Judgement JUDGMENT:- The plaintiff filed the suit out of which the present appeal arises, in the Court of the Assistant District Judge No. 1 at Gauhati, for a declaration that the purchase of the land described in the schedule A to the plaint by the registered deed dated 3-12-1927 in the name of Dukhuram was a benami purchase by, on behalf of, and for the plaintiff; for a declaration that the sale of the lands described in schedule C to the plaint to defendant No. 4 by Rangila by a registered deed dated 1-12-1959 was fraudulent and null and void; for a declaration that the decree granting Letters of Administration in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 by the Additional District Judge, Gauhati in T. S. (Probate) No. 10 of 1962 in respect of the B schedule land was not binding on the plaintiff; and for confirmation of his possession in respect of the B schedule land and for recovery of possession of the C schedule land. The land described in schedule A measures 54B-1K-14 Lechas comprising the land measuring 43B-4K-11 Lechas described in Schedule B and 10 B. 2K. 19 Lechas described in schedule C to the plaint. 2. The plaintiffs case may be stated as follows :- Domram and Kaluram were two brothers being the son of one late Dhaniram, Kaluram died leaving two sons, Dukhuram and Laghanu, Laghanu died leaving Baliram (defendant No. 5) and Dharjya Ram (defendant No. 6). Dukhuram died leaving his widow, Rangila only. Rangila died in 1960. The plaintiff is the son of Domram. The plaintiff alleges that he entered into an agreement for the purchase of the A schedule land from late Anandiram Das for a consideration of Rupees 1300/-. The agreement was effected by a registered deed dated 23-12-1927. An earnest money of Rs. 200/- was paid on the date of the agreement. The stipulation was that the balance of Rs. 1100/- of the consideration money would be paid within a month when the sale deed would be executed. Accordingly the plaintiff paid the balance sum of Rs. 1100/- on 3-12-1927 and purchased the land from Anandiram and took delivery of possession thereof. As the plaintiff was in Government service and as his two nephews, defendants Nos. 1100/- of the consideration money would be paid within a month when the sale deed would be executed. Accordingly the plaintiff paid the balance sum of Rs. 1100/- on 3-12-1927 and purchased the land from Anandiram and took delivery of possession thereof. As the plaintiff was in Government service and as his two nephews, defendants Nos. 5 and 6, were jointly living with him he got the sale deed executed in the name of his cousin, Dukhuram, who was living separately from him. The plaintiff alleges that although the sale deed was executed in the name of Dukhuram the consideration money was paid by him; he himself took delivery of possession of the land and was in possession thereof; he paid the land revenue and exercised all his rights in respect of the land continuously since the date of purchase. After the death of Dukhuram there was some litigation in respect of the suit land, but it was he who was taking all steps in those litigations in the name of Rangila. He possessed the land through tenants and adhiars and realised rents in respect thereof. Dukhuram was keeping a shop at Shillong where he died about 30 years ago. After the death of Dukhuram he maintained Rangila at his house till about 5 years ago when she picked up a quarrel with his wife and left Shillong for her brothers home. Defendant No. 3, Chiroram Boj, was her brother. Defendant No. 2 is Chirorams son. Defendant No. 1 is the son of Rangilas sister. After a few months of her stay with defendant No. 3, Rangila fell ill. Taking advantage of that position defendants Nos. 1 to 3 got a registered sale deed dated 1-12-1957 executed by Rangila in the name of defendant No. 4, Harmohan Bora, and got the money misappropriated. The plaintiff had no knowledge of the sale till April, 1961 when he learnt it from the tenants when he went to collect the rents. On 27-5-1960 Rangila executed a will in respect of the B schedule land in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 3. The plaintiff alleges that the will was collusive and involuntary. A few months after the execution of the will, namely, 15-6-1960, Rangila died. The plaintiff alleges that the purchase of the C schedule land by the defendant No. 4 was collusive and the sale is void. 1 to 3. The plaintiff alleges that the will was collusive and involuntary. A few months after the execution of the will, namely, 15-6-1960, Rangila died. The plaintiff alleges that the purchase of the C schedule land by the defendant No. 4 was collusive and the sale is void. It is also alleged that defendants Nos. 1 to 3 got Letters of Administration vide the decree of the Additional District Judge in T. Suit 10/60 in respect of the B schedule land. The plaintiff further alleges that when the defendant No. 4 appeared and filed his written statement he came to know that defendant No. 4 had sold the C schedule land in turn to the Gauhati Development Authority, which originally was not made a party to the suit but later on joined as defendant No. 4 (a). 3. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 have filed a joint written statement. They have inter alia pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, it was bad for multifariousness; and that the suit was inadequately valued and adequate Court-fee had not been paid. Their factual plea is that late Dukhuram was not in any way related to the plaintiff; Dukhuram, during his lifetime was keeping a shop at Shillong and was a man of substance. They allege that in 1927 Dukhuram purchased the land with his own money from late Anandiram by the registered sale deed in question, got his name mutated and was in possession thereof. They deny that the plaintiff paid the consideration money. They admit that the plaintiff was known to Dukhuram, who requested the former to help him in the purchase of the land. Dukhuram paid the earnest money of Rs. 200/- to the plaintiff to have the agreement for sale in the name of Dukhuram, but the plaintiff fraudulently got it executed in his own name, but later on when the fact was discovered the sale deed was executed in the name of Dukhuram. They claim that Dukhuram was the absolute owner of the suit land. They admit that Dukhuram died without any issue leaving his widow, Rangila as his sole heiress. After the death of her husband Rangila left Shillong and was living separately with her brother, defendant No. 3. They claim that Dukhuram was the absolute owner of the suit land. They admit that Dukhuram died without any issue leaving his widow, Rangila as his sole heiress. After the death of her husband Rangila left Shillong and was living separately with her brother, defendant No. 3. It is also alleged by them that defendant No. 1, Abharsharam, was living with Dukhuram and Rangila at Shillong since his childhood and after the death of Dukhuram he left Shillong and he and Rangila used to stay at the residence of defendant No. 3. They deny that the plaintiff had to do anything with the suit land. They aver that during his lifetime Dukhuram managed the land and after his death it was managed by Rangila with the help of defendant No. 1. Rangila being in need of money sold the C schedule land to defendant No. 4 by a registered deed dated 1-12-1959 for Rs. 6,500/- and put defendant No. 4 in possession thereof. Defendant No. 4 in turn, sold it to defendant No. 4 (a) who was put in possession thereof. They further aver that Rangila, out of natural love and affection and of her own free will executed the will bequeathing the B schedule land to them. They, in due course, duly applied for Letters of Administration in respect of the will. The suit was contested by the plaintiff but the Additional District Judge granted the Letters of Administration vide T. S. No. 10/62 on contest. On the strength of the Letters of Administration they got their names mutated in place of Rangila in respect of the land. They further plead that Rangila instituted Title Suit No. 1160/34 in the Court of the Sadar Munsiff, Gauhati, in repect of 27 Bighas 17 Lechas which is half of the suit land against one Bimala Dasya and others and got a decree in her favour and got possession of the land. The plaintiff knew about the suit but he did not set up any claim to the suit land. Thereafter also the plaintiff and one Sukuram filed mutation case No. 227 of 1933-34 claiming the suit land by right of inheritance from Dukhuram, but their case was rejected by the Assistant Settlement Officer by his order dated 2-1-1934 in which it was held that Rangila was the sole heir of Dukhuram and that she had been in possession of the land. The plaintiff did not prefer any appeal against that order, nor did he institute any civil suit. 4. Defendant No. 4, Harmohan Bora, has filed a separate written statement. His material plea is that he was a bona fide purchaser of the C schedule land for valuable consideration and was protected under Section 41 of the T. P. Act. He pleads that the land was in possession of some tenants who surrendered their possession by registered deed of relinquishment dated 1-12-1959 in his favour on payment of Rs. 1000/-. He further pleads that the plaintiff consented to the mutation of his name in respect of the C schedule land on 14-6-1962 before the Settlement Officer, Kamrup. He has also stated that by a registered sale deed dated 17-1-1962 he has sold the land to defendant No. 4 (a). 5. Defendant No. 4 (a), the Gauhati Development Authority, has filed a separate written statement. They deny the plaintiffs allegations. Their case is that they purchased the land of schedule C from defendant No. 4 by registered sale deed dated 17-1-1962 for Rs. 53,346/- and got possession thereof. This purchase was necessary to implement the "Middle Income Group Housing Scheme" of the Government of Assam. They plead that they are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration and are protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. They have also pleaded that the plaintiffs suit is barred under Section 60 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959. 6. On the basis of the pleadings the following issues have been framed by the trial Court: "1. Whether the suit is maintainable in this form? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of the Gauhati Development Authority, which purchased the interest of the defendant No. 4 by a registered sale deed before the institution of the suit? 4. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of causes of action? 5. Whether the different reliefs claimed in the suit can be combined together in one suit and whether one suit is competent to cover all these reliefs? 6. Whether the suit is properly valued and the plaint is adequately stamped? 7. Whether the purchase dated 3-12-1937 of the "A" schedule land by late Dukhuram was a banemi one for and on behalf of the plaintiff? 8. 6. Whether the suit is properly valued and the plaint is adequately stamped? 7. Whether the purchase dated 3-12-1937 of the "A" schedule land by late Dukhuram was a banemi one for and on behalf of the plaintiff? 8. Whether the sale dated 1-12-1959 by late Rangila Dasya in favour of the defendant No. 4 is a collusive and fraudulent one? 9. Whether the probate granted by the Addl. District Judge, L. A. D., Gauhati in T. S. No. 10/62 is binding on the plaintiff? 10. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his acts and conduct to institute this suit? 11. To what reliefs, if any, are the parties entitled? Additional issues:- 1. Whether the defendant No. 4 (a) is a bona fide transferee for value, without any notice of the claim of the plaintiff and protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act? 2. Whether the suit against the defendant No. 4 (a) is maintainable under Section 60 of the Assam Town and Country Planning Act, 1959 (Assam Act 11 of 1960)? 3. Whether the plaintiff has acquired title in respect of the suit land by right of adverse possession as claimed by him"? 7. After trial the learned trial Court has held that the plaintiff "has completely failed to prove his alleged case that the purchase dated 3-12-1927 of the A schedule land by late Dukhuram was a benami one for and on behalf of the plaintiff". It has also held that the sale deed executed by Rangila in favour of defendant No. 4 was genuine and that defendants Nos. 4 and 4 (a) were protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. It dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the plaintiff. 8. The only submission made before me by Shri A.M. Majumdar, learned counsel for the appellants, is that the finding of the learned Court below that the plaintiff has failed to prove his case that the purchase of land in the name of Dukhuram under sale deed Ext. 2 was not a benami transaction, is erroneous. He has expressly given up any challenge to the findings of the learned Court below that the sale in favour of defendant No. 4 by Rangila was genuine and that defendants Nos. 4 and 4 (a) were protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. 9. 2 was not a benami transaction, is erroneous. He has expressly given up any challenge to the findings of the learned Court below that the sale in favour of defendant No. 4 by Rangila was genuine and that defendants Nos. 4 and 4 (a) were protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. 9. In reply Sri J.N. Sarma, learned counsel for defendants 1, 2, 3 submit that the finding of the learned Trial Judge on the point of benami is a correct one. In addition he has raised two other points; (i) that the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation, and (ii) that appellants did not pay adequate court fee in the suit, as well as in the appeal. 10. Before we consider the alleged benami purchase let us examine the relevant law on the point. 11. The normal law is when a person is the ostensible owner of property he is presumed to be its real owner. When land is purchased by a registered deed in the name of a person the presumption is that he is the real owner of the land as well as ostensible. If a person alleges that the ostensible owner is not the real owner, the burden is upon him to prove that the ostensible owner is not the real owner. When a plaintiff brings a suit on the allegation that though the suit land stands in the name of the defendant and was purchased in his name it was a benami purchase and the real owner is the plaintiff, the burden is upon him (plaintiff) to prove it. He is to prove it by cogent evidence beyond reasonable doubt that he is the real owner. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to create a mere doubt in the mind of the Court that the ostensible owner may not be the real owner, or that the ostensible owner is real owner is doubtful. 12. The Privy Council in AIR 1926 P. C. 77 have held:- "In all benamidar transactions the very object of the parties is secrecy; but still the person who alleges that property conveyed on another belongs to himself must prove his allegation and prove it beyond reasonable doubt". 12. The Privy Council in AIR 1926 P. C. 77 have held:- "In all benamidar transactions the very object of the parties is secrecy; but still the person who alleges that property conveyed on another belongs to himself must prove his allegation and prove it beyond reasonable doubt". In another decision reported in AIR 1921 PC 69 the Privy Council has held: "The burden of proof lies on the party assailing a transaction as benami, although the circumstances may be suspicious. In such cases it is essential to take care that the decision of the Court rests not upon suspicion, but upon legal grounds, established by legal testimony. Their Lordships of the Federal Court in the case of Gangadara Ayyar v. Subramania Sastrigal reported in AIR 1949 FC 88 have laid down the law in still dearer terms thus: "The onus of establishing that a transaction is benami is on the person asserting benami nature of the transaction and it must be strictly made out. The decision of the Court cannot rest on mere suspicion but must rest on legal grounds and legal testimony. In the absence of evidence the apparent title must prevail. In a case where it is asserted that an assignment in the name of one person is in reality for the benefit of another, the real test is the source whence the consideration came and when it is not possible to obtain evidence which conclusive establishes or rebuts the allegation, the case must be dealt with on reasonable probabilities and legal inferences arising from proved or admitted facts." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the law in AIR 1965 SC 1364 with regard to the test by which a transaction can be determined whether it was a benami one. Their Lordships have observed: " . . . . . . We start with the position that the Court will presume an ostensible title to be the real title unless a plaintiff who seeks to assert the contrary pleads and proves that the ostensible owner is not the real owner. In other words, the onus is on the person who alleges a transaction to be benami to make it out. . We start with the position that the Court will presume an ostensible title to be the real title unless a plaintiff who seeks to assert the contrary pleads and proves that the ostensible owner is not the real owner. In other words, the onus is on the person who alleges a transaction to be benami to make it out. Of course, the source of the funds from which the purchase is made coupled with the manner of its enjoyment would be a very material factor for establishing the case of benami but the mere proof of the source of the purchase money would not finally establish the benami nature of the defendants title." Their Lordships then quoted with approval Maynes observation in the Hindu Law on the point: "While the source from which the money came is undoubtedly a valuable test, it cannot be considered to be the sole or conclusive criterion. For, the question whether a particular transaction is benami or not, is one of intention and there may be other circumstances to negative the prima facie inference from the fact that the purchase money was supplied by or belonged to another. The position of the parties, the relation to one another, the motives which could govern their actions and their subsequent conduct may well rebut the presumption." Their Lordships further observed: "Even where the benami is established, effect will not be given to the real title if the result of doing so would be to violate the provisions of the statute or to work a fraud upon innocent persons". 13. In the light of the above principles of law on the question, let us now examine the present case. Motive is one of the ingredients of a benami transaction and when the plaintiff alleges a motive he has to prove it. If he fails to prove the alleged motive of the benami transaction, his failure will detract from the credibility of his case. In the instant case the plaintiff alleged that he purchased the suit land in the name of Dukhuram for two reasons: first that he was in Government service and it was not possible for him to buy the land in his own name; and second, that his nephews, Baliram and Dharjya, (defendants 5 and 6 respectively) were living jointly with him. He did not purchase the land in his own name lest defendants 5 and 6 claimed shares in it. 14. To prove that he was in Government service, the plaintiffs is the only evidence. He has also relied on his own description, occupation-service in the agreement for sale, Ext. 1. The agreement stands in the name of the plaintiff. He has not explained as to why Ext. 1 was executed in his name although allegedly he was in Government service and living jointly with defendants Nos. 5 and 6. Even he himself has not stated the nature of his service under the Government. On the other hand, his own witness Udit (P. W. 1) has stated that he knew the plaintiff from his childhood and that the plaintiff used to work as a Mohoril (Pleaders clerk) in the Court. His allegation that he was in Government service has been seriously challenged by the defendants. The plaintiff has adduced no dependable evidence. It must, therefore, be held that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he was in Government service at the time of the transaction. 15. It is an admitted fact that originally the plaintiff lived in village Kheheripara. Presumably he was living there with his two cousins, defendants 5 and 6. In the plaint the address of defendants 5 and 6 is Kharipara, Mouza Barbangsar, District Kamrup, while the plaintiffs address has been given as North Gauhati Town, Mouza Sila Sundari Ghopa, in the district of Kamrup. In his evidence the plaintiff has stated that in 1920 or 1921 he shifted to North Gauhati from his original village Khehenipara and since then he has been living there. He has not deposed that defendants Nos. 5 and 6 also shifted to North Gauhati with him. There is, therefore, no evidence to prove his allegation that at the time of the transaction, which took place in 1927, he was living jointly with defendants Nos. 5 and 6. On the contrary the evidence shows that he was living separately from his cousins. In the result it must be held that the plaintiff has failed to establish the second motive also of the alleged benami purchase. 16. The next consideration is the source of the consideration money. The plaintiff in his evidence has stated that he paid the consideration, which was his money. In the result it must be held that the plaintiff has failed to establish the second motive also of the alleged benami purchase. 16. The next consideration is the source of the consideration money. The plaintiff in his evidence has stated that he paid the consideration, which was his money. His evidence is that there was an agreement for the purchase (Ext. 1) executed on 23-11-1927 on which date he paid an earnest money of Rs. 200/- and on the date of purchase, namely, 3-12-1927 he paid the balance amount of Rs. 1100/-. P. W. 1, Udit in his evidence has supported him on this point. On the other hand the evidence of defendant No. 1 who was with Dukhu at Shillong at the relevant time is that the plaintiff took the money from Dukhu. I do not have any reason to disbelieve P. W. 1. So it must be held that the actual payment of the consideration of the purchase was made by the plaintiff, although there is no credible evidence on the source of the money. The presumption is that it was the plaintiffs own money. 17. The source of the consideration money is not the conclusive test to determine the question of a benami transaction. It is to be considered along with other surrounding circumstances. 18. Let us now examine the other surrounding circumstances in the case. Let us first find on possession. (i) Possession The plaintiff has examined P. Ws. 2, 3 and 4 to prove his possession of the suit land, and proved some documents. Exhibits 3 (1) to 3 (16) P. W. 2, Kiringa Mikir, deposes that he possessed 24 bighas out of the suit land as a tenant under the plaintiff. The land in question is agricultural land. His evidence is that he used to pay cash rent of Rs. 2/- per bigha for 5 bighas and for the remaining area he used to pay rent in kind at the rate of 3 puras of paddy per bigha. He is aged about 35 years. His evidence is that settlement was taken by his father from the plaintiff. To prove the tenancy he has proved some rent receipts marked as Exts. 3 (1) to 3 (16). I have examined Exts. 3 (1) to 3 (16) in original. He is aged about 35 years. His evidence is that settlement was taken by his father from the plaintiff. To prove the tenancy he has proved some rent receipts marked as Exts. 3 (1) to 3 (16). I have examined Exts. 3 (1) to 3 (16) in original. It appears that Exts, 3 (1) and 3 (2) are for the rents for the same year 1964. Each of them is for 20 maunds of paddy and Rs. 10/-. Ext. 3 (2) is dated 3-1-1965 and Ext. 3 (1) is dated 6-1-1966. The plaintiffs evidence is that P. W. 2 possessed 25 bighas of land. The plaintiff deposes that the original agreement was with the father of P. W. 2 in the year 1927-28. He says that he used to give him 20 maunds of paddy per year. The rent receipts, Exts. 3 (1) to 3 (7) and 3 (11) to 3 (16) appear to have been written on pieces of white paper of same sizes and same quality. They also appear to have been written with the same pen and ink. Ext. 3 (8) also appears to have been written on a piece of paper of same size and of same quality as of Exts. 3 (1) to 3 (7) but with pencil. Exts. 3 (9) and 3 (10) appear to have been written on pieces of paper of the same quality as the paper of other receipts of the 3 series, though of different seizes but with the same pen and with the same ink. Furthermore there are some clear over-writings. In Ext. 3 (4) originally the year of rent was mentioned as 1362, which was a Bengali year, but 9 has been over-written on 3 and made it 1962. Similarly 9 has been over-written on 3 in Ext. 3 (5) and the year 1361 has been made 1961; similarly in Ext. 3 (7) 1356 has been altered to 1956; in Ext. 3 (8) 1350 has been altered to 1950; in Ext. 3 (9) 1342 has been altered to 1942, in Ext. 3 (10) 1340 has been altered to 1940; and in Ext. 3 (12) 1334 has been altered to 1934. Exts. 3 (1) to 3 (16) are suspicious documents and appear to have been fabricated for the purpose of the suit. No reliance can be put on them. 3 (9) 1342 has been altered to 1942, in Ext. 3 (10) 1340 has been altered to 1940; and in Ext. 3 (12) 1334 has been altered to 1934. Exts. 3 (1) to 3 (16) are suspicious documents and appear to have been fabricated for the purpose of the suit. No reliance can be put on them. The plaintiffs case that 24 Bighas of the suit land was possessed by him through his tenant P. W. 2 has to be rejected. Exhibits 5 (1) to 5 (11). P. W. 3 is Tithiram Mikir. He deposes that he occupied 4 bighas of the disputed land under the plaintiff on condition of paying 9 maunds of paddy per bigha as rent. He deposes that he used to pay the aforesaid rents and obtained rent receipts. These rent receipts have been proved as Exts. 5 (1) to 5 (11). He deposes that arrangement was not made with him. He is a very young man of 20 years at the time of deposition. The earliest receipt granted relates to 1953. He gave his evidence in 1966. He was, therefore, born about in 1946 and in 1953 he was about 13 years old. He admits that his father Kania is alive. No explanation has been given by the plaintiff as to why P. W. 3 has been examine in preference to his father, who presumably took the original arrangement. That apart, these Exts. 5 (1) to 5 (11) also appear to have been written on pieces of papers of the same sizes and quality and with the same ink and pen. Exts. 5 (1) to 5 (11) executed in favour of P. W. 3, Tithiram, appear to have been written on pieces of paper of sizes and quality as of Exts. 3 series. Exts. 5 (1) to 5 (11) also appear to be suspicious and appear to have been fabricated for the purpose of the suit. No reliance can be placed on them. The evidence of P. W. 3 that he possessed 4 bighas of the disputed land as tenant under the plaintiff cannot be accepted. Exhibits 5 (12) to 5 (21). P. W. 4 is Rajen Mikir aged about 25 years. He deposes that he occupied 4 bighas of the suit land under the plaintiff on payment of 4 maunds of paddy for the 4 bighas of land. Exhibits 5 (12) to 5 (21). P. W. 4 is Rajen Mikir aged about 25 years. He deposes that he occupied 4 bighas of the suit land under the plaintiff on payment of 4 maunds of paddy for the 4 bighas of land. He further deposes that the plaintiff used to grant him rent receipts. These rent receipts have been proved as Exts. 5 (12) to 5 (21). Exts. 5 (12) to 5 (21) also appear to have been written on pieces of paper of similar sizes and quality, as Exts. 5 (1) to 5 (11) and Ext. 3 series. Exts. 5 (12) to 5 (21) also appear to have been written with the same pen and same ink as Exts. 5 (1) to (11) and 3 series. No reliance can be placed on these receipts, Exts. 5 (12) to 5 (21). P. W. 4 is aged about 25 years at the time of his deposition on 30-9-1966. So he was about 15 years in 1955 when the earliest receipt, Ext. 5 (15), for the year 1956 was issued. Another suspicious thing is that the rent receipt Ext. 5 (16) for four maunds of paddy for the year 1964 is shown to have been issued on 6-1-1955, that is to say, 9 years earlier than the year of rent. These receipts Exts. 5 (12) to 5 (21) are highly suspicious and unacceptable. In fact all the exhibits 3 series and 5 series appear to be of the same age and appear to have been manufactured at the same time for use in the suit. The plaintiffs case that he possessed the suit land through P. Ws. 2, 3 and 4 has to be rejected. Exhibit 6 series. Exts. 6 (1) to 6 (11) have been filed by the plaintiff. They purport to be the revenue receipts in respect of the suit land and with these receipts the plaintiff intends to prove his possession of the land. Exts. 6 (1), 6 (5) to 6 (7) and 6 (11) do not bear the signature or seal of the Mauzadar. These documents appear to be collusive. They are worthless. The rest, namely, Exts. 6 (2), 6 (3), 6 (4), 6 (8), 6 (9) and 6 (10) have been duly signed on behalf of the Mauzadar and also bear his seal. Exts. These documents appear to be collusive. They are worthless. The rest, namely, Exts. 6 (2), 6 (3), 6 (4), 6 (8), 6 (9) and 6 (10) have been duly signed on behalf of the Mauzadar and also bear his seal. Exts. 6 (2), 6 (9) and 6 (10) show payment of revenue by Dukhuram on behalf of Anandiram. Exts. 6 (3) and 6 (8) show payment of revenue by Dukhuram on behalf of himself. Ext. 6 (4) shows payment of revenue by Dukhuram by money order. These receipts have come from the custody of the plaintiff. The suggestion of the defendant was that these receipts were filed by Rangila in the Title Suit before the Munsiff, but they were taken back from the Munsiffs Court by the plaintiff. These receipts show that they were exhibited before the Munsiff. They however to not prove payment of revenue, by the plaintiff. So and in view of the fact that Exts. 6 (1) 6 (5) to 6 (7) and 6 (11) have been held to be collusive, the revenue receipts Ext. 6 series do not prove plaintiffs possession of the suit land. So it must be held that plaintiff has failed to prove his possession. (ii) Ext. 8 is the chitha of the disputed patta. This document shows the names of Praneswar and defendant No. 4-Harmohan Bora as the pattadars. The name of the plaintiff appears to have been mutated by right of inheritance in place of Rangila, while the name of defendant No. 4 has been mutated on the chita by right of purchase. (iii) Ext. 10 is a copy of the Jamabandi of the suit patta. This document shows the name of Rangila as the pattadar in place of Dukhuram. Before Dukhuram, the names of Anandi Koch and Bimala were shown as pattadars. The name of Dukhuram was mutated in place of Anandiram by right of purchase in respect of half the land. After his death Rangilas name was mutated in his place on 16-6-1934 while Dukhurams name had been mutated on 3-8-1930. (iv) Ext. 12 is a patta of the suit land. The name of Dukhuram was mutated in place of Anandiram by right of purchase in respect of half the land. After his death Rangilas name was mutated in his place on 16-6-1934 while Dukhurams name had been mutated on 3-8-1930. (iv) Ext. 12 is a patta of the suit land. This patta was admittedly issued jointly to the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 on 3-8-65 during the settlement operation while there was still an appeal pending before the Settlement Officer against the order dated 9-7-64 of the Assistant Settlement Officer in respect of the order of settlement of the disputed land. 19. Let us now examine the evidence on possession adduced by the defendants. Ext. A is the registered sale deed executed by Rangila in favour of defendant No. 4, Harmohan, selling 10B-2K-6 Lechas of land out of the disputed patta on 1-12-1959. This document was signed by P. W. 2 Kiringa Mikir, as one of the attesting witnesses. One of the recitals in Ext. A is that the land sold was in possession of Chandi Kachari and his cousin under sukani agreement under the vendor, Rangila. Ext. C. is a registered deed of relinquishment. Ext. C shows that Chandi Kachari, Bhupen Chandra Boro and Abhoyram Kachari were tenants in respect of 10B-2K-6 Lechas of the C schedule land sold by Rangila to defendant No. 4 under Ext. A. The tenants have relinquished their tenancy right in favour of the vendor Harmohan Bora. D. W. 4, Gobinda Ch. Talukdar, depose that Harmohan Bora sold the above mentioned land which he had purchased under Ext. A to the Gauhati Development Authority, defendant No. 4 (a). He says that when Harmohan purchased the land from Rangila, Chandi Kachari, Bhupen Chandra Bora and Abhoyram had been in possession of the land and they relinquished their possession by executing the deed of relinquishment, Ext. C. He says that this deed vas read over to them. He has proved the signatures of the executants on Ext. C. He further deposes that after vacant possession was taken by Harmohan Bora he was put in possession and that he continued to be in possession. He has proved the rent receipts Exts. 1, 1 (1), 1 (2) and 1 (3) executed by defendant No. 4 (a) to him. Ext. He has proved the signatures of the executants on Ext. C. He further deposes that after vacant possession was taken by Harmohan Bora he was put in possession and that he continued to be in possession. He has proved the rent receipts Exts. 1, 1 (1), 1 (2) and 1 (3) executed by defendant No. 4 (a) to him. Ext. 8, the chitha discloses the name of Chandi Kachari as a tenant in respect of 3B-3K-9 Lechas of land, of dag No. 24/19/759 and 3B. 7 Lechas of dag No. 25/19. This document also disclosed the name of P. W. 2 as one of the tenants. D. W. 3 is an employee of the Gauhati Development Authority. He also proved Exts. 1,1 (1), 1 (2) and 1 (3) as rent receipts issued by defendant No. 4 (a) to Gobinda Talukdar (D. W. 4). D. W. 5 is Shrimati Jambati Das. Her evidence is that she was possessing 1 pura of land under Rangila for a long time on payment of 12 puras of paddy per year. She deposes that the paddy used to be collected by defendant No. 1, Abharsharam. She says that no rent receipt was issued for the rents. Her former husband was Dom whose name also appears in the chitha. She deposes that Dom also possessed 1 pura of land. She deposes that Praneswar never realised any rent from them. She deposes that before her marriage one Bidur used to possess that land. D. W. 7 is Muria Mikir. His evidence is that he cultivated 6 bighas of the disputed land under Rangila on payment of 3 puras of paddy per bigha per year. He says that he has been possessing this land for about 25 years. He further says that defendant No. 1 used to collect the paddy and that the plaintiff never realised any rent from them. D. W. 2, Harmohan Bora, deposes that he purchased 10B-2K-6 Lechas of the C schedule land from Rangila by Ext. A. His evidence is that before his purchase there were three tenants on the land he paid Rs. 1000/- to the tenants, got a deed of relinquishment (Ext. C) executed by them, and took khas possession of the land. Thereafter he sold the land to defendant No. 4 (a) and gave possession to it. He deposes that after his purchase he got his name mutated. 1000/- to the tenants, got a deed of relinquishment (Ext. C) executed by them, and took khas possession of the land. Thereafter he sold the land to defendant No. 4 (a) and gave possession to it. He deposes that after his purchase he got his name mutated. The plaintiff raised objection before the Settlement Officer against the mutation of his name. The objection was duly heard, but later on the objection was withdrawn by the plaintiff. The plaintiff consented to it and put his signature. This signature has been denied by the plaintiff. The defendants have filed the original order sheet in the Misc. Case No. 337 of 1961-62-Praneswar Das v. Harmohan Bora, pending before the Settlement Officer, Gauhati. The order dated 14-6-1962 shows an endorsement "Seen. P. Das 14-6-1962". This endorsement has been marked as Ext. X as the signature has been disputed by the plaintiff. The original petition of objection filed by the plaintiff before the Settlement Officer has also been filed. The objection petition bears two full signatures of the plaintiff marked as Y (1) and Y (2). The disputed signatures were sent to an expert who has given his opinion that the signature in Ext. X appears to be of that of the plaintiff. The hand-writing expert, Mr. M.B. Dixit, was examined on commission and his evidence has been tendered. On the basis of his evidence it must be held that the disputed signature was of the plaintiff. It, therefore, cannot be said that the plaintiff was not a consenting party to the mutation of the name of defendant No. 2 to 10B. 2 Kathas of land sold to defendant No. 4. Ext. S. is a Khatian in respect of 3B-4K-13 Lechas of land covered by dag No. 156 (old) and 168 (new) of the disputed patta. This khatian shows the name of Rangila as the pattadar and the name of Dom as the tenant. Ext. T. is another Khatian in respect of 6B-1K-15 Lechas covered by dag No. 90 (old) 94 (new) of the suit patta. This khatian also shows the name of Rangila as the pattadar and Moria Mikir as the tenant. Ext. N. is a copy of the Jamabandi. This shows the name of Rangila as the pattadar, her name having been mutated in place of Dukhuram. This khatian also shows the name of Rangila as the pattadar and Moria Mikir as the tenant. Ext. N. is a copy of the Jamabandi. This shows the name of Rangila as the pattadar, her name having been mutated in place of Dukhuram. Before her, her husband Dukhurams name was mutated in place of Anandiram in respect of 27B-17 Lechas of land by right of purchase. Ext. O. is a certified copy of the order in mutation case No. K. P. 268 of 1963-64, in which Abharsharam was the applicant. The order dated 15-6-1964 shows that the names of Abharsa Bez (defendant No. 1), Puspa Ram Bez and Chira Ram Bez were mutated in place of Rangila by right of inheritance in respect of 49B-4K-13 Lechas of land covered by patta No. 133 of village Hengarabari, Mouza Beltola. 20. A consideration of the above evidence conclusively proves possession of the land by Dukhuram, after him by Rangila and after her by the defendants. 21. There are some other circumstances which militate against the plaintiffs case. They are disclosed by Exts. K, P, M and 7. Ext. K. is the certified copy of the judgment of the Sadar Munsiff, Gauhati, in Title Suit No. 1760 of 1930 by Rangila, widow of Dukhuram, against Bimala Dasya in respect of the suit land. The suit was for a declaration of right, tittle and recovery of possession of 27B-17 Lechas of land covered by the disputed patta. The suit was decreed with costs in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff knew about the suit, for, in his deposition he says, "in the year 1930 T. S. No. 1760/1930 was instituted by Dukhuram against Bimala Dasya in the Court of the Musiff, Gauhati and during the pendency of that suit Dukhuram died. On the death of Dukhuram the name of Rangila Dasya was substituted in place of Dukhuram. The suit was decreed in favour of Rangila. I took all steps in that case for Dukhuram and Rangila. Rangila obtained possession of the land through Court". The plaintiff did not claim any title for himself to the suit land. Ext. P is a certified copy of the order dated 2-1-1934 of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Gauhati, in Case No. 227 of 1933-34. In that case the plaintiff and one Sukuram Das were the applicants. Rangila obtained possession of the land through Court". The plaintiff did not claim any title for himself to the suit land. Ext. P is a certified copy of the order dated 2-1-1934 of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Gauhati, in Case No. 227 of 1933-34. In that case the plaintiff and one Sukuram Das were the applicants. In that case the plaintiff claimed the land "by right of inheritance from Dukhuram". The Assistant Settlement Officer rejected the application and referred the plaintiff to the civil court. Ext. M is the certified copy of the probate of the will granted by the Additional District Judge, Gauhati, to defendant No. 1 and others in Probate Title Suit No. 10 of 1962 in respect of the B schedule land. In the probate case also the plaintiff set up his claim, not as the purchaser, but as an heir of Dukhuram. Ext. 7, the jamabandi, also shows that the plaintiffs name was mutated in place of Rangila by order of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 2-8-1960 in the chitha as an heir to Rangila. These exhibits K, P, M and 7 belie the plaintiffs case that he was the purchaser of the disputed land under- Ext. 2 and that Dukhuram was the benamdar. The plaintiff has admitted in his cross-examination that the name of Rangila was mutated in place of Dukhuram with the consent of the plaintiff. D. W. 8, Abharcharam, is defendant No. 1. His evidence is that Dukhuram was doing his business at Shillong. His wife Rangila was living with him at Shillong. They had no issue. He was living with them from his age of about 12 or 14 years. Rangila was his mothers younger sister. He has proved 17 revenue receipts Exts. J to J (16) showing payment of revenue for the suit land by Ragila. He deposed that he managed the land after the death of Dukhu. 22. Considering the facts of the case and the surrounding circumstances, I hold that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the purchase in question was benami. 23. Shri J.N. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the suit was barred by limitation. Issue No. 2, as quoted above, was on the question of limitation. But the learned trial court did not give any finding on it as the issue was not pressed. 23. Shri J.N. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the suit was barred by limitation. Issue No. 2, as quoted above, was on the question of limitation. But the learned trial court did not give any finding on it as the issue was not pressed. But as the question of limitation goes to the very root of jurisdiction of the Court, it has been allowed to be canvassed, before me. As stated above, the deed of purchase (Ext. 2) was executed on 3-12-1927. The plaintiffs suit is for a declaration that this deed is a benami purchase and that he is the real owner. In my opinion Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to the suit. It is a residuary Article, which prescribes a period of six years for a suit and the suit ought to have been filed within six years from the date of the execution of Ext. 2. The suit, therefore, was clearly out of time. 24. In the suit the plaintiff prayed for confirmation of possession in respect of B schedule land and for recovery of possession in respect of the C schedule land. Alternatively, he prayed for a declaration of his title by right of adverse possession in respect of both B and C schedule land. It has been found above that the plaintiff has not been able to establish his possession at all. On the other hand the defendants have by cogent evidence been able to prove their possession. It must, therefore, be held that the plaintiff has not acquired any title by adverse possession. 25. The only other question that remains for consideration is the question of valuation of the suit and payment of court fee. Issue No. 6 was "whether the suit is properly valued and the plaint is adequately stamped". The learned court below has not given any clear finding on it. He has found that the plaintiff has not adequately valued the suit, both for the purpose of jurisdiction as well as court-fee. He has very vaguely held that "the suit has not been properly valued and proper Court-fee not paid". The plaintiff has valued the suit at Rs. 8,000/-. There is vague evidence on the record that in 1960-61 the price of the land would be Rs. 4000/- to Rs. 5000/- per bigha. There is no concrete dependable evidence. He has very vaguely held that "the suit has not been properly valued and proper Court-fee not paid". The plaintiff has valued the suit at Rs. 8,000/-. There is vague evidence on the record that in 1960-61 the price of the land would be Rs. 4000/- to Rs. 5000/- per bigha. There is no concrete dependable evidence. So I accept the valuation of Rs. 8000/- for the purpose of Courts pecuniary jurisdiction and hold that the suit was properly valued for pecuniary jurisdiction. 26. At the time of filing of the memorandum of this appeal, the office note was that the memo was not adequately stamped and the appellant was directed to pay the deficit court-fee; but as he failed to do so, the matter was put up before the Court for orders. Presumably the correctness of the office order was questioned by the appellants counsel. So a Division Bench of the Court on 2-9-1971 passed the following order : "Let the appeal be registered subject to the matter relating to Court-fee to be decided at the time of hearing in presence of the other side". Thus the matter of Court-fee falls for decision. 27. For possession the plaintiff has paid Court-fee at 5 times the annual revenue under Section 7 (v) (b) of the Court-Fees Act and for declaration a fixed fee of Rs. 20/- has been paid under Article 17 (iii) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act. Clearly this is a declaratory suit with consequential reliefs, the dominant prayer being for a declaration that the purchase in question under Ext. 2 was a benami transaction, the reliefs of confirmation and recovery of possession were merely consequential, depending on the declaration sought. The suit, therefore, is clearly covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, which provides: "7. The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows: .... .... .... (iv) In suits- .... .... .... (c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, .... .... .... according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought." 28. .... .... (iv) In suits- .... .... .... (c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, .... .... .... according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought." 28. The plaintiff could not have filed the suit for mere declaration that the purchase of the A schedule land by registered deed dated 3-12-1927 was a benami purchase without seeking the reliefs of possession of the B and C schedule lands as in that case the suit would have been hit by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 7 (v) (b) of the Court-fees Act is not applicable to the present case. Section 7 (v) (b) applies when the suit is for possession of land which is not permanently settled, but which forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and it is also recorded as a estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to the Government. In the instant case neither the B schedule land nor the C schedule land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to the Government nor is it recorded as such an estate. B schedule and C schedule lands are merely parts of a bigger area. They do not fulfil the conditions laid down under Section 7 (v) (b) of the Court-fees Act. 29. In the instant case the plaintiff has put the valuation at Rs. 8000/-. He is liable to pay Court-fee on this amount both on the plaint as well as in the memorandum of this appeal. 30. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.