Sri Kamla Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar — 1975 DIGILAW 170 (PAT)

JUDGMENT UDAY SINHA, J. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing Annexures 9 and 10 to this application and for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the President, District Appeal Committee Cum District Education Officer, Saran at Chapra, respondent no. 2 and N. C. Tiwary, Ex. Headmaster, Yadav Chhatriya High school Khodaibag (hereinafter referred to as 'the School'), respondent no. 3 not to disturb the working of the petitioner as Headmaster of the school within Jalalpur police station in the district of Saran. Annexure 9 is the order of the President, District Appeal Committee Cum District Education Officer, Saran dated the 20th of June, 1974 whereby the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the School, respondent no. 4 was directed to see that respondent no. 3 was delivered charge of the office of the Headmaster of the School. Annexure 10 is an order of the District Education Officer dated the 20th of July, 1974 by which respondent no. 4 had been directed to maintain respondent no 3 in office on the ground that the latter was legal Headmaster of the said School. 2. The petition is founded on the following averments. The petitioner was appointed Headmaster of the School on 22.8.1962 and his appointment was approved by the Chairman, Board of Secondary Education. The petitioner was confirmed in service on the 20th of December, 1962 by a resolution of the Managing Committee which has been annexed and marked Annexure-2 to this application. After the petitioner had been confirmed the pay scale of the petitioner was fixed by the Board of Secondary Education and provident fund account was opened in his name in 1966. The special fund and the general fund of the School were also in the name of the petitioner. In November; 1969 the petitioner went on long leave granted by the Managing Committee and remained on leave till 31.12.1973. After the petitioner had gone on leave one Babunand Prasad, a teacher in the School was put in charge of the office of the Headmaster and continued to Act, as such till the 30th of June, 1971. On 1.7.1971 respondent no. 3, N. C. Tiwary was temporarily appointed as Headmaster of the School in the leave vacancy of the petitioner till May, 1973. On 1.7.1971 respondent no. 3, N. C. Tiwary was temporarily appointed as Headmaster of the School in the leave vacancy of the petitioner till May, 1973. A copy of the alleged resolution dated the 26th of June, 1971 has been annexed and marked as Annexure-3 to this application. The temporary appointment of respondent no. 3 was extended till November, 1973, as the petitioner alleges that by resolution dated the 14th of December, 1973 (Annexure-4) the services of respondent no. 3 were dispensed with. On the expiry of his leave the petitioner claims to have joined the officer of the Headmaster of the School on 1.1.1974. Respondent no. 3 being aggrieved by the termination of his service filed an appeal before the District Appeal Committee without impleading petitioner as a party thereto. According to the petitioner, this appeal was not maintainable, besides being defective as the petitioner had not been impleaded as a party thereto. The allegation of the petitioner is that before the District Appeal Committee respondent no. 3 and the Secretary of the Managing Committee, respondent no. 4 entered into an unholy alliance and filed a compromise petition and on that basis the District Appeal Committee passed one of the impugned orders contained in Annexure-9 dated the 20th of June, 1974 whereby respondent no. 4 was directed to reinstate respondent no. 3 to the office of the Headmaster of the School. Being aggrieved by the orders contained in Annexure-9 and 10, the petitioner has moved the present application for the relief mentioned above, 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged the following points in support of his application. (1) Respondent no. 3. N. C. Tiwari had no locus standi to file an appeal before the District Appeal Committee for the reasons that, (a) there was no provision for filing appeal under the Bihar High Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules 1972 (hereinafter called 'the 1972 Rules'); and (b) no major punishments in terms of rule 22 having been imposed by the Managing Committee, the order thereof was final and did not require to be confirmed by the District Appeal Committee for giving effect to it. (2) Assuming that the appeal was maintainable, the District Appeal Committee could only approve or disapprove the termination of services of respondent no. 3, but it had no jurisdiction to record a compromise between the parties and issue directive in terms of the compromise. (2) Assuming that the appeal was maintainable, the District Appeal Committee could only approve or disapprove the termination of services of respondent no. 3, but it had no jurisdiction to record a compromise between the parties and issue directive in terms of the compromise. (3) The Secretary of the Managing Committee, respondent no. 4 was not competent to enter into a compromise with respondent no. 3 contrary to the resolution of the Managing Committee and, therefore, the order passed by the District Appeal Committee was illegal. (4) The petitioner being the Headmaster of the School at the time the appeal was heard by the District Appeal Committee, he was a person interested in the controversy and by passing an order contrary to the interest of the petitioner without having heard him, the order violated the principles of audi alteram partem. 4. I shall now proceed to consider whether there is any substance in the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. So far as the first point is concerned, the submission is based upon an interpretation of rule 22 read with rule 23 of the 1972 Rules. Rule 22 provided for punishments which could be imposed on any staff of a School and created two categories of punishments-(Ka) Major and (Kha) minor punishments. Major punishments included (i) stoppage of increment of pay; (ii) reduction in rank; (iii) discharge; and (iv) dismissal. Minor punishments included (i) warning; and (ii) censure. Rule 23 provided that the Managing Committee after giving an opportunity to the person concerned to explain his conduct could impose minor punishments and that would be final. In regard to Rule 24 it was provided that before imposing a major punishment, the Managing Committee had to draw up detailed charges and approve them by resolution and then enter upon an inquiry in regard to the charges levelled against the teacher concerned. Rule 24 (kha) provided for suspension of a teacher proceeded against pending departmental proceedings. Rules 25, 26 and 27 lay down the detailed procedure in regard to imposition of major penalties upon a teacher. Rule 24 (kha) provided for suspension of a teacher proceeded against pending departmental proceedings. Rules 25, 26 and 27 lay down the detailed procedure in regard to imposition of major penalties upon a teacher. Rule 28 provided that where the Managing Committee decided to impose any of the major punishments on the delinquent teacher, the Managing Committee, before giving effect to the punishment imposed, had to transmit all relevant documents in relation to the departmental proceedings to the District Education Officer for being placed before the District Appeal Committee. Rule 20 provided for the constitution of the District Appeal Committee. Rule 30 provided for at least one sitting of the District Appeal Committee every month except when there was no matter to be considered. In its monthly meeting it would apply itself to all disciplinary proceedings and after examining them, it would decide whether (ka) the decision of the Managing Committee was just and proper and to approve it if it were so; and (kha) whether the decision of the Managing Committee was excessively harsh which called for modification and if it were so to pass order accordingly. The District Education Officer was required to communicate the decision of the District Appeal Committee to the parties concerned within a week and that decision of the District Appeal Committee would be binding on the Managing Committee. Rule 31 provided for an appeal to the President, Regional Appeal Committee against an order of the District Appeal Committee. Rule 32 provided that the termination of service (ka) during the period of probation; (kha) while the incumbent was holding a purely temporary appointment; (Ga) on the abolition of the post would not be considered to be a major punishment. But even in the three situations postulated by Rule 32, the person adversely affected by the decision of the Managing Committee had to be given a written notice of the impending proceeding. 5. Mr. Prabha Shankar Mishra for the petitioner contended that at the time his service was terminated on 14.12.1973 respondent no. 3 was holding a purely temporary assignment. To support his contention he drew our attention to Annexures-3 and 4 where his service has been described as temporary (Aasthai) and upon that footing he contended that the termination of the service of respondent no. 3 was holding a purely temporary assignment. To support his contention he drew our attention to Annexures-3 and 4 where his service has been described as temporary (Aasthai) and upon that footing he contended that the termination of the service of respondent no. 3, being covered by Rule 32 (Kha), no major punishment had been imposed upon him and, therefore, the order of the Managing Committee was final in terms of rules 23. The appeal to the District Appeal Committee was, therefore, incompetent. 6. Assuming that the appointment of the petitioner was temporary and he was holding it as such on the relevant date, i.e. 14.12.1973, although Annexures E.F.G and H conclusively prove to the contrary, we have to consider whether Annexure-4 partook the character of a minor punishment in terms of rule 22 (Ka) of the 1972 Rules. If it satisfied that test, contention of Mr. Mishra must be accepted. It is true that the petitioner has been described as temporary and on probation. The first sentence of Annexure-4 states that the probationary period of respondent no. 3 in the temporary post of Headmaster had been extended till 30.11.1973. The operative part of Annexure-4 indicates that the services of respondent no. 3 were being terminated with effect from 15.12.1973. The resolution contained in Annexure-4 was passed on 14.12.1973 and was to take effect from 15.12.1973. Annexure-5 is a copy of the resolution of the Managing Committee of the 24th of December, 1973 whereby the petitioner was directed to assume charge from the 1st of January, 1974 as his leave was expiring on the 31st of December, 1973. In pursuance of that letter the Secretary of the Managing Committee sent a letter on the 25th of December, 1973 to the petitioner requesting the latter to join his old post of Headmaster. This letter has been annexed and marked as Annexure-6. Annexure 7 is the Joining report of the petitioner dated 1.1.1974. In that array of events the Managing Committee acted in but haste to remove respondent no. 3 and give effect to it without the approval of the District Appeal Committee which prima facie was in contravention of rule 28 of the 1972 Rules which lays down that the Managing Committee shall forward all papers relating to the disciplinary proceedings to the District Appeal Committee. 3 and give effect to it without the approval of the District Appeal Committee which prima facie was in contravention of rule 28 of the 1972 Rules which lays down that the Managing Committee shall forward all papers relating to the disciplinary proceedings to the District Appeal Committee. In that situation, respondent no.3 moved the District Appeal Committee by sending a letter Annexure D/3, This has been described by learned counsel for the petitioner as filing an appeal. With great respect it cannot be so termed. The hot haste in which the Managing Committee was trying to oust respondent no. 3 left him with no choice but to move the District Appeal Committee and in those circumstances the District Appeal Committee assumed seisin over the matter as is evident from Annexure-E/3. The delinquency on the part of the Managing Committee was more serious than the Act, of respondent no. 3 in moving the District Appeal Committee for protecting his interest. The only way out for the Managing Committee and the petitioner lies in trying to establish that no major punishment had been imposed upon respondent no. 3 and, therefore, the order of the Managing Committee was final. 7. Annexures-3 and 4 do show that the petitioner held a temporary post. It is doubtful if he was on probation since Annexure-3, which the petitioner describes as a resolution of the Managing Committee, does not speak of respondent no. 3 being on probation yet I shall assume that the petitioner was holding a temporary post on probation but that does not conclude the matter. It is true that a temporary employee has no right to the post and a termination of service simpliciter cannot be challenged by the servant concerned, but one cannot lose sight of the fact that Annexure 4 does not represent the picture of simpliciter termination of a temporary employee. It shows without any shadow of doubt that the service of the petitioner had been terminated on account of certain short-comings and, therefore, there was a stigma attaching to his termination of service. It is now well settled that termination of a temporary servant with stigma attaching to it amounts to punishment. It shows without any shadow of doubt that the service of the petitioner had been terminated on account of certain short-comings and, therefore, there was a stigma attaching to his termination of service. It is now well settled that termination of a temporary servant with stigma attaching to it amounts to punishment. Without multiplying authorities reference may be made to the case of R.S, Sial versus State of U. P. and others 1974 SC 1317 Such a termination of service must accord with Article 311 of the Constitution if it is a case of a Government servants and in other cases it must accord with the rules of natural justice by drawing regular charges. Rule 32 (KA) and (KHA) must, therefore, be held to apply only to those cases where the service of a probationer or a temporary servant has been terminated without any stigma. It there is a stigma attaching to the termination of service, it must be held to be a major punishment in terms of rule 22. I am firmly of the view that a major punishment of discharge from service had been imposed upon respondent no. 3. A major punishment having been imposed upon respondent no. 3, it was obligatory on the Managing Committee to comply with the provisions contained in rule 28 and transmit the record of the proceeding to the District Appeal Committee before giving effect to it. In face of noncompliance with the provisions of rule 28, the resolution of the Managing Committee of the 14th of December, 1973 must be held to be absolutely illegal and of no consequence. The contention, therefore, of Mr. Mishra that the appeal was not maintainable and that the entire proceedings of the District Appeal Committee were vitiated as being without any jurisdiction, must be rejected. 8. The entire purpose of laying down the conditions of service of teachers in 1972 Rules was to provide security of job to teachers and if a Managing Committee chose to Act, in flagrant violation of Rules and to disregard them, the District Appeal Committee was fully empowered to carry out the purposes of the Rules by going into the matter sue motu on a representation having been filed by the concerned employee. There is no substance, therefore, in the submission of Mr. Mishra that the District Appeal Committee had no power to entertain the appeal of respondent no. There is no substance, therefore, in the submission of Mr. Mishra that the District Appeal Committee had no power to entertain the appeal of respondent no. 3 and order his reinstatement. 9. The next submission in regard to the powers of the District Appeal Committee is equally valueless. As stated earlier, it was contended that the District Appeal Committee while hearing an appeal can only approve or modify in terms of clauses (Ka) and (Kha) of rule 30. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner in this behalf has only got to be stated to be rejected. It is obvious that an authority which has the power to approve an Act, must also be deemed to have the power to disapprove it. Approval and disapproval are two sides of the same coin and one cannot be separated from the other. I have no doubt in my mind that the power to approve the order of the Managing Committee as provided in rule 30 (Ka) includes the power to disapprove it. It is manifest, therefore, that the District Appeal Committee was well within its power to set aside the termination of service of respondent no. 3 and consequently to order his reinstatement. 10. The next branch of submission of learned counsel for the petitioner was that even if the District Appeal Committee had the power of approving the Act, of the Managing Committee including that of disapproving it, it had no power to record a compromise and to dispose of the appeal in terms of the compromise. It was also stated by Mr. Mishra that the Secretary had acted in collusion with respondent no. 3 and entered into a compromise with him against the resolution of the Managing Committee. The conduct of the Secretary of the Managing Committee represents a sordid tale and I shall have occasion to deal with it later separately, but at the moment I shall confine myself to a consideration of the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the District Appeal Committee had no power to record a compromise and pass consequential orders. In my view, in the absence of any prohibition a Court or Tribunal is fully within its power to dispose of the matter before it, if there is an agreement between the parties. In my view, in the absence of any prohibition a Court or Tribunal is fully within its power to dispose of the matter before it, if there is an agreement between the parties. There is no question of the power to record a compromise, but it is a matter of disposing of an appeal, and if the parties to the controversy are not aggrieved by the order of the authority, that is an end of the matter. What will be the status or right of third person is a separate chapter to which I shall advert later. If the defendant in a civil action has no objection to the prayer of the plaintiff being all owed, a Court is fully within its powers to pass a decree notwithstanding the provisions contained in Order 23 rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that a Court may record a compromise in exercise of its inherent powers, but a Tribunal, judicial or quasi judicial has no inherent power and, therefore, in the absence of any provision empowering an authority to record compromise, any order passed in terms thereof must be held to be void and illegal. I regret, I am unable to accede to this submission. It is true that judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals have no inherent power. The non-existence, however, of inherent powers in such tribunals is not conclusive of the matter. The District Appeal Committee had to consider the grievance of respondent. If the respondent in that appeal did not intend to oppose the prayer of the appellant presumably under the impression that their stand may not stand in the test of independent scrutiny there was nothing to prevent the Appeal Committee from passing appropriate orders. The order of the District Appeal Committee contained in Annexure-8 must be read in that light and, therefore, the challenge to the power of the District Appeal Committee is pointless. The Rules laying down the conditions of service have a salutary purpose behind them, namely, providing security to the teachers and to minimize to the maximum extent the vagaries of the Managing Committee and, therefore, the rules in regard to the powers of the District Appeal Committee must be liberally interpreted, so that the District Appeal Committee may Act, as instruments of welfare and prevent aggrandisement of poor school teachers. This submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, in my view therefore, is fit to be rejected. Further this Court is not obliged to quash the order of the District Appeal Committee unless its course of conduct has caused manifest injustice to any party. If injustice has any meaning, I have no doubt injustice had been done to respondent no. 3 by the Managing Committee. I would be loathe to quash the impugned orders on this hyper technical ground, even if it had any force. 11. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the Secretary of the Managing Committee, respondent no, 4 was not competent to enter into a compromise contrary to the resolution of the Managing Committee must now be considered. The rules relating to the management of schools make the Secretary of the Managing Committee the king-pin of the entire system. There is not a word in the entire record to show that the Secretary of the Managing Committee was not authorised to represent the Managing Committee before the District Appeal Committee. The petitioner has only averred in paragraph 14 of the application that the Secretary colluded with respondent no. 3 in filing a compromise petition, Curiously enough, respondent no. 4 admitted the charge leveled by the petitioner in paragraph 14 of the petition that he was colluding with respondent no. 3. This admission of collusion by respondent no, 4 shows clearly whether the allegation of the petitioner or of respondent no. 3 is correct. The petitioner has alleged that the Secretary was colluding with respondent no. 3 and, therefore, he compromised the case before the District Appeal Committee. On the other hand, respondent no. 3 has alleged that the Secretary has been colluding with the petitioner and fabricating false documents. It is a rare experience for me at least that the person alleged to be colluding with another accepts brazen facedly the charge of collusion. I have no doubt that the Secretary has been colluding with the petitioner and judging papers to support his case and to defeat the claim of respondent no. 3. The petitioner has expanded the charge of collusion between the Secretary and the Headmaster, respondent no. 3 in paragraph 20 and 21 of the petition and the Secretary glibly swallowed those charges in paragraph 4 of his counter affidavit. 3. The petitioner has expanded the charge of collusion between the Secretary and the Headmaster, respondent no. 3 in paragraph 20 and 21 of the petition and the Secretary glibly swallowed those charges in paragraph 4 of his counter affidavit. He has gone to the length of saying that in entering into a compromise with respondent no. 3 there was no intention on his part to let respondent no, 3 join as Headmaster, but it was a compromise on internal matters and for good relationship. The contents of paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit filed by the Secretary leave no manner of doubt that it is false and not proper to accept his stand. There is nothing on the record to show that the conduct of the Secretary in entering into a compromise without the authority of the Managing Committee was censured or disapproved by the Managing Committee. In that state of affairs, it is difficult to hold that before the District Appeal Committee the Secretary acted without the authority of the Managing Committee in agreeing to reinstate respondent no. 3. 12. I now come to the last submission of learned counsel for the petitioner which is to the effect that since the petitioner was the Headmaster of the School in question and since there was a challenge to his holding the said office, he was a necessary party to the appeal before the District Appeal Committee and in so far as the impugned orders were passed without hearing him, they were illegal and without jurisdiction. This contention was opposed by learned Government Pleader appearing for respondent no. 2 as well as counsel for respondent no. 3. According to them, the petitioner had no right to be heard by the District Appeal Committee. The stand of respondent no. 2 who is the President of the District Appeal Committee as well as the District Education Officer, is that the petitioner not being a confirmed Headmaster of the School in question he held a precarious office and, therefore, he had no right to be heard. In paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit on behalf of respondent no. 3 it has been stated that the School authorities had never sent any information to the District Education Officer regarding the petitioner's confirmation on the permanent post and, therefore, the question of approval of the confirmation of the petitioner's appointment did not arise. In paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit on behalf of respondent no. 3 it has been stated that the School authorities had never sent any information to the District Education Officer regarding the petitioner's confirmation on the permanent post and, therefore, the question of approval of the confirmation of the petitioner's appointment did not arise. It is well known, every appointment, more so, of a Headmaster must bear the seal of approval of the District Education Officer. In that situation, if the confirmation of the petitioner's service had not been approved by the District Education Officer, the petitioner cannot be said to be a confirmed. Headmaster, Nothing has been produced before us to hold that the petitioner's confirmation had been approved by the Educational authorities. It is difficult to accept the petitioner's statement made in paragraph 2 of the application that the appointment and confirmation of the petitioner to the post of the Headmaster had been approved by the Chairman, Board of Secondary Education. The petitioner has filed Annexure 2 in support of his averment, but the letter does not support what has been stated in the affidavit. Annexure 2 only shows that the petitioner's appointment had been confirmed by the Managing Committee. It does not show that the confirmation had been approved by the Educational authorities. If the petitioner's confirmation had been approved by the Education Department, I would have expected the petitioner or respondent no. 4 to have produced some letter written by the Educational authority to the School. The petitioner has characterized the Secretary of the Managing Committee, respon no. 4 as being in collusion with respondent no. 3, but the documents brought on record and the counter-affidavit of respondent no. 4 leave no manner of doubt in my mind that respondent no. 4 is colluding with the petitioner: Apart from accepting the petitioner's allegation that he was colluding with respondent no. 3 a rare phenomenon-he has gone to the length of filling every lacuna in the petitioner's case by stating that the Educational authorities had passed oral orders. It is evident that the Managing Committee neither asked for approval nor was it granted by the authorities of the Board of Secondary Education. In that state of affairs, it is difficult to hold that the petitioner was a confirmed Head master of the School in question, 13. It was contended on behalf of respondent no. It is evident that the Managing Committee neither asked for approval nor was it granted by the authorities of the Board of Secondary Education. In that state of affairs, it is difficult to hold that the petitioner was a confirmed Head master of the School in question, 13. It was contended on behalf of respondent no. 3 that the fact of the petitioner being an unconfirmed Headmaster was reinforced by the reason that he could not have been conformed to that post unless he had passed the departmental examination in terms of Rule 2 of the Rules for appointments, discharge, dismissal and appeal of teachers of non-Government Secondary Schools published by the Education Department Notification No. 2/R4-01/55-E-5172 dated the 7th of September, 1955 which shows that a Headmaster can be conformed only when he has passed the departmental examination as laid down in Articles 322 and 326 of the Bihar Education Code. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon paragraph 9 of the petitioner's reply to counter-affidavit wherein it has been stated that the petitioner had appeared at the departmental examination held in the month of December' 1967 the result of which was declared in February, 1969. The submission of learned counsel for respondent no. 3 has force and I am inclined to accept the contention that the petitioner could not have been confirmed as a Headmaster in 1962, as contended in paragraph 2 of the petition. It was then contended that the petitioner had been confirmed by resolution of the Managing Committee dated the 28th of February, 1969 whereby the resolution of the 20th of December, 1962 was• confirmed. I have great difficulty in accepting the case put forth by the petitioner in this behalf for various reasons. My first difficulty in accepting it is that the Minute Book shows that the proceedings of' the 28th of February, 1969 do not represent the resolution of the Managing Committee, but it was the proceeding of a Sub-Committee. The word "Up-Samiti" has been mentioned. The second difficulty in accepting it is that every resolution or proceeding of the Managing Committee is signed by the Secretary as well as one Haribansh Singh, but the instant resolution has been signed only by the Secretary Mathura Prasad, respondent No. 4. The word "Up-Samiti" has been mentioned. The second difficulty in accepting it is that every resolution or proceeding of the Managing Committee is signed by the Secretary as well as one Haribansh Singh, but the instant resolution has been signed only by the Secretary Mathura Prasad, respondent No. 4. It is true that the top portion of the proceedings contains the signature of Haribansh Singh, Mathura Prasad and Kunj Bihari and another member (who is not a party before us) but since at the bottom of the resolution only the Secretary's signature is there, I am not inclined to accept it as a genuine document. In my view, it is not fit to be relied upon. The entry of the date in that regard had been interpolated subsequently. The entire proceeding of the 28th of February, 1969 has been written by some other person and it was closed by the signature of Haribansh Singh and the Secretary Mathura Prasad. Then it appears that there was a blank page. The last item in the proceeding of the 28th meeting ended with item no. 4. Thereafter after two blank pages item no. 5 has been inserted. The heading of the item is 'Anyanya' (miscellaneous) and therein it contained the entry showing confirmation of the resolution of the 20th of February, 1962 in regard to the confirmation of the petitioner, Apart from the fact that this stand is contradictory to what is stated in paragraph 2 of the petition, this resolution is a clumsy piece of forgery done by respondent no. 4 to help the petitioner. 14. Further being a resolution of a Sub-Committee of the Managing Committee, it cannot have the force of a resolution of the Managing Committee. The next reason for not accepting the petitioner's version that he had been confirmed in 1969 is that nothing has been produced before this Court to show that any resolution of the Managing Committee was passed in pursuance of this recommendation of the Sub-Committee, nor, has anything been brought on record to show that any letter was written by the Managing Committee to the District Education Officer seeking the latter's approval to the confirmation of the petitioner. Nor, has any letter or document been produced to show that the District Education authorities approved the confirmation of the petitioner. 15. Nor, has any letter or document been produced to show that the District Education authorities approved the confirmation of the petitioner. 15. The submission of the petitioner that he had been confirmed in 1962 was sought to be established by showing that provident fund account to the credit of the petitioner was opened in the post office and that is done only when a person's appointment has been confirmed. Merely because an account had been opened to the credit of the petitioner in the post office, I am unable to hold that the petitioner had been confirmed specially in view of the contradictory positions adopted by the petitioner in regard to the date of his confirmation. 16. Last but not the least, the circumstance which militates against the petitioner's claim that he had been confirmed as a Headmaster in 1969 is that the petitioner was on leave from the 2nd August, 1968 and remained as such till December, 1973. The proceeding of the Managing Committee dated 11.8.1969 shows that the petitioner was granted leave from 2.8.1968 to 15.12.1968-later extended from time to time till 31.12.1973-and that question relating to his salary would be taken up on his return from leave. I fail to see what was the occasion for a Sub-Committee of the Managing Committee to decide to confirm the petitioner on 28.2.1969 when he was on leave from 2.8.1968 to 31.12.1973. I have no doubt in my mind that the minutes of the meeting of the Managing Committee have been forged to show that the petitioner was confirmed on 28.2.1969. I am further of the view that the petitioner could not have been confirmed as a Headmaster prior to 1969. My concluded finding is that the petitioner was not a confirmed Headmaster of the School. 17. It has been submitted by learned Government Pleader no. I that the petitioner was never granted leave by the Managing Committee but he Just went away without informing the School authorities and, therefore, the Managing Committee terminated his service on 18.1.1970. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon Annexure-A which is a letter dated 10.9.1970 written by the Secretary of the Managing Committee to the District Education Officer, Saran. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon Annexure-A which is a letter dated 10.9.1970 written by the Secretary of the Managing Committee to the District Education Officer, Saran. Although it cannot be had that the petitioner went away without taking any leave, but there can be no doubt that the petitioner's services were terminated by resolution dated 18.1.1970 and this position was admitted to be true by learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Mishra for the petitioner attempted to explain it by submitting that the resolution of the Managing Committee dated 18.1.1970 was countermanded at the subsequent meeting of the Managing Committee held on 28.2.1970. The way the register relating to the minutes of the Managing Committee in regard to the meeting held on 28.2.1970 has been maintained, it is doubtful if it faithfully represents the correct state of affairs. (a) It is written on the very first page which has not been done in other minute books; (b) it is written in green ink which is the only recording in green ink in the three minute books produced before us; (c) the fact that the petitioner's services had been terminated at any point of time had been concealed initially in this writ application filed by the petitioner; and (d) he was working as a confirmed Headmaster in another School in Painar Ram Krishna School, Simaria in the district of Saran compel me to hold that the petitioner's services had been terminated in January, 1970 as contended by learned Government Pleader. The letter Annexure-A referred to above contained an extract from the resolution of the Managing Committee dated 18.1.1970. The documents coming from the custody of the Educational authorities are weighty and lend credence to the fact that the minutes of the proceedings produced before us are actions of forgery and that the petitioner's services had been terminated in January, 1970. 18. From the circumstances enumerated above, I have no doubt that the petitioner's services had been terminated on 18.1.1970. This is also supported by the fact that on 10.9.1970 the Secretary of the Managing Committee sent a letter to the District Education Officer for advertising the post of Headmaster of the School. 18. From the circumstances enumerated above, I have no doubt that the petitioner's services had been terminated on 18.1.1970. This is also supported by the fact that on 10.9.1970 the Secretary of the Managing Committee sent a letter to the District Education Officer for advertising the post of Headmaster of the School. This letter annexed as Annexure-C does not contain any statement that the petitioner had gone on leave and, therefore, the appointment has to be made only for the leave period which at that time, according to respondent no. 4, had been granted upto 30.6.1971. Annexure-C to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the District Education Officer is the advertisement under the signature of the District Education Officer. There also there is no mention of the fast that the applications had been invited for the post of the Headmaster during leave vacancy of the petitioner. It is therefore, doubtful if the petitioner had any lien over the post of Headmaster specially in view of the admitted position that the petitioner was holding an approved appointment in Ramkrishna High School, Simaria which fact was within the knowledge of the District Education Officer. His appointment in the High School at Simaria was on a substantive basis and had been approved by the District Education Officer. In that view of the matter, it is not surprising that the petitioner did not hold any lien over the office of the Headmaster of the School in question. Learned counsel for the petitioner, although asserted, but could not show anything to the effect that a person could hold substantive appointments in two schools at the same time. For the reasons stated above I am of the view that the petitioner was not a necessary party who should have been heard by the District Appeal Committee before disposing of the matter before it. 19. For the reasons stated, there is no merit in any of the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. No other submission having been raised, I find no merit in this application and. it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rupees two hundred payable by petitioner to respondent nos. 1 and 3 in equal share. K. B. N. SINGH, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.