SHAMBHU PRASAD SINGH, J. The petitioner has been convicted for an offence under section 13 of the Rice-Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month by the trial court. On appeal, the conviction and sentence have been maintained by the learned Session Judge of Hazaribagh. 2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that the petitioner was running a single huller rice mill at village Markacho in the district of Hazaribagh without a license in contravention of the provisions of section 8 (2) of the Act, and thereby liable for conviction under section 13 of the Act. According to the prosecution case once the huller of the petitioner was sealed by the Block Development Officer of Markacho, but on the 20th of December, 1967 the petitioner broke the seal and started operating the seal and started operating the mill. The defence was that the mill was not of the petitioner but of his nephew and further that cognizance of the case could not be taken on the report of the Block Development Officer, Markacho. Another point was also taken as to the right of the Supply Inspector, Markacho who inspected the mill premises under section 9 of the Act. In this Court, however the only point which has been urged on behalf of the petitioner is that taking of the cognizance of the case was itself illegal on two grounds: Firstly, that the Block Development Officer, Markacho was not the person to file a petition of complaint as envisaged under section 15 of the Act, and that in any event the Sub-divisional Officer, Hazaribagh himself being licensing Officer could not take cognizance of the case. 3. Section 15 of the Act, reads as follows : "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by the licensing officer or any person duly authorised by the Central Government or the licensing Officer in this behalf." It has been urged that no document has been brought on the record to show that the Block Development Officer, Markacho was duly authorised by the Central Government or the licensing officer for filing complaint for offence under section 13 read with section 8 of the Act. This point was also raised before the courts below and they have held that by the oral evidence of Block Development Officer it was proved that he was authorised by the Sub-divisional Officer, who was the licensing Officer to make reports for prosecution of persons who were running rice mills without a license. Section 15 of the Act, bars taking of cognizance itself. Therefore, the question whether the person making the report is a person authorised to make such a report for prosecution has to be considered at that very time and for that purpose there must be a statement in the petition of complaint itself of that fact. In absence of such a statement it may not be possible for the Magistrate taking cognizance to take cognizance whether the person making the report is the Licensing Officer or a person duly authorised by the Central Government or the Licensing Officer for making report for prosecution. Apart from the fact that there was no such statement in the petition of complaint, it that be treated at all as a petition of complaint, even in examination-in-chief the Block Development Officer, Markacho did not state that he was authorised by the Licensing Officer to make such report. It was only in answer to a question in cross-examination that he stated that the Sub-divisional Officer verbally directed him that he should file cases against mills without license. While deposing in Hindi, he stated-Mujhe S.D.O. ne verbally adesh diya ki bina license ke millon per mokaddma kijiye." On being further questioned he said that he had no proof with him that such a verbal order was given to him. There is a difference between authorising a person to do a thing and ordering him to do something. The evidence of the Block Development Officer which has been accepted by the courts below does not show that he was authorised by the Licensing Officer to make reports for prosecution. As stated earlier he has merely said that he was verbally ordered to do so. The expression used in section 15 is "duly authorised". The expression "duly" is not without significance and ordinarily it should mean that the authorisation should be in writing. Even it be assumed that authorisation need not be in writing, it must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts. The expression used in section 15 is "duly authorised". The expression "duly" is not without significance and ordinarily it should mean that the authorisation should be in writing. Even it be assumed that authorisation need not be in writing, it must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts. In this connection it is relevant to point out that the letter which the Block Development Officer sent to the Sub-divisional Officer was not in the shape of a petition of complaint, rather, it was a letter requesting the Sub-divisional Officer, who was the licensing Officer himself, to take legal action against the petitioner and start a case "against him. "In the circumstances, on the materials on the record, in my opinion, the prosecution has not been able to prove that the Block Development Officer was duly authorised to make reports for prosecution for offences under section 13 read with section 8 of the Act. In Gour Chandra, Rout and another V. The Public Prosecutor AIR 1963 SC 1198 , it was held that authorisation for sanctioning under section 198-B of the Code of the Criminal Procedure should be with respect to specific complaint and a general sanction can be of no avail. In State of Orissa. Vs. Bisram Patel AIR 1965 Ori. 159 a case under the Act, the learned Judge laid emphasis on the expression "in this behalf" in section 15 of the Act, and held that authorisation should be to make report in respect of the particular offence and not a general one. Be that as it may, the least which is required in such cases is that evidence of authorisation should be beyond any doubt and unequivocal. 4. The second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is also supported by the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Md. Sharfuddin alias Shamsuddin Vs. The State of Bihar 1974 BBCJ 507 . In that case it has been held that where a complaint is made' for violation of the order passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the cognizance is also taken by him, the cognizance is illegal. Sharfuddin alias Shamsuddin Vs. The State of Bihar 1974 BBCJ 507 . In that case it has been held that where a complaint is made' for violation of the order passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the cognizance is also taken by him, the cognizance is illegal. Reliance has been placed in that case on the provisions of section 556 of the Code and it has further been observed that it does not rest on the language of that section, but on the philosophy that human beings are after all human beings; and, with all honour due to the honesty and integrity of judges, they ought not hear cases in which they are themselves concerned. It can not be denied that a licensing officer under the Act, is concerned with prosecution of persons who run their mills without a license and in such cases he ought not to take cognizance. 5. In the circumstances, the cognizance itself being illegal, the conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner cannot be upheld and must be set aside on the ground that the trial itself was illegal. 6. In the result the application is allowed and the conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner are set aside. Application allowed.