Judgment 1. This is an application u/s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by defendants 1 and 2, challenging the order of the Munsif in the valuation matter. 2. The suit of the plaintiffs-opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 is for a declaration that the sale deed dated 23-3-1966 executed by plaintiff No. 1 in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 with respect to the suit lands was tainted with fraud and was, therefore, inoperative and fit to be cancelled. The consideration mentioned in the sale deed was Rs. 2,500.00 and the suit filed in the year 1967 was valued at Rupees 2,500.00 in terms of the valuation mentioned in the impugned sale deed. 3. The petitioners raised an issue on the question of valuation. According to them, the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif. 4. It may be mentioned that the plaintiffs had paid ad valorem court-fee on the value of the relief put by them. The trial Court was called upon to decide the valuation matter as a preliminary issue, and by the impugned order it has reached a finding that "the consideration money mentioned in the sale deed would be the proper valuation of the suit land. ............ Thus the plaintiffs appear to have correctly valued the suit land." 5. Mr. A.N. Chatterjee appearing for the petitioners challenges the finding of the learned Munsif on the ground that in view of the admission of P. W. 1 that the market value of the suit land would be between Rs. 5,000.00 to Rs. 6,000/-, it should have been held that the suit was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction. He placed reliance upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mossomat Rupia V/s. Bhatu Mahto, (AIR 1944 Pat 17) (FB). It is not disputed that the suit would be governed by the provision of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act which provides that in suits for declaratory decree and consequential relief, the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought and the court-fee will be payable according to that amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. In this connection it will be useful to refer to the provision of Section 7 (v) of the Court-fees Act as well which contemplates court-fee payable in suits for possession of land, houses and garden etc., according to the valuation of the subject-matter on the market value of the land. On a comparison of these two distinct provisions enumerated in Sections 7 (iv) (c) and 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act, an apparent distinction has been made in regard to the value of the relief and liability to pay court-fee thereon. Whereas liberty has been given to a plaintiff instituting a suit for declaration of title with consequential relief under Section 7 (iv) (c) to state the amount at which he values the relief, in other words, to put his own valuation, a plaintiff suing for possession of land, houses and garden etc., under Section 7 (v) has to value the subject-matter according to the market value of the property. There is, therefore, an apparent and fundamental difference in the procedure for valuation of the two types of suits following under two different classes of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. Basically, therefore, the contention of Mr. Chatterjee cannot be accepted as correct that since the valuation put by the plaintiffs was different than the market value of the suit land, the court below should have necessarily decided the question of valuation in terms of the market value in favour of the petitioners. 6. A question still arises as to whether a plaintiff is entitled under Section 7 (iv) (c) to put any arbitrary and ridiculous valuation. This question has fallen for consideration before this Court on earlier occasions several times and the consensus according to those decisions is that the plaintiff is not entitled to give an arbitrary valuation to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of a particular Court. Reference may be made in this regard to some of those cases, namely, Noor Md. V/s. Wazir Hussain, (1953 BLJR 100). Miss Sharmistha Sinha V/s. Ram Chandra Sahay, ( AIR 1965 Pat 469 ), Jadunandan Gope V/s. Syed Najmuzaman, ( AIR 1957 Pat 560 ) and State of Bihar V/s. Tulshi Ram, ( AIR 1958 Pat 201 ). The valuation given in the plaint should be a reasonable valuation and it is open to the Court to revise the same in appropriate cases. The valuation given in the plaint should be a reasonable valuation and it is open to the Court to revise the same in appropriate cases. But it cannot be held that simply because the said value could well be higher than that put by the plaintiff, the Court must necessarily revise the same. In other words where there is some rationale indicating the reasonableness of the value stated by the plaintiff, which cannot be said to be capricious or arbitrary, the Court will refuse to revise, rather it cannot revise the same. The Supreme Court in the case of The Dollar Company, Madras V/s. Collector of Madras, ( AIR 1975 SC 1670 ) while considering a matter under the Land Acquisition Act has observed that the best evidence of the value of a property is the sale of the very property to which the claimant is a party, particularly if the sale is of a recent date. In the case of State of Bihar V/s. Tulshi Ram, ( AIR 1958 Pat 201 ) (Supra) the plaintiff had brought a suit for a declaration that the land acquisition proceeding taken in respect of his land was null and void with a consequential prayer that the defendants be restrained from taking possession of the land and from demolition of buildings standing thereon. The suit was valued at the amount awarded to him as compensation in the land acquisition proceeding. On an objection taken by the defendants that the plaintiff must value the suit according to the valuation of the land and the buildings, it was held that the valuation put by the plaintiff was not arbitrary "because the plaintiffs refer to the awards made in the land acquisition proceeding and they have given the valuation which was the amount of the award in the particular case." It was held that it could not be said that the value was arbitrary and accordingly the court could not impose upon the plaintiffs a different value and ask them to pay higher court-fees. The said principle, in my opinion, applies with full force to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as where the plaintiffs have stated the valuation on the basis of the consideration mentioned in the sale deed which was sought to be impeached and, therefore, there is a reasonable basis for the valuation and the relief sought for and it cannot be said to be arbitrary. The finding on the question of arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the valuation is a jurisdictional fact, in the absence of which the Court cannot revise the valuation put by the plaintiff. Mossomat Rupias case AIR 1944 Pat 17 (FB) (Supra) relied on by the petitioners does not lay down any principle to the contrary. 7. The impugned order can be supported still on another ground. Even assuming that the valuation of Rs. 2,500.00 as put by the plaintiffs might be held to be a little lower, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court being upto Rupees 5,000/-, even if it could be raised up to that limit, in view of the materials on record, particularly in view of the admission of P. W. 1, the trial court would still have the necessary pecuniary jurisdiction and the defendants petitioners were not entitled to challenge the same in this Court as it did not then involve the question of jurisdiction, inasmuch as in that event, it would be merely a matter of court-fee, and this Court could not interfere at the instance of the defendants. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, I must hold that the trial Court has committed no error of jurisdiction and the value put by the plaintiffs on the basis of the impugned sale deed cannot be held to be arbitrary or capricious. This application has, therefore, got no merit and I Would, accordingly, dismiss the same with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 64/- only.