Judgment :- 1. The question that arises for consideration in this original petition is whether the State Government has a further power of revision when once the Commissioner of Civil Supplies has exercised his revisional powers under Clause.45 (11) of the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966 (for short, the Order) over the appellate order passed by the District Collector under Clause.45 (10) (iii) of the Order. In pursuance of a notice dated 30 51972 inviting applications for the issue of a new licence as dealer in respect of A. R. D. No. 21, the petitioner as well as the 2nd respondent submitted applications. The District Supply Officer, Quilon granted the licence to the 2nd respondent. The petitioner took up the matter in appeal before the District Collector, Quilon. The appeal was allowed, the order of the District Supply Officer appointing the 2nd respondent as A.R D. was set aside and in bis place the petitioner was appointed as A.R.D. No. 21 by Ext. P 1 order by the District Collector. The petitioner made the security deposit and he was granted licence K. Dis. 3145/72/G5 dated 22-1-1973. The petitioner was allowed to open the depot as A. R. D. No. 525 with effect from 28 11973. 2. Against Ext. P-1 order of the District Collector, the 2nd respondent filed a revision before the Commissioner of Civil Supplies under Clause.45 (11) of the Order. By Ext. P-2 order dated 7 31973 the Commissioner of Civil Supplies dismissed the revision filed by the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent then filed another revision before the 1st respondent-State and the 1st respondent by Ext. P 3 order dated 13 11-1973 cancelled Ext. P 1 order of the District Collector, Ext. P 2 order of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies and the order dated 2-81972 of the District Supplies Officer and ordered that steps are to be taken for the appointment of a new A. R. D. by the competent authority within a month. The petitioner in this original petition seeks to quash the above order Ext. P 3. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 1st respondent-State while the 2nd respondent has not filed a counter-affidavit. The contention in the counter-affidavit is that the 1st respondent has jurisdiction to pass Ext. P 3 order. 4.
The petitioner in this original petition seeks to quash the above order Ext. P 3. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 1st respondent-State while the 2nd respondent has not filed a counter-affidavit. The contention in the counter-affidavit is that the 1st respondent has jurisdiction to pass Ext. P 3 order. 4. Shri P. Krishnamoorthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the 1st respondent-State has no jurisdiction to interfere with Ext. P-2 order of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies, which itself is an order in revision passed under Clause.45 (11) of the Order. Though under Clause.45 (11) the State Government and the Commissioner of Civil Supplies have got revisional powers, there is only one revision against an order in appeal under Clause.45 (10) Ext. P 2 is an order passed in appeal by the District Collector under Clause.45 (10) (iii) of the Order. From such an order, the revision is to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies and not to the State Government. The learned counsel refers to Notification No. 8915 / FD. BI / 66-31 / Fd. D. dated 1st July 1966 issued by the 1st respondent (This notification is printed on page 66 of the book All State Orders under The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 by P. K. Venugopalan, Advocate) and points out that Ext. P1 order in appeal was passed by the District Collector against the order of the District Supplies Officer appointing the 2nd respondent as A. R. D. According to the learned counsel, from such an order in appeal the revision lies to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies and not to the State Government. The learned counsel also refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1963 SC. 1503). I do not think this decision is applicable to the facts of this case. 5. The learned Government Pleader contends that the 1st respondent-State has power under Clause.45 (H) of the Order to interfere in revision with any order passed by a subordinate authority under Clause.45.
1963 SC. 1503). I do not think this decision is applicable to the facts of this case. 5. The learned Government Pleader contends that the 1st respondent-State has power under Clause.45 (H) of the Order to interfere in revision with any order passed by a subordinate authority under Clause.45. According to the learned Government Pleader, this power is there over orders in revision passed by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies under Clause.45 (11) itself The State Government in revision can set aside an order in revision passed by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies as well and remit the case back to any authority directing such further action as the State Government considers proper in the circumstances of the case. The learned Government Pleader points out that this is what has been done in this case. The learned Government Pleader then contends that there is nothing wrong in conferring concurrent powers on two authorities and refers to S.26 and 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 where revisional powers are conferred on both the Custodian and the Custodian General. It is pertinent to note that S.26 which confers revisional powers on the Custodian is no longer part of the above Act as the same has been repealed by Act 91 of 1956. The learned Government Pleader then points out that under S.435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 such concurrent powers are conferred. The learned Government Pleader further contends that the word 'or' appearing in 'The Government or the Commissioner' in Clause.45 (11) is to be read as 'and' and relies on the decision of the House of Lords in Reg. v. Federal Steam Navigation ( (1974) 1 W.L.R. 505). In the above case which was under the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1955 as amended by the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1963 the question that arose for consideration was whether both the owner and master of a ship were liable for the offence of oil discharge in prohibited sea area under S.1 (1) of the Act.
In the above case which was under the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1955 as amended by the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1963 the question that arose for consideration was whether both the owner and master of a ship were liable for the offence of oil discharge in prohibited sea area under S.1 (1) of the Act. The House of Lords said: "the language of S.1 (1) led irresistibly to the conclusion that it was the intention of Parliament that both the owner and master should be liable for a breach of its provisions and that both could be prosecuted for an offence thereunder, and that, accordingly, the word 'or' was to be construed conjunctively since any other construction produced unintelligible and absurd results." I am at a loss to understand how the above decision can be of any support to the contentions advanced by the learned Government Pleader. In this case, it is the construction put forward by the learned Government Pleader, which, if accepted, will lead to absurd results. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent supports the contentions of the learned Government Pleader. 6. Sub-clauses (10) and (H) of Clause.45 of the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966 read: "(10). Any person aggrieved by any order passed under this clause may within thirty (30) days from the date of service of such order appeal: - (i) In the case of an order passed by the Commissioner to the Government. (ii) In the case of an order passed by the District Collector to the Commissioner, and (iii) In the case of an order passed by any other officer to such authority as the Government may specify in this behalf and the decision of the Government, Commissioner or such authority shall subject to the provisions of sub-clause (11) be final.
(ii) In the case of an order passed by the District Collector to the Commissioner, and (iii) In the case of an order passed by any other officer to such authority as the Government may specify in this behalf and the decision of the Government, Commissioner or such authority shall subject to the provisions of sub-clause (11) be final. (11) The Government or the Commissioner may, either suo mote or on application, call for and examine the records of any order passed by a subordinate authority under the provisions of this clause, for the purpose of satisfying themselves or himself as to the legality or to the propriety of such order, and may (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; (b) impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order; (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or any other authority directing such further action or enquiry as the Government or Commissioner considers proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) pass such other order as the Government or the Commissioner may deem fit Provided that no application under this sub-clause shall be entertained after the expiry of 60 days from the date of service of the order against which the application is made: Provided further that no order to the disadvantage of a person shall be passed under this sub-clause unless the person concerned is given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such order." Notification No. 8915/FD. B1/66-31/Fd. D. dated 1st July 1966 issued by State Government under Clause.45 (10) (iii) of the above Order reads: "No. 8915/FD.B1/66.31/Fd.D Dated Trivandrum, 1st July, 1966 In exercise of the powers conferred by paragraph (iii) of sub-clause (10) of Clause.45 of the Kerala Rationing 0.1966, the Government of Kerala hereby specify the authorities mentioned in column (1) of the schedule below to entertain and dispose of appeals on the original orders passed under the said clause by the officers specified against each of them in column (2) thereof Table:#1 Clause 45 (10) and (11) of the Order and the notification under Clause.45 (10) (iii) dated 1st July 1966 are to be read together. Under Clause.45 (10) (i), the Government is the appellate authority while under Clause.45 (10) (ii) the Commissioner of Civil Supplies is the appellate authority.
Under Clause.45 (10) (i), the Government is the appellate authority while under Clause.45 (10) (ii) the Commissioner of Civil Supplies is the appellate authority. Under Clause.45 (10) (iii) the appellate authority is to be specified by the State Government. This has been done by the notification dated 1st July 1966. Under the above notification the District Collector is the appellate authority in the case of as order passed by the District Supply Officer. That is why Ext. P2 was passed by the District Collector. Under Clause.45 (11) both the State Government and the Commissioner of Civil Supplies have got revisional powers. No revision will lie from an order in appeal under Clause.45 (10) (i) while a revision will lie from an order in appeal under Clause.45 (10)(ii) because the appellate authority there is an authority subordinate to the State Government. A revision will lie from an order passed in appeal under Clause.45 (10) (iii) to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies because the authorities mentioned in the notification dated 1st July 1966 arc subordinate to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies. A revision can lie to the State Government also. But there is only one and only one revision. Hence in a case like this where the Commissioner of Civil Supplies has exercised the revisional powers under Clause.45 (11), there is no further revision to the State Government. Moreover, it will be a revision of an order in revision under Clause.45 (11). This is not contemplated by Clause.45 (11) of the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966. 7. For the reasons stated above, I quash Ext. P3 order of the 1st respondent-State. The original petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.