Judgment 1. In this application in revision by some of the defendants some interesting questions have been raised for decision. 2. The plaintiff opposite party instituted a money suit for recovery of a sum above Rs. 35,000.00 against the defendants. By order dated 1-11-1971 the court below called upon the plaintiff to take steps for fresh service of summonses upon defendants 4 and 5, Although service of summons upon the principal defendant (Petitioner No. 1) had been validly effected as agreed at both the hands in this Court, the court below, in the same order as well as in the impugned order, has recorded that service upon the said defendant had not been effected as the summons had been mis-sent. However, in spite of several adjournments the plaintiff failed to take any steps in regard to the filing of the process, etc. for service of summons on the aforesaid defendants and ultimately by order dated 5-7-1972 the suit was dismissed for default. Long thereafter an application under Order IX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code) was filed by the plaintiff on 28-11-1972 for restoration of the suit. It was stated in the petition that the plaintiffs "Law Clerk missed to forward a date in his diary for the said money suit and thus the case escaped the diary. The aforesaid mistake was detected during the last annual vacation and thereafter your petitioners lawyer attempted to obtain information by filing inspection of the records ...... and it was learnt after inspection on 27-11-1972 that the suit had been dismissed for default." It was further contended on behalf of the plaintiff in the said application that it has not committed any wilful mistake nor has it indulged in negligence in the matter and the dismissal of the suit would put it to irreparable loss and injury. 3. Article 122 of the new Limitation Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) has prescribed a period of limitation of thirty days for restoration of a suit dismissed for want of prosecution or failure to pay costs of service of process, etc. and the period of limitation begins to run from the date of dismissal. 3. Article 122 of the new Limitation Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) has prescribed a period of limitation of thirty days for restoration of a suit dismissed for want of prosecution or failure to pay costs of service of process, etc. and the period of limitation begins to run from the date of dismissal. When the question of limitation was a raised during the course of the hearing of the application, the plaintiff filed a petition under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay, perhaps, applying the ground mentioned in Sec.17 (1) (c) of the Act, which prescribes that in the case of an application, for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the applicant has discovered the mistake if his application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake under clause (c). The learned Subordinate judge reached the following findings:- (i) There was no sufficient cause for non-appearance of the applicant in the suit which may lead to the restoration of the suit to its original file. (ii) In view of the fact that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the cases under Order IX Role 4 of the Code, the period of Limitation can be condoned in this case. (iii) here being no evidence that the applicant had knowledge about the dismissal of the suit before 27-11-1972, there was sufficient reason for the applicant for not filing the miscellaneous petition within 30 days from the date of the dismissal of its suit and therefore the period of limitation was fit to be condoned. (iv) For the failure of the plaintiff to file fresh requisites for service of summons on defendants 4 and 5, the dismissal of the entire suit did not appear to be correct. Therefore the order of dismissal was fit to be set aside and the suit fit to be restored to its original file. 4. On reference to the findings reached by the learned Subordinate judge, it is plain that he has refused to restore the suit under the provisions of Rule 4 of Order IX of the Code, having recorded an express finding that there was no sufficient cause for the plaintiff for not taking steps as ordered by the Court. 5. 4. On reference to the findings reached by the learned Subordinate judge, it is plain that he has refused to restore the suit under the provisions of Rule 4 of Order IX of the Code, having recorded an express finding that there was no sufficient cause for the plaintiff for not taking steps as ordered by the Court. 5. A question now arises as to whether, having recorded the said finding, the learned Subordinate judge could still restore the suit under his inherent powers, as has been purported to be done. Although in paragraph 10 of the order he has referred to the apparent mistake committed by him in dismissing the entire suit when the plaintiff was called upon to file requisites for service of summons on defendants 4 and 5 alone he has also referred in the next paragraph to the facts that the original suit was for a substantial claim and a fresh suit was barred by limitation. 6. Mr. Jyoti Narayan appearing for the petitioners seriously contended that the learned Subordinate judge, in the circumstances, has committed an obvious error of jurisdiction in invoking his inherent power on reference to the valuation of the suit or the ultimate loss to which the plaintiff could otherwise have been put. 7. Pressing the question of limitation, Mr. Jyoti Narayan contended that assuming that the court below had committed an error in dismissing the entire suit and the said mistake could be corrected under the inherent powers, the application must have been made within a reasonable time and the plaintiff itself being not diligent in coming to the court, it should not have been granted any indulgence under the cloak of the inherent powers. He placed reliance upon a decision in the case of Somar Bhuiya V/s. Kapil Kumar, ( AIR 1974 Pat 289 ). In that case an application under Order IX Rule 4 of the Code had been dismissed for default. The plaintiff thereupon made an application for restoration of the said application under Sec.151, but that itself was very much delayed. In that event it was held that although there was no period of limitation fixed for such an application under Sec.151, a person who wants to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of a court must himself be diligent and not guilty of any laches. The facts in the instant case are, however, entirely different. In that event it was held that although there was no period of limitation fixed for such an application under Sec.151, a person who wants to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of a court must himself be diligent and not guilty of any laches. The facts in the instant case are, however, entirely different. The plaintiff itself did not seek invocation of the inherent jurisdiction of the court but for restoration of the entire suit dismissed against all the defendants it applied under Order IX Rule 4. It was the court itself which in course of the deliberations of the points argued, took the view that a mistake had been committed in dismissing the whole suit when the order was for the plaintiff to file requisites for service of summons on defendants 4 and 5 alone. This Court in the case of Ramanand Singh V/s. Chandrama Singh AIR 1921 Pat 422 (1) held that non-payment of process fee for one defendant did not justify dismissal of the suit as against the other defendants. It is obvious, therefore that the learned Subordinate Judge was not right in dismissing the whole suit for non-payment of the process fee and not filing other requisites for service of summons on defendants 4 and 5. It is well settled that a court is authorised to correct its own mistake. Although the learned Subordinate Judge has made reference to the high valuation of the suit and the loss to which the plaintiff would be put to on account of limitation to bring a fresh suit, nonetheless, those circumstances were not made the basis for exercise of the inherent power. It may be, that he might have been influenced by those considerations which were not irrelevant. The basis of the finding, however, is the mistake that he has committed in dismissing the entire suit. He has, therefore, not invoked any jurisdiction on those considerations but has exercised the said power when the matter had already been before him. And, here lies the basic distinction. Once this position is correctly appreciated the question of limitation becomes irrelevant. The provision of Sec.151 of the Code, which envisages inherent jurisdiction gives the Court abundant power to exercise it if it thinks necessary for the ends of justice or for preventing abuse of the process of the court. It can pass such order as it thinks fit. Once this position is correctly appreciated the question of limitation becomes irrelevant. The provision of Sec.151 of the Code, which envisages inherent jurisdiction gives the Court abundant power to exercise it if it thinks necessary for the ends of justice or for preventing abuse of the process of the court. It can pass such order as it thinks fit. At the same time it is also open to a party to bring to the notice of the court by application that there has been such an abuse of the process of the court or it is necessary for the ends of justice that a particular order should be passed. Although this proposition is well settled, reference may be made to only one decision of the Supreme Court in Keshardeo V/s. Radha Kissen, ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ). The court was, therefore, justified in exercising the inherent jurisdiction vested in it. 8. However, the learned Subordinate Judge has committed an error at this stage as well. While invoking the inherent jurisdiction and recording a finding that the entire suit could not be dismissed, for the reasons already stated, he should not have restored the entire suit. In other words, having recorded a finding that there was no sufficient cause for the non-compliance of the order for filing fresh requisites for issue of summons to defendants 4 and 5 and having further found that on that account the whole suit should not have been dismissed, he committed an obvious mistake in restoring the suit against those two defendants as well. 9. I would accordingly allow this application in part and direct that the money suit in question will be restored only against the defendants 4 and 5. There will be no order as to cost.