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1975 DIGILAW 16 (PAT)

S. M. Nazim Baboo v. State

1975-01-24

NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, S.ALI AHMAD

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Judgment Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. This application in revision is directed against an order, dated the 13th November, 1971, passed by Shree P. Sinha, Sub-divisional Magistrate, Madhubani, by which he had taken cognizance of offence under section 153, 144, and 380 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners on the basis of a police report and transferred the case to Shree K.M. Agrawal, Munsif Magistrate. He had not, however, issued processes to the accused petitioners. It appears that, on the same day, on-receipt of the records, Shree Agrawal ordered for issue of non-bailable warrants of arrest fixing the 30th November, 1971 as the date for appearance of the accused persons. The petitioners have challenged the legality of the aforesaid orders on the ground that, under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (here in after referred to as the Code) only the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence can issue summons or warrant, as the case may be, to the accused. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the requirement of section 204 of the Code that only the Magistrate taking cognizance should issue process is imperative in nature and any violation thereof will nullify the proceedings taken subsequent thereto. 3. Under Section 190 (1) of the Code, a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence either upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer, or upon information derived by him from any source other than a police officer. Section 192(1) prescribes that the Magistrate who has taken cognizance of an offence may transfer the case for inquiry or trial to any Magistrate subordinate to him. In section 192 no stage is prescribed when such case can be transferred for inquiry or trial, and that is why from time to time controversies arise as to whether the said power can be exercised only after issuance of process under Section 204 or even at a stage prior to that, soon after taking cognizance under Section 190(1) Section 190 and 192 occur in Chapter XV under the heading conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings and that Chapter contains provisions meant to be applicable to cases instituted on police-reports as on petitions of complaint, as the case may be. In Chapter XVI there are four sections which relate exclusively to case instituted on petitions of complaint under the heading "Of complaints to Magistrates". Section 204, which is relevant for the present case, occurs in Chapter XVII, headed as "Of the Commencement of proceeding before Magistrates". This section is applicable to cases instituted on police reports as well as on petitions of complaint. 4. The question whether only the Magistrate taking cognizance can issue process or his successor-in office, temporary or permanent, can also summon the accused was decided by a Fun Bench of this Court in Krishnadeo Prasad Vs. Mt. Budhnil where it was held that temporary or a permanent successor-in office of the Magistrate who had taken cognizance under section 190 could also issue process. That was a case instituted on a petition of complaint. A Similar question arose for consideration before the Supreme Court in Rajendra Nath Mahto Vs. T. Gangooly, Deputy Superintendent of Purulia'. There, a complaint had been filed and one Shree S.K. Ganguly, Magistrate, took cognizance of the offence and fixed a date for holding judicial inquiry. On receipt of the report of the judicial inquiry, however, one Shree S. Sarkar, Sub-divisional Magistrate, directed issue of process against the accused persons. The legality of the order of Shree S. Sarkar directing issuance of processes was questioned: The Calcutta High Court quashed the said order holding that cognizance of the' offence had been taken by Shree S.K. Ganguli, and as such, Shree Sarkar had no right to issue processes in view of section 204 of the Code. The said order of the High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and in that connection the scheme of the Code was examined especially with regard to sections 190 (1), 192, 202 and 204 of the Code, and it was observed: "The relevant section which confers power on the Magistrate to whom the case has been transferred to issue process in Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The language of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that the Magistrate may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against. The language of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that the Magistrate may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against. The power of the Magistrate to issue process under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not limited by the terms of Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to issue process". Meaning thereby that, in view of section 202, a case could be transferred under Section 192 even before issuance of process. It was held that in such cases the transferee court could issue processes. In that connection their Lordships observed: "9. Therefore, the two courses are: first, under section 204 of Code of Criminal Procedure for the Magistrate taking cognizance to issue process or secondly, under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a Magistrate to whom a case has been transferred to issue process" 5. From the observations made above, it is obvious that there are only two course open, firstly, under Section 204, that is, only the Magistrate taking cognizance should issue process, and, secondly, in a case where the case has been transferred for inquiry under Section 202 without issuing processes, the transferee Magistrate can also issue process. The matter was later examined by a Bench of this Court in Sudama Singh Vs. Kavindra Narain Singh, where, on the basis of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, it was held that in cases instituted on petitions of complaint, to which aforesaid Chapter XVI containing sections 200, 202 and 203 is applicable, the Magistrate taking cognizance' could transfer the case before issuance of process and the transferee Magistrate could issue process in accordance with section 204 of the Code. Section 202 (1), which is relevant, is as follows: "202(1). Section 202 (1), which is relevant, is as follows: "202(1). Any Magistrate, on receipt of complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance, or which has been transferred to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against, and either inquire into the case himself or, if he is a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class, direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by a police-officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint: Provided that, save where the complaint has been made by a court, no such direction shall be made unless the complainant has been examined on oath under the provisions of sections 200”. 6. Thus, sections 202 and 203, read with section 204, make it amply clear that in cases instituted on petitions of complaint it is permissible to transfer a case after taking cognizance and the transferee Magistrate can issue process, although such Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offence. But, so far as cases instituted on police-reports are concerned, there is no provision parallel to section 202 (1) or section 203 of the Code; and as such when section 204 says that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence shall issue process, in cases instituted on the basis of a police report any transferee Magistrate cannot exercise that power. Although this point was not directly decided in the aforesaid Supreme Court case, nonetheless, my above view gets support from the observations quoted above where it was pointed out, after consideration of the different sections of the Code, that there were only two courses open, one under section 204, that is, the Magistrate taking cognizance should issue process, and the other in cases to which section 202 is applicable, where even the transferee magistrate could issue process. In other words, in cases other than cases to which section 202 is applicable, the process must be issued by the Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the offence. Obviously, in cases instituted on police report, the provisions of section 202 are not applicable, and, as such, in such cases only the Magistrate taking cognizance can issue process. In other words, in cases other than cases to which section 202 is applicable, the process must be issued by the Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the offence. Obviously, in cases instituted on police report, the provisions of section 202 are not applicable, and, as such, in such cases only the Magistrate taking cognizance can issue process. The Magistrate taking cognizance can transfer a case to another magistrate for inquiry or trial only after issuance of process. Even in the aforesaid Bench decision of this court in Sudama Singh's, case, in paragraph 10 it was observed as follows: "On this authoritative pronouncement of the law by the Supreme Court, it is manifest that the power of the transferee magistrate to issue process in a complaint case under section 202 of the Code is not circumscribed by the terms of section 204. That being so, even if the literal interpretation of the language used in section 204 does not permit transferee Magistrate to issue process in a case cognizance of which has been taken upon a police report, it is plain that such a limitation cannot be put upon the power of a transferee magistrate in a complaint case". The question whether the transferee magistrate has power to issue process in a case instituted on a police-report was left open, as there was no necessity of its being decided on the facts and in the circumstances of that case. It was however observed that it was advisable that in a police case the Magistrate taking cognizance should issue process and thereafter transfer it to the, transferee magistrate for inquiry or trial. 7. Once it is held' that only the magistrate who has taken cognizance of the offence can issue process, it has to be held that the order passed by Shree P. Sinha, Sub-divisional magistrate, in this case transferring the case before issuance of process is illegal and without jurisdiction. He could not have exercised the power of transfer under section 192 of the Code before process had been issued to the accused person in accordance with section 204. For the same reasons the order of Shree Agrawal directing issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused-petitioners has also to be held to be illegal. There would have been no necessity of quashing the whole order, dated the 13th November, 1971, passed by the sub-divisional magistrate. For the same reasons the order of Shree Agrawal directing issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused-petitioners has also to be held to be illegal. There would have been no necessity of quashing the whole order, dated the 13th November, 1971, passed by the sub-divisional magistrate. On the view taken by me, only the second part of the order transferring the case to Shree K.M. Agrawal, without complying with the requirements of section 204, is bad and I would have allowed the order taking cognizance of the offences mentioned therein against the petitioners to stand, but the difficulty is that in the mean-time the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'new Code') came into force with effect from the 1st April, 1974. On the view taken by me, only the sub-divisional magistrate, who had taken cognizance, could have passed the order under section 204 directing issuance of the processes against she accused-petitioners, but, in the changed circumstances, the said power under the new Code has to be exercised by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or by any other Judicial Magistrate duly empowered under the provisions of the new Code. As such if the case is sent back at that stage, it may create some complications. Section 484 (2) of the New Code, in my opinion, will not be applicable to such a case. As such if the case is sent back at that stage, it may create some complications. Section 484 (2) of the New Code, in my opinion, will not be applicable to such a case. Section 484 (2) reads as follows:- Notwithstanding such repeal - (a) if immediately before the date on which this Code comes into force, there is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, then, such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), as in force immediately before such commencement, (hereinafter referred to as the old Code), as if this Code has not came into force; Provided that every inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Old Code which is pending at the commencement of this Code, shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Code, (b) an notifications published, proclamations issued, powers conferred, forms prescribed, local jurisdictions defined, sentences passed and orders, rules and appointments, not being appointments as Special Magistrates, made under the Old Code and which are in force immediately before the commencement of this Code, shall be deemed, respectively, to have been published, issued, conferred, prescribed, defined, passed or made under the corresponding provisions of this Code; (c) any sanction accorded or consent given under the Old Code in pursuance of which no proceeding was commenced under that Code, shall be deemed to have been accorded or given under the corresponding provisions of this Code and proceedings may be commenced under this Code in pursuance of such sanction or consent; (d) the provisions of the Old Code shall continue to apply in relation to every prosecution against a Ruler within the meaning of Article 363 of the Constitution," According to these provisions, if immediately before the date when the new Code came into force, there was any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, it had to be disposed of continued or held in accordance with the old Code, as if the new Code had not come into force. Prima facie, this provision will not apply to a case which is at the stage of cognizance, because the investigation will be deemed to have been concluded and no inquiry or trial will be deemed to have begun. Prima facie, this provision will not apply to a case which is at the stage of cognizance, because the investigation will be deemed to have been concluded and no inquiry or trial will be deemed to have begun. In that view of the matter, I am setting aside the whole order, dated the 13th November, 1971, passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate and remitting back the case. The final form submitted under section 173 of the Code will now be placed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any other Judicial Magistrate duly empowered in accordance with the provisions of the new Code. 8. In the result, the application is allowed the impugned order, dated the 13th November, 1971, passed by Shree P. Sinha, Sub-divisional Magistrate, and the order of Shree K.M. Agrawal, issuing warrants of arrest, are set aside and the case is sent back to the Court below which will be disposed of in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Application allowed.