JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---The above Second Appeal is filed by the Appellant Plaintiff, whose suit for recovery of possession of the suit land and for declaration of her ownership to the extend of 5 acres 3 gunthas, from Survey No. 21, situated at Tungi, was dismissed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ausa, with costs, on March 30,1966. The decree was confirmed by the learned Assistant Judge, Latur on October 27,1967. 2. The relevant facts may briefly be stated as follows : 3. Survey No. 21 of Tungi is the ancestral property of the plaintiff and the Defendants. The plaintiffs father Mukinda was the son of one Makji. After Makjis death, Mukinda came into of the said land possession. Mukin-da died leaving behind him Jijabai, his daughter, Mandabai, his mother and two sisters Gitabai and Girjabai. After Mukindas death, Mandabai came to be in possession of this property. It was alleged by the Plaintiff in the Plaint that Mandabai died in 1956, after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, and hence she was to the time of her death the full owner of the property under section 14 of the Act. Plaintiff claimed to be the nearest heir of Mandabai. 4. According to the defendants there was no partition between Makaji and the defendants, and they were in joint possession of the property. It was their coparcenary property Mandabai was a widow in the joint family. She died in the year 1954. Hence the Defendants right to the ownership of the property could not be challenged by the plaintiff who could not become a coparcener after the death of her father Mukinda, or have any right or interest in the property after the death of Mandabai in the year 1954. The defendants further contended that before she filed the present suit, the plaintiff had filed another suit of a similar nature which was dismissed for default of appearance of the plaintiff. 5. Though the plaintiff had stated in the earlier suit that Mandabais death occurred in the year 1953-54, in the present suit, she died after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. She sought to prove it with a certificate Exh. 49 issued by the police patil of the village, Tungi. She examined the police patil as her witness. Though the plaintiff had stated in the earlier suit that Mandabais death occurred in the year 1953-54, in the present suit, she died after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. She sought to prove it with a certificate Exh. 49 issued by the police patil of the village, Tungi. She examined the police patil as her witness. The Defendants had filed a copy of the judgment dated July 13, 1954, wherefrom it is clear that the Plaintiffs case in that suit was that Mandabai died in the year 1953-54. 6. The learned Civil Judge disbelieved the Plaintiff and her witness, with regard to the date of the death of Mandabai, and came to the conclusion that Mandabai had no definite share in the property, and it was not proved by the plaintiff satisfactorily that Mandabai died in the year 1956, and not before 1956. The learned Civil Judge also ordered the plaintiff to pay the costs of the defendants. 7. In appeal the learned Assistant Judge confirmed the finding of the trial Court with regard to the date of death of Mandabai. He held that Mandabai died before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. He too did not accept the evidence of the certificate, issued by the police patil and his oral evidence. Further he held that the suit of the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also because she had not joined Gitabai and Girjabai as parties to the suit. The judgment and decree passed by the two courts below are challenged in this Second Appeal by the plaintiff. 8. Mr. Kulkarni, the learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that the certificate issued by the police patil prima facie showed that Mandabai died on July 26, 1956; and this was established by the evidence given by the police patil. However, the certificate is not in respect of any extract of the register, maintained under the Birth, Death and Marriages Registration Act, 1886. Even the extracts of such register have merely a prima facie value as evidence. The two courts below have disbelieved the police patil and refused to accept the certificate, which was not extract of entries regularly made in the register, maintained under the Birth, Death and Marriages Registration Act, 1886. 9. Even the extracts of such register have merely a prima facie value as evidence. The two courts below have disbelieved the police patil and refused to accept the certificate, which was not extract of entries regularly made in the register, maintained under the Birth, Death and Marriages Registration Act, 1886. 9. It is true that the fact of birth may be proved by parole testimony; and the evidence of the police patil was, therefore, relevant. The two courts below, however, on appreciation of the evidence disbelieved the police patil on the ground that they were not satisfied about his truthfulness because he allowed the plaintiff to produce the register in Court, and the plaintiff did not even care to produce a copy of the extract of the register. Even till today the plaintiff has not been able to produce before this Court a copy of the extract of the register which would have corroborated the evidence of the police patil. In these circumstances, the finding of the two courts below regarding the date of the death of Mandabai is a finding of fact, which will not be interfered with by this Court having regard to the limitations of its powers under sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. In view of this conclusion, the claim made by the plaintiff must fail. It is, therefore, unnecessary to decide whether the learned Assistant Judge was right in dismissing the plaintiffs suit also on the ground that as her previous suit was dismissed for default under Order 9, Rule 8, the present suit was barred under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Kulkarni attempted to argue that Order 9, Rule 8 was not applicable to this case because the defendants were not present in Court when the suit was dismissed. This may be so. As already stated above, the plaintiff was also absent. The order passed by the Court on December 2, 1959, at (Exh. 46), shows that on that date, when the suit was called, the Pleader for the defendants was present. The learned Assistant Judge was, therefore, quite right in holding that Order 9, Rule 8 applied to the case; and the present suit was barred by Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. The learned Assistant Judge was, therefore, quite right in holding that Order 9, Rule 8 applied to the case; and the present suit was barred by Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. In view of the close relation between the appellant and the defendants and having regard to the fact that the plaintiff was the grand daughter of Mandabai, who was admittedly a member of the family of the plaintiff and defendants, the parties to bear their own costs in the Second Appeal. -----