JUDGMENT Uday Sinha, J. These three applications have been heard together and are being disposed of by common judgment. The point raised in all these three applications is that the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the then Sub-divisional Magistrate, Buxar, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the petitioners, as the offences had not been committed within the jurisdiction of the Court at Buxar. 2. The facts, in short, on the basis of which the point has been urged are as follows: one Onkar Nath, a cloth dealer at Buxar had purchased some woolen shawls at Srinagar and, thereafter, given them to Sri Ram Gupta, a commission agent at Amritsar, for sending them to Onkar Nath at Buxar. On the 23rd September, 1966, Sri Ram Gupta double packed the shawls and entrusted them with Golden City Booking Agency at Amritsar, a private booking agency of the Northern Railway. At the booking agency, the goods were, in fact, entrusted to one Harjinder Singh (petitioner in Cr. Mise 1012/72). The bale of Shawls reached Buxar on the 28th September, 1966, and the following day Onkar Nath went to receive the consignment, but finding it loose and single packed, he applied to the Railway authorities for giving him open delivery of the bale. This request of Onkar Nath was acceded to by the Railway authorities and on 1-11-1965 he was given open delivery of the bale at Buxar in presence of the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Dinapur. On opening the bale, it was found that instead of containing shawls, it contained only waste papers and rags. The Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Dinapur, Shri D. N. Manna, then lodged a first information report with Buxar G. R. P. S, upon which case no.6 dated 9. 11. 1966 was instituted. After investigation, Buxar. G. R. P. S submitted charge-sheet against Avtar Kaur (petitioner in Cr. Misc. 1250/71) Dinanath Sharma, Sudarshan Singh Bedi (petitioner in Cr. Misc. 1013/72 and Harijinder Singh alias Jindan Singh alias Jindu (petitioner in Cr. Misc. 1012/72). Accused Avtar Kaur and Dina Nath Sharma were shown as absconding in the charge-sheet. On receipt of the charge-sheet, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Buxar, took cognizance of the offence and issued processes against all the accused. The petitioners on coming to know of the case pending against them appeared before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Buxar, and were released on bail. Misc. 1012/72). Accused Avtar Kaur and Dina Nath Sharma were shown as absconding in the charge-sheet. On receipt of the charge-sheet, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Buxar, took cognizance of the offence and issued processes against all the accused. The petitioners on coming to know of the case pending against them appeared before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Buxar, and were released on bail. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the file of Shri N. N. Sinha, Munsif Magistrate, Buxar, who framed charges under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code against Sudarshan Singh Bedi and Avtar Kaur. Besides that, charges were also framed against, Harjinder Singh under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioners thereafter moved this Court for quashing the proceeding pending before Shri N. N. Sinha, Munsif Magistrate, Buxar. on the ground that Buxar court had no jurisdiction to try the offences which were alleged to have been committed. 3. The charges were framed in January, 1971 and therefore, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 must govern the procedure relating to the trial of the petitioners. I shall, therefore, proceed to examine the relevant provisions for deciding the point urged in these applications. Section 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, provides that every offence must necessarily be enquired into and tried by the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not come into play in the instant case and, therefore, there is no point in referring to it. Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribed that when a person was accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which had been done, and of any consequence which had ensued, such offence could be inquired or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing had been done, or any such consequence had ensued. The other provisions relating to the place of inquiry or trial do not come into play so far as the charges under sections 411 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code are concerned. The other provisions relating to the place of inquiry or trial do not come into play so far as the charges under sections 411 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code are concerned. There is no controversy about the fact that every Act, in furtherance of the commission of the offence took place at Amritsar and that nothing happened at Buxar, In that sense, the application of section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is completely out of question. So far as the application of section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the offences prescribed in Sections 411 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code are- concerned, the receiving of stolen property or property obtained by criminal misappropriation was complete at Amritsar. It is no body's case that the receiving of property of the kind covered by section 411 of the Indian Penal Code, took place at Buxar. Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code therefore, could not be inquired into or tried at Buxar. So far as the offence of cheating contained in Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the delivery of property, i. e. loss, and deception with dishonest intention, if any took place at Amritsar. Therefore, the offence of cheating also was complete at Amritsar and Buxu did not come into picture. 4. Learned counsel for the State contended that the goods were to be sent to Buxar, but they were not sent and instead rags and waste papers were sent to Buxar, and, therefore, the consequence of cheating must be deemed to have been completed at Buxar. I regret, I am unable to accept this submission of learned Counsel for the State. The offence of cheating consists in a deception and retention of property with a dishonest intention, the delivery of property and the loss of property occurred at Amritsar. The dishonest intention of the accused was an incident which was conceived and fructified at Amritsar and thus the deception also was complete at Amritsar. The fact that the Shawls did not reach Buxar cannot be said to be a consequence of the cheating. The consequence of cheating was loss of property which took place at Amritsar itself. The dishonest intention of the accused was an incident which was conceived and fructified at Amritsar and thus the deception also was complete at Amritsar. The fact that the Shawls did not reach Buxar cannot be said to be a consequence of the cheating. The consequence of cheating was loss of property which took place at Amritsar itself. In that view of the matter, the court at Buxar cannot be held to have any Jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code in the instant case. I am fortified in the view that I have taken by a Division Bench decision of this Court in State v. Chunni Lal Begam4. In that case, the accused sent 125 chests of tea. The accused was himself consignee, but the consignments were endorsed in favour of different persons. In course of transit it was discovered at Jamalpur (Bihar) that 115 out of 125 chests contained paddy husks in place of tea and the remaining chests were found to contain rubbish tea and dust. Jamalpur Railway Police, therefore, submitted a charge-sheet against the accused before the Sub-divisional Officer, Monghyr, who took cognizance of the case. On those facts, it was observed by Choudhary , J. as follows:- From the facts stated above, it is manifest that the offence of cheating, if any, was committed at Gauhati from where, instead of tea, husks were despatched by the offender or where the endorsement of the consignment was made in favour of different reasons. At jamalpur, nothing was done except the discovery of the fact that the consignment contained husks, instead of tea, which showed that the offence of cheating had been committed." “Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that when a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose Jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence ensued. In the present case, the offence of cheating that is said to have been committed by the accused was committed at Gauhati where, instead of tea, husks were booked in the consignments, The discovery of this fact at Jamalpur could not be said to be of any consequence which had ensued from the fact of cheating by the accused at Gauhati. In other words, no consequence ensued at Jamalpur in respect of the offence of cheating that was committed at Gauhati. It is, therefore, manifest that the Court at Monghyr, within whose jurisdiction Jamalpur, lies, could have no jurisdiction to try the case. I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down by Choudhary, J. I am, therefore, of the view that the Court at Buxar had or has no jurisdiction to try the petitioners. 5. 1t now remains to consider whether offence of criminal breach of trust contained in section 406 of the Indian Penal Code with which petitioner Harjinder Singh has been charged could be tried at Buxar. It is well settled that section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (hereinafter referred as 'the Old Code) has no application to the offence of criminal breach of trust. In case of Gunananda Dhone versus Lala Santi Prakash Nandy2 it was observed as follows :- "Criminal breach of trust is not an offence which counts as one of its factors, the loss that is "the consequence of the act. It is the Act, itself, which in Jaw, amounts to the offence. I am therefore in entire accord with the decision in the case of Simhachalam v. Emperor 44 cal 912 and am clearly of opinion that S, 179 Criminal Procedure Code has no application to a case of criminal breach of trust. It is the Act, itself, which in Jaw, amounts to the offence. I am therefore in entire accord with the decision in the case of Simhachalam v. Emperor 44 cal 912 and am clearly of opinion that S, 179 Criminal Procedure Code has no application to a case of criminal breach of trust. The rule is to be found in S. 177 Criminal Procedure Code which lays down the general law and which again has been repeated in and made a part of the special provisions contain S. 181 sub-S. (2) Criminal Procedure Code." Again In re Jivandas Savchand3 Beaumont C. J. observed at page 493 as follows :- "In my view this case of Emperor v. Ramratan Chunilal is based on a wrong view of S. 179, and we ought to overrule it; and this court should come into line with the High Courts of Calcutta and Madrass, and hold that S. 179 has no application to cases of Criminal Breach of trust." The relevant provision in relation to offences of criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust is contained in section 181 (2) of the Old Code. The provision in regard to forum for trial and enquiries of those offences has been slightly altered in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and has been numbered as section 181 (4). But since the present case is governed by the old Code of 1898, I shall proceed to consider whether the offences with which petitioners are charged could be tried at Buxar. The temptation is great to clothe the Magistrate at Buxar with jurisdiction to try the alleged offences, but in the celebrated words of Beaumont, C. J. the provision in relation to place of inquiry or trial is founded on considerations of principle and expediency and that Courts ought not to be astute in finding reasons for assuming jurisdiction to deal with crimes committed outside their jurisdiction. Sub-section (2) of Section 181 of the old code provides that the offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained by the accused persons or the offence was committed. Admittedly the shawls in question were delivered to the petitioner Harijinder Singh at Amritsar and not at Buxar nor they are alleged to have been retained by the accused within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Buxar by any of the accused. The test, therefore, regarding reception and retention of any property provided in section 181 (2) is not fulfilled. It must, therefore, be considered whether the third ingredient of the offence "the offence was committed." at Buxar is fulfilled or not. The clause “the offence was committed" is a repetition of the provisions contained in section 177 of the old Code. The offence of criminal breach of trust consists in entrustment of any property by one person to another in any manner and dishonest use or disposal of that property in violation of any direction of law or of any legal contract express or implied. if the shawls were dishonestly misappropriated or converted to their own use in violation of the trust by the accused, such misappropriation or conversion took place at Amntsar and not at Buxar. Undoubtedly, there was a contract between Sri Ram Gupta (an agent of Onkar Nath of Buxar) and Harjinder Singh at Amritsar to send the goods to Buxar and that contract was not carried out or discharged. There can be no doubt that the reminiscences in that regard took place at Amritsar and not at Buxar. Since the goods were booked by Railway at Amritsar and faked package was discovered at Buxar, in my view, therefore, the offence of criminal breach of trust must be held to have been completed at Amritsar and not at Buxar. 6. Learned Government Pleader in opposition to the rule issued by this Court contended that the accused Harjinder Singh was under a liability to send the goods to Buxar and having failed in that regard the dishonest misappropriation or conversion or use or disposal in violation of any discharge of the contract must be held to have taken place at Buxar and so the offence of criminal breach of trust must be held to have been committed at Buxar. He placed reliance upon the observation of Mukherji. J. in Gunananda Dhone’s case2. He placed reliance upon the observation of Mukherji. J. in Gunananda Dhone’s case2. (Supra) at page 616 where it was observed that where the accused is under a liability to render accounts at a particular pl3ce and fails to do so by reason of having committed an offence of Criminal breach of trust which is alleged against him, the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction that place is situate, may enquire into and try the offence under section 181 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The observation of Mukherji. J proceeded upon the footing that the prosecution remains ignorant of the misappropriation or conversion until such time as the complainant finds that the accused fails to pay or to account. In his view the overt-act of the accuseds hawing his dishonesty is essentially necessary to be proved to establish the offence, and till the time arrives when it is found that the trust had not been discharged, it cannot he said with certainty that the offence had been committed. I regret, I am unable to accept the observation of Mukherji, J as laying down the correct position in law. I cannot do better than quoting the observations of Becaumont, CJ. in the Bombay case (Supra)3 in regard to the observation of Mukherji J. in the Calcutta case (Supra)3 which is as follows :- "With very great respect to the learned Judges who decided that case I am quite unable to follow the line of reasoning. It seems to me to involve a confusion between the place where the offence was committed and the place where the complainant first acquired evidence that the offence had been committed. Baker, J in the same Bombay case (Supra)3 observed as follows:- "If I may say so with respect, the variance between the views taken by different High Courts on the question of the jurisdiction in cases of criminal breach of trust appears in some cases to be due to the theory that knowledge of loss is the same as loss. …. … …. …. … …. That loss takes place at the place where the criminal breach of trust is committed, and not at the place where knowledge of that loss comes to the owner, which may be anywhere else." I would prefer to follow the majority view in the Bombay case and hold that the offence of criminal breach of trust cannot be said to have been committed at Buxar, 7. Learned Government Pleader also placed reliance upon a case of Gajjan Singh Versus State of Madhya Pradesh4 which involved interpretation of the words "or any such consequence has ensued" occurring in section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused in that case was being prosecuted under sections 471 and 474 of the Indian Penal Code. This case is of no assistance to learned Government pleader, as I have alrealy held that section 179 of the old Code has no application to cases of Criminal breach of trust. Further, the case before the Supreme Court was one of a continuing offence, and, therefore, it could have been tried at various places. It was also not known in that case where the alteration in the permit had taken place and, therefore, when the truck left Indore on a journey to Nasik and back, the case could certainly be tried at Indore. In the instant case, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the replacement of the shawls by waste papers and rags must have happened at Amritsar. Once the package had been booked, the package was in the custody and responsibility of the Rail ways and, therefore, the misappropriation of the property must be held to have taken place at Amritsar. 8. A reference may also be made to the observations of the celebrated Sulaiman, C. J, in Kashi Ram Mahto versus Emperor5 where it was observed as follows;- "The illustrations to the Section (Section 179) also make it clear that the consequence contemplated in the section is a consequence which coupled with the Act, done constitutes the offence. But if the two can be separated and the Act, itself is sufficient to constitute the offence, it would make the section inapplicable." His Lordship repelled the contention that loss to the victim of a criminal breach of trust is a consequence which alone can complete the offence. But if the two can be separated and the Act, itself is sufficient to constitute the offence, it would make the section inapplicable." His Lordship repelled the contention that loss to the victim of a criminal breach of trust is a consequence which alone can complete the offence. The consequence envisaged in section 179 must be necessary ingredient of the offence. In the instant case, the Joss of shawls by non-delivery at Buxar was not an ingredient of the offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust. It is manifest, therefore, that none of the offences have been committed at Buxar, the Magistrate at that place had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence with which the accused persons were charged. The applications must therefore, be allowed and the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate at Buxar be quashed. 6. For the reasons, mentioned above, the applications are allowed and the prosecution of the petitioners before the Magistrate at Buxar is quashed. The officer-in-Charge, Buxar G. R. P. S. will be at liberty to take back the charge-sheet filed by him before the sub-divisional Magistrate and present it before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar or where ever the State may consider appropriate. The learned Magistrate should inform the officer in-charge, Buxar, G. R. P. S. about the result of these applications. Applications allowed.