Judgment :- 1. The question that arises for decision in this petition is one on which there is conflict of views in the decisions of this Court and that is the reason why the matter was referred to a Division Bench. 2. S.28 of the Kerala General Sales tax Act, 1963 deals with the power to order production, of accounts, powers of entry, inspection and other like matters. Sub-section (3) (a) of this section reads: "(3) (a) If any officer not below the rank of an assessing authority has reason to suspect that any dealer is attempting to evade payment of any tax or fee due from him under this Act, he may for reasons to be recorded in writing, seize such accounts, registers and documents of the dealer as he may consider necessary and shall grant a receipt for the same. The officer who seizes such accounts, registers or documents shall return them within thirty days from the date of seizure unless they are required for a prosecution." The controversy here is about the scope of the term 'required for prosecution' in this sub-section. It is the petitioner's case that if within 30 days from the date of seizure of the accounts prosecution in which the books are to be used is not instituted, the books have necessarily to be returned. The words 'required for a prosecution' can, according to the petitioner, mean only, required for an existing prosecution and not one which may be filed beyond a period of 30 days. In support of this the decision of this Court reported in Mubarak Stores v. Intelligence Officer, Agricultural Income tax and Sales tax, Cannannore 1974 KLT 327 is relied on. The learned judge said: "The question is whether the prosecution for which they are required must be a prosecution in existence or it would include also a prosecution in contemplation. Seizure and retention of a dealer's books of account by an officer are serious inroads into his fundamental rights. But that is permitted by the above statutory provision in the interest of the general public under certain special circumstances. Any such restriction on the fundamental rights can be permitted only to the extent clearly provided by the Statute. Seizure and retention of a dealer's books of account by an officer are serious inroads into his fundamental rights. But that is permitted by the above statutory provision in the interest of the general public under certain special circumstances. Any such restriction on the fundamental rights can be permitted only to the extent clearly provided by the Statute. Construing the above provision in this background, it appears to me that the words "required for a prosecution" can mean only required for an existing prosecution." A different view had been taken earlier by one of us in the decision in O.P. No. 384 of 1971 decided on 10th February, 1972. This was what was said in that case: "4. S.28 (3) as well as R.34 (2) make it quite clear that the retention of the books and other documents can be only for 30 days. The only exception to this is a case where the books, documents or registers are required for a prosecution. This necessarily presupposes that the decision as to whether these books are so required has to be reached within 30 days and since such a decision would visit consequence of a grave nature on the party to whom these belong it must be a decision reached after considering all the materials available to the officer concerned. I am saying this because I feel the necessity of emphasising that in every case where books are retained beyond 30 days it is not sufficient if the officer concerned contends that these are required for prosecution and therefore were so retained. The good faith of the authority in regard to such retention is open to very serious challenge when, for years together, no action by way of prosecution is being taken. It is more so when such conduct is challenged before this Court and in answer no materials are disclosed as to why there has been such inordinate delay." Khalid J. in the decision in O. P. 2073/74 had followed the decision in 1974 K. L. T. 327 and it is the same learned judge who made the reference to the Division Bench later. 3. It appears to us that S.28 (3) lays down the period of 30 days as the period within which the documents, accounts and registers seized by the officer have to be returned subject to the exception which enables retention beyond that period. 3. It appears to us that S.28 (3) lays down the period of 30 days as the period within which the documents, accounts and registers seized by the officer have to be returned subject to the exception which enables retention beyond that period. That exception would operate in case these are required for a prosecution. The words "required for a prosecution" would necessarily involve the concept of a decision being reached within 30 days that these are required for the purpose of a prosecution to be lodged. But we cannot see the further requirement that the prosecution itself must be commenced within a period of 30 days from the date of seizure. The accounts, registers and documents would be said to be required for a prosecution even in respect of prosecution proposed to be lodged provided the decision to prosecute had been reached, for, when once an officer decides that there should be prosecution he could also decide whether the books and documents would be required for the purpose of such prosecution. The prosecution must be lodged within a reasonable time thereafter as otherwise it will be an abuse of power vested in the officer. It is no doubt true that the consequences of seizure of books and documents are grave. That by itself cannot alter the plain meaning of the section which appears to us to justify the construction placed on it by us here. In this view, with great respect, we are unable to agree with the decision of the learned judge in Mubarak Stores v. Intelligence Officer, Agricultural Income tax & Sales tax, Cannanore 1974 K. L. T. 327. 4. In the case before us in the counter affidavit it is categorically averred that the decision to prosecute was reached within 30 days and show cause notice was issued soon thereafter. Therefore there is no scope for directing the return of the books. The Original Petition is dismissed. But in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.