JUDGMENT Sen, J. This Rule for issue of a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus was obtained by the petitioner Sm. Sarbani Debi Jalan, wife of the detenu Nathmal Jalan on a writ petition moved in this court on December 24, 1974. The subject of challenge is the validity of the present detention of the detenu Nathmal under an order dated December 19, 1974, passed by the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Home Department, in exercise of his powers under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The detenu is being so detained with a view to preventing him from engaging in keeping smuggled goods. The grounds of detention bearing the same date recite that the detenu was being detained in pursuance of such an order on the ground that he had been engaging in keeping smuggled goods as evidence by the particulars set out thereunder and which are set out herein too : 1. "That on 26.10.71 pursuant to an information received to the effect that smuggled gold was kept concealed in your guddy on the first floor of the premises at 85/1, Monohar Das Street, Calcutta and inside a small room un the ground floor near the stairs leading to your guddy under the occupation of your durwan, the officers of the Central Excise and Customs Collectorate, West Bengal searched the said places on 26.10.71 between 5.15 p. m. and 9.30 p.m. and in course thereof they recovered and seized 48 bars of gold with foreign inscriptions to wit ARGORSA, 10 tolas, CHIASSO, FONDEUR. ASA, ESSAYEUR, 999.0 weighing 5598'63 grams valued at Rs. 1, 11, 360/- which were found secreted in a basket filled with mud (Gangamati) kept near the stair case in front of the said small room, on the ground floor, which was under your control. You did not offer any satisfactory explanation regarding illicit importation or acquisition of the said gold bars. 2. That on 22.5.74 on receipt of an information to the effect that foreign gold was kept concealed in your guddy at 85/1, Monohar Das Street, Calcutta, the officers of Calcutta Customs went to your guddy for conducting search at 3.30 p. m. on that day and recovered one gold rod weighing 101.2 grams valued at Rs. 2. That on 22.5.74 on receipt of an information to the effect that foreign gold was kept concealed in your guddy at 85/1, Monohar Das Street, Calcutta, the officers of Calcutta Customs went to your guddy for conducting search at 3.30 p. m. on that day and recovered one gold rod weighing 101.2 grams valued at Rs. 5160/- from your associate Jugnu Ustad alias Rajnu Guru as and when he was rushing out from your guddy. Your said associate Jugnu Ustad however managed to escape in the melee created by a crowd of about fifty persons who assembled there and some of whom obstructed the Customs Officers from effecting the seizure therefrom. The said gold rod was seized in the reasonable belief that the same was smuggled and you could not offer any satisfactory explanation in this regard. 3. That on receipt of an information to the effect that you were actively engaged in smuggling gold from Bangla Desh and would receive such gold from a few brokers in your guddy at 85/1 Monohar Das Street, Calcutta, your said guddy was searched by the Officers of Calcutta Customs on 14. 8. 74 at 5-30 p. m. while you and your associate Prem Ratan Damani were sitting there and as a result of search, goods including 3 cut pieces of smuggled primary gold weighing 22.10 grams valued at Rs. 1555/- were seized along with a sum of Rs. 23,483/- reasonably believed to be sale proceeds of disposal of smuggled goods. The foregoing instances indicate that you have been engaging in keeping smuggled goods and unless prevented, you are likely to continue to act in a similar manner in future." 2. It is not in dispute that prior to the aforesaid detention the detenu was put to similar detention under an order dated September 24, 1974, then passed by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, in exercise of his powers under sub-section (1) (c) read with sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, as amended by Ordinance XI of 1974. That detention, however, lapsed on December 19, 1974, when the said Act having come into force the Ordinance stood repealed. The said detention too rested on grounds similar to those which are the grounds constituting the foundation of the present impugned order of detention. That detention, however, lapsed on December 19, 1974, when the said Act having come into force the Ordinance stood repealed. The said detention too rested on grounds similar to those which are the grounds constituting the foundation of the present impugned order of detention. The previous order of detention and the grounds are annexures 'A' to the present writ petition. 3. In her petition to this court, the petitioner has sought to make out a case that the impugned detention of the detenu is not in accordance with law. It is claimed that the order of detention rests on grounds which are false, irrelevant, vague and non-existent. It is further claimed that the facts and allegations incorporated in the grounds are such that the same cannot raise any rational or reasonable inference that the detenu had been engaging himself in keeping smuggled goods and it is also claimed that the detaining authority, Respondent No.2, acted mechanically and without applying his mind and without going through the full records of the cases when he made the impugned order of detention just in a routine manner only to satisfy the caprice of the Customs Authorities who have positive bias and prejudice against the detenu. It is more so because such an authority could not have reasonably satisfied himself in the manner as in the order on the grounds incorporated in the grounds for detention. Though in the petition two other points as to constitutional validity of the said Act and violation of the fundamental fights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution had been raised, those two points have not been pressed at the hearing by Mr. Deb, counsel for the petitioner, in view of the Presidential proclamation dated December 23, 1974, suspending the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21, 22 (4) to 22 (7) in respect of detentions under the said Act under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution. The petitioner relies principally on the writ petition and the supplementary affidavit together with an affidavit-in-reply and certain subsidiary affidavits to support her case. 4. This Rule, is being contested by two sets of respondents, namely, Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 including therein the detaining authority and the Union of India, Respondent No.6. While two affidavits have been filled on behalf of the first set of respondents an affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 6. 4. This Rule, is being contested by two sets of respondents, namely, Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 including therein the detaining authority and the Union of India, Respondent No.6. While two affidavits have been filled on behalf of the first set of respondents an affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 6. In these affidavits respondents have controverted the allegations and claim set up by the petitioner in her petition to this court and the supplementary affidavit and furthermore a plea in bar has been raised to the effect that during the continuance of the Presidential proclamation this application disputing the validity of the detention of the detenu is not maintainable. 5. As indicated hereinbefore, the lea rued counsel for the petitioner had very fairly conceded at the very beginning that he is not in a position to press the petitioner's challenge so far as the same is based on infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 21, 22(4) to 22 (7) of the Constitution is concerned and has proposed to limit such challenge to the only ground that such detention is not within the sanction of the statute. But Mr. Chakraborty learned counsel for the Union of India and Mr. Roy, counsel for the detaining authority have raised an extreme contention that even such a challenge is barred by the Presidential proclamation under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution. The objection so proposed to be raised by Mr. Chakraborty and Mr. Roy seems to be inadmissible as the point is no longer res integra in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of (1) Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, AIR (1964) SC 381 and (2) Ram Monohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR (1966) SC 740. That apart, in the present case, the respondents earlier raised a preliminary issue on the objection as aforesaid which, however, was decided against them by this court in its (3) decision dated January 29, 1975 (since reported in 1975 (1) Calcutta Law Journal, P. 427) and as such so far as this case is concerned the issue is now concluded as between the parties to this Rule. 6. The first point pressed by Mr. Deb in support of this Rule is that the detention rests on grounds entirely baseless and materially irrelevant. Strong reliance is placed by Mr. 6. The first point pressed by Mr. Deb in support of this Rule is that the detention rests on grounds entirely baseless and materially irrelevant. Strong reliance is placed by Mr. Deb on the facts emerging from the pleadings, particularly showing variations in respect of weight, value, nature or character of the gold alleged to have been recovered and the places of such recovery and the circumstances in which those were seized for supporting his contention that the grounds are false and baseless. Similarly, it has been contended by Mr. Deb that the gold seized as referred to in grounds 2 and 3 and so also the money seized on the reasonable belief that the same is the sale proceeds of smuggled gold referred to in ground 3 are irrelevant consideration to the power exercised in the present case. In my opinion, these two aspects of Mr. Deb's contention deserve to be considered separately as they have quite distinct implications of their own. 7. To support his contention that the grounds are baseless, Mr. Deb has contended that so far as the first ground is concerned, the gold seized was not from the detenu's guddi or in any of his rooms. It has been further contended that though in the ground it is alleged that the said gold was found secreted in a basket kept near the stair case in front of a small room in the ground floor under the control of the detenu, the search list would show that such gold was recovered from near a gate which again was near the staircase and there is no reference to any small room in the ground floor within the control of the detenu. On the averment made in the writ petition it is again claimed that the detenu had no room in the ground floor in his control. It is next pointed out that in the adjudication proceeding, the Customs authorities proceeded against all the gold dealers having their establishment in that premises indiscriminately so that none was sure as to who was actually in possession thereof. Referring to ground No.2 it has been contended that the gold in question was covered from another person, namely Jagnu Ustad alias Rajnu Guru and not from the detenu's guddi. Referring to ground No.2 it has been contended that the gold in question was covered from another person, namely Jagnu Ustad alias Rajnu Guru and not from the detenu's guddi. Referring to the Customs adjudication notice it has been pointed out that the gold so recovered weighed 100.80 grams and not 101.2 grams as referred to in the ground. It is further claimed on the pleadings now before this court that an assembly of 50 persons or so obstruction to the Customs officers in course of the seizure are not true as it could not have been possible for so many people to assemble in the narrow passage. Similarly, referring to the third ground it has been contended that what had been seized on 14.8.74 were four items of gold–three of them were recovered from Prem Ratan Damani and one from the detenu's guddi. Referring to the search list which is annexure 'E' to the writ petition it has been pointed out that the three items recovered from Prem Ratan Damani would weight about 31.66 grams. In the grounds of detention served on the detenu under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, these three items were referred to as weighing 31.10 grams which would correspond approximately to the weight as in the search list and was then valued at Rs. 1555/-. But in the present grounds of detention the weight given is 22.10 grams valued at Rs. 1555/-. It has further been pointed out that one out of the three items so recovered from Prem Ratan Damani bears an inscription of the manufacturer being Ambalal Aminchans & Co. of Bombay which shows that the gold concerned is of Indian origin and as such not smuggled. 8. Most of such discrepancies had not been specifically referred to or relied on in the writ petition so that the respondents were not called upon to meet these allegations specifically in their pleadings before this court. Mr. Chakraborty, counsel for the Union of India has pointed out that there is no material discrepancy between the allegations incorporated in the ground No. 1 and those in the records including the search list. The forty eight gold bars with foreign inscription were seized by the Customs authorities on 29.10.71 from a basket kept near the stair case. That is the substantial allegation both in the search list as also in the grounds. The forty eight gold bars with foreign inscription were seized by the Customs authorities on 29.10.71 from a basket kept near the stair case. That is the substantial allegation both in the search list as also in the grounds. Reference to a small room in the control of the detenu near the place of recovery of the gold may not have been referred to in the search list. But that is a fact established in the investigation. Reliance is placed on the petitioner's admission in the previous Rule obtained from this court on the previous detention acknowledging the detenu's possessing a small room in the ground floor as well. As for the adjudication proceedings under the Customs Act is concerned, Mr. Chakraborty relies on the award which when it imposed a penalty on the detenu, at least established that the detenu was one amongst the others involved in keeping of the smuggled gold. As such, it is claimed there is no material discrepancy. So far as ground No. 2 is concerned, it has been pointed out by Mr. Chakraborty that the weight of the gold referred to in this ground as 101.2 grams is the weight incorporated in the search list while the weight of 100.80 grams is the weight referred to and incorporated in the laboratory report. Similarly Mr. Chakraborty has pointed out that the original record indicates that there was a malee of a number of persons and there was also obstructions to the Customs officers leading to fleeing of Jagnu Ustad. As such it is claimed by Mr. Chakraborty that there is no material discrepancy in the facts set out in ground No.2. So far as ground No.3 is concerned Mr. Chakraborty has pointed out that in the present detention what had been taken into consideration are the two items of gold recovered from Prem Ratan Damani which constitutes item No.2 of the search list and the one item which was recovered from the detenu's guddi, being item No.4 thereof. So far as ground No.3 is concerned Mr. Chakraborty has pointed out that in the present detention what had been taken into consideration are the two items of gold recovered from Prem Ratan Damani which constitutes item No.2 of the search list and the one item which was recovered from the detenu's guddi, being item No.4 thereof. The gold referred to in the first item of the search list bearing the inscription of Ambalal Aminchand has been excluded from consideration by the detaining authority in the present case and he has pointed out that the total real weight as ascertained in the laboratory of the three items so referred to would amount to 22.10 grams and so far as the value is concerned it has been claimed by Mr. Chakraborty that on the material now before this court it is difficult to explain the fact of value continuing to remain as Rs. 1555/-. But it is claimed at the same time that it may be well justified on the market value varying from time to time or by the fact that the said value really represents the value of 22.10 grams of gold as aforesaid–the weight given in the earlier ground being erroneous. Accordingly it is claimed by Mr. Chakraborty that there is no real discrepancy in this ground as well so that there is no foundation for the petitioner's claim that the grounds are baseless. 9. In considering such a point raised by Mr. Deb I cannot but remind myself of the very limited jurisdiction which I possess in this respect. It should be remembered that this court can neither go into the propriety or otherwise of the satisfaction on the materials nor has this court any jurisdiction to go into the question of falsity or otherwise of the allegations incorporated in the grounds. Reference may be made to the case of (4) Ananda Sarkar v. Chief Secretary to the Govt. of West Bengal, AIR (1953) Cal 129 (34) and (5) S. P. Yadav v. State of Bihar AIR (1975) SC 1143 para 6, (6) Shibbanlal v. State of UP, AIR (1954) SC 179 (para 8). It is for the detaining authority to satisfy himself about the truth or otherwise of the allegations incorporated in the ground and it is for the detenu to agitate it before the Advisory Board when the reference it open. It is for the detaining authority to satisfy himself about the truth or otherwise of the allegations incorporated in the ground and it is for the detenu to agitate it before the Advisory Board when the reference it open. This court has the limited jurisdiction of finding out whether the grounds as incorporated or any of them are factually nonexistent or not so that if they or any of them are non-existent the satisfaction itself would be illusory and not bonafide. (Mintu Bhakta v State of W. B. AIR 1972 SC 2132 ), There remains, however, a basic difference between an investigation on a question whether a ground is factually nonexistent and whether the allegations constituting the ground are materially true or false. A ground can be said to be non-existent when there are no materials to substantiate the ground or when proved facts negatives the very existence of the ground. Investigation as to truth or falsity of the grounds on the other hand contemplates an enquiry with reference to certain infirmities and attending circumstances as to whether materials constituting the ground can be accepted as trus. This involves a scrutiny of facts otherwise proved to be in existence to find out whether they are reliable and acceptable enough to render them so probable that the same may reasonably be accepted as true. This part of the adjudication in case of subjective satisfaction lies with the detaining authority himself and not with the court. On the facts of the present case, recovery and seizure of the different items of gold referred to in the grounds cannot be disputed and in so far as the same constitutes the foundation for the grounds, they cannot be said to be non-existent, whether because of such discrepancies as pointed out by Mr. Deb, the detaining authority could have reasonably satisfied himself on those materials or how far it can be said to establish non-application of mind by the detaining authority are different questions to be considered by me hereinafter. But because of such discrepancies, this court cannot hold the grounds to be false or untrue as that will entail exercise of appellate powers over the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Therefore the manner in which Mr. Deb asks me to review the ground is entirely beyond my power. But because of such discrepancies, this court cannot hold the grounds to be false or untrue as that will entail exercise of appellate powers over the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Therefore the manner in which Mr. Deb asks me to review the ground is entirely beyond my power. Grounds as they are cannot be condemned as non-existent and beyond that it is not within the realm of adjudication before me. 10. Next I proceed to consider the second aspect of Mr. Deb's contention. Much stress is laid by Mr. Deb on the fact that in neither of the two grounds Nos. 1 and 2, there is any assertion by the detaining authority that the gold seized is smuggled. So it is suggested that seizure and recovery of some gold by itself can have no relevance to a satisfaction that the detenu was found engaged in keeping smuggled goods, in the present case, gold. I am, however, unable to accept such a suggestion put forward by Mr. Deb. The preamble to the grounds clearly recites that the three instances set out are instances of the detenu's keeping smuggled goods that is gold. The first ground further shows that the forty-eight bars of gold recovered were of foreign origin bearing foreign inscription and having the fineness of foreign gold. Such recovery was again made pursuant to an information that the detenu had been concealing smuggled gold. Similar is the position with the second ground. No doubt, here the gold had not the inscription or fineness of foreign gold but it was recovered while working out on information that the detenu was concealing foreign gold under circumstances leading to the Customs officers seizing the same on the belief that it is smuggled gold. The gold that was so recovered could not be accounted for at the time of seizure and upto the lime of making the order by the detaining authority. If in these circumstances had the detaining authority to conclude as he concluded that these are instances of the detenu's keeping smuggled goods. I do not think it can be said that the detining authority did not satisfy himself that gold so recovered was smuggled. I agree with Mr. Chakraborty that grounds of detention must be read in its substance and with reference to the preamble and the conclusion. I do not think it can be said that the detining authority did not satisfy himself that gold so recovered was smuggled. I agree with Mr. Chakraborty that grounds of detention must be read in its substance and with reference to the preamble and the conclusion. So read there can be no doubt that the detaining authority himself considered the gold referred to in grounds 1 and 2 as smuggled gold. 11. Next it has been suggested by Mr. Deb that the gold that was recovered and referred to in grounds 2 and 3 is ordinary gold having the fineness much below the fineness of Indian standard gold and such gold, therefore, if it is to be confiscated has to be confiscated under section 120 and not under section 111 of the Customs Act. Similarly, it is also pointed out by Mr. Deb that the sum of Rs. 23, 483/- referred to in ground No.3 which was seized by the Customs authorities on a reasonable belief that the same constitutes the sale proceeds of smuggled gold can be confiscated–if at all–under section 121 of the Customs Act and not under section 111 thereof. These materials according to Mr. Deb cannot validly enter into consideration by the detaining authority in exercising powers under section 3 (1) of the said Act because of the defination clause, 'smuggled goods' for the purposes of this Act must be goods confiscateable under section 111 of the Customs Act and not under section 120 or 121 thereof. In my opinion, on the allegations incorporated in grounds 2 and 3 it cannot be said that the gold so seized and referred to in these grounds cannot be confiscateable at all under section 111 of the Customs Act. It may no doubt be true that the gold so seized does not bear any foreign inscription and it is not of such fineness as of foreign gold, but that by itself does not bring into operation sec. 120 of the Customs Act. Gold not having the foreign inscription or the fineness of foreign gold may as well be smuggled into India and when so smuggled, the same is liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act. 120 of the Customs Act. Gold not having the foreign inscription or the fineness of foreign gold may as well be smuggled into India and when so smuggled, the same is liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act. It is not a case made out in these two grounds that the gold concerned after wrongful importation had changed its form or had been allowed with other materials to bring down its fineness below the Indian standard gold which alone could bring into operation section 120 of the Customs Act. This being the position, I am unable to agree with Mr. Deb that keeping of gold of such nature as is referred to in grounds 2 and 3, if reasonably considered to be smuggled gold, can not be a relevant consideration for arriving at the satisfaction which constitutes the foundation for the impugned order. So far as the seizure of money is concerned, Mr. Deb may be right that amount will not be confiscateable under section 111 of the Customs Act but that fact alone, in my opinion, does not render the said fact to be an wholly irrelevant consideration to the power exercised in the present case. On the facts if it is found that the detenu had been keeping smuggled gold then recovery of an unexplained sum of Rs. 23,483/- reasonably believed to be the sale proceeds of such smuggled gold can also be a relevant consideration in so far as the said fact fortifies the conclusion that the detenu had been keeping smuggled gold, a part whereof on being sold has been converted into money. Thus, considered in the background of the detenu's keeping smuggled gold, the recovery of the money becomes a relevant consideration. In this view, I cannot but over rule the contention of Mr. Deb that the order of detention in the present case is in any way based on irrelevant consideration. 12. The next point urged by Mr. Deb is that the first ground is top remote in point of time to furnish any reasonable foundation for the satisfaction on which the detention rests if it is so considered bereft of grounds 2 and 3. According to him grounds 2 and 3 again are casual in nature and the detaining authority could not have reasonably arrived at the satisfaction based thereon which led to the passing of the order of detention. According to him grounds 2 and 3 again are casual in nature and the detaining authority could not have reasonably arrived at the satisfaction based thereon which led to the passing of the order of detention. Similarly it is claimed that the foreign gold referred to in ground I not having been recovered from the possession of the detenu, the same could not have reasonably furnished any basis for the satisfaction underlying the detention. In support of this contention Mr. Deb has invoked in his aid the well recognised principles laid down by Lord Halsbury in (7) Susannah Sham v. Wakefield, 1891 Appeal Cases 173 at page 179 to the effect : "When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice not according to private opinion (Rooke's case), according to law and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, fanciful, but legal and regular". 13. Mr. Deb has drawn my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (8) Rhotas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal, AIR (1969) SC 707 (paragraphs 28 and 32) wherein the Supreme Court approved the aforesaid principle and also to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (9) Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1975) SC 550 (paragraph 10) where the Supreme Court applied the same principle even in cases of preventive detention. Relying particularly on the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court Mr. Deb has contended that the satisfaction which had been arrived at by the detaining authority in making the order of preventive detention is not entirely beyond the realm of judicial review. On the other hand, even such satisfaction can be reviewed by the court to find out whether any reasonable authority could ever have arrived at a satisfaction or a conclusion which have been arrived at on the materials available to the detaining authority. Applying this test Mr. On the other hand, even such satisfaction can be reviewed by the court to find out whether any reasonable authority could ever have arrived at a satisfaction or a conclusion which have been arrived at on the materials available to the detaining authority. Applying this test Mr. Deb has sought to argue before us that on the three grounds incorporated in the grounds of detention no such satisfaction as has been arrived at by the detaining authority could have been arrived at by any reasonable authority because one of the grounds is too remote and inconsequential and other two are so casual that they can hardly furnish any reasonable foundation for the satisfaction. 14. I have considered very carefully the contention so raised by Mr. Deb. In my opinion, there can be no dispute about the principle contended for by Mr. Deb. But I am unable to agree with him or accept his contention that on the application of the said principle to the facts of the present case it can be said that the satisfaction arrived at could not have, at all, been reasonably arrived at on the materials incorporated in the grounds. In Khudiram Das's case, the Supreme Court no doubt turned down the exterme proposition that the satisfaction which constitutes the foundation for the order is entirely beyond judicial review. It was held that if the satisfaction is such that, on the materials available to the detaining authority, no reasonable authority could ever have come to it then the legitimate inference can be drawn by the court that the detaining authority did not honestly arrive at the satisfaction or that in so arriving at the could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts. But at the same time the Supreme Court did reaffirm the well established restriction on the scoped judicial review in pointing out that the court in considering the reasonableness or otherwise of the satisfaction cannot go into the adequacy or sufficiency of the grounds on which the order of detention is based. It was observed : “It is true that this ground in a sense tends to blur the dividing line between subjective satisfaction and objective determination but the dividing line is very much there howsoever faint or delicate it may be, the courts have never failed to recognize it.” 15. It was observed : “It is true that this ground in a sense tends to blur the dividing line between subjective satisfaction and objective determination but the dividing line is very much there howsoever faint or delicate it may be, the courts have never failed to recognize it.” 15. In my opinion, the true test would be to take the grounds and the materials as they are and consider if they are relevant to the object and the satisfaction and also find out whether acting on such materials any reasonable authority could honestly have come to a satisfaction as has been arrived at by the detaining authority. Whether the court would have arrived at similar satisfaction or not on the same materials is wholly immaterial so long as the materials are relevant and any reasonable authority can arrive at a similar satisfaction as has been arrived at. Applying this test, I would now proceed to consider whether the detaining authority as a reasonable authority could have arrived at a conclusion or satisfaction as has been arrived at on the three grounds incorporated, in the grounds of detention. So far as ground No. 1 is concerned, Mr. Deb's criticism is that it is too remote to be relevant and the recovery of the gold not being from the detenu, it could not have furnished any reasonable basis for a honest satisfaction as has been arrived at in the present case. On the point of remoteness it is, however, conceded that it would be so only if it is considered in isolation and bereft of the other two grounds so that if grounds 2 and 3 are not discarded this objection would be of little help to the petitioner. That, in my opinion, is a fair concession because if grounds 2 and 3 are accepted as relevant and good grounds for a reasonable satisfaction as has been arrived at, ground No. 1 would only fortify the satisfaction so arrived at by furnishing a solid foundation in the background. I find no substances in the other objection of Mr. Deb to this ground. There is ample evidence of the fact of recovery of a huge amount of gold which can reasonably be considered to be smuggled. I find no substances in the other objection of Mr. Deb to this ground. There is ample evidence of the fact of recovery of a huge amount of gold which can reasonably be considered to be smuggled. Detenu's involvement may not, however, have been proved by direct evidence but there are in my view circumstances which may well justify an inference by the detaining authority in that respect. Those circumstances amongst others are the information on which the search was led, the proximity of the place of recovery to the small room in possession of the detenu, the value of the gold recovered and the financial resources of the detenu, his relation with the other dealers operating from the same premises. After all such clandestine transactions are not always proved by direct dividence. The inference drawn is also a part of the subjective satisfaction not subject to any scrutiny on the test of standard of proof before a court of law. 16. According to Mr. Deb grounds 2 and 3 are casual in nature. The different items of gold referred to in these two grounds were recovered from persons other than the detenu/petitioner or his guddi except a small piece which is item No. 4 of the search list in respect of the search and seizure dated 14.8.74. None of these items of gold have any inscription of the same being of foreign origin and all of them are of fineness much below the fineness of Indian standard gold. Such items of gold again, according to Mr. Deb, are not considered or taken to be smuggled gold by the detaining authority but he proceeds on the belief of the customs officer which can never reasonably constitute the foundation for the satisfaction. Giving anxious consideration to these aspects contended for by Mr. Deb I have come to the conclusion that such contentions are not acceptable to me. Both the grounds indicate that the search and seizure were the result of previous information that foreign smuggled gold would be available at the detenu's guddi at 85/1, Monohardas Street, Calcutta. Such information assumes its importance when the search leads to seizure of unaccountable gold. Deb I have come to the conclusion that such contentions are not acceptable to me. Both the grounds indicate that the search and seizure were the result of previous information that foreign smuggled gold would be available at the detenu's guddi at 85/1, Monohardas Street, Calcutta. Such information assumes its importance when the search leads to seizure of unaccountable gold. The gold referred to in ground No.2 was no doubt recovered from a person known as Jagnu Ustad alias Rajnu Guru but the fact remains that the person was found rushing out of the detenu's guddi when the Customs Officers were approaching for the search. Similarly, two out of the three items of gold referred to in ground No.3 were recovered from the person of one Prem Ratan Demani who was sitting in the detenu's guddi. Both these persons are found to be the detenu's associates. I have pointed out hereinbefore that the fact that these gold bars had no foreign inscription on them or had not the finances of foreign gold does not lead to the conclusion that such gold cannot be considered to be smuggled. It is no doubt true that the ground recites that the gold so recovered was seized by the Customs officers in the reasonable belief that the same is smuggled but it is not correct to suggest that the detaining authority substituted his own satisfaction by such belief of the Custom officers. He has merely considered the fact of seizure on such reasonable belief by the Customs officers in arriving at his own satisfaction that those are instances of the detenu's engagement in keeping smuggled goods, i. e., gold in the present case. In my opinion, the fact of such seizure by the Customs officers on existing facts leading to a reasonable belief that the gold recovered is smuggled is a relevant fact which could reasonably have been taken into consideration by the detaining authority in arriving at his satisfaction. Such being the position, the materials incorporated in these two grounds are relevant materials and are materials on which any reasonable person could have arrived at a satisfaction which had been arrived at by the detaining authority and as such even applying the test contended for by Mr. Such being the position, the materials incorporated in these two grounds are relevant materials and are materials on which any reasonable person could have arrived at a satisfaction which had been arrived at by the detaining authority and as such even applying the test contended for by Mr. Deb, I cannot strike down the satisfaction as one which can be said to be an unreasonable satisfaction which can hardly be arrived at honestly by the detaining authority. On the conclusions as above, I must overrule this contention of Mr. Deb. 17. The last point urged by Mr. Deb is that the detaining authority never applied his mind to the relevant materials and as such the satisfaction arrived at is not an honest one and no detention can rest on such a satisfaction. To support this contention strongest reliance is placed on the facts and materials related to ground No.3. It has been pointed out that ground No.3 refers to the search and seizure dated 14.8.74. The search list annexure E refers to seizure of four items of gold. Of these, three items were recovered from the person of Prem Ratan Damani having respectively the approximate weight of 11.66 grams, 11 grams and 9 grams. The total whereof would be 231.66 grams. Of these three items one it has been pointed out that in any event the value thereof could not be Rs.1555/-. Comparing the old ground with the new one it has been pointed out by Mr. Deb that if the value of 31.10 grams of gold be Rs. 1555/-, gold weighing 22.10 grams cannot have the same value as incorporated in the present grounds and this fact alone would show that the detaining authority was proceeding mechanically without any application of his mind. Similarly, Mr. Deb has pointed that although in the previous grounds as also in the present ground the weight of the gold referred to in the ground No. 2 is furnished as 101.2 grams and the value thereof at Rs. 5160/-, in the Customs adjudication notice dated 1.11.74 the weight furnished is 100.20 grams and the value thereat at Rs. 4032/-. Referring to these variation Mr. Deb has contended that such unexplained discrepancies clearly establish non-application of mind by the detaining authority to the facts. 18. Mr. 5160/-, in the Customs adjudication notice dated 1.11.74 the weight furnished is 100.20 grams and the value thereat at Rs. 4032/-. Referring to these variation Mr. Deb has contended that such unexplained discrepancies clearly establish non-application of mind by the detaining authority to the facts. 18. Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the Union of India has contended that the petitioner not having referred to or relied upon these discrepancies specifically in the writ petition the respondents had no opportunity to meet them by specific pleadings. So far as ground No. 2 is concerned Mr. Chakraborty claims that there is no real inconsistency. The weight and the value incorporated in the two grounds, according to Mr. Chakraborty, tallies with each other and tallies with the weight as in the search list. The weight and the value furnished in the show cause notice is the weight as found finally in the laboratory test but that has not been referred to in drawing up the grounds. The fact, however, remains that when the impugned ground was drawn up the laboratory test had already been made and there was no reason why the actual weight so found out was rot referred to in the grounds. So far as the third ground is concerned, Mr. Chakraborty has contended that the three cut pieces refer to items 2 and 4 of the search list and it has not included the first item thereof which is not a cut piece but a disc having the inscription of being manufactured by Ambalal Aminchand & Co. He has further pointed out that though calculated on the weight approximately set out in the search list items 2 and 4 thereof would amount to 20.50 grams ; the real weight as found in the laboratory of the aforesaid three cut pieces is 22.10 grams as specified in the ground. Mr. Chakraborty has fairly conceded that the weight as furnished for these three cut pieces in the earlier grounds at 31.10 grams was ex facie erroneous but the detaining authority in respect of the two detentions being different the error in the earlier grounds would, according to Mr. Chakraborty, have no bearing on the point. On the materials now before this Court Mr. Chakraborty has failed to explain the value as furnished at Rs. Chakraborty, have no bearing on the point. On the materials now before this Court Mr. Chakraborty has failed to explain the value as furnished at Rs. 1555/- for 22.10 grams of gold but he has suggested that may represent the value of 22.10 grams of gold as in items 2 and 4 of the search list and the weight furnished in the earlier ground being erroneous there is no real inconsistency in value remaining the same. 19. I have carefully considered all these aspects pointed out by Mr. Deb and controverted by Mr. Chakraborty. In my considered opinion, there are no such material discrepancy as could render the satisfaction suspect. The material facts alleged in the grounds as against the detenu are the recovery of certain unaccountable items of gold seized on a search consequent to two informations that the detenu is likely to be found in possession of foreign or smuggled gold. These material facts are well established and are quite consistency recited in all the documents. Variation in the weight and the value of the gold referred to in ground No. 2 from the valuation and the weight as in the adjudication show cause notice would not in my opinion by itself establish that the detaining authority had not applied his mind. Gold that was recovered remains the same. The weight of the gold as in the ground No. 2 is based on the approximate weight as in the search list, so is the valuation. It may be different from the actual weight as found out in the laboratory test and as referred to in the show cause notice. If the detaining authority had not referred to that weight and the value based thereon but has proceeded on the approximate weight that by itself would not establish non-application of his mind. Similar is the position with ground No.3. In my opinion, there is ample substance in the contention of Mr. Chakraborty that when the detaining authority refers to three cut pieces he is excluding the item No. 1 of the search list which was not a cut piece but a disc. The other three pieces have their real weight at 22.10 grams on the laboratory test report. In my opinion, there is ample substance in the contention of Mr. Chakraborty that when the detaining authority refers to three cut pieces he is excluding the item No. 1 of the search list which was not a cut piece but a disc. The other three pieces have their real weight at 22.10 grams on the laboratory test report. Here, in this case unlike the ground No.2 the detaining authority might have referred to the actual weight instead of the approximate weight of 20.50 grams as in the search list ; but that by itself does not establish non-application of mind as the gold referred to are the same three cut pieces incorporated in items 2 and 4 of the search list. The value at Rs. 1555/- could not, of course, be explained but if in the earlier grounds reference was made to the same three cut pieces there is really no discrepancy in the value when it remains the same at Rs. 1555/-. The weight as furnished in the earlier ground of these three cut pieces is ex facie wrong. But in my opinion, that was a mistake committed by the detaining authority in respect of that order of detention which might have vitiated his satisfaction but the detaining authority here is a different authority and the mistake in the earlier ground would not invalidate the satisfaction of the present detaining authority. Accepting, however, the position that the value so furnished in the present grounds is incorrect, that in my opinion is not such a discrepancy that on the facts now before me it can be said to well establish non-application of mind by the detaining authority. Non-application of mind has to be established substantially on over all consideration of all the facts and circumstances not because of one or other mistake appearing in the grounds because such a mistake is possible even in the hands of a careful person honestly exercising his discretion. For these reasons, I am unable to hold that any case of non-application of mind by the detaining authority in arriving at his conclusion has been made out in this case. 20. These are the only points raised in support of this Rule and as these points fail, the application fails and the Rule is discharged. Bhattacharya, J. I agree.