Judgment :- 1. The question arises under the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, 1970 (referred to as Act 11 of 1970). Two agriculturists filed an application as O.P. 188/1970 for a full settlement of their debts in accordance with the provisions of S.15 of Act 11 of 1970. The creditors were arrayed as respondents 1 to 24; and the 10th respondent is a co-operative society within the meaning of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act 1969 (referred to as Act 21/1969). The applicants debtors filed three interlocutory applications as I.A. Nos. 2459/70, 53/71 and 708/73 for prohibiting the concerned creditors from realising their debts from the petitioners. In this revision we are concerned with I.A 708/1973 laid against the 10th respondent society. The 10th respondent society had already obtained an award against the petitioners who are numbers of that society. In execution of the award the society sold certain agricultural property belonging to the petitioners on 19 41973, and what remained was confirmation of the sale and consequential proceedings. It was at that stage that the petitioners debtors prayed for an order prohibiting the Circle Officer of Co-operative Societies (Administration), Ottappalam, from proceeding with the sale in enforcement of the award till the disposal of the present petition. It appears that only the 10th respondent opposed the three interlocutory applications referred to above. According to the society the debt involved in the award is not one capable of being settled under S.15 of Act 11/1970 and that, at any rate, in view of S.100 of Act 21/1969 the civil court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the sale already conducted. The lower court repelled those contentions and issued the prohibitory order as prayed for by the petitioners. The 10th respondent has, therefore, preferred this revision. 2. The first contention urged on behalf of the revision petitioner is that the debt in question is not one capable of being settled under S.15 of Act 11/1970; and in support reliance is placed upon the definition of 'debt' contained in S.2 (4) of Act 11/1970. While defining 'debt' S.2 (4) of Act 11/1970 enumerates the categories of debts which are excepted from the purview of the definition. S.2 (4) (v) deals with debt due to any co-operative society including a land mortgage bank registered or deemed to be registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for the time being in force. While defining 'debt' S.2 (4) of Act 11/1970 enumerates the categories of debts which are excepted from the purview of the definition. S.2 (4) (v) deals with debt due to any co-operative society including a land mortgage bank registered or deemed to be registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for the time being in force. That the award in question is a debt due to a society admits of no doubt. But the question is whether the expression 'debts' as used in S.15 of Act 11/1970 has to be interpreted with the aid of the definition contained in S.2 (4). That question was already answered in the negative by this court in the decision reported in Umbichi Ahmed v. Kalyani Amma (I960 KLT 865), Meenaksaikutty Varasiaramma v. Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. (1961 KLT 377) and Hameed Koya v. Arunachalam Nadar & others (1963 KLT 653). Though these decisions were concerned with the scope of S.15 to 18 of Act 31 of 1958, I do not think that a different principle can apply while interpreting S.15 of Act 11/1970 because substantially the concerned provisions in the two statutes are similar. While considering the scape of S.15 to 18 of Act 31 of 1958 this court took the view that those sections are meant for a full settlement of all liabilities of the agriculturist, whether such liability be a debt as defined in the Act or not, and for that the word 'debt' used in those sections has to be understood in its broad grammatical sense to include every liability of an agriculturist. It is, therefore, held that the debt due to the 10th respondent is also a liability which could be settled under S.15 of Act 11 of 1970. 3. If the debt, in question could be settled under S.15 of Act. 11/1970 it is only logical to hold that all the relevant provisions of S.15 and allied sections of the Act could be invoked by the petitioners as against the debt due to the 10th respondent. Sub-S. 5 of S.15 of Act 11/1970 enjoins that during the pendency of an application under S.15 the court may stay the trial of any suit or the execution of any decree against the applicant or his properties. Sub-S. 5 of S.15 of Act 11/1970 enjoins that during the pendency of an application under S.15 the court may stay the trial of any suit or the execution of any decree against the applicant or his properties. It follows, therefore, that when once the debt in dispute is a liability that could be settled under S.15, the court trying the relevant application has the jurisdiction to stay the trial of any suit or the execution of any decree against the applicant or his properties. In this sense perhaps no other question survives for decision. 4. The revision petitioner seeks avoidance of S.15(5) of Act 11/1970 on the strength of S.100 read with S.69, 70, 75 and 76 of Act 21 of 1969. S.100 of Act 21/1969 provides that no civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter for which provision is made in Act 21/1969. S.69 of that Act provides that disputes referred to thereunder are to be referred to the Registrar, and S.70 deals with the decision and award on disputes referred under S.69 As far as the award obtained by the 10th respondent against the petitioners is concerned it is clear that the stage as contemplated by S.69 and 70 is already over; and the civil court in considering the present application is not dealing with any matter provided for in S.69 and 70 of Act 21/1969. The further question is whether S.75 and 76 have any bearing on the matter in dispute. Here also I may state that S.75 has not much relevance, and it is S.76 that assumes importance. S.76 of Act 21/1969 deals with the execution of orders, decisions and awards referred to in S.68, 73, 75 etc. The utmost that could be gathered from S.75 read with S.100 is that Act 21/1969 itself provides the machinery for executing orders and awards passed under that Act and that the civil court cannot exercise that jurisdiction. By passing an order under sub-section 5 of S.15 of Act 11/1970 the civil court is not assuming powers as to the manner of execution of the award obtained by the 10th respondent. Subsection 7 of S.15 of Act 11/1970 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Insolvency Act 1955 shall mutatis mutandis be applicable to the proceedings under S.15. By passing an order under sub-section 5 of S.15 of Act 11/1970 the civil court is not assuming powers as to the manner of execution of the award obtained by the 10th respondent. Subsection 7 of S.15 of Act 11/1970 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Insolvency Act 1955 shall mutatis mutandis be applicable to the proceedings under S.15. S.16 of Act 11/1970 sets out the manner of settlement of liability of the agriculturist by court. It is to facilitate the working out of the remedies provided for in S.15 and 16 that the court is clothed with the powers of staying the trial as well as execution by sub-s. 5 of S.15. While trying a petition under S.15 of Act 11/1970 the court in this case is not apparently dealing with any dispute as between the 10th respondent society and its members, the two petitioners, within the meaning of S.69, 70 and 75 of Act 21/1969. 5. Yet another alternative contention urged on behalf of the revision petitioner is that even if the civil court has jurisdiction to stay proceedings by virtue of S.15 (5) of Act 11/1970, in the instant case there is no 'decree', the execution of which could be stayed by the court. It is true that under S.15 (5) of Act 11/1970 what a court may stay is "the execution of any decree against the applicant or his properties". According to the revision petitioner the award is not a decree within the meaning of S.15 (5). But I think, the answer to that contention is contained in S.76 of Act 21 of 1969. S.76 (a) reads as follows: 76. According to the revision petitioner the award is not a decree within the meaning of S.15 (5). But I think, the answer to that contention is contained in S.76 of Act 21 of 1969. S.76 (a) reads as follows: 76. Every order made under sub-section (2) of S.68 or under S.75, every decision or award made under S.70, every order made by the liquidator under S.73 and every order made by the Tribunal under S.82, S.84, S.85 or S.86 and every order made under S.83 shall, if not carried out, (a) on a certificate signed by the Registrar or any person authorised by him in this behalf, be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and shall be executed in the same manner as a decree of such court; or" It is clear from that provision that as far as executability is concerned the various orders, decisions or awards referred to in the opening portion of S.76 are to be deemed as decree of a civil court. I hold that the lower court had jurisdiction to pass the order that is challenged before me. I confirm the decision of the lower court and dismiss the revision. No costs. Dismissed.