the decree disallowing interest and dismissing the suit against defendant No. 7, Mr. Divekar, the learned Counsel for the appellants fairly stated that so far as defendant No. 7 was concerned, the findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge that as the acquisition proceedings were still going on at the time of the suit, the defendant No. 7 was neither a proper nor a necessary party was a finding which could not be challenged by him as erroneous. He, however, submitted that the learned Civil Judge erred in disallowing interest in the exercise of his discretion under section 21(b) of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946. He, however, submitted that the learned Civil Judge erred in disallowing interest in the exercise of his discretion under section 21(b) of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946. He urged that the decree was being passed on the mortgage deed which the defendants could not challenge and, therefore, interest ought to have been given as prayed for by the plaintiffs. 34. It is common experience that although the Bombay Money Lenders Act was enacted in 1947, the money lenders are still not inclined to comply with the provisions of sections 18 and 19 which intended to prevent malpractices by money lenders and to protect the debtors from these malpractices. All that the money lender had to do was to deliver a statement of account from year to year to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and Bhivrao under section 19, as he was keeping account. The plaintiffs have not explained as to why they did not comply with this provisions. In these circumstances we find no reason to interfere with the discretion used by the learned Civil Judge under section 21 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act. 35. In the result, both the above First Appeals are dismissed with costs and the judgment and decree passed by the lower courts are confirmed. -----