( 1 ) THEAS petitions under Art. 226 raise a common question of law relating to the scope of the third proviso to S. 36 of the Karnataka Agricultural income lax Act 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) THO facts giving rise to these petitions are these: Prior to 1958 certain areca garden was jointly held by one P. C. Pai and his three brothers. On 10-11-1958, there was a division in his family. For the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 P. C. Pai filed returns furnishing agricultural income to the extant of his share in that areca garden.- The Agricultural Income. Tax Officer, Puttur-Rcspondent herein called upon P. C. Pai to submit the particulars of his income and expenditure by issuing notice in Form No. 5. In response to the said notice P. C. Pai produced befone the Respondent a copy of the registered partition deed d/. 10-1-1958 and three Term lease deeds in respect of the areca garden from which he delved income He contended that he was a divided member of the family separately enjoying his share in the areca garden. On perusal of the documents produced by p. C. Pai the Respondent came to me conclusion that there was only a partial partition and the family continued to hold the areca garden as a joint family property. On that oasis P. C. Pai was assessed in the status of huf for the years 1965-66 and 1966-67. ( 3 ) CHALLENGING the validity off the said assessment orders P. C. Pai moved this Court in WPs. 1769 and 1770 of 1967. The Court allowed those petitions after holding that the respondent was clearly in error in treating p. C. Pai as Kartha of HUF and be and his brothers should have been assessed as tenants-in-common. In the concluding portion of me order this Court observed as follows ;". . . . . The petition suoseds on the ground urged by the petitioner, viz that the respondent is in error in assessing the petitioner in the status of a Hindu undivided family. That being a clear error apparent on the face of the record we quash the impugned orders of assussment made by the respondent ihe respondent is at liberty to assess. the petitioner and his brothers for the relevant assessment years in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment. That being a clear error apparent on the face of the record we quash the impugned orders of assussment made by the respondent ihe respondent is at liberty to assess. the petitioner and his brothers for the relevant assessment years in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment. No costs. "the petitioner referered to above is P. C. Pai. He is not before me the petitioners before me are his three younger brokers who were not eo nomine parties to the previous proceedings. ( 4 ) PURSUANT to the direction issued by this Court in WPs. 1769 and 1770 of 1967 the respondent issued notice under S. 19 (3) read with S. 3 of me Act calling upon the petitioners to show cause wny final ass-Esment orders for the years 1965-66 and 1966-67 should now be made against them by apportioning the income oi the areca garden to each of the brothers as tenanis-in-common. Tho notice was issued on 16-7-1973. The petitioners filed objections contending inter alia that the proceedings against them were barred by limitation under S. 36 of the Act. Repeilmg that contention the respondent passed assessment orders which are challenged in these petitions. The respondent has held that previous assessment proceedings taken against P. C. Pai should be held to be binding on his three brothers even though they were not parties to the said proceedings. He has further held that P. C. Pai is a main tenant-in-common who was and is liable to pay the tax assessed on each of his brothers. Before me the contention regarding the limitation was repeated on behalf of the petitioners by placing reliance on S. 36 of the Act. For the respondent is was urged that the assessment orders were valid and saved by the third proviso to Section 36. Before me the contention regarding the limitation was repeated on behalf of the petitioners by placing reliance on S. 36 of the Act. For the respondent is was urged that the assessment orders were valid and saved by the third proviso to Section 36. ( 5 ) FOR immediate reference the above prqvision is set out below :" 36 Income escaping assessment-If for any reason any agricultural income chargeable to tax under this Act has escaped assessment in any financial year or has been assessed at too low a rate, the agricultural Incomq Tax Officer may in cases falling under sub- sec (3) of S. 40 at any time within five years and in any other case at any time within three years of the end of that year serve on the person liable to pay the tax or in the case of a company on the principal officer thereof a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-sec (2) of S. 18 and may proceed to assess or reassess as such income and the provisions of this act shall so far as may be apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice under that sub-section : (ii) Provided further that in computing the period of limitation for assessment or re-assessment under this section the time during which the assessment has been deferred on account of any stay order granted by any Court or other authority in any case or by reason of the fact that an appeal or other proceeding is pending before the High court or the Supreme Court; shall be excluded: (Hi) Provided also that nothing contained in this section limiting the time within which any action may be taken or any order assessment or re-assessment may be made shall apply to an assessment or re-assessment made on the assessee or any person in consequence Off or to give effect to any finding direction or order made under Ss. 32 33 (34) 35 or 55 or any judgment or order made by the Supreme Court the high Court or any other Court. " ( 6 ) FOR the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 the respondent initiated proceedings against the petitioners by issuing notices on 16-7-1973. It was clearly beyond five years as provided by S. 36. But the third proviso therein lifts this ban under certain circumstances. " ( 6 ) FOR the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 the respondent initiated proceedings against the petitioners by issuing notices on 16-7-1973. It was clearly beyond five years as provided by S. 36. But the third proviso therein lifts this ban under certain circumstances. It statest that the period within which any action to be taken for assessment or re-assessment shall not apply to an assessment or re-assessment made on the assesses or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding direction or order made under Ss. 32 33 34 35 or 55 or any judgment or order made by the Supreme Court or High court or any other Court. The proviso deals with an assesses and any other person against whom the assessment or re-assessment could be made for giving effect to any finding direction or order of any authority under the Act or by any Court. The assessment on P. C. Pai was certainly to give effect to the order of this court and therefore saved by the third proviso. But the petitioners were neither assessees nor parties in the previous proceedings. The impugned assessment orders therefore cannot bind any one of them unless he falls within the meaning of the words 'any person' occurring in the third proviso. It is therefore necessary to examine the scope and meaning of the said words. These words are not new to the taxation law. They were found in s. 34 (3) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 which was the subject of judicial pronouncements. Before referring to the decisions it is better to set out Section 34 (3):" (3) No order of assessment or re-assessment other than an order qr assessment under S. 23 to which clause (c) of sub-sec (1) of s. 28 applies or an order of assessment or re-assessment in cases falling within clause (a) of sub-sec (1) or sub-sec (1a) of this section shall be made after the expiry Off four years from the end of the year in which the income profits or gains were first assessable: provided. . . . . Provided further that nothing contained in this section limiting the time within which any action may be taken or any order, assessment or re-assessment may be made shall apply to a reassessment made under S. 27 or to an assessment or re-assessment madei on the assesses or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or dirqction contained in an order under Ss. 31 33 33a 33b 66 or 66a. "the above proviso to S. 34 (3) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 is analogous to the third proviso to S. 36 of the Act. While dealing with the scope of the proviso to S. 34 (3) of the Income tax Act in Income Tax Officer A. Ward Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagivan das, AIR. 1965 SC 342 349. the Supreme Court observed :" The words 'any person' it is said conclude the matter in favoar of the Dept. The expression 'any person' in its widest connotation may take in any person whether connected or not with the assessee whose income for any year has escaped assessment; but this construction cannot be accepted for the said expression is necessarily circumscribed by the scope of the subject-matter of the appeal or revision as the case may be. That is to say that person must be one who would be liable to be assessed for the whole or a part of the income that went into the assessment of the year under appeal or revision. If so construed we must turn to S 31 to ascertain who is that person other than the appealing assessee who can be liable to be assessed for the income of the said assessment year. A combined reading of S. 30 (1) and s. 31 (3) of the Act indicates the cases where persons other than the appealing assessees might be affected by orders passed by the appellate Commissioner Modification or setting aside of assessment made on a firm joint Hindu family association of persons for a particular year may affect the assessment for the said year on a partner or partners of the firm member or members of Hindu undivided family or the individual as the case may be. In such cases though the latter are not nomine parties to the appeal their assessments depend upon the assessments on the former. In such cases though the latter are not nomine parties to the appeal their assessments depend upon the assessments on the former. The said instanoss are only illustrative it is not necessary to pursue the matter further. We would therefore hold that the -expression 'any person' in the setting in which it appears must be confined to a person intimately connected in the aforesaid sense with the assessments of the year under appeal. " ( 7 ) THE above view has been reiterated by the Supreme Count in cjt Bombay v. Onkarmal Meghraj, AIR 1973 SC. 2585 . At page 2589 of the report it was observed :". . . . . The words 'any person' in the second proviso to S. 34 (3) has been interpreted by this Court in Income Tax Officer v. Murlidhar bhagwan Das ( (1964) 52 ITR 335= air 1965 SC 342 ) as any person intimately connected like members of a HUF partners of the firm or individuals forming an association of individuals because in such cases though they are not eo nomino parties they could be deemed to be represented by the HUF partnership or association before the relevant income Tax Authority. Such is not the case with regard to thqse indi- viduals because no HUF was before the concerned Income Tax Authority-indeed there was no HUF-and therefore they would not be bound by those orders. In the case of individuals who were actually before the Appellate Asst Commr and the Tribunal the orders would bind those three individuals. In their case therefore the second proviso can be rightly applied. " ( 8 ) IT is clear from the aboive decisions that the words 'any person' do not include all other persons unconnected with the previous assessment proceedings. It takes within its fold those persons who might be affected by orders passed by the Courts or the authorities constituted under the Act. They may be partners of a firm members of HUF or individuals forming an association of persons because in such cases though they are not eo nomine parties they shall be deemed to be represented by the HUF partnership or association. But the tenants-in-common do not fall within any one of those categories. A tenant-in-common is as to his own share in the position of the owner of an entire] and separate estate. But the tenants-in-common do not fall within any one of those categories. A tenant-in-common is as to his own share in the position of the owner of an entire] and separate estate. On his death his estate would devolve on his heirs. Therefore the order of assessment against one tenant-in-common is not binding on others unless they also had nofice of that assessment proceedings. Quite apart from that in the instant case petitioners were not connected with the peevious assessment proceedings. P. C. Pai was then assessed in the status of HUF which in fact he was not. There was no huf which he could represent. He did not and in fact could not represent these petitioners in the previous proceedings. The petitioners had no notice of that proceedings. Therefore if the respondent is to proceed against the petitioners on the ground that there was an escaped assessment fo the years 1965-66 and 1966-67 he ought to take proceedings within the time allowed by Sec. 36 of the Act and the third proviso therein is not attracted to extend the period of limitation. ( 9 ) IT must be stated that this Court has no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation prescribed under the said section nor the operative portion of the direction issued by this Court in WPs. 1769 and 1770 of 1967 could be construed in that manner. All that this Court observed was that the respondent would be at liberty to assess the petitioner and his brothers for the relevant assessment years in accordance with law. If the proceedings against the petitioners were barred by time the respondent cannot take advantage of the direction issued by this Court. ( 10 ) ON behalf of the respondent a feeble attempt was made to sustain the impugned assessment orders by relying on the second proviso to Section 36. ( 11 ) SECOND proviso reads :" Provided further that in computing the period of limitation for assessment or re-assessment under this section the time during which the assessment has been deferred on account of any stay ordier granted by any Court or other authority in any case or by reason of the fact that an appeal or other proceeding is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court; shall be excluded. "the above proviso is clearly not applicable to the facts of the present case as this Court has never stayed any proceedings as against the petitioners. It may at best be applicable to the case of P C Pai who has not come before this Court. ( 12 ) IN the result rules issued in these petitions are made absolute and a writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the impugned assessments. The petitioners are entitled to their costs. 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