JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) RESPONDENTS 1 and 2-Dhannalal and Hemraj-obtained a decree for possession after eviction of their tenant Draupadibai (respondent No. 3)from the suit house. In execution of that decree, an objection was raised by kanhaiyalal (now dead) that he was in possession of the suit house in his own right as the owner on account of which he could not be evicted in order to hand over actual possession to the decree holders. Respondents 4 and 5 and the appellants are all legal representatives of the deceased Kanhaiyalal. ( 2. ) DURING the execution proceedings, symbolical possession alone was given to the decree holders since actual possession could not be given without evicting Kanhaiyalal. The two main objections taken by Kanhaiyalal were:- (1) that symbolical possession having been already given to the decree-holders, the decree was fully satisfied and no further execution for delivery of actual possession was permissible; and (2) by virtue of the proviso under section 23 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the act), the possession of Kanhaiyalal was protected since he had an independent title of his own as owner of the house. ( 3. ) BOTH these objections of Kanhaiyalal being rejected, an appeal (Civil misc. Appeal No. 129 of 1967-Kanhaiyalal v. Dhannalal and two others) was filed by Kanhaiyalal in this Court reiterating the aforesaid objections. The aforesaid first objection was decided against Kanhaiyalal since it was conceded that the argument had no merit in the facts of the present case. However, no enquiry having been made by the executing Court before deciding the other question, this Court remanded the case for a fresh decision on that point after holding an enquiry. ( 4. ) AFTER remand the executing Court once again rejected Kanhaiyalals claim on the basis of his independent title and the first appeal to the district court has been dismissed. Hence this further appeal. ( 5. ) IT has been found as a fact by the first appeal Court that Kanhaiyalal had forcibly occupied the house after evicting the judgment-debtor, Draupadibai. It has been further found that Kanhaiyalal has failed to prove his title as owner of the house and that Kanhaiyalal was merely a trespasser. ( 6. Hence this further appeal. ( 5. ) IT has been found as a fact by the first appeal Court that Kanhaiyalal had forcibly occupied the house after evicting the judgment-debtor, Draupadibai. It has been further found that Kanhaiyalal has failed to prove his title as owner of the house and that Kanhaiyalal was merely a trespasser. ( 6. ) IN support of this appeal, Shri N. R. Nevaskar, learned Counsel for the appellants has advanced two arguments, namely:- (1) that delivery of symbolical possession to the decree holders resulted in full satisfaction 6f the decree so that no further execution of the same for delivery of actual possession is permissible; and (2) the proviso under section 23 of the Act refers to a title independent of the judgment-debtor so that even on the finding that Kanhaiyalal was a trespasser, it must be held that Kanhaiyalal had an independent title as a trespasser. Apart from merely stating both these contentions, Shri newaskar has not shown anything to support any of these contentions. ( 7. ) IN my opinion, the aforesaid first contention of Shri Nevaskar is concluded by this Courts decision in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 129 of 1967 decided on 30-4-1968 between the same parties. This very argument was decided against kanhaiyalal and on account of this fact alone the point is concluded so that it cannot be raised again. Moreover, it appears that a decree for delivery of actual possession is deemed to be fully satisfied with delivery of symbolical possession alone, only if the decree holders accept the symbolical possession in full satisfaction of the decree and not otherwise. It would, therefore, be a question of fact in each case whether the decree-holder had accepted symbolical possession in full satisfaction of the decree. In the present case nothing has been shown to suggest any such acceptance by the decree holders. For this reason, there is no basis to contend that the decree was fully satisfied when symbolical possession was given to the decree-holders, even though the execution proceedings are continuing for the purpose of giving actual possession to the decree holders. ( 8. In the present case nothing has been shown to suggest any such acceptance by the decree holders. For this reason, there is no basis to contend that the decree was fully satisfied when symbolical possession was given to the decree-holders, even though the execution proceedings are continuing for the purpose of giving actual possession to the decree holders. ( 8. ) IN Shew Bux Mohta and another v. Bengal Breweries Ltd. and others AIR 1961 SC 137 , in execution of a decree for delivery of actual possession the decree-holders gave a receipt evidencing full satisfaction of the decree and permitted the execution case to be dismissed on that basis. It was only thereafter that the decree-holders applied again for obtaining actual possession. In such a situation the Supreme court held that the decree-holders having exercised the option to accept delivery of symbolical possession as full satisfaction of the decree, it was no longer open to them to take a contrary stand thereafter. The relevant portion from the decision is as follows:- "ii is true that the Nazirs return showed that defendant No. 4 had not been bodily removed. But the same return also shows that it had not been so removed because of certain arrangement arrived at between it and (he decree-holders and as the decree-holders had not required the removal of defendant No. 4 from the premises. Now under Order 21, rule 35 a person in possession and bound by the decree has to be removed only if necessary, that is to say, if necessary to give the decree-holder the possession he is entitled to and asks for. It would not be necessary to remove the person in possession if the decree-holder does not want such removal. It is open to the decree-holder to accept delivery of possession under that rule without actual removal of the person in possession. If he does that, then he cannot later say that he has not been given that possession to which he was entitled under the law. This is what happened in this case. The decree-holders in the present case, of their own accepted delivery of possession with defendant No. 4 remaining on the premises with their permission. They granted i receipt acknowledging full delivery of possession. This is what happened in this case. The decree-holders in the present case, of their own accepted delivery of possession with defendant No. 4 remaining on the premises with their permission. They granted i receipt acknowledging full delivery of possession. They permitted the execution case to be dismissed on September 8, 1949, on the basis that full possession had been delivered to them by defendant No. 4. The fact that they put their guards on th- premises as mentioned in the Nazirs return would also show that they had obtained full possession. It was open to the decree holders to accept such possession. Having once done so, they are bound to the position that the decree has been fully executed, from which it follows, that it cannot be executed any more. In the case of Jagdish Nath Roy v. Nafar Chandra Parmanik, AIR 1931 Cal. 427= 35 Cal. WN 12. an exactly similar thing had happened and it was held that the decree was not capable of further execution. It was there said at p. 15 (of Cal. WN) : (at p. 429 of AIR), the case, therefore, seems to me to be one of those cases in which a decree-holder having armed himself with a decree for khas possession executes that decree in the first instance by obtaining symbolical possession only with some ulterior object of his own and thereafter subsequently and as a second instalment asks for Khas possession. The question is whether such a course is permissible under the law. I am of opinion that it is not. " (Italics by me) We entirely agree with the view that was there expressed. The first contention of Shri Nevaskar, apart from being concluded by the earlier decision of this Court, is also devoid of any merit in the facts of the present case. ( 9. I am of opinion that it is not. " (Italics by me) We entirely agree with the view that was there expressed. The first contention of Shri Nevaskar, apart from being concluded by the earlier decision of this Court, is also devoid of any merit in the facts of the present case. ( 9. ) THE other contention of Shri Nevaskar is based on the construction of section 23 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 which reads as under:- "vacant possession to landlord.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, where the interest of a tenant in any accommodation is determined for any reason whatsoever and any decree or order is passed by a Court under this Act for the recovery of possession of such accommodation, the decree or order shall, subiect to the provisions of section 16 be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the accommodation and vacant possession thereof, shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such persons therefrom: provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any person who has an independent title to such accommodation. " The main enacting part of the section provides that the landlord is entitled to recover vacant possession of the accommodation on eviction of all persons, who may be in occupation of the same. Thereafter the proviso indicates the exception to this general rule. The proviso must be construed to mean that any person who is found to have an independent title to the accommodation shall not be evicted for the purpose of giving vacant possession to the landlord. The expression "independent title" must mean a title independent of the judgment-debtor. But then the important fact is that such person claiming an independent title must be found to have that title in order to avail the protection given by the proviso. A mere claim to an independent title is not sufficient to get the benefit of the proviso. When a person claims an independent title, it must be found on an enquiry that he possesses the title claimed by him. Unless it is so found, benefit of the proviso is not available. Use of the word "has" in the proviso must necessarily lead to this conclusion. When a person claims an independent title, it must be found on an enquiry that he possesses the title claimed by him. Unless it is so found, benefit of the proviso is not available. Use of the word "has" in the proviso must necessarily lead to this conclusion. If the intention of the legislature was to give benefit of the proviso even to a person who makes such a claim even though he is unable to prove the same to the satisfaction of the court, then instead of using the word "has", the word used would have been "claims". The use of the word "has" in the context must mean that the claim to an independent title has been substantiated in an enquiry. The net result is that the benefit of the proviso is available only to a person whose claim to an independent title has been substantiated to the satisfaction of the Court on an enquiry being held for the purpose. In my opinion, a plain construction of the proviso leads necessarily to this conclusion. ( 10. ) IN the present case Kanhaiyalal claimed to be in possession as owner of the house. This claim has not been substantiated in the enquiry held after remand by this Court. The finding is that the possession of Kanhaiyalal and thereafter of his legal representatives is without any right and is merely as a trespasser. From this finding alone which is not challenged before me in this appeal, it is clear that the independent title claimed by Kanhaiyalal has not been substantiated. This fact alone is sufficient to hold that benefit of the proviso is not available to Kanhaiyalals legal representatives in the present case. ( 11. ) ON this point, the argument of Shri Nevaskar really is that even as a trespasser, the objector has an independent title which enables the objector to get the benefit of the aforesaid proviso. As already pointed, this was not kanhaiyalals case on account of which fact alone such a claim cannot be made. However, even on merits, I do not find any substance in this argument and as already stated Shri Nevaskar apart from making this statement has shown nothing to support this argument. ( 12. As already pointed, this was not kanhaiyalals case on account of which fact alone such a claim cannot be made. However, even on merits, I do not find any substance in this argument and as already stated Shri Nevaskar apart from making this statement has shown nothing to support this argument. ( 12. ) ADMITTEDLY, the objectors forcible entry into possession was without any right whatsoever and such possession has not been for the statutory period of 12 years so as to extinguish the title of the true owner. The suggestion of shri Nevaskar is that from the moment the adverse possession commenced, a title was acquired by the trespasser. In this connection it would be useful to see the meaning of adverse possession. An often quoted passage from the judgment of Mark J. in Bejoy Chunder Banerjee v. Kally Prossonno Mookerjee, ILR 4 Cal. 327. , which continues to be quoted in the uptodate text books as a classical definition of adverse possession, is as follows :- "by adverse possession I understand to be meant possession by a person holding the land, on his own behalf, (or on behalf) of some person other than the true owner, the true owner having a right-to immediate possession. If by this adverse possession the Statute is set running, and it continues to run for twelve years, then the title of the true owner is extinguished and the person in possession becomes the owner. " From the meaning of adverse possession so summarised, it is clear that the true owner continues to have a right to immediate possession till extinction of his title, as a result of the adverse possession continuing for 12 years. Thus, the trespasser has neither any right to immediate possession nor any title till the true owners title is extinguished as a result of the adverse possession for 12 years and the trespasser becomes the owner. In short, till then the trespasser is not possessed of any acknowledged right in the property, which is obvious from the fact that he has no transferable interest in the same. The absence of any alienable right in the property is another factor to indicate that the trespasser has no title to the property. In short, till then the trespasser is not possessed of any acknowledged right in the property, which is obvious from the fact that he has no transferable interest in the same. The absence of any alienable right in the property is another factor to indicate that the trespasser has no title to the property. For these reasons, it is difficult "to accept the argument that a mere trespasser who came into passession by a forcible entry has any title, which was intended to be protected by the proviso under section 23 of the Act. ( 13. ) IT is also clear that the proviso under section 23 of the Act was only intended to protect the possession of persons who had entered into possession by virtue of some right independent of the judgment-debtor so that their right to possession being independent of the judgment-debtor has to be protected. The case of a trespasser could never be intended to be covered by the proviso. This argument is also, therefore, devoid of any merit and is rejected. ( 14. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs, since no one appeared at the hearing on behalf of the respondents. Leave refused. Appeal dismissed.