J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) IN these Civil Revision Applications the learned Single Judge has formulated the following eight questions in his order which according to him arise for consideration and which being of general importance the same have been referred to us. The said order mentions the following eight questions which according to the learned Single Judges are questions which are likely to arise for consideration :1 Where the trial Court has determined the amount of standard rent and permitted increases by its judgment (or by some other order) and has not fixed any date for the payment of all the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases so determined and the question of standard rent is in dispute before the appellate Court in appeal filed by the landlord or the tenant and there are also cross-objections in such appeal with the result that the question whether the standard rent and permitted increases are more or less than those determined by the trial Court requires to be determined by the trial Court and the appellate Court also does not fix the date for payment of standard rent and permitted increases then due at the rate as determined by the trial Court is the tenant bound to deposit re- gularly in the appellate Court the standard rent as determined by the trial Court till the appeal is finally disposed of either from the date of such determination by the trial Court or from the date of the service of notice of appeal on the tenant ? (A) What would be the position of a tenant who has in the circumstances mentioned hereinabove already paid amount in excess of the amount which would be due and payable by the tenant to the landlord till the date of the judgment or the order of the trial Court in accordance with the determination of the standard rent and permitted increases but does not pay such standard rent and permitted increases regularly even after the amount deposited stands appropriated towards the arr- ears due for the time being ? (B) What would be the position of a tenant who has in the circumstan- ces mentioned hereinabove paid only a part of the amount which would be due and payable by the tenant to the landlord till the date of the judgment or order in accordance with the determination of the standard rent and permitted increases by the trial Court and does not pay standard rent and permitted increases regularly after it is so determined ? (C) What would be the position of a tenant who has in the circumstances abovementioned paid no such amount whatsoever towards the amount which may be found due and payable by the tenant to the landlord in accordance with the determination of the standard rent and per- mitted increases by the trial Court and makes no payment after such determination ? (D) In the circumstances mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (c) of clause 1 what would be the position of a tenant who does not pay arrears of standard rent and permitted increases as determined by the trial Court but continues to pay regularly the standard rent and permitted increases so determined regularly in the suit and appeal after the date of such determination by the trial Court or service of notice of appeal ?ii. Whether the appellate Court is bound to fix the date for payment of all the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases as determi- ned by the trial Court by its order or judgment upto the date of the order of judgment of the trial Court and thereafter for the period upto the date fixed by the appellate Court for payment of such sta- ndard rent and permitted increases as determined by the trial Court ?iii. What would be the position of a tenant who continues to pay regularly in the trial Court the standard rent and permitted increases at the rate the standard rent and permitted increases are determined by the trial Court after the date of such determination irrespective of the fact whether the trial Court or the appellate Court has fixed a date for the payment of all arrears of such standard rent and permitted increase. calculated at the rate determined by the trial Court?iv. calculated at the rate determined by the trial Court?iv. Whether the tenant is absolved from liability to pay all arrears of rent and/or mesne profits of further rent and/or mesne profits regularly in the appellate Court for payment of all arrears of standard rent and permitted increases till the date of the judgment of the trial Court and/or till such date for payment is fixed by the appellate Court in absence of fixation of such date by the trial Court ?v. Whether in a case falling under section 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act where the trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs suit for eviction fixing the standard rent by its judgment only without fixing another date for the payment thereof the tenant can claim protection in appeal. (a) by paying up all the arrears on or before the judgment in appeal especially where he too has challenged the standard rent fixed by the trial Court either by filing an appeal or cross objections against the trial. (b) by paying up all the arrears upon the fixation of another date for payment thereof by the appellate Court then due and continues to pay or tender in Court regularly or where no such date is fixed on or before the judgment in appeal ?vi. Whether the word regularly as used in sec. 12 (3) (b) has any definite connotation in the context in which it is found bearing in mind the expression then due and thereafter preceding it ?vii. What is the significance of the observations of the Supreme Court in VORA ABASBHAI V. HAJI GULAMNABI 5 G. L. R. 55 and of the Full Bench of this Honble Court in C. R. A. No. 959 of 1958 (LALCHAND V. NANABHAI XVII G. L. R. 1) on the phrase. . . if an appeal is filed against the decree the standard rent is enhanced the appellate Court may fix a date for payment of the difference and if on or before that date the difference is paid the requirements of sec. 12 (3) (b) would be complete?viii. Whether a tenant who fails to pay regularly the standard rent and permitted increases after the date of determination of such standard rent and permitted increases by the trial Court whether by judgment or by any other order at least from the date of such determination loses the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) would be complete?viii. Whether a tenant who fails to pay regularly the standard rent and permitted increases after the date of determination of such standard rent and permitted increases by the trial Court whether by judgment or by any other order at least from the date of such determination loses the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act ? ( 2 ) BEFORE we propose to answer these questions it will be proper to consider the scope of this reference because the learned Single Judge has not referred these four matters as such but under Rule 5 of the appellate side Rules Chapter I he has referred only the questions arising in these four matters; and in fact while setting out the eight questions the learned Single Judge has described those questions as only questions which are likely to arise for consideration. The relevant Rule 5 (1) in Chapter I of the Appellate Side Rules runs as under: Reference to a larger Bench a Single Judge may refer any matter before him or any question arising in such matter to a Division Bench of two Judges. Therefore we would have jurisdiction to go into these questions only in so far as these questions would be arising in the four matters in question; and if those questions had not been raised for disposal of these matters we would have to decline to answer these questions. In an identical context in Income-tax Commissioner of West Bengal Anusuya Devi A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 779 at page 783 where a reference could be of questions of law which arise out of the order of the Tribunal their Lordships in terms held that merely because a question was referred the High Court was not bound to answer such a question. The High Court may decline to answer the question which was purely academic or which had no bearing on the matter in dispute even though it may have been referred. Similarly the High Court may decline to answer a question if it was unncessary or irrelevant or was not calculated to dispose of the real issue between the parties. The High Court may decline to answer the question which was purely academic or which had no bearing on the matter in dispute even though it may have been referred. Similarly the High Court may decline to answer a question if it was unncessary or irrelevant or was not calculated to dispose of the real issue between the parties. Their Lordships in terms emphasised that in such references while exercising advisory jurisdiction the High Court could not proceed to answer the question without consi- dering whether it arose out of the order of the Tribunal and whether it was question of law or whether it was academic or unnecessary or irrelevant. It is true that the power to reframe a question may always be exercised to clarify some obscurity in the question or to pinpoint the real question. In the present case a reference could arise only in respect of questions which would arise for disposal of these four revision petitions. If in that context they were merely academic or unnecessary or would not necessarily arise for disposal of these petitions such hypothetical academic questions could not be answered by this Court which exercising this jurisdiction under the relevant Rule 5. Even the very questions which have been framed by the learned Single Judge have been labelled by him as questions which are likely to arise for consideration and they have been referred on hypothetical basis without actual context of the facts of these four petitions. We would have ordinarily sent back the matter to the learned Judge for reframing the questions which actually arise for dispos- ing of these revision petitions after recording necessary findings of fact. But as a large number of matters have remained pending by reason of this reference and as question No. 1 without its sub-clauses (a) to (d) and question No. 6 are questions which really arise for disposing of these petitions we propose to answer these questions and we decline to answer other questions which are purely academic and on which nothing is shown by the parties as to how the would arise in the context of the facts of the present cases. As our discussion will show these other questions are proceeding on the assumption as to a particular interpretation of the term regularly in the Full Bench decisions and on the assumption that the Full Bench decision has not even conclude I the first question and therefore also we are confining our decision only to the first and the sixth questions referred to us in this reference. ( 3 ) SEC. 12 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act runs as under :12 A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premi- ses so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases if any and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. (2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in sec. 16 of the Transfer of Property Act 1889 (3) (A) where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regard- ing the amount of standard rent or permitted increases if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice refe- rred to in sub-sec. (2) the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession. (B) In any other case no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also costs of the suit as directed by the Court. (4) Pending the disposal of any such suit the Court may out of any amount paid or tendered by the tenant pay to the landlord such amount towards payment of rent or permitted increases due to him as the Court thinks fit. Explanation-In any case where there is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-sec. (2) he makes an application to the Court under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court ( 4 ) THE relevant provision has come up for interpretation from time to time and the interpretation of the substantial part of this section is now settled by a host of decisions Which we will now broadly indicate at the outset so that the relevant questions could now be examined in so far as they arise for consideration before us. ( 5 ) IN AMBALAL V. BABALDAS 3 G. L. R. 625 a Division Bench con- sisting of J. M. Shelat J. (as he then was) and Modi J. had interpreted the entire scheme of sec. 12 in the light of the historical context because after the decision in DAYARAM KASHIRAM V. BANSILAL 55 BOM. L. R. 30 the legislature in 1953 amended the Rent Act by substituting the ori- ginal sub-section (3) by dividing it into new sub-section (3) which now consists or the relevant clauses 12 (3) (a) and 12 (3) (b ). ( 6 ) THIS ratio of the decision in Ambalals case was slightly affected by the decision of their Lordships in MRS. MANORMA V. MRS. DHANLAKSHMI 7 G. L. R. 1061 where their Lordships interpreted the new sec. 12 (3) (a) after the amendment by holding that the word may in sub- sec. 12 (3) (a) was mandatory and had the effect of shall as laid down in the earlier decision in BHAIVA PUNJALAL BHAGVANDIN V. DAVE BHAGVATIPRASAD A. I. R. 1963 S. C.-120 IV G. L. R. 473 where it had been held that once the requirements of sec. 12 (3) (a) was mandatory and had the effect of shall as laid down in the earlier decision in BHAIVA PUNJALAL BHAGVANDIN V. DAVE BHAGVATIPRASAD A. I. R. 1963 S. C.-120 IV G. L. R. 473 where it had been held that once the requirements of sec. 12 (3) (a) where satisfied the Court was bound to pass a decree for eviction and that is why it had been held that the landlord had a vested right to recover possession of the premises if the rent was in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglected to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after the statutory notice in sec. 12 (2) and the other conditions of sec. 12 (3) (a) were satisfied. That right could not be defeated by saying that the tenant was ready and willing to pay arrears of the rent after the default only before the institution of the suit because to put any other construction would be rewriting that sec- tion. Therefore it was held that if the conditions of sec. 12 (3) (a) were satisfied the tenant could not have protection from eviction under the Act by tendering rent after the expiry of one month from the service of the statutory notice under sec. (12) (2) and by claiming any protection under sec. (12) (1) and in that context it was held that it was immaterial whether the tender was made before or after the institution of the suit. In such a case of gross default falling under sec. (12) (3) (a) the tenant has to be dealt with under this special provision of sec. (12) (3) (a) and he could not claim any protection from eviction under the general clause in sec. 12 (1) which created a fetter on the landlords right to evict a tenant so log as he was ready and willing to pay rent. To that extent the ratio in Ambalals case was affected that sec. 12 (1) had operation at the date of the institution of the suit. Reiterating this ratio in DHANSUKHLAL V. DALICHAND 9 G. L. R. 759 their Lordships in terms held after referring to even other decision in VORA ABBASBHAI V. HAJI GULAMNABI. S G. L. R. 55 that sec. 12 (1) had operation at the date of the institution of the suit. Reiterating this ratio in DHANSUKHLAL V. DALICHAND 9 G. L. R. 759 their Lordships in terms held after referring to even other decision in VORA ABBASBHAI V. HAJI GULAMNABI. S G. L. R. 55 that sec. 12 (1) applied to a tenant who continued to remain in occupation even after the expiry of the contractual tenancy so long as the tenant was ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent and permitted increases. But that protection was however available to the tenant only subject to the provisions of sec 13 and to the limitation contained in sec. 12 (2) and sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. Therefore it was in terms said that in such cases the landlord had a vested right because the cause of action had ripened into a vested right which could not be defeated by reference to sec. 12 (1 ). It was therefore held that where the suit was filed on the ground that the tenant was in arrears for a period of more than six months and although he raised a dispute as to the standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under the Act he made no application under sec. 11 (3) he could not claim protection under sec 12 (1) by merely offering to pay or even paying all arrears due from him when the Court was about to pass a decree against him. Once sec. 12 (3) (a) was not attracted their Lordships held that if the tenant was in arrears at the date of the suit he could not sit quiet and offer to pay all the amounts due from him at the time of the hearing of the suit so as to get protection of sec. 12 (1 ). To be within the protection of sec. 12 (1) where he raised a dispute about the standard rent payable he must make an application to the Court under sec. 11 (3) and thereafter he had to pay or tender the amount of rent and permitted increases if any specified in the order made by the Court. If he did not approach the Court under sec. 11 (3) it was not open to him thereafter to claim protection of sec. 12 (1 ). 11 (3) and thereafter he had to pay or tender the amount of rent and permitted increases if any specified in the order made by the Court. If he did not approach the Court under sec. 11 (3) it was not open to him thereafter to claim protection of sec. 12 (1 ). That is why in that context their Lordships considered even the scope of protection of sec. 12 because in that case sec. 12 (3) (a) was not attracted and application of sec. 12 (1) was negatived as aforesaid. Even under sec. 12 (3) (b) their Lordships held that to be within the protection of that provision the tenant must not only pay all the arrears due from him on the first date of the hearing of the suit but he must thereafter continue to pay or tender in Court regularly the standard rent and the permitted increases till the suit was finally decided. In that case upto the date of the first hearing the sum paid by the tenant came to Rs. 1554-5-3; while the amount due from him came to Rs. 1561-6-9. Their Lordships also referred to the fact that there was failure on the part of the appellant to Pay or tender thereafter the rent which fell due from October 1 1956 to March 1 1957 Therefore even leaving out of consi- deration the question of costs awarded against him under the decree it was held that the appellant could not get protection under sec. 12 (3) (b ). Therefore this decision also settles the interpretation of the relevant scheme that even when sec. 12 (3) (a) is not attracted as to give ripened cause of action even before the date of this suit to the landlord the tenant could not sit quiet and offer to pay all the amount due from him at one time to get protection of sec. 12 (1) or sec. 12 (3) (b ). Once the landlord had cause of action at the date of the suit the cause of action could be negatived by denying decree to the landlord only if the tenant availed of this statutory concession under sec. 12 (3) (b) by complying with its terms. 12 (1) or sec. 12 (3) (b ). Once the landlord had cause of action at the date of the suit the cause of action could be negatived by denying decree to the landlord only if the tenant availed of this statutory concession under sec. 12 (3) (b) by complying with its terms. ( 7 ) THEREAFTER in the decision of VORA ABBASBHAI V. GULAMNABI 5 G. L. R. 55 which has now been finally interpreted by the Full Bench in C. R. A No. 959 of 1968 decided on October 4 1974 (LALCHAND V. NANABHAI XVII G. L. R. 1) to which my learned Brother was a party and where the learned Chief Justice spoke for the Full Bench the relevant question as to whether in view of sec. 12 (3) (b) in order to earn protection of that clause a tenant whose case falls under that clause must pay standard rent and permitted increases during the pendency of the appeal had been finally concluded after considering even the decision in JASVANTLAL V. ANANDIRAM A. I. R. 1965 S C. 1419 in the light of the historical setting of this relevant provision. The Full Bench referred to KURBAN HUSSEIN V. RATIKANT 59 BOM. L. R. 158 at age 162 where it was pointed out that original sec. 12 (3) in terms provided that no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if at the hearing of such a suit the tenant pays or tenders in Court standard rent or permitted increases then due together with costs of the suit. This sub-section provided one more safeguard in the interest of the tenant. If the tenant paid or tendered in Court the rent due at the hearing of the suit decree for his eviction would not be passed. It was a matter of history that this original sub sec 12 (3) was construed by the High Court as giving an opportunity to the tenant to pay or tender rent even at the appellate stage and therefore the legislature has intervened by enacting the two different clauses 12 (3) (a) and 12 (3) (b) by distinguish- ing the defaulter. The gross defaulter is only covered under sec. 12 (3) (a) and where if these relevant conditions of sec. 12 (3) (a) are satisfied there is a mandatory obligation cast on the Court to pass a decree for eviction. The gross defaulter is only covered under sec. 12 (3) (a) and where if these relevant conditions of sec. 12 (3) (a) are satisfied there is a mandatory obligation cast on the Court to pass a decree for eviction. That vested right of the landlord could not be defeated after the expiry of the statutory period of one month under sec 12 (2) by paying rent in arrears even before the date of the suit. Sec. 12 (3) (b) however has dealt with other cases which did not fall under sec. 12 (3) (a) and where the legislative mandate was in the salutary words no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit. The Full Bench first considered the effect of the ratio in Vora Abbasbhais case along with the ratio in JASVANTLAL V. ANANDIRAM A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1419. In the later decision in Jasvantrais case dispute about the standard rent was held to be continuing even during the revision. The view taken in C. R. A. No. 1215 of 1967 (Akbarali v. Abdulgafur) by our learned Brother T. U. Mehta J as to the interpreta- tion of the expression as directed by the Court as governing the whole clause in sec. 12 (3) (b) and not merely the question of costs was first disap- roved by the Full Bench. In view of the categorical pronouncement made by their Lordships in Vora Abbasbhais case in the two passages set out at page 61 in that decision it was obvious that the words as directed by the Court occurring at the end of sec. 12 (3) (b) merely govern the costs of the suit and not any other portion of sec. 12 (3) (b ). The Full Bench therefore categorically held as under :with respect we are unable to hold that the words as directed by the Court refer to the question of regularity of the payment because the Court has not to direct regularity of the payment. 12 (3) (b ). The Full Bench therefore categorically held as under :with respect we are unable to hold that the words as directed by the Court refer to the question of regularity of the payment because the Court has not to direct regularity of the payment. If the standard rent and permitted increases were not previously fixed by the Court the Court may as pointed out by the Supreme Court in VORA ABBASBHAI V. HAJI GULAMNABI take up the Issue of standard rent at the first opportunity and decide what the standard rent and permitted increases are and once it so decides and fixes the standard rent and permitted increases it must also fix the date on or before which the standard rent and permitted increases must be paid and therefore in order to earn the benefit of sec. 12 (3) (b) the tenant must continue to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided. The learned Chief Justice thereafter observed that after the date was fixed by the Court as referred to in that judgment of the Supreme Court there was no question of any other directions having to be given by the Court in that connection. The Court had done its work by fixing the standard rent and permitted increases and in order to be fair to the tenant since the first date of hearing had already gone it had to fix a date on or before which the tenant must pay the standard rent and permitted incre- ases an all arrears thereof and thereafter the tenant must go on paying regularly or tendering in Court regularly such standard rent and permitted increases. No further direction by the Court was expected to by given rega- rding the payment of standard rent and permitted increases in order to enable the tenant to pay. That was also in accordance with the grammatical meaning of sec. 12 (3) (b) that the costs of the suit as directed by the Court may have to be paid by the tenant even before the decree was passed. Ordinarily the amount of costs could be known only after the decree was passed and the amount of costs was fixed by an order of the Court while sec. 12 (3) (b) contemplated that the tenant in order to earn the benefit of sec. Ordinarily the amount of costs could be known only after the decree was passed and the amount of costs was fixed by an order of the Court while sec. 12 (3) (b) contemplated that the tenant in order to earn the benefit of sec. 12 (3) (b) had to pay over and above the amount of standard rent and permitted increases also the costs of the suit before the suit was finally decided. Since the amount of costs being not known to the tenant in advance that is before the suit was decided and the decree of the trial Court was passed the Court might have to give dire- ctions regarding the quantum of costs and if the Court gave direction as regards the costs the tenant had to pay such costs also before the suit was decided. Therefore it was held that the expression as directed by the Court could only apply to a costs and not to any other part of sec. 12 Thereafter the Full Bench disagreed with the view expressed by our learned brother M. P. Thakkar J. in C. R. A. No 1206 of 1969 (Pitamberdas v. Jasbhai) that the decision in RATILAL V. RANCHHODBHAI 9 G. L. R. 48 (58) required reconsideration because he felt that the requirement of depositing of future rent could only apply during the pendency of the suit and not during the pendency of the appeal. The Full Bench in terms pointed out that the main idea behind sec. 12 (3) (b) as it stood on the statute book was to see that tenant pays and continued to pay regularly the amount of standard rent and permitted increases after the trial Court had decided the quantum of standard rent and permitted increases. Once that amount was fixed it was not open to the tenant to decline to pay or tender in the Court the standard rent regularly and still claim the benefit of sec. 12 (3) (b ). If the appeal was filed and the tenant came to know about it he had to pay or tender in Court regularly at the appellate stage the standard rent and permitted increases as fixed by the trial Court and if the appellate Court enhanced the quantum of standard rent and the permitted increases he had to pay the difference on or before such other date as the Court might fix. It was obvious that if he had not been paying regularly the standard rent and permitted increases during the pendency of the appeal there would be no question of his paying the difference in the event of the appellate Court enhancing the standard rent and permitted increases. Therefore no difficulty could arise in such cases in view of the categorical observations of their Lordships in VORA ABBASBHAI V. HAJI GULAMNABI 5 G. L. R. 55 because the tenant in order to earn the benefit for himself must go on paying on regularly even during the pendency of the appeal. Therefore the Full Bench in terms recorded its conclusion that Ratilals case (supra) had correctly explained the legal position and the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (b) and it did not require any reconsideration Finally the Full Bench recorded its conclusion as under :in the light of the above discussion we hold that sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act applies even at the appellate stage and the words till the suit is finally decided occurring in see. 12 (3) (b) refer also to the decision of the suit in appeal by the appellate Court when an appeal is preferred by the landlord against a decree passed by the trial Court dismissing his suit and when the question arises before the appellate Court whether the tenant is entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) the appellate Court would have to consider whether the tenant has after paying or rendering in Court the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases on the first day of hearing of the appeal or on or before such other date as might have been fixed by the Court continued to pay or tender in Court regularly the standard rent and permitted increases till the decision of the appeal. If he has not paid the amount of standard rent and permitted increases as fixed by the trial Court and in case the appellate Court has enhanced the standard rent and permi- tted increases has not paid the difference arising because of such enhancement on or before such date as the appellate Court might fix and after such date continued to pay regularly the enhanced rent andpermitted increases the tenant would be deprived of the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b ). 12 (3) (b ). That was the only conclusion that could be drawn in the light of the historical background and the host of authorities which settled this legal position. That is why in JASVANTRAI V. ANANDILAL A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1419 their Lordships had categorically held that sec. 12 (3) (b) comprehen- ded all cases other than those falling within clause (a) and a case in which there was a dispute about the standard rent must obviously fall not in clause (a) but in clause (b ). When there was a dispute about the standard rent and the tenant had paid all the arrears of provisional stan- dard rent which had been fixed by the Court he had complied with the requirement of sec. 12 (3) (b) and he was protected because the dis- pute about standard rent continued till the revision was also finally decided. Therefore the Full Bench decision clearly settles the first ques- tion which the learned Single Judge has referred to us that where the trial Court has determined the standard rent and permitted increases by its judgment or by some preliminary order even if no date has been fixed by the trial Court or by the appellate Court the tenants obligation to deposit regularly in the appellate Court till the suit is finally decided the standard rent as provisionally determined by the trial Court or by the appellate Court would not cease. The whole assumption of the learned Single Judge is that the dispute about the standard rent being pending in appeal till it was finally determined by disposal of the appeal of the landlord or the tenants cross-objections such a liability of the tenant was dependent only on the fixation of the date. The legislature has provi- ded an obligation on the tenant and so once the standard rent was determined by the judgment of the Court or by some other order of the Court the said obligation has to be discharged to avail of this statutory prote- ction. The legislature has provi- ded an obligation on the tenant and so once the standard rent was determined by the judgment of the Court or by some other order of the Court the said obligation has to be discharged to avail of this statutory prote- ction. The Full Bench pointed out that it is only to meet with these cases of difficulties because the first hearing date had gone that for depositing the arrears in accordance with the provisional fixation by the order of the trial Court or by the final judgment determining the standard rent or the standard rent 3nd permitted increases that some date would have to be fixed so that the tenant could avail of the statutory protection under sec. 12 and the same would be the case in appeal when any enhance- ment was made by the appellate Court. As explained in NANJI PANCHA V. DAULAL 11 G. L. R. 285 this was only on the principle that if the Court had postponed resolution of the dispute of standard rent the tenant could not be prejudiced and therefore date had to be fixed for paying up all the arrears and if the appellate Court enhanced the said fixa- tion of the standard rent and permitted increases it had to be fixed even by the appellate Court to pay up the difference on that basis because of such enhancement as pointed out by the Full Bench. But merely on the ground that the determination of the trial Court was provisional or liable to be modified in appeal or revision it could never be contened that no liability of deposit arose in accordance with this provisional fixation till the suit was finally decided or that the liability arose only after such date was fixed. The legislature contemplated protection to the tenant only if he continued to pay regularly amount of the standard rent and per- mitted increases till the suit was finally decided and when the Court had even provisionally determined by its order on the preliminary issue of standard rent or even by judgment the aforesaid amount the protection could be earned only by continuing the deposit on that basis. The deter- mination was of course provisional till such issue was finally resulted in appeal or revision but the liability of the tenant arose to pay in accor- dance with the provisional determination and it was not dependent on any date being fixed by the trial Court or the appellate Court. The trial Court or the appellate Court fixed the date for the arrears only in those cases where the determination was first made by the trial Court or it was enhanced by the appellate Court so that the tenant could avail of this protection by continuing thereafter to pay standard rent and permitted increases regularly. This is why the Full Bench has pointed out that in such cases some interregnum may arise when the tenant had no knowledge of the appeal but as soon as he knew of the appeal on service of the notice he had to fulfil his statutory obligation of continuing the payment regularly till the suit was finaly decided. ( 8 ) THEREFORE the aforesaid question is completely concluded by the Full Bench decision because the tenant would be bound to deposit regu- larly in the appellate Court standard rent as determined by the trial Court till the appeal was finally disposed of from the date of such deter- mination by the trial Court although his regularity may not be affected if he has late notice of this standard rent fixation or of the pendency of the appeal when the notice of appeal had been served on him. ( 9 ) THE next material question which therefore arises is on the later part of sec. 12 (3) (b) as to the true ambit of the obligation of the tenant for availing of the benefit of the protection under sec. 12 (3) (b) by continuing to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit was finally decided. ( 10 ) IN order to appreciate the true scope of this statutory obligation of the tenant. we must bear in mind the true scope of the statutory setting and context of this relevant clause in sec 12 (3) (b) and the relevant guideline which has been laid down by the legislature as sec. 12 (1) has to be read in the light of the limitations in the said clauses (2) and (3) as held by their Lordships. 12 (1) has to be read in the light of the limitations in the said clauses (2) and (3) as held by their Lordships. Sec. 12 (3) (b) also would have to be considered in the light of this rele- vant guideline. In VORA ABBASBHAI V. HAJI GULAMNABI 5 G L R. 55 their Lordships have interpreted sec. 12 (3) (b ). It is in terms held at page 62 that the explanation enacted a rule of evidence. If after service of the notice upon the tenant by the landlord under sub-sec. (2) of sec 12 the tenant made an application under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 11 before the expiry of a month and thereafter paid or tendered regularly the amount of interim rent specified by the Court till the disposal of the suit the Court was bound to presume that the tenant was at the date of the decree ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases. Sec. 12 (3) (b) required the tenant to pay the standard rent and not the interim rent and for the purpose of that clause the expression standard rent might not be equated with interim rent specified under sec. 11 (3 ). Compliance with an order for payment of interim rent was made by the Explanation to sec. 12 conclusive evidence of the readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent but that by itself was not a ground for holding that the interim rent which might be specified under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 11 was standard rent fixed under sub-sec. (1) of sec 11. Their lordships pointed out that the statute required the tenant to pay or tender in Court standard rent at the rate which might still remain to be fixed by order of the Court such order itself being liable to be varied or modified by an order of a superior Court. But that was not a ground for departing from the definition supplied by the statute. The legislature had prescribed conditions on which the tenant might qualify for protection of his occupa- tion and one of the important conditions was the readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent and permitted increases which might be proved by obtaining an order of the Court fixing the rate of standard rent and complying therewith or by complying with the Explanation to sec. 12 or otherwise. 12 or otherwise. Further proceeding at page 64 their Lordships made the following pertinent observations:sec. 12 (2) does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain and decide a suit in ejectment against a tenant. It merely confers a protection upon a tenant if certain conditions are fulfilled and clauses 2; 3 (a) and 3 (b) and the Explanation deal with certain specific cases in which readiness and willingness to pay standard rent may either be presumed or regarded as proved. Therefore their Lordships had categorically laid down that sub-clauses 2 3 and 3 (b) and the Explanation only deal with certain specific cases in which the crucial criterion of readiness and willingness to pay standard rent can be presumed or regarded as proved. It is that guideline which has to be borne in mind for interpreting the relevant statutory obligation on the tenant. The second material feature to be noted is that sec. 12 (3) (b) is applicable to all other cases which do not fall under sec. 12 (3) (a) where the gross defaulter has been dealt with by the legislature and where the mandatory obligation has been on the Court to pass a decree for eviction after those conditions in sec. 12 (3) (a) are fulfilled because in such cases the rent is payable by month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases and the tenant is a gross defaulter in arrears for a period of six months or more and still he neglects to make payment even during one months statutory period after the statutory notice under sec. 12 (2) has been served on him. The legislature having emphasised neglected to make payment as one of the necessary ingredients and not mere failure to pay within one month of the statutory notice under sec. 12 (2) even in case of such gross default a person who fails to pay under a bonafide dispute would not be guilty of such neglect and would be clearly protected under sec. 12 (3) (a ). 12 (2) even in case of such gross default a person who fails to pay under a bonafide dispute would not be guilty of such neglect and would be clearly protected under sec. 12 (3) (a ). The cases of such persons and even others whose rent is not payable by month or where arrears of rent are due to bonafide dispute of standard rent and permitted increases or where even due to other grounds of eviction the landlord is unwilling to accept rent when tendered by a tenant are all cases falling within this residuary clause under sec. 12 (3) (b) and it is in the context of these cases that this statutory obligation has to be interpreted in the relevant statutory context that the Court is under a mandate not to pass a decree in such cases if the tenant fulfils this statutory condition in sec. 12 (3) (b ). In this context it must be borne in mind that if arrears were of less than six months after the statutory notice under sec. 12 (2) and the tenant tendered the same by money order or otherwise to the landlord and the landlord did not accept the same the landlord would loose cause of action on the statutory notice served by him. In such cases on the tenant fully tendering rent within the notice period or even before the date of the suit to the landlord he would have no cause of action as his cause of action would be destroyed on the aforesaid notice and even for further arrears the landlord would have to give a fresh notice before filing a suit as laid down by my learned Brother in THAKKAR MAGANLAL V. THAKKER BHIKUBHAI DEVJI I. L. R. 1972 (GUJ.) 74. Even H. Sheth J. had rightly pointed out in LILAVATI DHIRAJLAL V. HARJIVAN 16 G. L. R. 1002 that if a landlord refused to accept the amount tendered by his tenant either by money order or in any other recognised mode of payment without any justifiable cause the tenant was not bound nor was he under an obligation to go on repealing the remittances of the same amount over and over again. A landlord could not try to take advantage of his own wrong and seek the recovery of possession of the premises. A landlord could not try to take advantage of his own wrong and seek the recovery of possession of the premises. The Rent Act is a measure which is intended to protect the tenants. It is not a trap for the landlord to lay in order to draw his tenant in. The question of availing this further locus paenitentiae under sec. 12 (3) (b) would therefore arise only if the tenant was in arrears at the date of the suit. The third factor which must he borne in mind is that even in case of such a tenant who is initially in arrears where the arrears may be due to various reasons which fall in this residuary clause not necessarily because of his willful default but even because of the bonafide dispute or because of the landlords unwillingness to accept rent or because of his dispute about the standard rent the tenant would be first showing his readiness and willingness by paying arrears then due at the date of the first hearing or the date fixed by the Court as per the settled interpreta- tion of the earlier part of the clause. It is only thereafter that during the subsequent stage of the continuance of the suit till the final decision that the question would arise as to compliance with this statutory obligation in question of continuing to pay standard rent or permitted increases regularly till the suit is finally decided. The fourth factor is that in the opening word of sec. 12 (1) the legislature has in terms pro- vided a general fetter on the landlord that he would not be entitled to recover possession of premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent and permitted increases if any and he observes and performs other conditions of tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provision of the Act. Therefore in case of such a statutory tenant so far as the other conditions of the contractual tenancy are concerned in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act they have got to be complied with because they are statutorily incorporated even in the statutory tenancy. Therefore in case of such a statutory tenant so far as the other conditions of the contractual tenancy are concerned in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act they have got to be complied with because they are statutorily incorporated even in the statutory tenancy. However so far as the term of payment of rent is concerned the legislature has only enacted the condition that the tenant must pay or must be ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent and permitted increases. This was as per the English law where also the settled legal position is as laid down in BRYANSTON PROPERTY CO. LTD. V. EDWARDS 1944 (1) K. B. 32 AND REGIONAL PROPERTIES LTD. V. OXLEY 1945 A. C. 355 (358) that the condition about payment of rent is not incorporated in the statutory tenancy. Therefore the mode of payment in the contractual tenancy is not incorporated in the statutory tenancy. In fact sec. 27 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law contract usage or custom to the contrary recovery of rent shall be according to the British calendar. Therefore there can be no assumption that in the statutory tenancy periodicity for payment of rent as per the contractual tenancy was necessarily contemplated by the legislature while using the expression regularly. The fifth factor is that the legislature has advisedly made non-payment of standard rent and permitted increases due only as a ground of eviction after giving statutory notice under sec. 12 (2) but it has not enacted mere regularity in payment of rent in the sense of punctuality being not observed as per the contractual mode of payment of rent as ground of eviction. The sixth factor is that if the legislature intended any particular time interval or periodicity to be laid down whether as per the original contract of rent or otherwise as had been the pattern in some of the rent legislation measures in the country as per sec. 17 (1) of the West Bengal Act 1956 or any other rent legislation for payment before a particular date on the next succeeding month it could have used appropriate language to that effect. 17 (1) of the West Bengal Act 1956 or any other rent legislation for payment before a particular date on the next succeeding month it could have used appropriate language to that effect. The legislature has even refrained from using the term as and when due as per the contract or month to month or punctually and as earlier pointed out it has even refused to incorporate this erm as to mode of payment of rent in the statutory tenancy in the rent clause under sec. 12 (1) where other conditions of tenancy were sought to be incorporated. The seventh factor is that periodicity would have various meanings as per the contract of payment of the rent practice and usage of the parties or order of payment of interim rent or as in terms fixed by the legislature; and if the legislature on such vital matter left this lacuna advisedly the Court would not have any jurisdiction to fill up such lacuna so as to make the condition of protection of tenant more stringent by adding words which would introduce any fixed periodicity or introduce words like as and when due month to month punctually before a particular date of the succeeding month etc. The eighth factor is that even if we were to look to the history of 1953 amendment to find out mischief which the legislature sought to remedy by dividing the original sec. 12 (3) into sec. 12 and sec. 12 (3) (b) it is obvious as pointed out in the decision in Kurban Hussein (supra) that the original sec. 12 (3) was construed by the Court as giving an opportunity to pay or tender rent even at the appellate stage in one lump sum. In DHANSUKHLAL V. DALICHAND 9 G. L. R. 759 also their Lordships had in terms held that if sec. 12 (3) (b) was not attracted and the tenant was in arrears he could not sit quiet and offer to pay all the amounts due from him at the time of the final hearing of the suit so as to get protection of sec. 12 (1) or sec. 12 (3) (b ). In such cases he would have to avail of any concession only by compliance with condition under sec. 12 (3) (b ). 12 (1) or sec. 12 (3) (b ). In such cases he would have to avail of any concession only by compliance with condition under sec. 12 (3) (b ). Therefore the whole intention of the legislature was to remedy this peculiar state of affairs under which the tenant could seek protection by one lump sum payment even in the last stage of appeal by tendering all the arrears of rent. The legislature was dividing the defau- lters in two classes gross defaulters to be dealt with sec. 12 (3) (a) under where the Court had a mandate of eviction if those conditions in sec. 12 (3) (a) were fulfilled while the other cases falling in this residuary clause of sec. 12 where the Court had the opposite mandate not to decree eviction if the tenant availed of this concession by showing his readiness and willingness to pay all the arrears then due at the first date of hearing of the suit or at the date fixed by the Court for this purpose and there- after if he continued to pay the standard rent and permitted increases regularly under this relevant clause. Therefore the legislature never wanted to confer a new cause of action on the landlord so as to afford him a ground of eviction on the score of periodicity being not observed in payment of rent. The legislature never intended to cast a wide net for unwary tenant so that he may get tripped. As the conduct over a long period is thus adopted as a test by the legislature it would necessarily envisage the break down of any punctuality test because the time would be nece- ssarily taken in filing an appeal and the tenant would not be aware of the pendency of the proceedings in appeal till the notice of appeal was served on him and so there would be a long interval or a time-lag for no fault of the tenant. It is in this context that the relevant clause has to be interpreted. The ninth factor which should be kept in mind is as enacted even in the marginal note that no ejectment ordinarily is to be made if the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay arrears of rent and permitted increases and as laid down by their Lordships in Vora Abhasbhais case (supra) the is that statutory guideline of sec. 12 (1) perm- eating all the relevant clauses in sec. 12 (2) and sec. 12 (3) and the Explanation which are specific cases where such readiness and willingness is either presumed or treated as proved. In such a remedial benevolent measure when the statutory language is not clear and plain and unambi- guous the relevant clause would have to be interpreted to find out whether the tenants conduct extending over such a large period till the suit is finally decided as per this relevant statutory guideline to show the readi- ness and willingness to pay rent when no particular periodicity is fixed by the legislature was such that the bar created on the landlord was removed or which disentitled the tenant to the intended protection if he had once shown his readiness and willingness in the first instance by fulfilling the earlier part of the relevant sec. 12 (3) (b ). ( 11 ) THE settled principles of construction would have therefore to be considered in the light of the aforesaid protective legislative scheme object and purpose of this remedial clause and the ultimate effect of adopting one or the other construction especially as the statutory language is not clear precise and unambiguous so as to give any clear indication as to the intention of the legislature. In S. T. OFFICERS PONKUNNAM V. K. I. ABRAHAM A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1823 at page 1825 their Lordships while interpreting the power of rule-making under the phrase in the prescribed manner held that the phrase in the prescribed manner did not take in the time element and the rule making authority could not prescribe a time-limit for making a declaration. Their Lordships pointed out that the expression in the manner would denote only the mode in which the act was to be done and if any time-limit was to be prescribed for the doing of the act specific words such as the time within which were also necessary to be put in the statute. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary it is said that the words manner and form refer only to the mode in which the thing is to be done and do not introduce anything from the Act referred to as the thing which is to be done or the time for doing it. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary it is said that the words manner and form refer only to the mode in which the thing is to be done and do not introduce anything from the Act referred to as the thing which is to be done or the time for doing it. This decision makes it in terms clear that when the mode of payment has been prescribed by the legislature as regularly continuing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases if any particular time prescription or the period or interval was intended to be enacted it should have been specifically or expressly laid down and therefore there could be no imp- lication on that score. Besides in such a context such prescription of time as per the settled legal position can be read only in a directory manner. In Re: Presidential Election 1974 A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1682 at page 1686 their Lordships held that on a question whether the provision was mandatory or directory the subject-matter the importance of the provision the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act would decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the provision to be construed. The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law it is the animus imponentis the intention of the law maker expressed in the law itself taken as a whole. (See. BRETT V. BRETT. (1826) 3 ADDAMS 210 at p. 216 ). Applying this settled principle in the BOMBAY MUNICIPALITY V. B. E. S. T. WORKERS UNION A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 883 the relevant provision in sec. 78 (i) (D) (i) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1947 had been treated as directory and not as mandatory. The relevant provision gave power to the Labour Court to reinstate an employee when it was found that the order of dismissal discharge etc. was passed by the employer after the expiry of six months prior to the date of this order. The relevant provision gave power to the Labour Court to reinstate an employee when it was found that the order of dismissal discharge etc. was passed by the employer after the expiry of six months prior to the date of this order. This statutory context being as regards the power of the Labour Court it was held that the Labour Court had to exercise just discretion treating the six months presrciption as only directory and must go into the reasons given by the employer for the delay caused in passing the order. The relevant provision only emphasised that an employer should be vigilant in taking disciplinary action against an employee for misconduct. Once the said misconduct had come to the notice he should be vigilant in passing suitable orders. At page 891 their Lordships pointed out that various principles were laid down for deciding whether the provision was mandatory or directory. It had been always emphasised that for ascertaining the real intention of the legislature the Court among other things might consider the nature and the design of the statute the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other and whether the object of the legis- lation would be defeated or furthered by a particular construction. It is this live approach which is now adopted by the Courts and their Lord- ships have approved this approach in STATE OF BIHAR V. A. K MUKHERJEE A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 192 at p. 196 by approving the observations of Denning L J. in SEAFORD COURT ESTATES LTD. V. ASHER (1949) 2 ALL. E. R. 155 at p. 164 :when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the drafts. man. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliaments and then he must supplement the written words so as to give force and life to the intention of the legislature. A Judge should ask if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this rule in the texture of it they would have straightened it out ? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge should ask if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this rule in the texture of it they would have straightened it out ? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven but he can and should iron out the creaseseven in the context of rent control legislation this approach has been emphasised by their Lordships in B. BANERJEE V. SMT. ANITA PAN A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1146 at p. 1155 by holding that mere humanist considerations public policy and the statutory purpose may provide guidelines of const- ruction within reasonable limits in such statute. Therefore bearing in mind the settled legal principles for construction of statute we will have to resolve this problem of statutory construction in the context of these factors which we have enumerated to find out whether the word regularity has the effect of mandatory or directory obligation In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 76 pages 608-609 the term regular and regularly have been mentioned. The word regularly has various shades of mean- ins Regularly suggests a practices and ordinarily implies uniformity continuity consistency and method or something of fixedness or perma- nency. It excludes isolated or unusual transactions and also excludes the idea of occasional accidental incidental or casual use. Regularly is variously defined as meaning in a regular manner; in accordance with law or with some constant or periodic rule or practice. It is also defined as meaning in due time at certain intervals or periods; regular in point of time. The word regularly as used in legal proceedings has a much broader meaning and ordinarily is used in the sense of duly. There fore the term is clearly capable of a variety of shades of meaning and when the legislative silence is eloquent not to show any particular perio- dicity or interval or by way of contract of rent usage or practice or under the interim order of the Court the legislature must be presumed to have advisedly made such broad provision so that the tenant could substantially observe it and earn his protection by liberal interpretation of this obliga- tion and this term regularly in such a context could never be rewritten by substituting anything by the Court. It would not be open to the Court in such a case to rewrite the statutory language or to add words like as and when due month to month punctually or on a particular date in the next succeeding month etc. As we have already pointed out the legislature has even refrained as in England from incorporating in the statutory tenancy the term about payment of rent by using clear language in sec. 12 (1) and has therefore left this matter advisedly to Courts discretion by using this term of wide import so that on hypothetical con- siderations of clock-wise punctuality periodicity or likewise regularity protection intended for the tenant would not be whittled down and made illusory. We cannot proceed on any assumption in such a matter be cause the rent is periodic compensation for use and occupation and so only monthly periodicity must be intended by the legislature especially when the relevant clause has been made applicable to cases other than those where rent is payable by month even when distinction is made between the two clauses in secs. 12 (3) (a) and 12 (3) (b) by the legislature and the legislature has not prescribed any particular periodicity or time interval or used appropriate language to suggest any particular time con- cept being introduced in this clause. The legislature has not even treated non-periodical payment of rent as a ground of eviction and has confined the ground of eviction only to non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases i. e. the ground of arrears only. Therefore even though we cannot agree with the contention on behalf of the tenants that the word regularly is surplusage because the legislature never speaks in vain and tautology is not the fault which could be attributed to our wise legislature we would have to hold that the phrase continues regularly to pay standard rent and permitted increases has been used so that the tenant would have been ordinarily able to claim protection after payment of the arrears unless his conduct disentitles him as it does not substantially comply with this obligation. As their lordships pointed out in Dhansukhlals case (supra) the tenant could not offer all payment of arrears in one lump sum at the final hearing and it is in that sense that the legislature has advisedly used both the terms conti- nues and regularly so that rent would be paid in full from time to time over this entire long period till the suit was finally decided in appeal and revision. When all the aforesaid factors are borne in mind it is obvious that the only possible conclusion in such case is that the legisla- lature having not prescribed any specific periodicity or time interval the term regularly would have to be interpreted as a directory provision so far as the time interval of the deposits in the Courts is concerned for the fulfilment of the obligation to pay standard rent and permitted in creases till the suit is finally decided. The mandatory interpretation would clearly frustrate the whole purpose of this remedial measure where even after the 1953 amendment the legislature intends to protect the tenant by conferring adequate protection on the tenant falling under the residuary clause under sec. 12 (3) (b) where there is a mandate on the Court not to pass any decree of eviction if the tenant avails of this concession. The question would have always in this context to be treated as one of judicial discretion to find out whether the conduct of the tenant extending over such a long period till the suit is finally decided is one which protects him or whether it is such conduct which removes the bar enacted on the landlord and disentitles the tenant to avail of this intended protection even after he had once shown his readiness and willingness in the first instance by fulfilling the earlier part. The discretion which the Court would exercise to find out whether this obligation has been sub- stantially complied with in this spirit as like other judicial discretion is to be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice commonsense and sound judgment. As pointed out by their Lordships in LOCAL GRAM PANCHAYAT V. RAMGIRI GOSAVI A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 223 the discretion is to know through law what is just. (See KEIGHLEYS CASE (1609) 10 CO. REP. As pointed out by their Lordships in LOCAL GRAM PANCHAYAT V. RAMGIRI GOSAVI A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 223 the discretion is to know through law what is just. (See KEIGHLEYS CASE (1609) 10 CO. REP. 139-77 E. R. 1136.) Their Lordships pointed out that in the context of sufficient cause for condonation of delay under sec. S it was settled legal position that such discretion was to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the word sufficient cause receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bonafides was imputable to the appellant. In the present case the question is not of condonation of delay but the question is whether over such a long period till the suit is finally decided the tenant has continued to pay or tender rent in Court regularly. A guideline has also been enacted by the legislature that the substantial compliance has to be judged by finding out readiness and willingness of the tenant to pay rent. Therefore the test is of the conduct of the tenant which must be such as would remove the bar created on the landlord or would disentitle the tenant from the intended protection. Such a discretion would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and would not be capable of any exhaustive enumeration. Some of the relevant considerations would however be as to the periodicity of payment of rent under the can. Such a discretion would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and would not be capable of any exhaustive enumeration. Some of the relevant considerations would however be as to the periodicity of payment of rent under the can. tract the previous practice as to payment or acceptance of rent between the parties as to whether the term if any was observed more in its breach than in compliance; the intervals at which the deposits are made in the Court and their frequency; the conduct of the parties as to whether the landlord has been unwilling to accept rent or refuses to accept rent as and when tendered by money order or otherwise because non-payment of rent is an additional ground in the suit with the other grounds of eviction or otherwise or a to the silence of the landlord in not raising any objection on the score of such time intervals or alleged irregularity in the deposits in the Court at any earlier stage of the suit or he waited till the fag end to trap the unwary tenant; or whether the case was one of a long history of persistent defaults on the part of the tenant by way of only occasional or casual and that too not full deposits where the Court may readily draw the inference of the tenant being not ready and willing to pay rent o r one where the deposits are fairly reasonably made to comply with this obligation and the failure if any is without fault and for good reasons or well explained as not being a designed or calculated omission to discharge the liability to pay rent because when all the arrears had been made up by deposits from time to time the conduct of the tenant which initially was of plying up all the arrears before the first hearing or the date fixed by the Court would be ordinarily show ing even his further readiness and willingness to avail of this concession. These are some of the illustrative of course not exhaustive factors which must be carefully weighed after due investigation by the Court before holding that the tenant has forfeited the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) by his default to pay the rent regularly as envisaged by this statutory provi- sion. These are some of the illustrative of course not exhaustive factors which must be carefully weighed after due investigation by the Court before holding that the tenant has forfeited the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) by his default to pay the rent regularly as envisaged by this statutory provi- sion. As these relevant circumstances arise even during the course of the further pendency of the suit in appeal or in revision in appropriate cases if necessary even evidence could be taken by the Court for a just exercise of its discretion in such cases so that discretion could be justly and soundly exercised ;q the interest of justice on the facts and circu- mstances of the case and the decree could be suitably modified in view of the picture of the entire conduct till the suit is finally decided as to whether the tenant had substantially complied with this obligation or not and accordingly whether a case had been made out or not to remove the fetter on the landlord so as to disentitle the tenant to his statutory protection. (vide VENKATESHWARLU V. MOTOR and GENERAL TRADERS A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1409 AND SOONDA RAM V. RAMESHWARLAL A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 479. ( 12 ) WE were referred to a host of authorities but it is needless to refer them in great detail. We may point out that in C. R. A. No. 1364 of 1971 decided on November 20 1974 the learned Single Judge had erro- neously assumed that the Full Bench decision had laid down on a true interpretation of this later part of sec. 12 (3) (b) that the tenant must have deposited rent in Court regularly every month. Similarly in C. R. A. No. 495 of 1973 decided on August 29 1975 the words were sought to be read by the learned Single Judge: as rent fell due from time to time. In C. R. A. No. 1273 of 1966 decided on July 28/29 1975 the words were read: regularly every month as and when rent became due. In 12 G. L. R. at page 819 (835) the words were read as; rent must be reg- ularly deposited on 5th as per the contract of rent. In C. R. A. No. 1273 of 1966 decided on July 28/29 1975 the words were read: regularly every month as and when rent became due. In 12 G. L. R. at page 819 (835) the words were read as; rent must be reg- ularly deposited on 5th as per the contract of rent. These are all cases where no attempt had been made to interpret this relevant clause which could only be read as per the settled legal principles in a directory manner and not in a mandatory manner. In C. R. A. No. 455 of 1967 decided on October 26 1971 the learned Single Judge had found the tenant to be persistently defaulting and so grossly irregular that on facts he had been deprived of the protection. On the other hand in PHAGUMAL V. KHAJUMAL 15 G. L. R. 577 at page 582 the learned Single Judge had in fact relied on these guidelines under sec. 12 (1) by requiring the Court to consider whether by not complying with the directions of clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) the tenant had shown a conduct which would be indicative of a want of his readi- ness and willing to pay the rent. If the answer was in the affirmative the general protection granted to tenants by sub-sec. (1) could not be availed of by that tenant. If the answer was in the negative Court should cons- ider how far the tenant could avail of general protection contemplated by sub-sec. (1 ). The learned Judge had emphasised that eviction did not automatically follow from its non-compliance and a pragmatic approach of the Court with reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case was not ruled out. The said reasoning although it was based therein on the terms of sec. 12 (1) should be really based on the directory term of this relevant clauses in sec. 12 (3) (b ). In HASMUKHLAL BABULAL V. VITHALBHAI 15 G. L. R. 598 at page 602 the learned Single Judge had in terms held that the requirement as regards tendering such rent in Court regularly emb- odied in sec. 12 (3) (b) was not mandatory but was merely directory. 12 (3) (b ). In HASMUKHLAL BABULAL V. VITHALBHAI 15 G. L. R. 598 at page 602 the learned Single Judge had in terms held that the requirement as regards tendering such rent in Court regularly emb- odied in sec. 12 (3) (b) was not mandatory but was merely directory. The emphasis was on tendering the amount of future rent in Court and not on tendering the same at a stroke at a particular hour with computer like precision or punctuality and so pragmatic approach had to be adopted so that the legislative intention of giving adequate protection to the tenant would be achieved. The landlord was reasonably protected but he could not capitalise on the economic distress of the tenant The legislature had not designed this provision by way of a trap so that unless he paid punctually he loses this protection. This line of reasoning has been ado- pted by us in the aforesaid approach as per the settled legal principles. the landlords had however vehemently relied on the decision in RATILAL V. RANCHHODBHAI G. L. R. 48 at page 59 where speaking for the Division Bench Bhagwati J. (as he then was) had interpreted the scheme of sec. 12 and which ratio has been approved in the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench. While judging the facts of that case the Division Bench had pointed out that the tenant had admittedly made default in payment of standard rent in the month of December 1961 with the result that on January 15 1962 which the appellate Court gave its decision enhancing the standard rent the petitioner was in arrears of standard rent even acco- rding to the rate determined by the trial Court. Therefore it was no obligation of the appellate Court to grant him time to make payment of the arrears of standard rent according to enhanced rate and the appellate Court could not be said to be guilty of an error of law in passing the eviction decree because the tenant had not regularly deposited in Court the standard rent at the rate determined by the trial Court as required by sec. 12 (3) (b ). 12 (3) (b ). We need not go into the question as to the correctness of this decision because admittedly this decision has now been quashed by their Lordships on the ground that once revisional jurisdiction was already exercised by the High Court writ jurisdiction could not again be exercised Therefore this ratio could not be pressed in service for the correct interpretation of the term regularly which arises for the first time before us and which task has not been undertaken in any earlier decision of this Court or in the decision of the Supreme Court as to whether the term regularly is mandatory or directory. In fact in Dhan- sukhlals case (supra) their Lordships had adopted a pragmatic approach for finding out whether sec. 12 (3) (b) was complied with by considering all the deposits which had been made from time to time but because of the fact that at the first hearing date the deposit was not full and because thereafter rent from October 1956 to November 1957 had remained in arrears it had been held that the tenant did not avail of concession under sec. 12 (3) (b ). Even in the unreported decision of their Lordships in RAMCHANDER NARSEY and C. V. WAMARAO V. SHENOY Civil Appeal No. 361 of 1966 decided on March 3 1959 their Lordships did not think it necessary to spell out in that case the true scope of sec. 12 (3) (b) and pro- ceeded on an assumption that the Court had jurisdiction to extend time for depositing arrears of rent due in exercise of its discretion without going into the question as to whether the appellate Court had such discretion. Their Lordships held that the facts of the case militated against the exe- rcise of such discretion because the tenant had defaulted and had put forth the false plea of payment and tried to support the same by false evidence to show that he had paid rent. He has not moved for fixing the standard rent for over two years. Their Lordships held that the facts of the case militated against the exe- rcise of such discretion because the tenant had defaulted and had put forth the false plea of payment and tried to support the same by false evidence to show that he had paid rent. He has not moved for fixing the standard rent for over two years. Ejectment notice was given on December 12 1955 and he had applied for fixing standard rent only in April 18 1958 and even though the standard rent was fixed on January 15 1960 he did not deposit the rent due not only till the suit was disposed of by the trial Court but even in the appellate Court till the appeal came up for hearing. In such circumstances it was held that the appellate Court was justified in not extending time for payment of the arrears. So far as his Court is concerned the Full Bench had already concluded the posit ion that there is no question of fixing further date for payment of the arrears except so far as shown by the Full Bench when the provisional standard rent is first fixed by the trial Court or is enhanced by the appe- llate Court and opportunity is given to the tenant to comply with the relevant statutory provision in sec. 12 (3) (b ). Therefore even these decisions do not lay down any other principle and do not preclude us from construing in this relevant clause in later part of sec. 12 (3) (b) the term regularly as only directory and not mandatory so that the Court would have to inqu- ire about its substantial compliance by making enquiry as aforesaid. ( 13 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion we should answer the two questions Nos. 12 (3) (b) the term regularly as only directory and not mandatory so that the Court would have to inqu- ire about its substantial compliance by making enquiry as aforesaid. ( 13 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion we should answer the two questions Nos. 1 and 6 as follows: as regards question No. 1 we must answer that the position is concluded by the Full Bench decision and it must be held that the tenant is not relieved of the liability to pay or tender in the Court regularly as per the provisional standard rent determined by the order or judgment of the trial Court and his liability to make deposit is from the date of such determination but while judging the regularity the fact would have to be borne in mind that the tenant had no earlier opportunity to deposit the arrears on that basis because no date had been fixed by he trial Court while determining the standard rent at the time of the judgment or because he had late notice of the pend- ency of appeal when it was served on him so that thereafter only he could comply with his obligation under sec. 12 (3) (a ). As regards question No. 6 our answer is that we interpret the term regularly in later part of sec. 12 (3) (b) only as directory and not as mandatory and therefore the Court would have to inquire into all the relevant facts and circumstances of each case to find out whether such requirement has been substantially complied with in the light of the aforesaid observations. ( 14 ) ON these two answers the other questions would hardly arise as in fact the learned Single Judge had made a reference of the hypothetical academic questions because he was under the erroneous assumption with great respect that the Full Bench had interpreted the term regularly as regularly every month and that when the date was not fixed by the Court the liability for payment could not arise. ( 15 ) ONCE these questions are set at rest by our aforesaid answers the rest of the questions would be purely academic including question No. 7 which only relates to significance of a passage in the judgment and would be purely academic. In view of this we have declined to answer the rest of the questions. ( 15 ) ONCE these questions are set at rest by our aforesaid answers the rest of the questions would be purely academic including question No. 7 which only relates to significance of a passage in the judgment and would be purely academic. In view of this we have declined to answer the rest of the questions. In view of our answers these matters shall now go back to the learned Single Judge for expeditious disposal in accordance with law. Answer accordingly. .