JUDGMENT S. K. Jha, J. In this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has prayed for appropriate writs to be issued quashing the order of assessment dated the 11th of July, 1972, passed by the Additional Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Begusarai, and the consequent demand notice dated the 11th of July, 1972. The impugned order of assessment and the notice of demand have been marked Annexures 6' and 4', respectively, to the application. 2. The assessment of the petitioner has been made and the demand notice issued to it under the provisions of the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961 (Act XVII of 1961), hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act". It is the legality of the two impugned orders (Annexures 6 and 4) which has been challenged in' this application. In order to appreciate the points urged at the Bar, the following relevant facts may by noticed. The petitioner, the Fertilizer Corporation of India, is a Government of India undertaking in the public sector. It has a factory at Urvaraknagar, Barauni, in the district of Monghyr where fertilizer is produced. A large number of workers are employed in the petitioner's factory. The petitioner owns a fleet of vehicles such as, buses, cars and jeeps, Some of the vehicles are, as stated by the petitioner, utilised for the following purposes:- (a) Buses are used for transporting the employees from the township to the factory to attend to their duties and for coming back. The distance from the township to the factory is about 5 Kms. and a sum of Rs. 4/- per month is deducted from the salary of each employee availing of this facility. (b) Buses are provided to the children of the employees for attending educational institutions at Begusarai, which is at a distance of approximately 13 Kms. A sum of Rs. 2/- per month for the first school going child and Re. 1/- per month for the subsequent child is deducted from the salary of the parent-employee, (c) In cases of emergency any member of the staff can utilise the staff car or jeep for his personal use on reimbursement charge of 45 paise per Km. for car and 50 paise per Km. for jeep. 1/- per month for the subsequent child is deducted from the salary of the parent-employee, (c) In cases of emergency any member of the staff can utilise the staff car or jeep for his personal use on reimbursement charge of 45 paise per Km. for car and 50 paise per Km. for jeep. (d) The General Manager of the factory uses one of the cars of the petitioner Corporation for which a sum of Rs. 100 per month is deducted from his salary. (e) An employee can also obtain a vehicle, subject to the same being available, for welfare purposes, such as, picnic, sightseeing, educational trips etc. An employee so using a vehicle pays the cost of petrol plus the daily allowance of the driver and conductor. (f) On Sundays a bus is provided for the employees and their family members for visiting cinema shows and for marketing at Begusarai, which, as already stated above, is at a distance of 13 Kms. A charge of 50 paise per head for going to Begusarai and coming back• is made and the amount so recovered is intended to be spent for the welfare of the employees. These vehicles are registered as private vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It has further been stated by the petitioner that the vehicles maintained by it are never offered for hire to the general public and there is no obligation on the drivers of the vehicles in terms of rule 77 (IX) of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Rules 1940 to carry any person who tenders the legal fare. The further case of the petitioner is that the utilisation of the vehicles for the purposes above-mentioned is not guided or controlled by any profit motive. On the contrary, the petitioner suffers huge financial loss on this account. The Additional Superintendent of Commercial Taxes (respondent no. 2) by his order dated the 28th of December, 1971, issued a notice under section 7 (5) of the Act, directing the petitioner to show cause why it should not be assessed under the Act, for the vehicles owned by the petitioner and to produce books of account for the period from the start of its business till the 25th of January, 1972. A copy of the order dated the 28th of December, 1971, has been marked Annexure ‘l’ to the application. A copy of the order dated the 28th of December, 1971, has been marked Annexure ‘l’ to the application. Having come to know of the issuance of such a notice, the petitioner appeared before respondent no. 2 and on the 24th of May, 1972, filed a show cause claiming that the petitioner was not liable to registration and payment of tax under the Act. The petitioner also insisted before respondent no. 2 that the question of the petitioner's liability to be taxed under the Act, should be decided first before proceeding to make an assessment under the Act. Respondent no. 2 directed the petitioner to file detailed statement by the 26th of May, 1972. This date, however, was extended subsequently to the 11th of July, 1972, which is borne out by a copy of the order sheet marked Annexure 2'. It is further stated by the petitioner that on the 11th of July, 1972, the petitioner's lawyer attended the office of respondent no. 2 at about 10.30 a.m. but found the office closed on account of the strike of non-Gazetted Government employees. He again attended the office of respondent no. 2 at 1.30 p. m. and presented a petition for adjournment on the ground that the petitioner was filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in this Court. Respondent no. 2, however, merely filed the petition as he observed that orders had already been passed before 1.30 p. m. These are all the relevant facts. 3. Mr. Rajeshwari Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended, firstly, that there was no liability to pay the tax upon the petitioner under the Act. Elaborating this point, it was contended that the object and purpose of the Act, is to levy a tax on the owners of 'public service motor vehicles', who are engaged in the business of carrying passengers and goods for hire or reward. Since the petitioner does not carryon any such business it was immune from the taxing provisions of the Act. It was next urged that since the petitioner's vehicles in question were registered not as public service motor vehicles but as private vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the petitioner would not be covered by the Act, in question also. Since the petitioner does not carryon any such business it was immune from the taxing provisions of the Act. It was next urged that since the petitioner's vehicles in question were registered not as public service motor vehicles but as private vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the petitioner would not be covered by the Act, in question also. Another branch of the argument was that the petitioner's vehicles in any event cannot be called public service motor vehicles within the meaning of section 2 (1) (h) of the Act. For all these reasons it was urged that there was absolutely no liability fastened on the petitioner with regard to the vehicles in question for the payment of any tax under the Act. The second main contention raised was that in any event the impugned assessment order, which was ex parte and more or Jess based on best judgment, must be struck down as bad in law because the time for the petitioner's compliance on the 11th of July, 1972, had not even expired before the order was passed exparte. I shall deal with each of the points raised seriatim. 4. I am not able to persuade myself to hold that the object and purpose of the Act, is to levy a tax on the owners of public service motor vehicles who are engaged in the business of carrying passengers and goods for hire or reward. As has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Rai Ramkrishna and others v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1667 the Act, is one which has been passed in exercise of the legislative powers of the State under Entry 56 of the Second List in Schedule VII of the Constitution. Entry 56 refers to taxes on goods or passengers carried by road or on inland waterways. By this Entry the State Legislatures are authorised to levy taxes on goods and passengers. Nevertheless it is obvious that the goods themselves as such cannot pay taxes and so taxes levied on goods have to be recovered from some persons and these persons must have an intimate or direct connection or nexus with the goods before they can be called upon to pay the taxes in respect of the goods carried. Nevertheless it is obvious that the goods themselves as such cannot pay taxes and so taxes levied on goods have to be recovered from some persons and these persons must have an intimate or direct connection or nexus with the goods before they can be called upon to pay the taxes in respect of the goods carried. Similarly, it would be inexpedient, if not impossible, to recover the tax directly from the passengers and so it would be expedient and convenient to provide for the recovery of the said tax from the owners of the vehicles themselves. Hence, in exercise of the powers under Entry 56, it is also competent to the Legislature to devise a machinery for the recovery of the said tax by requiring the bus operators or bus owners to pay the said tax. It is abundantly clear that by the Act, tax has been levied on passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles in the State. It would not be correct to say that the Act, levies any tax on the owners of the vehicles. It is the machinery for recovery provided in the Act, which makes the owners liable to ray who in their turn may shift the incidence of the passengers and owners of taxation goods carried by vehicles under section 3 (3) of the Act. The question raised by learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the petitioner not being engaged in the business of running public service motor vehicles for the purpose of carrying passengers or goods for hire or reward is not warranted in view of what I have said above. 5. There is equally no substance in the argument advanced that merely because the petitioner's vehicles in question are not registered as public service motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the petitioner should be held to remain outside the purview of the Act, also. The definition of the term "public service motor vehicle" in section 2 (1) (h) read with the provision of section 3 (5) of the Act, makes it abundantly clear that even in respect of vehicles not registered as public service motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, taxes can still be payable under the Act. The definition of the term "public service motor vehicle" in section 2 (1) (h) read with the provision of section 3 (5) of the Act, makes it abundantly clear that even in respect of vehicles not registered as public service motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, taxes can still be payable under the Act. The only requirement is as to whether the vehicles in question come within the definition of section 2 (l) (h), and the charging section relevant in the present case, namely, section 3 (1), brings within its sweep cases of the present nature or not. It is not relevant to look into the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, for the purpose of finding out the liability for the payment of tax under the Act. It is worthwhile to refer here to a passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, page 256: “In a taxing Act,' said Rowlatt J., ‘one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used: But this strictness of interpretation may not always endure to the subject's benefit, for, if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appeal to the judicial mind to be”. Thus, we will have to judge the liability to tax of the petitioner's vehicles in the light of the express letter of certain provisions of the Act, which I shall hereafter refer to. In this connection learned counsel has placed reliance on two single Judge decisions of the Madras High Court in the cases of Kadir Mohideen Sahib v. Emperor A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 577 and In re Rupchand Forma and others A.I.R. 1966, Mad. 449 These were cases under the Motor Vehicles Act, wherein on the special fact s and in the circumstances of those cases it was held that the persons against whom penal actions had been taken had not incurred any legal liability to be penalised under the Motor Vehicles Act. No principle decided in those cases is of any avail in respect of the petitioner's case. 6. No principle decided in those cases is of any avail in respect of the petitioner's case. 6. That then brings us to the next question whether the petitioner's vehicles can be called public service motor vehicles' within the meaning of the Act, and whether section 3 (1) is attracted so as to bring within its sweep the petitioner's case. Section 2 (1) (h) “public service motor vehicle' means any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passenger and goods for hire or reward and in chides a motor cab, a stage carriage, a contract carriage or a public carrier.” Section 3 (1) of the Act, reads as follows : “There shall be levied and paid to the State Government a tax on all passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles at the rate of twenty per centum of the fares and freights payable to the owner of such vehicles.” “Passenger” has been defined in section 2 (1) (e) of the Act, to mean any person traveling in a public service motor vehicle other than an officer of the Commercial Taxes Department of the State Government empowered to inspect or search vehicle or an officer subordinate to him etc., namely, officers in the discharge of their official duty relating to the vehicle in question. The terms 'hire' and 'fare' have no where been defined. I have already held above that irrespective of the fact that the petitioner's vehicles are registered under the Motor Vehicles Act, as private vehicles, if the case be covered by section 2 (1) (h) read with section 3 (1) of the Act, tax may be levied. The motor vehicles in question are certainly used by the petitioner for the carriage of its employees, their children and their family members it is also admitted that the petitioner gets reimbursement only to a fraction of the cost incurred from out of the salary of its employees by deducting every month at source the amount so fixed as lump-sum. On the petitioner's own case, although deductions are made every month as lump-sums they are based upon certain rates per kilometre for the use of vehicles. The crux of the matter is as to whether this reimbursement, as the petitioner terms it, amounts to 'hire' within the meaning of section 2 (1) (h) or 'fare' within the meaning of section 3 (1). The crux of the matter is as to whether this reimbursement, as the petitioner terms it, amounts to 'hire' within the meaning of section 2 (1) (h) or 'fare' within the meaning of section 3 (1). It is obvious from the language of section 3 (1) that tax is to be levied and paid on all passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles at a certain rate of the fares and freights payable to the owner of the vehicles. The ordinary grammatical meaning of the term 'hire' is 'the price paid for the use of anything' and the word 'fare', as the dictionary shows, means 'the price of passage' or 'the cost of passenger's conveyance. According to the petitioner, the deduction or charged amount of reimbursement from the employees is merely to safeguard, against the misuse of the vehicles by its employees. All the same, the case is more or less admitted that unless these payments are made by the employees who are passengers on these vehicles they will not be permitted the use of the vehicles. The rates at which the employee-passengers are charged may be high or low. The motive of the petitioner may not be a profit making one at all. On the contrary, it may be philanthropic that will not make the slightest difference if it be held that even payment at a low rate, which is sine qua non for the use of vehicles, may be covered by the term 'fare' in section 3 (1) or 'hire' in section 2 (1) (h); the money which is paid by the employees is certainly the price paid for the use of the vehicles. There is no reason why it will not be covered by the word 'hire' in section 2 (1) (h) or 'fare' within the meaning of section 3 (1) of the Act. In my considered view, therefore, the vehicles of the petitioner in question carrying their employees as passengers on payment of price for the use of the vehicles or the price of passage, at homes over low a rate it may be, will be covered by the provisions of section 2 (1) (h) and 3 (1) of the Act. In my considered view, therefore, the vehicles of the petitioner in question carrying their employees as passengers on payment of price for the use of the vehicles or the price of passage, at homes over low a rate it may be, will be covered by the provisions of section 2 (1) (h) and 3 (1) of the Act. The petitioner thus cannot claim immunity in respect of the vehicles for the use of which payments are made by the employees, albeit by getting lump-sums deducted at source every month from their salary. I do not thus find any merit in the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner that there is no liability in the circumstances of the present case for the payment of tax on the petitioner. 7. The only other main argument which needs be discussed is as to whether the order of assessment passed ex parte on the 11th of July, 1972, can be said to be legal and valid. From Annexure ‘5' it appears that on the 26th of June, 1972, respondent no. 2 passed an order to the effect that the petitioner was allowed last chance to file statement and appear for hearing on the 11th of July, 1972, along with complete books of account. On the 11th of July, 1972, the petitioner has asserted, its lawyer went to the office of respondent no. 2 at 10.30 a. m. but found it closed on account of the strike of non-gazetted Government employees. The lawyer went back and the order-sheet bears it out that on that very day at 1.30 p. m. he was present before respondent no. 2 and had filed an application for time. But respondent no. 2 has observed thus: “1l-7-72-Later at 1-30 P.M.-Perused the petition filed by the assessee. Order of assessment has already been passed in this case. Hence the petition cannot be considered at this stage. File and inform.” It is thus clear from the order-sheet that respondent no. 2 passed an order of assessment even before 1-30 p.m. on the 11th of July, 1972, which was the date fixed for the petitioner's compliance with the directions to file statement and complete books of account. No specific time was mentioned as to when the petitioner was called upon or directed to be present on the 11th of July, 1972. 2 passed an order of assessment even before 1-30 p.m. on the 11th of July, 1972, which was the date fixed for the petitioner's compliance with the directions to file statement and complete books of account. No specific time was mentioned as to when the petitioner was called upon or directed to be present on the 11th of July, 1972. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement made on behalf of the petitioner Corporation that their lawyer went at 10-30 a.m. and found the office of respondent no. 2 closed. Notwithstanding the correctness or otherwise of the statement of the petitioner regarding their appearance at 10-30 a.m., the order does support their case that at 1-30 p.m. their lawyer was present before respondent no. 2. It does not stand to reason as to when the time for compliance with the directions and for appearance of the petitioner and their representative was given up to the 11th of July, 1972, how respondent no. 2 could have passed the order of assessment even before 1-30 p.m. on that date. This certainly seems to be against the principles of natural justice. It cannot be said that the petitioner failed to comply with the orders without any cause before the order had been passed. To say the least, respondent no. 2 should not have acted with such undue haste but should have waited till the close of the office hours on the 11th of July, 1972, which was the date fixed. In that view of the matter, I think, the exparte order of assessment must be held to be bad. I would accordingly quash the exparte order of assessment dated; the 11th of July, 1972 (Annexure 6) and as a necessary corollary the demand notice (Annexure 4) consequent thereupon. 8. In the result, this application is allowed and the impugned orders (Annexure 6 and 4) are quashed and the case is remitted back to respondent no. 2 for giving a fresh opportunity to the petitioner to produce all their books of account and other such statements which respondent no. 2 may direct. After the petitioner is given reasonable opportunity of being heard a fresh assessment order should be passed in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. S. N. P, Singh, C.J. I agree Application allowed.