JUDGMENT VIMADALAL J.- This is a petition filed by the son of the Ramlal Narang who has been detained under an order passed by the Central Government on July 1, 1975 under section 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"),challenging the validity of the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities (Maharashtra Conditions of Detention) Order, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Order") made under section 5 of the Act. The vaiidity of the said - Order is challenged on four grounds, viz., (a) that it is ultra vires section 5 of the Act in so far as its provisions do not deal with the condition of detention of detenus having relation to the purpose and object of the Act, but are in the nature of punishment; (b) that the provisions of the said Order are aimed at terrorising and punishing the detenu, and are, as such, not reasonable and not consistent with the object of the Act, and are also arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and contravene Articles 19, 21 and 22 thereof; (c) that security prisoners detained under the Act are being treated with hostile discrimination in contrast with, the treatment meted out to other detenus as well as to civil and criminal prisoners, and there being no reasonable nexus for differentiating the treatment of one detenu detained under any law of preventive detention from another, the provisions of the said Order are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; and (d) that the power of the Government to withhold any concessions or facilities provided under the said Order is an arbitrary and naked power uncontrolled by any guidelines .and offends Article 14 of the Constitution on that ground also. On these grounds, the petitioner has prayed (a) for a writ, direction or order to quash and set aside the said Order laying down the conditions of detention; (b) for a writ, direction or order requiring the respondents to keep the detenu under detention in accordance with the conditions applicable to undertrial prisoners or civil prisoners in accordance with the Rules contained in the Jail Manual, or Rules made under the Prisons Act, 1894, and in conformity with the Prisons Act, 1894; and (c), for a writ, direction or order requiring the respondents not to put the detenu in solitary confinement, and to grant certain facilities to him by way of· food, medical treatment, interviews, reading material, etc. In prayer (d) of the petition, the petitioner has prayed for an order restraining the respondents, pending the hearing and final disposal of the petition, from transferring the detenu from the Thana Central Prison where he is at present lodged to any other place of detention, and by prayer (e) of the petition, interim reliefs have been sought in terms of prayers (b), (c) and (d) set out above. It may be· mentioned that the four respondents are one Pillai, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, the Superintendent of the Thana Central Prison, the State of Maharashtra, and the Union of India. Thepetition has come up fore us for the issue of a Rule as well as for interim reliefs. 2. In- order to direct the issue of a Rule as well as for the purpose of granting interim relief, the first question that arises is, whether the petitioner has made out a prima facie case to sustain the petition. The power of "Preventive detention" is contained in Entry No.9 of List I (Union List), as well as in Entry No.3 List III (Concurrent List) in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It is our prima facie opinion that, on a plain reading of the said entries, the word "preventive" occurring therein is clearly used in antithesis to the concept of "punitive" detention. It is our prima facie opinion that, on a plain reading of the said entries, the word "preventive" occurring therein is clearly used in antithesis to the concept of "punitive" detention. Happily, this prima facie view which we take is supported by a judgment of the highest Court of our country, and that is the judgment in the case of Sampat v. State of J and K.1 in which, in a case under the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964, J. C. Shah J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed as follows (p. 1157): "One more question needs to be dealt with. The petitioner who was present in the Court at the time of hearing of this petition complained that he is subjected to solitary confinement while in detention. It must be emphasized that a detenu is not a convict. Our Constitution, notwithstanding the broad principles of the rule of law, equality and liberty of the individual enshrined therein, tolerates, on account of peculiar conditions prevailing, legislation which is a negation of the rule of law, equality and liberty. But it is implicit in the Constitutional scheme that the power to detain is not a power to punish for offences which an executive authority in his subjective satisfaction believes a citizen to have committed. Power to detain is preliminary intended to be exercised in those rare cases when the larger interest of the State demands that restrictions shall be placed upon the liberty of a citizen curbing his future activities. The restrictions so placed must, consistently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal." (Italics ours.) On the basis that the conditions of detention must, consistently with its effectiveness, be "minimal" in their rigour, we are clearly of opinion that the petitioner in the present case has a prima facie case that the said Order is ultra vires section 5 of the Act which would not justify any conditions of a punitive nature being imposed upon the detenu, and a Rule limited to the challenge to the said Order on that ground must, therefore, be issued. In so far, however, as the petitioner has challenged the validity of the said Order on the grounds of its being violative of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution, we are afraid, in 'View of the provisions of the Presidential Order made under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution, the right to move the Court for enforcement of the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21 and 22 stands suspended during the subsistence of the Emergency, and the petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to, to have a Rule issued in regard to the same. The reference to Article 19 in the petition appears to us to be inapposite. 3. As far as interlocutory relief is concerned, once a prima facie. case is made out, we certainly have the power to grant such interlocutory relief as could be said to be in aid of, and ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to the petitioner at the hearing of this petition on the footing that the provisions of the said Order laying down the conditions of detention are ultra vires section 5 of the Act. Once a prima facie case is made out, as the petitioner before us has made out on that point, the Court must next have regard to considerations of balance of inconvenience, and, in our opinion, those considerations clearly point to the granting of interlocutory relief in the present case. If such interlocutory relief is not granted, irreparable damage may be used to the detenu if, for instance, his health is impaired because of poor food, or he suffers a nervous breakdown by reason of being emotionally upset as a result of being cut off from his family, or if he is unable to have the petition contested effectively. On the other hand, no prejudice would result to the Government by an appropriate interlocutory order in limited terms. If, after such interlocutory relief is granted, the Government ultimately succeeds at the final hearing of this petition, it can enforce the said Order in its full rigour. If, on the other hand, the Government ultimately loses at the final hearing of the petition, it will, in fact, have benefited in the interregnum by having fettered the detenu with some conditions of detention which it was not entitled to impose. If, on the other hand, the Government ultimately loses at the final hearing of the petition, it will, in fact, have benefited in the interregnum by having fettered the detenu with some conditions of detention which it was not entitled to impose. Considerations of balance of inconvenience, therefore, clearly point to the granting of appropriate interlocutory relief to the petitioner in the present case. 4. The only question that survives is in regard to the form of the interlocutory relief which should be granted to the petitioner. Two principles in the matter of granting interlocutory relief are well-settled, and they are, (1) it should not make the main proceedings infructuous; and (2) as regards quantum, since the rights of the parties are still to be finally determined, it should be the minimum that is necessary pendente lite. If, at the final hearing of this petition, the petitioner succeeds in obtaining the relief sought in prayer (a) of the petition, and the provisions of the said Order regulating the conditions of detention are quashed and set aside, the petitioner would further be entitled to the relief claimed in prayer (b) of the petition, and· perhaps, also to the relief claimed in prayer (c) thereof. We are, however, not disposed to grant all the interim reliefs that the petitioner has claimed in prayers (d) and (e) of the petition. In particular, having regard to the powers of the Government contained in section 5 (b) of the Act, and in the absence of any special reasons in that behalf, we do not pass any order which would preclude the respondents from removing or transferring the detenu to any other place of detention, pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition. As far as the other interlocutory reliefs sought by the petitioner are concerned, in our opinion, it is not necessary to grant all of them, but we have come to the conclusion that the minimum relief that is necessary to prevent irreparable damage or harm being caused to the detenu, pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition, should be granted. As already stated earlier, irreparable damage would be caused to the detenu if his health is impaired as a result of poor food, or hl: suffers a nervous breakdown by reason of his being cut-off from his family, or he is unable to have the petition contested effectively, and the interlocutory relief that we should grant to the petitioner should be moulded so as to prevent such damage or harm to the detenu by making appropriate provision for the supply of food of his own choice from o.utside, as well as for interviews with his family members and legal advisers. 5. Before we pass the final order granting that interlocutory relief, we might deal briefly with the contentions that were advanced before us by Mr. M. V. Paranjpe on behalf of the Union of India (respondent No.4) as well as by the learned Government Pleader Mr. Gumaste on behalf of the State (respondent No.3). Mr. Paranjpe's first contention was that the cases of detenus under the Act deal with extraordinary situations in which extraordinary persons are concerned, and the Court should not, therefore, interfere by an interlocutory order. We are afraid, no such proposition has ever been laid down by the Courts. On the contrary, the proposition that has been laid down by no less an authority than the Supreme Court in a case under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, is that a law which confers extraordinary power on the executive- to detain a person without recourse to the ordinary laws of the land and to trial by Courts and places the personal liberty of the subject in extreme peril, against which he is provided with only a limited right of challenge, must be strictly construed, and the power conferred by such a law has to be exercised with extreme care and scrupulously within the bounds laid down in that law (Kishori Mohan v. State of W. B.'J). We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this contention of Mr. Paranjpe. Mr. Paranjpe's next contention that permitting outside food to be given to the detenu may lead to malpractices by reason of daily contact with police constable is, in our opinion, an imaginary grievance that does not need to be dealt with. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this contention of Mr. Paranjpe. Mr. Paranjpe's next contention that permitting outside food to be given to the detenu may lead to malpractices by reason of daily contact with police constable is, in our opinion, an imaginary grievance that does not need to be dealt with. His next contention that since the Central Government is responsible for the health and safety of the detenu while in detention, outside food should not be permitted, is a point which has position but no substance, in so far as it is inconceivable that the food supplied to a detenu by his own family would be such as could be deleterious or harmful to his health. The very purpose o~ making an application for an interlocutory order for the supply of food from outside the prison is obviously that the detenu should have more wholesome food than is available to him in the prison. 6. Mr. Paranjpe's next contention that before the said Order is declared ultra vires, the Central Government's power to regulate the conditions of detention should not be affected by an interim order does not lay down a correct proposition of law in regard to the granting of interim relief. As already stated above, all that the petitioner must establish in order to get appropriate interim relief is that he has a prima fade case. If, as Mr. Paranjpe sought to contend, interlocutory relief cannot be granted till the impugned provision is declared ultra vires, the position would be that no interlocutory order could ever be granted in such cases. Mr. Paranjpe's next contention that interviews with the legal advisers of the detenu should be within the hearing of a Customs Officer as provided in clause 12 (vii) of the said Order, would make a mockery of a relief of that nature, since it would be impossible for the detenu to place his cards on the table in the presence of a Customs Officer. Moreover, since the provisions of clause 12 (vii) are themselves in question in the present petition, reliance on it, is, in our opinion; out of place when we are considering the question of passing a reasonable interlocutory order. The last contention of Mr. Moreover, since the provisions of clause 12 (vii) are themselves in question in the present petition, reliance on it, is, in our opinion; out of place when we are considering the question of passing a reasonable interlocutory order. The last contention of Mr. Paranjpe was that since the petitioner bases .his challenge to the said Order also on rights under Articles 14, 21 and 22 which cannot be enforced at present by reason of the Presidential Order, the granting of interlocutory relief would be "perpetuated'" till the petition is heard after the removal of the Emergency. In view of the fact that the Rule which we are issuing is limited to the challenge to the said Order regulating the conditions of detention on the ground of its being ultra vires section 5 of the Act, this contention of Mr. Paranjpe does not survive at all. 7. The learned Government Pleader contended on behalf of the State that we should not pass an interim order which goes counter to the Presidential Order suspending the right to move the Court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution, and that as long as section 5 of the Act stands, the Court should not interfere by an interim order with the Government's right to regulate the conditions of detention. This argument of the learned Government Pleader overlooks the fact that the prima facie case which we have held the petitioner to have made out, and on the basis of which we purpose to issue a limited Rule and grant interlocutory relief, is not affected by the Presidential Order and has nothing to do with the validity of section 5 of the Act for, even if that section is valid, the said Order cannot go beyond it. We, therefore, reject these contentions of the learned Government Pleader. 8. In the result, we pass the following order :- Rule in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c), limited to ground (a) in paragraph 7 of the petition, and to ground (b) in the said paragragh (omitting the last sentence thereof). We make the Rule returnable on August 11, 1975. 9. 8. In the result, we pass the following order :- Rule in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c), limited to ground (a) in paragraph 7 of the petition, and to ground (b) in the said paragragh (omitting the last sentence thereof). We make the Rule returnable on August 11, 1975. 9. We also order that, pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition, (1) the detenu should be permitted to .have his food from outside at his own expense, subject to routine check; (2) the detenu should be permitted one interview with his legal advisers for two hours in the presence of a Customs Officer, but not within his hearing; (3) the detenu should be permitted one interview per month with any of his family members, which should be in accordance with and subject to sub-clauses (iii), (vi), (vii) and (ix) of clause 12 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities (Maharashtra Conditions of Detention) Order, 1974. Order accordingly.