JUDGMENT H. L. Agrawal, J. In this application under section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, (Act VIII of 1890) hereafter to be referred to as 'the Act', by the petitioner for her appointment as the legal guardian of a minor boy. who according to the statements in the petition itself was “residing at present......at Benares with the sister of the respondent (his father)”, a question arises as to whether it could be entertained by the High Court or a District Court. The father of the minor, the respondent is said to be his only relation and residing at Purulia (West Bengal). It has also been stated in the third paragraph of the petition that the "name and residence of the person having the custody or possession of the person of the minor-Mr. Ajit Kumar Mitra, Benaras” A little latter, it is further stated that the minor was living with the petitioner “till 1.6.1972 at Purulia from which place he was forcibly snatched away.” 2. It is not necessary to state the grounds on which the petitioner claims to be appointed as a guardian. As the question that has fallen for consideration on the objection of the office is regarding the maintainability of the application itself in this Court in view of the provisions contained in section 9 of the Act. 3. Section 9 provides that if the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of a minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. The 'District' Court has been defined in subsection (4) of section 4 of the Act, as “besides having been given the meaning assigned to this expression in the Civil Procedure Code, also to include the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction.” It will also be necessary to refer to section 3 of the Act, which say that “this Act, shall be read subject to every enactment heretofore or hereafter passed relating to any Court of Wards.........and nothing in this Act, shall he construed to affect, or in any way derogate from, the jurisdiction or authority of any Court of Wards, or to take away any power possessed by any High Court.” 4. The objection of the office is that this application should have been filed in the District Court instead in this Court in view of section 9 read with sub-section (5) of section 4 of the Act. 5. Mr. R. S. Chatterji, appearing for the petitioner, however, vehemently contested the report and contended that by virtue of the very definition of the expression "District Court" which includes the High Court, this Court had concurrent jurisdiction to entertain this application besides the District Court. Learned counsel emphasized his submission with reference to clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court according to which this Court has got the necessary power and authority with respect to the person and estates of infants within the State. The contention raised by Mr. Chatterji although attractive, is fallacious and must be rejected for various reasons which I would discuss hereinafter. 6. As already shown above, according to the provisions of the Act, the application with respect to the guardianship of the person of a minor has to be made in the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. The statements of facts in the petition in question show that the minor resides at present at Benares. There is no allegation as to where he was residing after his birth at Ranchi. It has been stated that he was snatched from the custody of the petitioner at Purulia where he was residing along with her. Examining the facts as they have been stated in the petition, it is admitted that except that the minor was born at Ranchi, he was earlier residing at Purulia and at present for more than three years at Benares, both the places being outside the territorial limits of this Court. 7. Mr. Chatterji, however, relying upon a decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Mrs. Annie Besant V.G. Narayaniah and another AIR 1914 P.C. 41 contended that this Court in the circumstance can still exercise an extraterritorial jurisdiction. This argument has no merit nor the decision of the Privy Council is an authority for any such argument and is entirely distinguishable. In that case the minor who had his ordinary place of residence in the town of Madras, was taken to England for his maintenance and education. This argument has no merit nor the decision of the Privy Council is an authority for any such argument and is entirely distinguishable. In that case the minor who had his ordinary place of residence in the town of Madras, was taken to England for his maintenance and education. In this case itself it has clearly been laid down that the jurisdiction of the District Court under section 9 of the Act, was confined to infants ordinarily residents in the district and cannot extend to those who had months previously left India with a view to being educated in England. It is not, therefore, necessary to discuss the cases reported in the case of Sarada Nayar V. Vayankara Amma AIR 1975 Ker. 158 and in the case of Jamuna Pd. V. Most. Panna. AIR 1960 All. 285 In both these cases it was held that if a child was either forcibly or stealthily removed from the jurisdiction of the Court 'X' to the jurisdiction of the Court 'Y', the Court 'X' will still hold the necessary jurisdiction to entertain an application for appointment of a guardian of the minor. As already indicated, the facts which at all disclose are that the child was forcibly removed from Purulia, situate in West Bengal. It cannot, therefore, be contended that even on this account this Court can have jurisdiction, if at all. 8. It is necessary to dispose of the main contention of Mr. Chatterji, namely, that the High Courts and the District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 25 of the Act. In this connection the most relevant provision is section 4 (5) of the Act, where the word "Court" has been defined to mean only a "District Court" having jurisdiction to entertain an application for an order appointing a person to be a guardian. In this connection, reference may be made to the marginal notes of section 9 which reads "Court having jurisdiction to entertain application." The expression "Court", therefore, used in the marginal notes cannot be ignored. In this connection, reference may be made to the marginal notes of section 9 which reads "Court having jurisdiction to entertain application." The expression "Court", therefore, used in the marginal notes cannot be ignored. I do not mean to suggest that while interpreting section 9 itself the marginal notes would control its construction, but the expression "District Court" used in the body of the section, in view of the two expressions "Court" and the "District Court" separately defined, in section 4, having different connotations the marginal notes in my view certainly provides a guide line for the proper interpretation of the expression the "District Court" which must be held to be that falling under the definition of the "Court" under section 4 (5) of the Act, and cannot in its turn would be taken to be an independent expression by itself as having been defined under section 4 (4). Such a construction will render the apparent scheme of section 9 of the Act, ambiguous and in apparent conflict with the main provision of the section itself. In my view, therefore, it cannot be doubted that the use of the expression "District Court" in section 9 of the Act, appertains to the definition of the expression "Court" in sub-section (5) of section 4 and is not referable to the definition of the "District Court" in sub-section (4) of section 4. 9. There may be yet another answer of the contention of Mr. Chatterji. Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes that every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. The whole argument of Mr. Chatterji is that the "District Court" and the High Court have concurrent jurisdiction. Even assuming that this argument is available to Mr. Chatterji, it has been settled by a series of decisions that in such an event a Court of higher grade must be protected from the over crowding of such cases which can be tried by a court of lower grade. A reference in support of this proposition can be made to two cases; (i) a decision of this Court in the case of Bhuwaneshwari Kuer V. Raghubansh Mani Prasad Narayan Singh AIR 1954 Pat. 34 and (ii) in the case of Lal V. Suraj Bhan. AIR 1944 All. A reference in support of this proposition can be made to two cases; (i) a decision of this Court in the case of Bhuwaneshwari Kuer V. Raghubansh Mani Prasad Narayan Singh AIR 1954 Pat. 34 and (ii) in the case of Lal V. Suraj Bhan. AIR 1944 All. 1 In the Patna case, it has been held that in a case where a court of higher grade has got concurrent jurisdiction it has got discretion either to return the plaint or not to return it for being presented to the court of lower grade. Therefore, if it at all comes to the exercise of even the discretion of this Court, I do not feel it will be advisable that it should rather entertain such an application here instead of directing it to be entertained by the District Court. 10. All the contentions raised on behalf of Mr. Chatterji, therefore, having been found to be devoid of any substance, it must be held that this application is not maintainable in this Court. Let the same therefore, be returned to the petitioner for filling it in a proper court. Order accordingly.