JUDGMENT K.N. SINGH, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the award of the Central Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur, dated 30th September, 1972. Briefly, the facts giving rise to the petition are that Hira Lal Dikshit, opposite party No. 1, was employed as a Teller in the State Bank of India, City Branch Office, Kanpur. R.N. Govil was also employed in the said Branch of the Bank. On 19th May, 1960, while the Agent of the Bank of the City Branch Office, Kanpur, was discussing certain matters with the Bank's Head Clerk, Hiralal Dikshit and Govil entered the Agent's room and interfered with the discussion which the Agent was having with the Head Clerk. Opposite party No. 1 as well as Govil shouted at the Agent and assaulted him. A charge sheet was issued against the respondent workman containing four different charges which alleged that the petitioner was guilty of serious misconduct, indiscipline, insubordination and assault on the Agent, opposite party No. 1 furnished his explanation and denied the charges. A domestic enquiry was held into the said perverse. The Tribunal further recorded a positive finding (bat the charges against respondent No. 1 had been fully proved at the domestic enquiry and that the finding of the enquiry officer was not perverse and the workman concerned had been given full opportunity of representation and the enquiry was held in a fair and just manner. The question then arises as to whether after recording the aforesaid findings the Tribunal had jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the management merely on the ground that the punishment of dismissal was excessive. In determining this question it is necessary to refer to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court relating to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunals exercising powers under the Industrial Disputes Act, Prior to 15th December, 1971, there was no express provision in the Act conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal or Labour Court to interfere with the employer's action in discharging or dismissing its workman on the finding of misconduct. Once a proper domestic enquiry was held and the management dismissed the workman on charges of misconduct the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement unless the order was passed mala fide. Once a proper domestic enquiry was held and the management dismissed the workman on charges of misconduct the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement unless the order was passed mala fide. The parliament however amended the Act and enacted section 11-A of the Act which was enforced with effect from 15th December, 1971, conferring express powers on the Labour Court and Tribunals to modify order of discharge and dismissal and to direct dismissal or discharge of the workman on such terms as it considers fit. Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act is not retrospective in its operation, instead it is prospective, it applies only to disputes referred for adjudication on or after the date of its coming into force (15-12-1971). Section 11-A is therefore hot applicable to the instant case as the reference in this case had been made on 20th March, 1971. Though there was no express statutory provision, the Labour Court and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to interfere with the employer's action on the ground of excessive punishment. The Supreme Court laid down the principles with regard to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Courts in directing reinstatement of a workman against whom charges of misconduct may. be found to be proved. 2. In Messers Indian Iran and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workman ( AIR 1958 SC 130 ) while considering the powers of the Tribunal, the Supreme Court held that the management of the concern has power to direct its own internal administration and discipline but the power is not unlimited and when a dispute arises the Industrial Tribunals have been given power to see whether the termination of service of a workman is justified and to give appropriate relief. The Supreme Court further observed:- "In cases of dismissal on misconduct the Tribunal does not however act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. The Supreme Court further observed:- "In cases of dismissal on misconduct the Tribunal does not however act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere (i) when there is want of good faith, (ii) when there is victimisation of unfair labour practice, (iii) when the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of the principles of natural justice (iv) when on the materials the finding is completely baseless or perverse." After laying down the aforesaid principles the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Industrial Tribunal directing reinstatement of a workman whose services had been terminated by the employers on the ground of his prejudicial and subversive activities. The principles laid down in the above case have been affirmed throughout even in later cases. In Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India v. The Management and others, ( AIR 1973 SC 1227 ) the Supreme Court considered the question at length and held that once the misconduct is proved against a workman either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before the Tribunal the punishment imposed against the workman cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation. In East India Hotels v. Their Workmen ( AIR 1974 SC 696 ) after considering the question the Supreme Court observed:- "In the undoubted exercise of the right of the employer to take disciplinary action, and to duties upon the question of quantum of punishment, both of which are part of the managerial functions, what has to be seen is whether the employer before imposing the punishment had conducted a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer and the finding of misconduct has support from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer and the finding of misconduct has support from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified when the enquiry is unfair or the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or have no basis in evidence or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide or the punishment is harsh and oppressive." 3. It is not necessary to multiply cases, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court make it amply clear that if a proper domestic enquiry is held in a fair and just manner and if on the findings recorded at the domestic enquiry charge of misconduct is proved and if the employers award punishment of termination of the services of the workman, it is not open to the Tribunal to sit in appeal either on the findings recorded by the management or on the punishment awarded to the workman, unless the management is found guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice, mala fide or to punishment is so harsh and oppressive which may indicate victimisation. 4. In the instant case, the Tribunal gave three reasons in support of its conclusion that the workman should be reinstated. It is necessary to quote the relevant observation of the Tribunal which is in the following words:- "It appears that the major role in the incident which resulted in the action against Dixit and Govil was of Govil and Dixit's guilt consisted in assisting Govil in mishandling the Agent. It has come in evidence that prior to the date of the incident Dixit had an unblemished record of service. The incident took place as far back as 19-5-1960. It appears that Dixit was an enthusiastic member of the Bank Employees Union. There is evidence to indicate that there was some dissatisfaction among the Banks employees against the Agent which led to the unfortunate incident in question. More than 12 years have elapsed since aforesaid incident and Dixit has suffered enough for his misconduct on 19-5-1960. It appears that Dixit was an enthusiastic member of the Bank Employees Union. There is evidence to indicate that there was some dissatisfaction among the Banks employees against the Agent which led to the unfortunate incident in question. More than 12 years have elapsed since aforesaid incident and Dixit has suffered enough for his misconduct on 19-5-1960. ft appears as has been mentioned above, that Dixit has been sufficiently punished for his misconduct and misbehaviour." The Industrial Tribunal lost sight of the fact that the charge of serious offence of assaulting the Agent of the petitioner Bank and of behaving in a disorderly and indecent manner and in hurling abuse to the Agent had been established against the workman in the domestic enquiry and that finding was upheld by the Tribunal in the earlier part of its judgment. There was thus no justification for the Tribunal to hold that Hira Lal Dikshit's guilt consisted in assisting Govil in mishandling the Agent. Even if the main culprit was Govil the Tribunal itself held that Hira Lal Dikshit assisted R.N. Govil in mishandling the Agent. If clerks and Tellers working in the Bank who are subordinate employees mishandle the Agent who is a superior officer and who is invested with the managerial functions of control, supervision and discipline in the Bank, the working in the Bank is bound to be seriously affected and no discipline could be maintained. The retention of an employee of the Bank who either mishandles the Agent of the Bank or who assists in mishandling the Agent can never be in the interest of discipline or orderly functioning of the Bank. The Tribunal's observation that the past record of service of Dikshit was unblemished is based on no evidence. Even in its statement before the Tribunal, Hira Lal Dikshit did not refer to his past record. Lastly, the consideration that since 12 years period had elapsed and the workman had suffered enough for his misconduct, he was entitled to reinstatement is again misconceived. As already noted after the completion of the domestic enquiry show cause notice was issued to opposite party No. 1, but instead of giving any reply to the show cause notice, he filed writ petition in this Court and obtained an interim order. As already noted after the completion of the domestic enquiry show cause notice was issued to opposite party No. 1, but instead of giving any reply to the show cause notice, he filed writ petition in this Court and obtained an interim order. The writ petition was finally decided in 1966 and only thereafter the management of the Bank could pass orders against opposite party No. 1. The management of the petitioner Bank was not responsible for the delay. 5. In my opinion the Tribunal directed reinstatement of the respondent workman on irrelevant considerations. The Tribunal has not recorded any findings that the punishment awarded to the workman was harsh, disproportionate to the misconduct or was oppressive indicating victimisation of the workman. The Tribunal further did not record any finding, nor it could do so in the face of its own findings recorded earlier that the punishment of termination of service was unreasonable or that no reasonable employer could have awarded that punishment against a workman on the proof of the charges of misconduct and mishandling of the Agent of the Bank. The Tribunal thus exceeded its jurisdiction in directing reinstatement of the workman, Sri K.P. Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent-workman, placed reliance on Messrs Hind Constructions v. Their Workman ( AIR 1965 SC 917 ) in support of his contention that the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in directing reinstatement even though the charge of misconduct was proved against him. The facts of that case were quite different. On 2nd January, 1961, permanent workman of M/s Hind Construction Company did not attend their work. The employers held enquiry and terminated their services for their absence for one day. The Industrial Tribunal held that the punishment of dismissal for the absence of workmen for one day was awarded by way of victimisation of the employees and as such it was unjustified both in severity and in relation to absence from work for one day. In this background the Supreme Court observed: - "In respect of punishment it has been ruled that the award of punishment for misconduct under the Standing Orders, if any, is a matter for the management to decide and if there is any justification for the punishment imposed the Tribunal should not interfere. The Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe. The Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe. But where the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, regard being bad to the particular conduct and the past record or is such as no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances the Tribunal may treat the imposition of such punishment as itself showing victimisation or unfair labour practice." 6. After laying down the above principles the Supreme Court held that on the facts of the case no reasonable employer could have imposed that punishment on its employees merely because they remained absent for one day. As already noted the Tribunal in that case had recorded a positive finding that the order of termination was passed by way of victimisation. In the instant case, the Tribunal has not recorded any finding that the punishment of termination of service was awarded against opposite party No. 2 by way of victimisation or unfair labour practice or that no reasonable employer or could have imposed that punishment on the charge of misconduct proved against respondent No. 1. In my opinion the case of Messrs Hind Constructions (supra) does not support the respondent's contentions. Lastly, it is urged by Sri K.P. Agarwal that this Court cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, specially so when the Tribunal in its discretion modified the punishment awarded to the workman. No doubt this Court is not entitled to sit in appeal over the discretion of the Industrial Tribunal but if the Tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction in exercising its powers in directing reinstatement of a workman against whom charges of misconduct are fully proved, this Court is bound to set aside the order of the Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal is a special authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act for adjudicating the industrial disputes, but it must exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law and procedure laid down. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal on the question of quantum of punishment awarded by the management unless the tests laid down as discussed above are fulfilled. In the instant case the Tribunal failed to record any finding to justify interference with the quantum of punishment awarded to the workman by the petitioner Bank. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal on the question of quantum of punishment awarded by the management unless the tests laid down as discussed above are fulfilled. In the instant case the Tribunal failed to record any finding to justify interference with the quantum of punishment awarded to the workman by the petitioner Bank. In the result, I allow the petition and quash the impugned award dated 30th September, 1972. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.