JUDGMENT DIGHE J.- Mr. Kamlakar appearing for the accused invited our attention to the decision of the Court in Jagir Singh v. State1 (Delhi Administration), a case decided P.N. Bhagwati and N. L. Untawalia JJ. Mr. Kamlakar relies upon the following observations: "It is new well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit that witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony: See Khijiruddin v. Emperor2," He contends that these are the observations of the Supreme Court on a point of law and hence they ought to be followed so that the evidence of the hostile witnesses has to be discarded completely and it cannot at all be assessed even for finding out whether any part of it is corroborated. 2. In that case the appellant was convicted of the murder of one Harneksing and mainly there were three witnesses: Pritamsingh (P. W. 10), Swaransingh (P. W. 11) and Sajjansingh (P. W. 13). Permission to put questions in the nature of cross-examination to Swaran Singh (P. W. 11) was granted and the decision shows that the evidence of the two other witnesses was not sufficient to establish the case for the prosecution so that the appeal was allowed and the conviction was set aside. It appeared to be the case of the witnesses that they had seen the accused shooting at the deceased. Thereafter they had gone to meet one Banta Singh and subsequently went to the police station where information was already lodged. During the course of the judgment discussion centres round the point whether the persons posing to be eye witnesses were really and truly the eye witnesses to the incident as deposed to by them. Fault was found with the position of attack as given by Pritamsingh (P. W. 10) in contrasting it with the medical evidence and it is said that Pritamsingh, Swaransingh and Sajjansingh had earliest opportunity of disclosing the name of the appellant as the assailant of Harneksingh when they brought Harneksingh in the truck. There Constable Bishambhardayal was present. It appears that Sajjansingh and one Mehal singh not examined, had given the information of the incident to the Constable. There Constable Bishambhardayal was present. It appears that Sajjansingh and one Mehal singh not examined, had given the information of the incident to the Constable. That was given in the presence of Pritamsingh and Swaransingh, but fault is found that none of them disclosed the name of the person who fired at Harneksingh. It is stated to be a very important part of the information and like others, Swaransingh (P. W. 11) the hostile witness, was also subjected to condemnation for not doing that. Similarly during the course of the judgment it is remarked that the prosecuting counsel should have put a question for finding out whether anybody had given the name of the appellant to the Constable and while naming such persons Swaransingh is also indicated as one of the persons. In the further discussion it is as if assumed that Swaransingh was present when Harneksingh was brought to the hospital and a finding is given that Pritamsingh, Swaransingh, Sajjansingh and Meharsingh did not disclose the name of the assailant in the hospital. It is also stated later on that like others (P. W. 11) Swaransingh also did not witness the incident. Surprise was expressed why Swaransingh as well as others did not go to the police station and it is said that this was strange and inexplicable conduct on the part of Pritamsingh, Swaransingh and also Sajjansingh and Meharsingh. A reading of the judgment, therefore, would prima facie show that some of the statements made by P. W. 11 Swaransingh were considered in the appropriate context in arriving at certain conclusions. 3. Mr. Rajkarne appearing for the State has pointed out our attention to the fact that in giving the dictum their Lordships of the Supreme Court have referred to the judgment in Khijiruddin v. Emperor, but the ratio of that decision has undergone a change as evidenced by a number of decisions which are consistent, chief of which is the Full Bench decision of the same High Court reported in PrafulJa Kumar Sarkar v. Emperor3. That was a case where the Full Bench has considered the effect of section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, where the Court may in its discretion permit the person who called a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. The observations at page 407 are material. That was a case where the Full Bench has considered the effect of section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, where the Court may in its discretion permit the person who called a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. The observations at page 407 are material. They are as follows: "The fact that the witness is dealt with under section 154, Evidence Act, even when under that section he is cross· examined to credit, in no way warrants a direction to the jury that they are bound in law to place no reliance on his evidence or that the party who called and cross-examined him can take no advantage from any part of his evidence. The evidence of such a witness is not to be rejected either in whole or in part." The Full Bench decision has referred to Bradley v. Recardo4, where the ratio is as follows: "131. English Reports-Common pleas.-Where a party being surprised by a statement of his own witnesses calls, other witnesses to contradict him as to a particular fact, the whole of the testimony of the contradicted witness is not, therefore, to be repudiated by the Judge," Tindal C. J. in exploring this proposition has stated as follows: "The object of all the laws of evidence is to bring the whole truth of a case before a Jury, but if this rule were to be discharged, that would no longer be the just ground on which the principles of evidence would proceed." It will also appear that a specific reference to Khijiruddin’s case (supra) bas been made at page 403. After referring to the factual aspects, the relevant remarks regarding the discussion of that case are as follows: "The argument would seen to have been that this result would follow from the permission of the Court to cross-examine and that the result had in fact been brought about without taking the Court's permission, and that thus the accused were prejudiced. I see more than one difficulty in this reasoning, but the case does seem to assume that permission given to the prosecution to cross-examine prosecution witness prevents even the defence from relying upon his evidence, at all. I see more than one difficulty in this reasoning, but the case does seem to assume that permission given to the prosecution to cross-examine prosecution witness prevents even the defence from relying upon his evidence, at all. I am out clear that this was intended, but as the judgment has been taken in this sense, I would point out that the prosecution can hardly be correct." 4. The Full Bench decision has been followed by the same High Court in Romesh. Chandra Das v. National Tobarco Company5 with the following observations : "When a, witness becomes hostile it would, in certain cases, be unsafe to accept any portion of the testimony which he has rendered in examination-in-chief. To pick and choose between the statements which a witness makes in examination-in-chief under the influence of an animus adverse to the party who has called him would sometimes be an unsound proceeding. But to say that the-Court has no discretion to decide whether or not what is elicited from such a witness in cross-examination is the truth is an entirely different proposition. The cross-examiners very function is not only to get rid of testimony which examination-in-chief has brought on the record, but to strive to extract from the witness the real truth. It would be quite wrong to hold that a court is entirely debarred from bringing its judicial discretion to bear on material, which cross-examination elicits and of deciding whether the truth lies there. 5. It seems, so far as our Bombay High Court is concerned, it had dissented from the view expressed in Khijiruddin v. Emperor as appearing in the decision in Emperor v. Jahangir6, where the observations at page 506 are as follows: "I am unable to say that the total discarding of the evidence of such witnesses can be formulated as a necessary legal result, amounting in fact to falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. If it cannot be formulated, then the result must be the same as in other cases, and it must be a matter for the Court on the particular facts in each case to credit or to discredit the different portions of the evidence of each witnesses as in other cases." 'In Shridhar v. Emperor', it is laid down as follows; "It is an ordinary incident of the Courts for a witness to resile from some portion pf his statement and to be allowed to be cross-examined by the prosecution, and there 'is nothing illegal in the Courts partly believing this witness and partly not." 6. It would be perhaps relevant to note that the same view is expressed by other High Courts and the line continued at least till the year 1969. We may refer to State v. Naginder Singh8. The view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Shridhar's case has been followed. In, In re Kalusing Motisjngh9 the following observations are made: "Even if a witness is declared hostile and is cross-examined under section 154, Evidence Act the value of his evidence would depend upon all the circumstances and would not, merely because of the cross-examination, become suspect. It is however, to be noted that any such use of the previous statement for the purpose of contradiction is cross-examination properly so called. Though section 162 does not use the word "cross-examination", section 145, which has referred to it, itself clearly provides that "the witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements." It is not conceivable how such statement can be used except for the purpose of contradiction by way of cross-examination, Now, cross-examination is normally the right of the party opposing the one which calls a witness. If, how ever, that party itself wants to cross-examine him, then it has to seek the leave of the Court for putting questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. This is under section 154 and it is the established practice that a Court would not give leave to, the party calling a witness question him under section 154 until it is satisfied that there is some hostility or adverseness displayed by the witness to the very patty oil whose behalf he has come to give evidence. This is under section 154 and it is the established practice that a Court would not give leave to, the party calling a witness question him under section 154 until it is satisfied that there is some hostility or adverseness displayed by the witness to the very patty oil whose behalf he has come to give evidence. If his memory plays a trick in regard, to a detail, and he does not in any other manner go back oh his previous statement, or show any disinclination to tell the truth then he is not hostile or adverse. In other words, he cannot be cross-examined and therefore the statements made by him to the police cannot be used in the manner provided in the amendment.” Similarly, in Rema Naik, v. State10, the decision in Profulla Kumar Sarkar v. Emperor is relied upon and the view expressed is as follows: “The evidence of a hostile witness is no necessarily to be rejected either in whole or in part. It is also not to be rejected so far as it is in favour of the party which called in the witness nor is it to be rejected so far as it is in favour of the opposite party.” In In re Saibanna Tippanna11, it is laid down as follows: “Even in the case of a witness who has permitted to be cross-examined under section 154 of the Evidence Act, the Court can depend upon that part of the testimory given by the witness which appears to be truthful evidence there being no principle on the basis of which it can be said that a witness who is permitted to be cross-examined must be dismissed as person giving false evidence on every matter about which he speaks.” 7. Thereafter if we come to Sahdeo Tanti v. Bipti Pasin12, earlier view expressed by the same High Court in Sarjug Prasad v. State13 has been followed and it is held that permission to cross-examine witness by itself is not enough to discredit the witness. 8. Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujrat14, is a case where the witness was allowed to be cross-examined. Permission to cross-examine the witness was granted at the stage of re-examination. It was a case where insanity was pleaded as a defence. 8. Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujrat14, is a case where the witness was allowed to be cross-examined. Permission to cross-examine the witness was granted at the stage of re-examination. It was a case where insanity was pleaded as a defence. Witness had earlier not spoken about it during investigation but in the Court a different case was sought to be made out and for the purpose of dislodging that view the evidence given by the witness, who was allowed to be cross-examined has been considered in detail and it has not been totally discarded. Similarly if we go to Bhanu Prasad v. State of Gujrat15 the Supreme Court had met with a situation that in the course of the trial servral prosecution witness were alleged to have gone back over their statements made by them during the investigation. With the permission of the Court some of them were cross-examined with reference to their statements recorded during the investigation. One such witness was Maghukanta. Another was Dabhabhai in preference to that of Madhukanta. After quoting that the first appellant was in possession of the postcard dated Februaty 18, 1963 this finding of fact on the weighting of the evidence of a witness declared hostile is approved under the following words: “In our judgment in coming to that conclusion those Court did not ignore any legal principle.” In relation to Dahyabhai also the following observations would be material, appearing at page 1326: ''The trial Court as well as the High Court accepted the evidence of Dabyabhai Sanghvi and Sendhalal to the extent it supported the prosecution case and rejected the rest. It was open for those Courts to do so: It appears, therefore that the various High Courts have so far taken into consideration the evidence of the hostile witnesses for whatever it is worth and seeking corroboration for basing certain conclusions on the statements found in the evidence of such witnesses. The Supreme Court judgment in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) (Supra) would not possibly permit us to do so, as is evidenced from the case in Khijiruddin v. Emperor (Supra). We are also aware of the observations found in Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh16, where it is laid down: "Even obiter dictum of the Supreme Court should be accepted as binding not statements on matters other than law have no binding force. We are also aware of the observations found in Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh16, where it is laid down: "Even obiter dictum of the Supreme Court should be accepted as binding not statements on matters other than law have no binding force. Since on facts no two cases are similar, Supreme Court's decisions which are essentially on questions of fact cannot be relied upon as precedents for decisions of other cases." In view of this position, it seems, the evidence of witnesses Ramarao (P.W. 13) and Babarao (P.W. 14) may have to be kept aside in arriving at the conclusions for the purposes of finding the guilt of the appellants. [Rest of the judgment not given.] MASODKAR J.-Being bound by the express statement of law, as found in Jagir Singh v. Statel (Delhi Administration), which appears to allude to the case in Khijiruddin v. Emperors as laying down that the effect of cross-examining a witness called by the party is to entirely and altogether discredit such a witness and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony I cannot, but agree to whatever has been said by my learned brother Justice Dighe in his erudite judgment with which I entirely concur. However, I proceed to add of my own the following few observations which I feel necessary to indicate what occurs to my mind upon the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties in these appeals. 2. In the present controversy, we have evidence of P. W. 13 Ramrao and P. W. 14 Babarao, both of whom have been declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. That is done by recourse to the provisions of section 154 of the Evidence Act. What is the effect of this course? Can the Court at all take into account the evidence of such witnesses? 3. Jagir Singh's case (supra) before the Supreme Court was an appeal from the judgment of the Delhi High Court wherein the conviction of Jagir Singh was in issue. It appears that the High Court rested the conviction on the evidence of two witnesses being Pritam Singh (P. W. 10) and Sajjansingh (P. W. 13). The third witness Swaransingh (P. W. 11) was cross-examined by the prosecution. It appears that the High Court rested the conviction on the evidence of two witnesses being Pritam Singh (P. W. 10) and Sajjansingh (P. W. 13). The third witness Swaransingh (P. W. 11) was cross-examined by the prosecution. The question that arose for consideration primarily, therefore, was, whether the conviction could be sustained by placing reliance on the testimony of (P. W. 10) Pritam Singh and (P. W. 13) Sajjan Singh. That appears to be the matter directly in issue as is evident from paragraph 7 followed by the discussion till paragraph 11, where the Supreme Court held that apart from the evidence of Pritamsingh (P. W. 10) and Sajjan Singh (P. W. 13), there is no other evidence to establish the prosecution case and that the appellant was entitled to acquittal. That indicates that evidence of (P. W. 11) Swaransingh was not treated as evidence available to prosecution. No doubt while evaluating the evidence of these two witnesses, the evidence of Swaransingh (P. W. 11) was also referred to. But with regard to that evidence, the Court clearly observed: "Swaran Singh (P. W. 11) was also examined on behalf of the prosecution but his evidence is of no help to the prosecution because he went back on the story of the prosecution and was permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution. It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution is permitted, to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit that witness a together and not merely to get rid of part of his testimony: [See Khijiruddin v. Emperor.]" [emphasis provided]. After these observations have been made, there is further reference to the evidence of (P.W. 11) Swaran Singh ruling out the possibility of he being the proper eye witness from the fact that he had not disclosed the name of the person who had fired at Harnek Singh. There is also a conclusion that (P. W. 11) Swaran Singh as well as the other two witnesses being Pritam Singh and Sajjan Singh must not have witnessed the incident, nor could identify the assailant of Harnek Singh. [para. 7, page 1404]. 4. From this, two conclusions were pressed in service on behalf of the State. There is also a conclusion that (P. W. 11) Swaran Singh as well as the other two witnesses being Pritam Singh and Sajjan Singh must not have witnessed the incident, nor could identify the assailant of Harnek Singh. [para. 7, page 1404]. 4. From this, two conclusions were pressed in service on behalf of the State. It was submitted that in fact whether (P. W. 11) Swaran Singh's evidence should at all be taken into account or not was not the issue directly in question before the Supreme Court and, therefore, the observations quoted (supra) were not the ratio. Secondly, it was urged that looking to the discussion it should be permissible course for the Court to evaluate the evidence of such witness on its own merit. It is further urged that the proposition in the above observations with regard to Khijiruddin's case decided by the Calcutta High Court as laying down the settled law about the witnesses cross-examined under section 154, Evidence Act upon the survey of law could be shown to be erroneous. Submission proceeds to attribute an assumption about state of law in the above passage; and such statements based on mistakes being not an authority. Reliance was placed on the decisions of several of the High Courts in the country and some of the decisions of the Supreme Court to indicate that Khijiruddin's case did not purport to lay down the law on the subject nor was treated as good law even in the same High Court. It is submitted that these observations do not purport to lay down any law on the topic. 5. On behalf of the defence it is submitted that the statement of law regarding the position of the witness like Swaran Singh (P. W. 11) found in Jagirsingh's case made by the Supreme Court was binding for all purposes on this Court. It is not open to this Court to take into account the state of law to find out errors or assumptions or on that basis to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses who are cross-examined by the party calling the same. It is submitted that in view of the clear statement of law such evidence cannot at all be read once the prosecution has cross-examined the witness and neither party can rely on it. It is urged that, that is the ratio of the judgment. 6. It is submitted that in view of the clear statement of law such evidence cannot at all be read once the prosecution has cross-examined the witness and neither party can rely on it. It is urged that, that is the ratio of the judgment. 6. These dimetrically opposite approaches do fall for consideration. 7. Undoubtedly as the question arises of applying the decision of the higher Court any party before this Court is entitled to draw our attention to the relevant controversy that surrounded the provisions of section 154, Evidence Act right in Twenties and thereafter. As far as this Court is concerned, it is enough to refer to the decisions in the case of Emperor v. Jahangir Ardeshir Cama3 and Shridhar Mahadeo v. Emperor4, taking the view that the evidence of a witness cross-examined will have to be evaluated on its own merit and the result is not to discredit the witness altogether. The controversy in the Calcutta High Court was eventually settled by the Full Bench of Five Judges presided over by Rankin, C. J., in Profulla Kumar Sarkar v. Emperor5. The learned Chief Justice with whose judgment the other learned Judges concurred, expressly ruled that the fact that the witness is dealt with under section 154, Evidence Act, in no way warrants a direction to the jury that they are bound in law to place no reliance on his evidence or that the duty who called and cross-examined him can take no advantage from any part of his evidence. Khijiruddin v. Emperor, along with other decisions of that Court were fully considered and the learned Chief Justice found that Khijiruddin's case did not lay down the correct proposition. Learned Chief Justice found it difficult to hold that the case decided the question about the witnesses cross-examined under section 154 of the Evidence Act. However, as the decision made reference to the principle stated in the case of Faulkner v. Brino6 the Court observed: ''The argument would seem to have been that this result would follow from the permission of the Court to cross-examine and that the result had in fact been brought without taking the Court's permission, and that thus the accused were prejudiced. I see more than one difficulty in this reasoning, but the case does seem assume that permission given to the prosecution to cross-examine a prosecution witness prevents even the defence from relying upon his evidence at all. I am not clear that this was in/ended, but as the judgment has been taken in this sense, I would point out that the prosecution can hardly be correct. " [emphasis provided]. Further the cases that arose before the Court of Common Pleas along with the decision in Faulkner v. Brino (supra) were examined to find out the exact conspectus of the Jaw. It is not necessary for the present purpose to refer to that judgment in extenso Buckland J. who concurred and gave separate reasons, observed: "The object of calling witnesses is to elicit the facts and if the facts to be elicited are such as ought to be elicited from a witness, and if they cannot be elicited without cross-examining him it would be difficult to say that the discretion was wrongly exercised. When a witness has made contradictory statements in examination-in-chief and in cross-examination, whether such cross-examination be by the party who has called him or by the adverse party or by both parties" the resultant position as regards his deposition is the same. It makes not one iota of difference whether his answers have been given in reply to questions by one side or by the other or even by the Court itself There can be no question as a matter of law of rejecting the evidence of such a witness either so far as it is in favour of the party calling the witness or so far as it is in favour of the adverse party." Thus, the Full Bench firstly doubted the ratio of Khijiruddin's case and secondly settled the law about the witnesses cross-examined under section 154 of the Evidence Act. 8. In Calcutta as well other High Courts this decision and the principles stated therein have been uniformly followed and the evidence of the witnesses though cross-examined to credit under section 154 have not been altogether rejected but evaluated on its own merits. [See: Romesh Chandra Das v. National Tobacco Co., Sarjug Prasad v. State8, State v. Naginder Singh9, In re Kalusingh Motisingh10, Rama Naik v Statell, and In re Saibanna Tippannau.] 9. [See: Romesh Chandra Das v. National Tobacco Co., Sarjug Prasad v. State8, State v. Naginder Singh9, In re Kalusingh Motisingh10, Rama Naik v Statell, and In re Saibanna Tippannau.] 9. On this topic of evaluation of such evidence, even the commentaries on the Evidence Act, do appear to be unanimous in that what was stated by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Profulla Kumar Sarkar v. Emperor, is being followed as the law by the several High Courts in India [See Sarkar on Evidence. Twelth Edition, Page 1337, Topic-"Effect of Cross-examining a Party's own witness" and Woodrojfe and Ameerali's Law of Evidence, 12th Edition, Volume 4, page 2888, para 12-"Value of evidence of hostile witness".] 10. For the defence Mr. Kamlakar candidly submitted that he was not in a position to cite any contrary decision after Profulla Kumar's case was decided by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court. II. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, I may refer to two decisions wherein it appears that, that Court was called upon to evaluate the evidence of the hostile witnesses. In Dahyabhai Thakkar v. State of Gujrat13, reliance was being placed on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who were cross-examined. To find the plea of defence based on insanity, it appears, that after holding that even at the stage or re-examination the provisions of section 154 of the Evidence Act would be available for the prosecution, the Court proceeded to evaluate the testimony of the witnesses discredited to find out whether that evidence could be accepted for finding the truth of the plea in defence. In other words defence was not shut out from relying on the testimony of the witnesses cross-examined. 12. Then again in Bhanuprasad v. State of Gujrat14, the evidence of witnesses declared hostile was evaluated. From that judgment, it can be safely inferred that the evidence of such witnesses is available to the Courts for evaluation on its own merit. The appeal before the Supreme Court was against the conviction in a trial for the offence under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 161 Indian Penal Code. It appears from the report of the case that certain witnesses at the trial turned hostile and were cross-examined. One such witness was Madhukanta, who tried to assert contrary to what her statement was to the police. It appears from the report of the case that certain witnesses at the trial turned hostile and were cross-examined. One such witness was Madhukanta, who tried to assert contrary to what her statement was to the police. She was cross-examined with the leave of the Court. It appears that submission was made that Madhukanta's cross-examination with regard to the statements recorded during the investigation which was held to be illegal, was not available to the prosecution. Considering that aspect of the matter, the Court observed that bath the trial Court and the High Court have accepted the evidence of Ramanlal and Dahyabhai in preference to that of Madhukanta and that was a finding of fact and in the judgment of the Court in reaching that finding of fact, no legal principle was violated. Similarly, another witness Dahyabhai had turned hostile to the prosecution at the trial. He did support the evidence of an other witness Ramanlal in some respect, but in other respects did not support the prosecution case. After referring to his evidence, both the trial Court as well as the High Court in appeal had accepted the evidence of Dahyabhai to the extent it supported the prosecution and had rejected the rest of it. On this aspect of the matter, the following observations are made in the judgment: "The trial Court as well as the High Court accepted the evidence of Dahyabhai, Sanghvi and Sendhalal to the extent it supported the prosecution case and rejected the rest. It was open for those Courts to do so." [Emphasis supplied.] Bhanuprasad's decision, there fare, appears to me to be endorsing the modality of evaluating the evidence of such hostile witnesses like Dahyabhai or Madhukanta an its awn merits. It should be permissible an the authority of these observations to accept part of such evidence and reject the rest. In other wards, it is not that by crass-examining the witness his evidence is rendered unavailable to either of the parties. Bath these decisions indicate just the contrary. 13. I may also. refer to. the abservatians in Bhanu Prasad's decision an an ather paint which indicate that far purposes of the precedent and binding authority of the Supreme Court decisions inter se the decision given by a Bench of mare Judges would be binding on the Bench constituted of the lesser number of Judges; [See reference to. 13. I may also. refer to. the abservatians in Bhanu Prasad's decision an an ather paint which indicate that far purposes of the precedent and binding authority of the Supreme Court decisions inter se the decision given by a Bench of mare Judges would be binding on the Bench constituted of the lesser number of Judges; [See reference to. E. G. Barsay v. State of Bombay15 and State of Bihar v. Baswan Singh16 and the Court's observations that the latter judgment was rendered by the Bench of five Judges and that decision was binding an the Bench that decided the farmer case.] Incidentally bath these judgments in Dahyahbai's and Bhanuprasad's case were by the Benches presided aver by three Judges of that Court while Jagir Singh's case by the Bench of two Judge;. 14. This State of law is not referred to in Jagirsingh's case. On the other hand, in that case reference is only made to. Khijiruddin's case and the proposition is stated (quoted supra) as a statement of law. Far a moment, I pause to pander whether at all it is open to the High Court to still apply the principles underlying the two decisions in Dahyabhai Thakkar v. State of Gujrat, and particularly in Bhanuprasad v. State of Gujrat. Left to myself I would have thought that these decisions preferably lay dawn the binding authority on the paint and would have proceeded to evaluate the evidence of the two discredited witnesses. But none of these authorities refer to any "settled law" an the subject. Jagir Singh's case only makes a reference to it and states what is settled law. Although there is no discussion nor reference to the controversy or the decisions of the Courts, the case in terms purports to declare the law. That being the position, is it open at all to this Court to ignore that statement of law an any ground ? 15. The juridical doctrine of precedent which enjoins the employment of decisions as guides in moulding the future decisions is undoubtedly the welcome product of the developed systems of law. Precedents are binding in the sense that they have to be, followed or else to be distinguished. The doctrine of stare devises which is distinguished from the doctrine of precedents can well be treated as the part of the latter. Precedents are binding in the sense that they have to be, followed or else to be distinguished. The doctrine of stare devises which is distinguished from the doctrine of precedents can well be treated as the part of the latter. These principles historically can be traced to the bask principles of system of English Common law and have now been firmly built into the' structure even of Indian Jurisprudence. It can well be noted that the doctrine of precedent is of considerable antiquity, while that of stare decisis relates to 'modernity. 16. Both these doctrines have engaged considerable judicial, attention in English Courts. The rigidity that a decision of the House of Lords upon a question of law is conclusive and binds the House in subsequent Cases and further even an erroneous decision can only be set right only by an Act of Parliament. [London Streat tramways Co. v. London County Council17, as well the exception mooted in Rudd v. Elder Dempstor and Co.18]; in that judgment rendered in ignorance of the statute would not be binding has now passed on to a phase of an approach which indicates the very rationale underlying the binding precedent or the doctrine of stare decisis. See also [Morelle Ld. v. Wakeling19 and Yound v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.20] which suggest that it is possible to find out whether a judgment pressed in aid is rendered per incuriam. 11. Reference to the speeches of the learned Lords in Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones LtdJ1;I would suffice to indicate the shift in the approach in this field. Therein the question was posed before the House of Lords as to the binding authority of its earlier decision rendered in Elder Dempster and Co. Ltd. v. Paterson Zochonis and Co.22. Lord Simonds observed as to the practice and, the principle of stare decisis by referring to the celebrated authority of Quinn v. Leathem23 that a decision of the House of Lords Will not be treated as departing from along established principle unless such an intention is made abundantly clear by the majority of the Lords participating in it: (See also Lord Morris's speech relying on Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd.v. Selfridge and Co. Ltd.24, to the effect that the rule of Elder Dempster and Co. Ltd.v. Selfridge and Co. Ltd.24, to the effect that the rule of Elder Dempster and Co. Ltd's decision (supra), for better or for Worse was firmly built into the structure of English Law.) Lord Reid in his celebrated speech cast out three exceptions pointing out to three classes of cases where the House is entitled to question or limit a previous ratio decidendi of its decision being: Firstly, where it is obscure, secondly, where the decision itself is out of line with other authorities or established principles and thirdly, where it is much wider than was necessary for the decision. 18. However, it must be mentioned and noted that all this debate in those Courts was; concerning the binding authority of the earlier decision of the same House or Court in subsequent cases, involving examination of the earlier decision. Similar is the position here in our country. The principle of stare decisis and the doctrine of precedent as far as the decisions of the Supreme Court are concerned as being binding on that Court have also been alluded to and Considered in Sajjansingh's case25. The Supreme Court observed therein that the normal rule was that the judgments pronounced by the Supreme Court would be final and could not be ignored by that Court unless considerations of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. This was so stated while considering the effect on its earlier decision in Shankari prasad's cased rendered by the Supreme Court. It was observed that an earlier decision of the Supreme Court was open to review on the ground of any alleged infirmity in the earlier decision, its impact on public good and the validity and compelling character of the considerations urged in support of the contrary view. While considering this, the factor that the decision has been followed in a large number of cases will also have its own importance. 19. None of these doctrines or principles however appear to have any application when High Court is asked to apply the law clearly stated or avail able in the judgment or decision of the Supreme Court. 20. Because in such matters we are faced with different type of difficulty. Our Constitution has provided for some in built limitations that appear to hinge upon the topic. Article 141 makes law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all Courts in the country. 20. Because in such matters we are faced with different type of difficulty. Our Constitution has provided for some in built limitations that appear to hinge upon the topic. Article 141 makes law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all Courts in the country. That provision is obviously enshrined to sub-serve the need of unity as well uniformity of justice and to instil the institutional faith based on judicial discipline. Dictates of its terms are all clear. It is not merely the principles of precedent or doctrine of stare decisis that is superimposed but something more than that. Had it been a matter of finding a precedent and/or applying stare decisis, I would have thought that the exceptions attending upon those could have been forcefully applied by attempting a permissible exercise of finding the "State of settled law" and the errors in that regard and proceeding further to delve what law should govern the controversy. Similarly by implying the ratio in the two decisions of the Supreme Court viz., Bhanuprasad's case and Dahyabhafs case, it would have been possible, for at least two reasons; one being both these cases having been decided earlier and by larger benches of Supreme Court and second being Jagir Singh's case having omitted to expressly notice the same. All this seems to me impermissible exercise in the High Court in view of the clear statement of law available in Jagir Singh's case and the matter must because of constitutional compulsion be left to the Supreme Court to be determined as and when the occasion arises. 21. This is more so because no authoritative statement of law is available in any of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above except in Jagir Singh's case as to the result that follows once the witness is cross-examined to credit under section 154 of the Evidence Act and that case alone appears to set out as a statement of law the proposition regarding the same and further appears to reinstate the authority of the decision in Khijiruddin's case by express reference and impliedly taking the view that the cases that overruled that authority did not lay down correct law. If this be the law as applicable while appreciating the evidence of the witness cross-examined by the party calling the same, it would bind us. If this be the law as applicable while appreciating the evidence of the witness cross-examined by the party calling the same, it would bind us. Even if it were an obiter dictum upon the matter of law, no freedom is left in High Court to take any other view of the matter: [See-Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh27]. The statement being in the form of law stated, it is still binding on High Court and the same cannot be ignored on the ground that relevant state of law or even "relevant provision of law was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court"; [B.M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality28] expressly disapproving the contrary modality in the decision of this Court in Municipal Committee of Malkapur v. B. M. Lakhani9.9, because of the terms of Article 141 of the Constitution]. To me, it appears, therefore, that the proposition in Jagir Singh's case will have to be followed "as binding not because of its conclusion but in regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein." [See-B. Shyamarao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry (supra)]. 22. This all may have a look of blind faith and following; and even as was observed in Rajeshwar Prasad v. State of West Bengal30, would be open to the charge that the decision of the Supreme Court is being put on the pedestal of an enactment. As stated earlier in B. M. Lakhani's case (Supra), the Supreme Court in terms left nothing to doubt nor visualised any freedom in this regard by observing that it is not open to the High Court to ignore the decision of the Supreme Court because the High Court thought that relevant provisions even of the statute were not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. 23. This by itself indicates that the phrase "law declared" in Article 141 is of wide amplitude and takes in the "ratio decidendi" of the case as well "obiter dictum" on the matters of law available in the Supreme Court decision and further the clear statement of law stated by that Court in its decisions. That phrase does not merely take in the decisions which purport to declare law on any given topic. The law may, it appears, be found to be declared even by statements of law available in the decisions of the Supreme Court. 24. That phrase does not merely take in the decisions which purport to declare law on any given topic. The law may, it appears, be found to be declared even by statements of law available in the decisions of the Supreme Court. 24. I am fully conscious that by deciding to apply the principles of Article 141 to the statement of law in Jagir Singh's case, this Court will be making the testimony of the witnesses cross-examined by the party calling unavailable both in criminal and civil jurisdictions to either of the party and further that all the decisions referred to above taking contrary view would be treated as overruled and as such not available to evaluate such evidence on its merits. This may also lead to somewhat drastic results particularly in criminal trials where one stumbles against "hostile witnesses" on and off and their tribe appears to be on increase. All these and other realities operative in the practical and pragmatic field of experience may all have co-relation to public good and eventual administration of justice. However, the matter must of necessity be left to the jurisdiction of the highest Court in the country. 25. That being the position, I do not feel bound to enter upon this aspect of the controversy because of the clear statement of law available in Jagir Singh's case (supra), leaving hardly anything to doubt and/or to debate. Putting that statement of law before me and the terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, it will have to be found that the evidence of P. W. 13 Ramarao and P. W. 14 Babarao who have been cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution discredits them altogether and no part of their testimony is available to either of the parties. ORDER PER CURIAM – Criminal Appeal Co.35 of 1974 filed by accused Shankar is allowed. Shankar Kisan Jagtap is found not guilty of any of the offences. He is acquitted. He be set at liberty forthwith. The appeals of accused Nos. 1 to 4, viz., Criminal Appeals Nos. 267/73, 271/73, 2/74 and 21/1974 are partly allowed. The conviction and sentences of accused Nos. 1 to 4 under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code are set aside. He is acquitted. He be set at liberty forthwith. The appeals of accused Nos. 1 to 4, viz., Criminal Appeals Nos. 267/73, 271/73, 2/74 and 21/1974 are partly allowed. The conviction and sentences of accused Nos. 1 to 4 under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code are set aside. But each of the appellant is found guilty of the offence under section 326 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. Under section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the imprisonment undergone by each of the appellants during trial or proceeding shall be deducted. Appeal partly allowed.