( 1 ) THE petitioner is the proprietrix of Tirandaz Talkies, Gulbarga, where she has been carrying on the business of exhibition of cinematograph shows. In these petitions she has questioned the validity of the orders of assessment passed under sub-sec. (2) of S. 6a of the Karnataka Entertainments tax Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the Act, in respect of 100 weeks. The impugned orders of assessment are similar except with regard to the particulars of the period and the tax assessed and demanded. The prescribed authority has determined the liability of the petitioner in the said orders of assessment on the basis of the returns filed on her behalf and also issued notices of demand to the petitioner. ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by the said impugned orders of assessment and the notices of demand the petitioner has filed these writ petitions it is alleged by the petitioner that she had filed the returns as required by Rule 29-E (1) of the Karnataka Entertainments Tax Rules, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, before the assessing authority from time to time enclosing with the returns receipted challans' on which the local treasury had acknowledged that the sums mentioned therein had been remitted to the treasury. But no action to assess the petitioner under the act as required under sub-sec (2) of Section. 6a was taken for a long time apparently for the reason that the authority concerned proceeded on the basis that the amounts mentioned in the receipted challaps' enclosed by the petitioner with the returns were genuine. It would appear that it came to the notice of the assessing authority after a lapse of a number of year that there were no credit entries in the accounts of the treasury corresponding to the challans which the petitioner had enclosed with her returns and that in fact no payment had been made as stated in the returns filed by the petitioner. Immediately thereafter the assessing authority passed orders of assessment under S. 6-A (3) of the Act. They were challenged by the petitioner in certain writ petitions filed by her earlier. In the course of the hearing of the said writ petitions it was urged on behalf of the State government that the impugned orders of assessment were made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 6a of the Act. They were challenged by the petitioner in certain writ petitions filed by her earlier. In the course of the hearing of the said writ petitions it was urged on behalf of the State government that the impugned orders of assessment were made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 6a of the Act. The Court, however, proceeded to set aside the orders of assessment PS it was of the opinion that certain parts of sub- rules. (2) and (3) of Rule 29-E of the Rules were invalid. Liberty was however reserved to the authority to make fresh orders of assessment (vide doulatabai Dinshaw Irani v. The Entertainment Tax Officer (1974) 1 Karlj. 171 . Thereafter the authority passed fresh orders of assessment and issued notices of demand which are impugned in these petitions. ( 3 ) IN order to understand the contentions of Sri K. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to refer tc the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Under S. 3 of the Act entertainment tax is levied at the rates mentioned therein on the proprietor providing an entertainment. S. 6a which was introduced by Act 14 of 1966 provides for filing of the returns by the proprietor of an entertainment and also for the assessment of his liability. It reaods thus: Return.- (1) Every proprietor of an entertainment shall submit such returns relating to complimentary tickets and to payments for admissions, to such authority, in such manner and within such periods, as may be prescribed. (2) If the prescribed authority is satisfied that any return submitted under sub-sec. (1) is correct and complete, it shall assess the proprietor on the basis thereof. (3) If no return is submitted by the proprietor of the entertainment under sub-sec. (1) before the date prescribed or if the return submitted by him appears to the prescribed authority to be incorrect or incomplete, the prescribed authority shall, after making such enquiry as it considers necessary, determine the tax due under sections 3, 3a and 4, and assess the proprietor to the best of its judgment: provided that before taking action under this sub-section, the proprietor shall be given a reasonable opportunity of proving the correct ness and completeness of any return submitted by him or that no return was due from him. ( 4 ) SECTION 9 of the Act prescribes the manner of recovery of tax under the act. It reads thus:"9. Marker of recovery of tax.- Any amount due on account of the tax under section 3 or section 3a or section 4, may, without prejudice to any other mode of collection, be recovered. . . . . . . . . . . (a) ag if it were an arrear of land revenue, or (b) on application to any judicial magistrate by such magistrate as if it were a fine imposed by him. "it is seen from the provisions of S. 6a that sub-sec. (2) thereof authorises the prescribed authority to make an assessment an the proprietor when he is satisfied that the return submitted by the proprietor under sub-sec. (1) is correct and complete and that sub-sec. (3) confers the power on the prescribed authority to pass a best judgment assessment where no return is filed by the proprietor or where he considers that the return filed by him is either incorrect or incomplete. The contentions of Sri Srinivasan may be summarised thus: (i) the notices of demand issued pursuant to the orders of assessment are invalid as there is no provision either in the Act or in the Rules for issuing a notice of demand when the order of assessment is made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 6a; (ii) since the impugned orders of assessment are passed under sub- sec. (2) of S. 6a on the basis that "receipted ehallans have been enclosed with the returns, the authority concerned cannot make a fresh demand after passing the orders of assessment; (iii) If the prescribed authority was of the opinion that the petitioner had not enclosed genuine receipted challans, then he could not have passed the orders of assessment under sub-sec. (2) of S. 6a as such orders can be passed only when the returns are accompanied by "receipted challans" as prescribed by sub-rule (1) of Rule 29-E of the Rules. (iv) sub-sec. (2) of S. 6a does not provide for the determination cf the liability of the proprietor; and, (v) that S. 9 authorises the authority to recover the amounts which are due and payable under orders of assessment passed under sub-sec. (3) of S. 6a of the Act only. (iv) sub-sec. (2) of S. 6a does not provide for the determination cf the liability of the proprietor; and, (v) that S. 9 authorises the authority to recover the amounts which are due and payable under orders of assessment passed under sub-sec. (3) of S. 6a of the Act only. ( 5 ) IT is no doubt ture that no tax can be levied or collected except by authority of law. It is well known that in the case of levy of taxes there are three important stages, namely, levy, assesment and collection. It is also well settled that a law which provides for a levy and collection of tax should make provision with regard to each of the three stages referred to above. It cannot also be disputed that principles cf equity cannot be resorted to while determining the liability of a person under a fiscal statute. But while construing a fiscal statute the Court should make a distinction between the charging provisions and the provisions prescribing the procedure for the quantification of the liability and the recovery of the tax. the Court should proceed on the assumption that the legislature while levying a tax has also made provisions to make the charge effective. The above view receives tupport from the observations of Lord Dunedim in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1925) 10 TC. 88, 110 which reads as follows: mr Lords I shall now permit myself a general observation. Once that it is fixed that there is liability, it is antecedently highly improbable that the statute should not. go on to make that liability effective. A statute is designed to, be workable and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. Now there are three stages in the imposition of a tax; there is the declaration of liability, that is the part of the statute which determines what persons in respect or what property are liable. Next there is the assessment. Liability does not depend on assessment. That exhypothesi, has already been fixed. But assessment particularises the exact sum which a person liable has tq pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery, if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay. ( 6 ) IN Allen v. Trehearne (1938) 22 TC. 15, 26. Next there is the assessment. Liability does not depend on assessment. That exhypothesi, has already been fixed. But assessment particularises the exact sum which a person liable has tq pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery, if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay. ( 6 ) IN Allen v. Trehearne (1938) 22 TC. 15, 26. where S. 45 (5) of the English Finance Act, 1927 came up for'consideration, Scott, LJ. , observed as follows : the rules. . . . in S. 45, sub-sees (5) and (6), are rules affecting assessment and collection, and that if there is any difficulty in the precise applicability of the language of those sub-sections, it should be interpreted largely and generously in order not to defeat the main object of liability laid down by Rule 1 of Schedule E. The above two decisions of the English Court were cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Gurusahai Saigal v. Commr of I. T. , Punjab AIR. 1963 SC. 1062. where the provisions of S. 18a of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 came up for consideration. While rejecting the contention of the assessee in that case that he was not liable to pay interest on the advance tax payable by him as he had not paid any advance tax at all during the relevant period, the Supreme Court observed as follows : now it seems to us that we are dealing here with a provision which lays down the machinery for the assessment of interest. That sub-sec (8) intended to and did in the clearest term impose a charge for interest seems to us to be beyond dispute. It says that interest calculated in a certain manner shall be added to the tax. We do not here have to resort to any equitable rule of construction or to alter the meaning of the language used or to add to or vary it in order to arrive at the conclusion that the provision intended to impose a liability to pay interest. That is the plain effect of the language used. But the sub-section also provides that the interest for which liability was created, has to be calculated in a certain manner. It is this provision which has given rise to the difficulty. That is the plain effect of the language used. But the sub-section also provides that the interest for which liability was created, has to be calculated in a certain manner. It is this provision which has given rise to the difficulty. But obviously this provision only lays down the machinery for assessing the amount of interest for which liability was clearly created; it in substance says tha in calculating the amount of interest the machinery of calculation laid down in sub-section (6) shall be applied. The proper way to deal with such a provision is to give it an interpretation which, to use the words of the Privy Council in Mahaliram kamjidas's case (AIR 1940 PC. 124) 'makes the machinery workable utres valet potius quam pereat. We, therefore, think that we should read sub-sec (6) according to the provision of which interest has to be calculated as provided in sub-sec (8) in manner which makes it workable and thereby prevent the clear intention of sub-sec (8) being defeated. Now, how is that best done? As we have earlier said sub- sec (6) deals with a case in which tax has been paid and therefore it says that interest would be calculated 'from the 1st day of January in the financial year in which the tax was paid'. This obviously cannot literally be applied to a case where no tax has been paid. If however the portion of sub-sec (6) which we have quoted above is read as 'from the 1st day of January in the financial year in which the tax ought to have been paid, the provision becomes workable. It would not be doing too much violence to the words used to read them in this way. The tax ought to have been paid on one or other of the dates earlier mentioned. The intention was that interest should be charged from Jan 1 of the financial year in which the tax ought to have been paid. Those who paid the tax but a smaller amount and those who did not pay tax at all would then be put in the same position substantially which is obviously fair and was clearly intended. Which is the precise financial year in any case would depend on its facts and this, would make no difference in the construction of the provision. Which is the precise financial year in any case would depend on its facts and this, would make no difference in the construction of the provision. ( 7 ) THE principle enunciated above has been recently followed by the supreme Court in Muralilal Mahabir Prasad v. B. R. Vad CA,1802/70 d/5-9-75 SC. In that case the contention urged by the appellants was that after a firm was dissolved there could be no valid order of assessment under the Bombay Sales Tax act, 1953, in respect of the turnover relating to the pre-dissolution period in the absence of an express provision. Rejecting the above contention chandrachud, J. speaking for the Court observed : the true implication of the principle that a taxing statute must be construed strictly is often misunderstood and the principle is unjustifiably extended beyond the legitimate field of its operation. Indeed, the more well expressed the principle as in the Cape Brandy case, greater the reluctance to see its limitations. In that famous passage marked by a happy turn of phrase, Rowiatt J, said there is no equit about a tax. There is no presmption as to a tax. There is no equity about a tax in the sense that a provision by which a tax is imposed has to be construed strictly, regardless of the hardship that such a construction may cause either to the treasury or to the tax-payer. If the subject falls squarely within the letter of law he must be taxed, howsoever inequitable the consequences may appear to the judicial mind. If the Revenue seeking to tax cannot bring the subject within the letter of law, the subject is free no matter that such a construction may cause serious prejudice to the Revenue. In other words though what is called equitable construction may be admissible in relation to other statutes or other provisions of a taxing statute, such a constructions is not admissible in the interpretation of a charging or a taxing provision of a taxing statute. Speaking for the Court in CIT v. Ajax Products ltd ( (1965) 1 SCR. 700 ) Subba Rao, J, after citing the passage from the judgment of Rowlatt. J. in the Cape Bombay Brandy case said: to put it in other words, the subject is not to be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation. Speaking for the Court in CIT v. Ajax Products ltd ( (1965) 1 SCR. 700 ) Subba Rao, J, after citing the passage from the judgment of Rowlatt. J. in the Cape Bombay Brandy case said: to put it in other words, the subject is not to be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation. ( 8 ) WE are concerned in this case to determine not whether a particular turnover can be brought to sales tax but whether if the turnover wps liable to be charged to sales-tax, the firm can be assessed to tax after its dissolution. In other words, we are concerned with a provision which prescribes the machinery for the computation of tax and not with a charging provision of the Sales Tax Act. . . . . . It is indisputable that the first aupellant firm was liable to be charged to sales tax on its business turnover. The charging provisions are contained in Chap. III of the Act of 1053 and Chap. II of the Act of 1959, In this appeal, we have to construe the machinery provisions of those Acts. In accordance with the view taken in the cases cited above the machinery sections ought to be construed so as to effectuate the charging sections. The construction which we have placed on the machinery provisions of the 1953 Act will give meaning and content to the charging sections, in the sense that our construction will effectuate the provision contained in the charging sections. The resourcefulness and ingenuity which go into well-timed 'dissolution of firms ought not to be allowed to be used as convenient instruments of tax evasion. As observed by Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commr of inland Revenue ( (1925) 10 TC. 88) A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to' secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable". Far from there being crucial omission or a clear direction in the present case which would make the end unattainable, the various provisions to which we have drawn attention leave it in no doubt that a dissolved firm can be assessed on its pre-dissolution turnover. ( 9 ) THIS case has to be decided with the above legal background. Far from there being crucial omission or a clear direction in the present case which would make the end unattainable, the various provisions to which we have drawn attention leave it in no doubt that a dissolved firm can be assessed on its pre-dissolution turnover. ( 9 ) THIS case has to be decided with the above legal background. It is not disputed that the petitioner was liable to pay the amount now demanded by the assessing authority under S. 3 of the Act. It is also not the case of the petitioner that there are entries in the treasury accounts showing that the amounts mentioned in the receipted challans' enclosed by her with her returns had been credited. The assessing authority has not found that the returns were incorrect. In fact in all the impugned orders of assessment he has accepted the correctness of the statement made by the petitioner or on her behalf in the returns. The returns were also not incomplete. He has, assessed the petitioner under S. 6a (2) and demanded of the petitioner the amounts assessed by him on the basis of the returns filed by the petitioner because the tax due under S. 3 has not been ordited into the treasury. Since it is not the case of either of the partis the orders of assessment fall under sub-sec (3) of Sec. 6a, it is refer to the said sub-section. The only question which arises for consideration is whether, having regard to the requirement of sub-sec (1) of S. 6a "which requires every proprietor of entertainment to file a return in such manner as prescribed and of sub-rule (1) of the Rule 29e which preseribes that the proprietor shall submit a return along with the or a crossed cheque drawn in favour of the the full amount of the tax due in respect of all the perfomes ofr show to which the return relates, it can be held that the prescribed authority had no jurisdiction at all to pass an order of assessment under sub-sec (2) of s. 6a, as, according to the prescribed authority, the "receipted challans relied upon by the petitioner were not genuine ones. I am of the view that on a fair construction of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules, the contention of the petitioner that the authority had no jurisdistion to pass the orders of assessment under S. 6a (2) is untenable. S 6a is provision. It authorises the prescribed authority to pass an order of assessment when the return filed is correct and complete. This Court has held in the cases filed by the petitioner earlier Doulatabai Dinshaw Iraniss case (l) that the prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to satisfy himself whether the tax due in respect of the shows to which the returns related had been paid or not. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted then the levy made by the statute under S. 3 can be successfully defeated by a person who encloses along with the return which is otherwise correct a fake challan or no challan. I do not think that the language of sub-sees (1) and (2) of S. 6a is capable of such a construction. The expression in such manner. . . . as may be prescribed' found in sub-sec (1) of S. 6a does not lead to the construction that the rules made pursuant thereto can prescribe that the proprietor should also enclose a 'receipted challan. It only authorises the Govt to prescribe the form of the return and the particulars it should contain. I am of the view that the provision in sub-rule (1) of Rule 29e which requires that the return shall be accompanied by a treasury receipt or crossed cheque drawn in favour of the Entertainments tax Officer for the full amount of the tax and surcharge due in respect of all the performances or shows to which the return relates is not traceable to what is contained in sub-sec (1) of S. 6a. Similarly, the words 'and the treasury receipt or crossed cheque found in sub-rule (2) of Rule 29e cannot also be traced to S. GA (l) When once that position is reached there can be no doubt about the power of the prescribed authority to make an assessment under sub-sec (2) of S. 6a of the Act when the return is correct. The contentions of the petitioner that the filing of the 'receipted challans' in respect of which there are no corresponding entries in the treasury would absolve petitioner of the liability under the Act and that the prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to pass an order of assessment under sub-sec (2) of S. 6a if he is of the opinion that the 'receipted challans enclosed to the return are not genuine, have to be rejected. The prescribed authority was, therefpre, sompetent to make the impugned orders of assessment under sub-sec (2) of S. 6a of the Act. Contentions 2 to 4 therefore fail it is no doubt true that there is no specific provision with regard to the issue of notices of demand after the passing of the orders of assessment under subsec (2) of S. 6a. That, however is not a lacuna which would defeat the levy of tax. No authority is cited by Sri Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the proposition that in the absence of a provision enabling the issue of a separate notice of demand after the passing of an order of assessment the amount assessed cannot be recovered. After the order of assessment is communicated to the assessee, the amount assessed thereunder can be recovered in accordance with law. It is no doubt true that in the instant case the prescribed authority has issued separate notices of demand. It is unnecessary to quash them as the liability of the petitioner is not in any way affected by reason of the issue of the notices of demand which are also impugned in these writ petitions s. 6a, as, according to the prescribed authority, the "receipted challans relied upon by the petitioner were not genuine ones. I am of the view that on a fair construction of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules, the contention of the petitioner that the authority had no jurisdistion to pass the orders of assessment under S. 6a (2) is untenable. S 6a is provision. It authorises the prescribed authority to pass an order of assessment when the return filed is correct and complete. S 6a is provision. It authorises the prescribed authority to pass an order of assessment when the return filed is correct and complete. This Court has held in the cases filed by the petitioner earlier Doulatabai Dinshaw Iraniss case (l) that the prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to satisfy himself whether the tax due in respect of the shows to which the returns related had been paid or not. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted then the levy made by the statute under S. 3 can be successfully defeated by a person who encloses along with the return which is otherwise correct a fake challan or no challan. I do not think that the language of sub-sees (1) and (2) of S. 6a is capable of such a construction. The expression in such manner. . . . as may be prescribed' found in sub-sec (1) of S. 6a does not lead to the construction that the rules made pursuant thereto can prescribe that the proprietor should also enclose a 'receipted challan. It only authorises the Govt to prescribe the form of the return and the particulars it should contain. I am of the view that the provision in sub-rule (1) of Rule 29e which requires that the return shall be accompanied by a treasury receipt or crossed cheque drawn in favour of the Entertainments tax Officer for the full amount of the tax and surcharge due in respect of all the performances or shows to which the return relates is not traceable to what is contained in sub-sec (1) of S. 6a. Similarly, the words 'and the treasury receipt or crossed cheque found in sub-rule (2) of Rule 29e cannot also be traced to S. GA (l) When once that position is reached there can be no doubt about the power of the prescribed authority to make an assessment under sub-sec (2) of S. 6a of the Act when the return is correct. The contentions of the petitioner that the filing of the 'receipted challans' in respect of which there are no corresponding entries in the treasury would absolve petitioner of the liability under the Act and that the prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to pass an order of assessment under sub-sec (2) of S. 6a if he is of the opinion that the 'receipted challans enclosed to the return are not genuine, have to be rejected. The prescribed authority was, therefpre, sompetent to make the impugned orders of assessment under sub-sec (2) of S. 6a of the Act. Contentions 2 to 4 therefore fail it is no doubt true that there is no specific provision with regard to the issue of notices of demand after the passing of the orders of assessment under subsec (2) of S. 6a. That, however is not a lacuna which would defeat the levy of tax. No authority is cited by Sri Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the proposition that in the absence of a provision enabling the issue of a separate notice of demand after the passing of an order of assessment the amount assessed cannot be recovered. After the order of assessment is communicated to the assessee, the amount assessed thereunder can be recovered in accordance with law. It is no doubt true that in the instant case the prescribed authority has issued separate notices of demand. It is unnecessary to quash them as the liability of the petitioner is not in any way affected by reason of the issue of the notices of demand which are also impugned in these writ petitionssince the orders of assessment which are also communicated to the petitioner make the process of assessment complete and effective. Hence there is no substance in contention No. 1. ( 10 ) THE next Question is whether S. 9 authorises the prescribed authority to recover the tax assessed under sub-sec (2)of S. 6a. It is no doubt true that if the jurisdiction of the authority to pass an order under sub-sec (2) of S. 6a depends upon the payment of the tax before the return is filed, there would be no necessity to resort to Sec. 9, since there would be no arrears at all to recover after the order of assessment is passed under Section 6a (2) and that S. 9 would be applicable to orders of assessment passed under sub-sec (3) of S 6a alone. Since I am of the view that the payment of the amount of tax before a return is filed under sub-sec (1) of s 6a is not a condition precedent to make assessment under S. 6a. Since I am of the view that the payment of the amount of tax before a return is filed under sub-sec (1) of s 6a is not a condition precedent to make assessment under S. 6a. (2), the amount determined by the prescribed authority under sub-sec (2) of s 6a, if it is in arrears, can be recovered under S. 9 which the procedure for recovery of tax due under S. 3, I am, therefore, of the view that there is no impediment to the recovery of the amount due by the petitioner under S. 9 or in any other manner prescribed by law. In the result the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner fail and the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. The petitioner is granted time till 29th February 1976 to pay the amount due under the impugned orders of assessment. --- *** --- .