JUDGMENT : 1. This application in revision on behalf of the accused persons is directed against the concurrent JUDGMENT :s of the courts below ending in their convictions and sentences under various sections. All of them were held guilty under Section 147, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- each, by the Magistrate. He also held them guilty under Section 448, Indian Penal Code but did not impose any sentence for the same. So far as accused Baijnath and Nagina (petitioners 6 and 7) are concerned, he also convicted them under Section 380, Indian Penal Code and awarded a sentence of two months' rigorous imprisonment as also a fine of Rs. 55/- on each. The accused Doma, Badri and Baijnath (petitioners 1, 3 and 6) were further held to be guilty under Section 323, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month each. Their appeal to the sessions court failed and the learned Sessions Judge, who heard the appeal maintained their convictions as also sentences. Thereafter, this revision. 2. The case for the prosecution is that on 19.6.1966 at about 10 A.M. accused Baijnath came to the shop of the informant (P.W. 6) and purchased articles like dalda etc. worth Rs.28.37. On demand of the price with the previous dues, in all aggregating to Rs. 84/-, Baijnath refused to pay it and left the shop with those articles saying that he would clear off the dues when he would have money. About half an hour after Baijnath along with the other six accused persons came to the shop again. They alleged that 4 seers of dalda which Baijnath had purchased from the shop was found short in weight by 10 chhataks. They, accordingly, demanded explanation for the short weight from the informant and further abused him filthily. In course of that, one of the accused caught hold of the informant and two others assaulted him with fists and slaps. At that very time, 3 of them opened the informant's cash box in the shop and took out Rs 40 to 45, which was there being the sale proceeds of that day. Having indulged in all these high handed acts they left the shop and went away. 3. Thereafter, the informant went and lodged a written complaint (Ext. 7) with the Gram Panchayat that very day, i.e. 19.6.1966. Having indulged in all these high handed acts they left the shop and went away. 3. Thereafter, the informant went and lodged a written complaint (Ext. 7) with the Gram Panchayat that very day, i.e. 19.6.1966. On 21.6.1966 the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat (P.W. 7) informed him that his case was not entertain able by the Panchayat and that he should' take necessary steps in the matter before the police or a competent court. The informant then proceeded to the police station and lodged first information report (Ext. 1). On that basis the police registered a case against the accused persons and after having duly investigated into it submitted charge sheet dated 1.9.1966 against all of them under Sections 147/380, Indian Penal Code. After receiving this charge sheet, the Subdivisional Magistrate on 21.9.1966 took cognizance of the offences under Section 147/380, Indian Penal Code against them and transferred the case to another Magistrate for disposal. In the trial court charges under Sections 452 and 147, Indian Penal Code ware framed against all. Some of them were also charged under Sections 323 and 380 Indian Penal Code. The prosecution examined 8 witnesses, including the Investigating Officer (P.W. 8). Of these, besides the informant (P.W. 6), three (P.W's 1, 2 and 4, figured as eye witnesses of the occurrence. The Sarpanch (P.W. 7) acknowledged lodging of the complaint by the informant with the Gram panchayat on 19.6.1966 and his having referred him to take the matter to the police or a competent court because the case was not cognizable by the Gram Panchayat. He also produced that complaint (Ext. 7) and the Gram Panchayat ORDER :sheet (Ext.8) in this behalf. Learned Magistrate on the basis of those evidence held the case to have been duly proved against the accused and convicted and sentenced them as above. Their defence that the case was untrue and had been filed falsely out of enmity did not find favour with the Magistrate. As already observed, their appeal to the Sessions Judge also failed. 4. Mr. Baidaynath Prasad No. 2 appearing for the petitioners has urged that the trial as such from the very cognizance stage must be treated as vitiated so that their convictions as recorded by the trial court has to be taken as wholly void and illegal. As already observed, their appeal to the Sessions Judge also failed. 4. Mr. Baidaynath Prasad No. 2 appearing for the petitioners has urged that the trial as such from the very cognizance stage must be treated as vitiated so that their convictions as recorded by the trial court has to be taken as wholly void and illegal. His first argument in support of this contention is the serious irregularity to which the Sarpanch subjected himself in failing to examine the complainant on the complaint so filed before him. His submission is that under rule 42 of the Bihar Gram Cutchery Rules, 1962 it was mandatory for the Sarpanch to examine on oath or on solemn affirmation the complainant after receiving this complaint and to reduce that examination to writing. It was, after having done so, that under rule 43 the Sarpanch could have summarily dismissed the complaint if it did not disclose any offence or disclosed an offence beyond the competence of the Bench of the Gram Cutchery. The Sarpanch had not, however followed these mandatory requirements of law. Instead, as is evident from his (Sarpanch- P.W. 7) testimony coupled with his ORDER :sheet (Ext. 8) that he at the very beginning referred the complaint to one of the Punches of the Gram Cutchery to enquire into its truth and send his report, which on being done, the Sarpanch directed the complainant to seek his remedy before the police or in a competent court because on the facts, as they stood, offence under Section 452, Indian Penal Code, seemed involved which was beyond the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutchery. Such an action of the Sarpanch, which was clearly in violation of the mandatory requirement of law in this behalf, made that shifting of the case from the Gram Cutchery to another authority wholly illegal, and in spite of that step by the Sarpanch which was manifestly unwarranted in law the complaint continued to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Gram Cutchery and could not be tried in a regular court. His Submission next is that since the charge sheet in the case had been submitted under Sections 147/380, Indian Penal Code, case under which sections is exclusively triable by the Gram Cutchery in view of the specific provisions of Section 62 read with Section 68 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act 1947, it was not at all open to the Subdivisional Magistrate to take cognizance thereof unless he had passed an ORDER :to the contrary, which he had not obviously done. In such a circumstance, according to counsel, the cognizance, so taken in the case, is void ab initio and consequently the trial on that basis must also be deemed to have been wholly vitiated. To support this submission he has strongly relied upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in (1) Bimal Singh and others v. State of Bihar (1965 B.L.J.R. 664). 5. On a careful consideration in the background of relevant facts in this behalf, these contentions do not appear to have much substance. It may be observed at the outset that no objection on these lines appear to have been raised by these petitioners in any of the two courts below and they had submitted to their jurisdiction for this trial. Mr. Prasad has, however, contended that it being a question of jurisdiction, it is open to him to canvass it for the first time in this revision even though they had failed to do so in the courts below. Learned State Counsel has no quarrel with this stand of Mr. Prasad. His contention is that in the context of the facts of the case this objection has got to fall and must be rejected. 6. No doubt, in normal course, after receiving this complaint the Sarpanch should have examined the complainant and recorded his statement and after he had done so, if he found that the offence was beyond the competence of the Gram Cutchery, he should have summarily dismissed the complaint, as per requirements of the aforesaid rules 42 and 43. This he, however, did not do and referred the complaint to another Punch for enquiry and report on receiving which he directed the complainant to seek his remedy before another form because the offence alleged appeared to be under Section 452, Indian Penal Code, which the Gram Cutchery had no jurisdiction to handle. This he, however, did not do and referred the complaint to another Punch for enquiry and report on receiving which he directed the complainant to seek his remedy before another form because the offence alleged appeared to be under Section 452, Indian Penal Code, which the Gram Cutchery had no jurisdiction to handle. Though not in form, but in substance, this action of the Sarpanch is to be deemed to his summary dismissal of that complaint. After all, his formal ORDER :dismissing the complaint summarily on the ground that the offence complained was beyond the competence of the Gram Cutchery would not have meant anything else substantially. So his mere omission to examine the complainant and then dismiss the complaint without any further action for the reason that it was not cognizable by the Gram Cutchery can at best be treated as a procedural irregularity on his part curable under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. A case under Section 452, Indian Penal Code, is not entertainable by a Gram Cutchery, vide Section 62 (supra). As such, if on the allegations made in the complaint read with that statement of the complainant, if recorded, would have made out a prima facie case of that nature the Sarpanch was bound to dismiss the complaint leaving the party to seek his remedy at the proper forum. In this view of the matter, if the Sarpanch, on the enquiry report of the Punch, felt satisfied he could not do anything else but to refuse to entertain it and advise the complainant to seek relief before the police or any competent court. The petitioners have not been able to show that this mistake of procedure on the part of the Sarpanch has resulted in prejudice to them or has caused any failure of justice in the case. The argument of the petitioners that on the allegations made in the complaint (Ext. 7) no case under Section 452, Indian Penal Code was at all made out is not of any material consequence at this stage. In fact, if any opinion was required about this matter at that time it could have gone for the prosecution, prima facie. The argument of the petitioners that on the allegations made in the complaint (Ext. 7) no case under Section 452, Indian Penal Code was at all made out is not of any material consequence at this stage. In fact, if any opinion was required about this matter at that time it could have gone for the prosecution, prima facie. As already noticed, on the facts alleged during the examination of the witnesses examined from the side of the prosecution before charge, the Magistrate had felt satisfied of its prima facie presence and charged the accused accordingly under this Section. It is another matter that in his JUDGMENT :, after having looked into the entire evidence on record, he held this charge not being fully substantiated. 7. The charge sheet in the case had been submitted under Sections 147/380, Indian Penal Code. Since the theft alleged against the accused was said to be an amount of Rs.40 or 45 only, the offences under both these sections were to be taken as exclusively triable by a Gram Cutchery, as provided in Section 62 read with Section 68. It is also not disputed that the Subdivisional Magistrate had not passed any ORDER :to the contrary at the time of taking this cognizance. If these matters had stood there, then there would have been substance in the contention raised by the petitioners that the Subdivisional Magistrate's cognizance thereof was not justified in law. It is, however, not so. The complainant, before lodging the case with the police, had actually approached the Gram Panchayat and filed a regular case there The Sarpanch of the Gram Cutchery, however, declined to entertain the case on the ground that it was beyond its jurisdiction and directed him to approach the police or a competent court in the matter. It was in that background that the complainant went to the police and lodged the first information report, who, in regular course, after necessary investigation, submitted charge sheet against the accused persons under these Sections (147/380, Indian Penal Code). The fact about the complainant having previously approached the Gram Cutchery and its refusal to entertain it as the offence was beyond its jurisdiction and then lodging of this first information report was specifically mentioned in the charge sheet. The fact about the complainant having previously approached the Gram Cutchery and its refusal to entertain it as the offence was beyond its jurisdiction and then lodging of this first information report was specifically mentioned in the charge sheet. It was after perusal of the charge sheet that the Subdivisional Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offences as mentioned therein, i.e. under Sections 147/380, Indian Penal Code. On these facts, it will not, I think, be correct to accuse the Subdivisional Magistrate to have taken cognizance in the case even though his jurisdiction to do so had been completely barred under the aforesaid provisions of the Gram Panchayat Raj Act. Had the complainant by passed the Gram Panchayat and lodged the complaint with the police and the Magistrate had taken cognizance of these offences on the basis of the charge sheet, there would have been scope for the petitioners to advance such an argument. But, when the Gram Panchayat had expressed itself against entertaining the complaint as the offence alleged appeared to be under Section 452, Indian Penal Code, which was not cognizable by it and the complainant lodged his case with the police who submitted charge sheet against the accused, how could the Subdivisional Magistrate be said to have fallen into error in taking cognizance of the offences merely on the ground that in the ordinary course they were exclusively triable by the Gram Cutchery. On the basis of the charge sheet the Magistrate was to take cognizance of the offences, as he had actually done. In view of the fact that the charge sheet clearly mentioned about the complainant's having first approached the Gram Panchayat with the complaint and latter's refusal to entertain it because it was beyond its jurisdiction, it was obviously not for the Magistrate at that stage to try to investigate whether those offences were exclusively triable by a Gram Panchayat so that he could refuse to take the cognizance. On the obtaining (Sic) facts, there could be no question of his passing an ORDER :to the contrary to be able to take its cognizance as provided under Section 68 above. On the strength of those undisputed facts I have no manner of doubt that there was nothing wrong in the cognizance so taken by the subdivisional Magistrate and Section 68 could not operate as a bar to his doing so. On the strength of those undisputed facts I have no manner of doubt that there was nothing wrong in the cognizance so taken by the subdivisional Magistrate and Section 68 could not operate as a bar to his doing so. Evidenity, therefore, no illegality can be inferred in the trial of the case following that cognizance. 8. On these facts, which would appear distinguishable from the facts involved in the aforesaid Bench Bimal Singh's case (1965 B.L.J.R. 664), its help cannot perhaps be invoked in aid of the petitioners. In that case, the informant Lagan Mochi had initiated his action against the accused persons before the police straightway. On the first information report lodged by him the police in the usual course, submitted charge sheet against the accused persons for offences under Sections 143/379 Indian Penal Code. After having received the charge sheet, the Subdivisional Magistrate took cognizance in the case under Sections 143/379/447, Indian Penal Code and transferred the case to another Magistrate for trial which was done and they were convicted and sentenced. In appeal, their conviction under Section 379, Indian Penal Code, was struck down, but maintained in respect of Sections 143/447, Indian Penal Code. In the revision against that to the High Court learned Judges accepted the contention addressed for the petitioners because those offences were exclusively triable by Gram Cutchery and the Magistrate had not passed any ORDER :to the contrary while taking their cognizance It is thus clear that the complainant in that case had taken the shelter of the police for those offences, exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutchery, at the very beginning without trying to knock the door of the Gram Panchayat. Here, however, the informant had actually been with his complaint to the Gram Panchayat. but they declined to act on it because the offence made out a case which was not within their competence and then he want to the police. In the other single Judge case of (2) Sri Mahton and others v. Ram Lakhan Poddar (1965 B.L.J.R. 64), faintly relied upon by the petitioners to substantiate these contentions, the point at issue was entirely different In that case, the Sarpanch had submitted the records of the Subdivisional Magistrate for necessary action on the ground that the petitioners ware turbulent persons and were of badmash type. Upon receiving that record, the Subdivisional Magistrate took cognizance of the case, which was subsequently tried by another Magistrate who convicted the accused persons. On the failure of their appeal, they took the matter in revision to the High Court where their convictions and sentences were set aside and the case was remitted to the Gram Cutchery for trial on the ground that the act of the Sarpanch in submitting the record of the case to the Subdivisional Magistrate was illegal and unwarranted, and consequently, his cognizance as also their trial were illegal and vitiated. 9. On the above considerations, I am unable to discern any illegality in the cognizance or the trial of the case for any of the above reasons. The trial so held following that cognizance appears to be in accord with law and no fault can be found with them. 10. At the end, Mr. Prasad has urged for remission of the sentences keeping in view their trifling nature as also other relevant facts. According to him, the petitioners have already been subjected to severe financial strain in fighting it out upto this time. Moreover, they have had to be in jail in connection with this litigation for about ten days. In such circumstances, they do not deserve to be put behind bar once again because that may cause further strain in their neighbourly relationship. 11. It is conceded between the parties that these petitioners had to be in jail for ten days or so at the time of the appeal and this revision. Their having had to incur substantial expenditure in defending themselves up to this stage cannot also be denied. In the fracas involved no weapon had been used and the assault on the informant was by means of slaps, and fists. Keeping all these facts in mind, I feel inclined to agree with Mr. Prasad that they may not be made to be in jail again. I, accordingly, remit the sentence of imprisonment as passed in the courts below on Baijnath and Nagina (petitioners 6 and 7) and retain only their sentence of fine of Rs 55/- each. Similarly, I would change the sentence of imprisonment of one month on Doma, Badri and Baijnath (petitioners 1, 3 and 6) to be that of a fine of Rs.50/- in each case and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each. Similarly, I would change the sentence of imprisonment of one month on Doma, Badri and Baijnath (petitioners 1, 3 and 6) to be that of a fine of Rs.50/- in each case and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each. The sentence of fine of Rs.100/- each of the petitioners under Section 147, Indian Penal Code is maintained. 12 Subject to the above modifications in the sentences of' the petitioners, the application is dismissed. Application dismissed