ARUN KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS rule is directed against an order of suspension dated 31. 12. 74 passed by the respondent No. 3 under sub-Rule 2 (b) of Rule 10 read with Rule 20 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. ( 2 ) THE petitioner joined service under the Government of India in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (Department of Food) on December 29, 1948. Subsequently, he was transferred on deputation to serve under the Food Corporation of India with effect from December 16, 1968. Petitioner left Calcutta for Switzerland on the 16th July, 1974 by a Chartered Flight in connection with the works of religious and relief Organization. On the 27th July, 1974, while the petitioner was going to board the Air Craft through Customs Check at Zeneva, he picked up quarrel with the Police as two police men were abusing Indians by saying 'bloody niggars'. The petitioner protested and he was arrested by the police. The Chartered Air Craft by which the petitioner was to fly, left Zeneva in time 28th July and 29th July, 1974 were closed holidays in Switzerland and no work was done on those days. On the 30th July, 1974 the Police came and asked for Cash Memo of each of articles of goods which the petitioner was possessing. He failed to produce any such Cash memo. On the following day he was taken to a Court of Municipal Magistrate at Lussane. Petitioner did not know Swiss of French language. A student was procured, who knew very little English, to work as an interpreter. The said student explained that any defence in that country would be futile and it would be very expensive too. He also said that the accused was presumed, in Swiss law, to be guilty unless he proved to the contrary. The Air Craft had left. Petitioner had no money to purchase a ticket. In utter confusion he singed few blank papers without knowing the contents of any one of them. In the prison known as 'mal', he was allowed to use telephone. He contacted one of the office bearers of the Social Service Organization whom he met in a conference at Zeneva. The Office bearer came and explained the mattes to the Magistrate, who expressed regrets, returned the seized goods and remitted the rest of the sentence. In the prison known as 'mal', he was allowed to use telephone. He contacted one of the office bearers of the Social Service Organization whom he met in a conference at Zeneva. The Office bearer came and explained the mattes to the Magistrate, who expressed regrets, returned the seized goods and remitted the rest of the sentence. On 3rd August, 1974, petitioner was provided with an air ticket by the said Social Service Organization. He availed of a Swiss Air Line Flight. On the 4th of August, 1974 petitioner reached Calcutta. On the following day, he joined his service and resumed his duties under the Food Corporation of India. On the 31st December, 1974, the petitioner was served with the impugned order of suspension by which the Managing Director ordered that the petitioner was deemed to have been under suspension with effect from July, 1974. Being aggrieved the petitioner moved this Court on 17th January, 1975 and obtained the present Rule. ( 3 ) IN affidavit-in-opposition, filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1, the Regional Director (Food) Government of India and affirmed by Sudhir Chandra Bhattacharya it is stated that the Central Bureau of Investigation (Inter Pol) Delhi brought to the notice of the respondent No. 2 that the petitioner visited foreign countries, unauthorisedly during July-August, 1974. It was further reported that while the petitioner was in Switzerland, he was convicted and awarded imprisonment for a period of 8 (eight) days including the detention period of 5 (five) days awaiting trial for committing repeated thefts. In view of the gravity of the offence and treating that moral tarpitude is involved in such offence, the authority concerned issued the order of suspension against the petitioner. ( 4 ) MR. Ray, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended that the purported order of suspension had been passed on erroneous and incorrect basis. The order of conviction made by the Municipal Magistrate at Lausanne in Switzerland could not be made a ground for suspension under Rule 10 (2) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 inasmuch as the said conviction was not made by any Indian Court for an offence punishable under a law in force in this country. Mr. Ray submitted, that ?conviction? and ?offence? as contemplated under Rule 10 (2) of the Rules are ?conviction? and ?offence? by Indian Court, and in Indian Laws. Mr. Ray submitted, that ?conviction? and ?offence? as contemplated under Rule 10 (2) of the Rules are ?conviction? and ?offence? by Indian Court, and in Indian Laws. Rule 10 (2) read as follows: - a Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority: - (b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction:. ( 5 ) MR. Chakraborty, appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that the petitioner was convicted for committing theft which was an offence under the Indian Law as well. Conviction of an employee in the petitioner's position for theft by any Court in any country involved moral tarpitude. Mr. Chakrborty points out that ? offence? has been defined under Section 3 (38) of the General Clauses Act, which means an act and/or commission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. According to Mr. Chakraborty the word 'any law' includes law of other countries as well. ( 6 ) IN sub-clause 3 of Article 13 of the Constitution the word ?law? and ?laws in force? are explained. ?laws in force? denote all prior and existing laws passed by the Legislature or other competent authority which have not been repealed notwithstanding the fact that they are not in operation wholly or in part throughout India or part thereof. In Venkataraman v. Commissioner of Police, A. I. R. , 1951 Mad. 1015 Gobinda Menon, J. referring to 'law' and 'law in force' in Article 366 (1) of the Constitution, observed both the expressions ?existing Law? and ?law in Force? referred to positive legal Acts which were in existence at the time of Constitution whereas the word ?law? in Clause (3a) to Article 13 denotes those that have to be passed hereafter. ( 7 ) ARTICLE 372 (1) of the Constitution enjoins that all laws before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue to be in force unless repealed or altered. ( 8 ) THE word ?offence? in Clause (3a) to Article 13 denotes those that have to be passed hereafter. ( 7 ) ARTICLE 372 (1) of the Constitution enjoins that all laws before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue to be in force unless repealed or altered. ( 8 ) THE word ?offence? in Article 20 is to be construed in the light of Section 3 (38) of the General Clause Act, 1897 where it is described as ?act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force?. The Supreme Court pointed out in Shiv Bahadur Singh's case, A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 394, that the phrase ?law in force? as used in Article 20 (1) must be understood in the natural sense as being the law in fact in existence and in operation at the time of the commission of the offence as distinct from the law 'deemed' to have become operative by virtue of the power of legislature to pass retrospective laws. ( 9 ) ARTICLE 20 (1) of the Constitution provides protection in respect of conviction for offences. It is stated that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence. The ?existing law? has been defined in Clause (10) of Article 366 of the Constitution which means any law, ordinance order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation. ( 10 ) IN Edward Company Mills v. State of Ajmer, A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 25, the Supreme Court observed that there was no material difference between ?existing law and a law in force. ? Quite apart from Article 366 (10) of the Constitution, the expression - ?indian Law? has itself been defined under Section 3 (29) of the General Clauses Act as meaning any Act, ordinance, regulation, rule, order or bye-law which before the commencement of the Constitution had the force of any law in any province of India or any part thereof. ( 11 ) IN Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales, (1891) A. C. 455, the Privy Council was required to interpret the 54th section of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1883. ( 11 ) IN Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales, (1891) A. C. 455, the Privy Council was required to interpret the 54th section of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1883. Relevant part of that Section reads as follows: - ?whosoever being married marries another person during the life of the former husband of wife, wheresoever such second marriage - takes place, shall be liable to penal servitude for seven years?. ( 12 ) LORD Halsbury, L. C. said, it is necessary to construe the word ?whosoever?; and in its proper meaning it comprehends all person all over the world, natives of whatever country. The next word which has to be construed is ?wheresoever?. There is no limit of person, according to one construction of ?whosoever?; and the word ? wheresoever? is equally universal in its application. Therefore, if the statute is construed as it stands, and upon the bare words, any person, married to any other person, who marries a second time anywhere in the habitable globe, is amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of New South Wales if he can be caught in the Colony. That seems to be an impossible construction of the statute. ?wheresoever:, therefore, may be read, ?wheresoever? in this Colony the offence is committed. ( 13 ) IT is abundantly clear from the foregoing references to various provisions of the Constitution that a person cannot be convicted of an offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an offence. Therefore, in my opinion, the word ?any law for the time being in force? as occurred in Section 3 (38) of the General clause Act, 1897, must be construed as ?any law for the time being in force? in India. Obviously it has no reference to any law of other countries of the world. ( 14 ) THE General Principle of International Law is, that every person found within a Foreign State is subject to, and is punishable, by its law. Territorial jurisdiction attaches (with special exceptions) upon a person who permanently or temporarily resides within the territory, but its law does not follow him when he leaves the foreign territory and comes back to his own country. Territorial jurisdiction attaches (with special exceptions) upon a person who permanently or temporarily resides within the territory, but its law does not follow him when he leaves the foreign territory and comes back to his own country. In Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales, (1891) A. C. 455, the Privy Council pointed out that all crime is local, and jurisdiction over a crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed. ( 15 ) SECTION 3 of the Indian Penal Code provides punishment of offence committed beyond India to which by law may be tried within India. Section 4 extends the Code of extra-territorial offences. It could not be doubted that theft committed by a responsible officer of Central Government in foreign country is a serious offence and involves moral tarpitude. If it is contemplated to take a disciplinary action against the petitioner, the appointing authorities can very well suspend the petitioner under Rule 10 (1) (a) of the Rules or the authorities are competent to take criminal proceedings against the petitioner, for the offence committed by him in the foreign country. Article 20 (1) obviously would not be applicable in the present case. But the authorities, in my opinion, cannot issue an order of suspension under Rule 10 (2) (b) of the Rules for an offence which is not punishable by any law for the time being in force in India and for conviction of such an offence by a foreign Court in a foreign country. The legislature of a country is territorial. It laws are intended to apply to matters occurring within the realm and not beyond it. ( 16 ) ACCORDINGLY, in my opinion, ?conviction? and ?offence? as contemplated under Rule 10 (2) (b) of the Rules are ?convictions? and ?offences? by Indian Courts and in Indian Laws. ( 17 ) IN the result, this Rule is made absolute. The impugned order of suspension which is Annexure ?b? to the petition is quashed by Writ of Mandamus. The respondents however, shall be at liberty to issue a fresh order of suspension in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Rules made absolute.